Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Problem of Perception" by Tim Crane and Craig French
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- Ali, Rami, 2018, “Does Hallucinating Involve Perceiving”, Philosophical Studies, 175: 601–627. (Scholar)
- Anscombe, G.E.M., 1965, “The Intentionality of Sensation: a
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- Antony, Louise, 2011, “The Openness of Illusions”, Philosophical Issues, 21: 25–44. (Scholar)
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- Burge, Tyler, 1991, “Vision and Intentional Content”, in E. LePore and R. Van Gulick (eds.) John Searle and his Critics, 195–214, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
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- Burnyeat, Myles, 1979, “Conflicting Appearances”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 65: 69–111. (Scholar)
- Butchvarov, Panayot, 1980, “Adverbial Theories of Consciousness”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: 261–80. (Scholar)
- Byrne, Alex 2001, “Intentionalism Defended”, Philosophical Review, 110: 199–240. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, “Concepts, Beliefs and Perception”, in C. Demmerling & D. Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Byrne, Alex, and Logue, Heather, 2008, “Either/Or”, in Haddock and Macpherson (eds.), 57–94. (Scholar)
- ––– (eds.), 2009, Disjunctivism, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
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- Chalmers, David, 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Perception and the Fall from Eden”, in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.) 2006, 49–125. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, R, 1957, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Craig, E.J., 1976, “Sensory Experience and the Foundations of Knowledge”, Synthese, 33. (Scholar)
- Crane, Tim 1998a, “Content, Non-Conceptual”, in E.J.
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- –––, 2001, Elements of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Is there a Perceptual Relation?”, in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.) 2006, 126–46. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?”, Philosophical Quarterly, 59: 452–69. (Scholar)
- –––, (ed.) 1992, The Contents of Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Crane, Tim and Sarah Patterson (eds.) 2000, History of the Mind-Body Problem, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Crane, Tim and Katalin Farkas (eds.) 2004, Metaphysics: a Guide and Anthology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Crowther, Tom, 2006, “Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism”, Erkenntnis, 65: 245–276. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Watching, Sight, and the Temporal Shape of Perceptual Activity”, Philosophical Review, 118: 1–27. (Scholar)
- Cussins, Adrian, 1990, “The Connectionist Construction of Concepts”, in M. Boden (ed.) The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, 368–440, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- D’Ambrosio, Justin, 2019, “A New Perceptual Adverbialism”, The Journal of Philosophy, 116: 413–446. (Scholar)
- Dancy, Jonathan (ed.) 1988, Perceptual Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Arguments from
Illusion”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 45:
421–38. (Scholar)
- Davies, M. 1992 “Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92: 21–45. (Scholar)
- Dennett, Daniel, 1991, Consciousness Explained, New York: Little, Brown. (Scholar)
- Dretske, Fred, 1969, Seeing and Knowing, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Ducasse, C.J., 1942. “Moore’s Refutation of
Idealism”, in P.Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of G.E.
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- Egan, Andy, 2006, “Appearance Properties?”, Noüs, 40 3:495–521. (Scholar)
- Evans, Gareth, 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Clarendon Press (Scholar)
- Farkas, Katalin, 2006, “Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106: 39–59. (Scholar)
- Fish, William, 2009, Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Foster, John, 2000, The Nature of Perception, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- French, Craig, 2014, “Naive Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily”, Ratio, 27: 393–413. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “Naïve Realism and
Diaphaneity”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
118: 149–175. (Scholar)
- French, Craig, and Walters, Lee, 2018, “The Invalidity of the Argument from Illusion”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 54: 357–364. (Scholar)
- French, Craig, and Phillips, Ian, 2020, “Austerity and Illusion”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 20(15): 1–19. (Scholar)
- Fulkerson, Matthew, 2014, The First Sense: A Philosophical Study of Human Touch Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Gendler, Tamar Szabó and John Hawthorne, eds., 2006,
Perceptual Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Genone, James, 2014, “Appearance and Illusion”, Mind, 123: 339–376. (Scholar)
- Glüer, Kathrin, 2009, “In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience”, Mind and Language, 24: 297–327. (Scholar)
- Gow, Laura, 2019, “Everything is Clear: All Perceptual Experiences are Transparent”, European Journal of Philosophy, 27: 412–425. (Scholar)
- Grice, H.P., 1961, “The Causal Theory of Perception”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35: 121–52. Selection reprinted in Dancy 1988. (Scholar)
- Gunther, York (ed.), 2002, Essays on Non-Conceptual Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Guttenplan, Samuel (ed.), 1995, A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Haddock, Adrian and Macpherson, Fiona, (eds.) 2008, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Harman, Gilbert, 1990, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience”, in J. Tomberlin ed. Philosophical Perspectives, 31–52, 4 Atascadero: Ridgeview 1990, reprinted in Ned Block, Owen Flanagan and Guven Güzeldere eds. The Nature of Consciousness, 663–76, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1997. (Scholar)
- Heck, Richard, 2000, “Non-conceptual Content and the Space of Reasons”, Philosophical Review, 109: 483–523. (Scholar)
- Heidegger, Martin, “The Origin of the Work of Art”,
translated by David Farrell Krell, in Martin Heidegger: Basic
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- Hellie, Benj, 2013, “The Mulitdisjunctive Conception of Hallucination”, in Macpherson and Platchias (eds.) 2013. (Scholar)
- Hilbert, David R. and Mark Eli Kalderon, 2000, “Color and the Inverted Spectrum”, in S. Davis (ed.) Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic and Computational Perspectives, Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science Volume 9 New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hinton, J.M., 1973, Experiences, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Husserl, Edmund, 1900–01, Logical Investigations
translated by J.N. Findlay, 2 volumes, revised edition by D. Moran,
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- Jackson, Frank, 1975, “On the Adverbial Analysis of Visual
Experience”, Metaphilosophy, 6: 127–135. (Scholar)
- –––, 1977, Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F. and Smith, M, 2005, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Johnston, Mark, 2004, “The Obscure Object of Hallucination”, Philosophical Studies, 103: 113–83. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “On a Neglected Epistemic Virtue”, Philosophical Issues, 21: 165–218. (Scholar)
- Kalderon, Mark, 2011, “Color Illusion”, Noûs, 45: 751–775. (Scholar)
- Kim, Jaegwon, 1993, Supervenience and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Kriegel, Uriah, 2013, Phenomenal Intentionality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lewis, C.I., 1929, Mind and the World Order, London: Constable. (Scholar)
- Logue, Heather, 2012a, “Why Naive Realism?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 112: 211–237. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012b, “What Should the Naive Realist Say About Total Hallucinations?”, Philosophical Perspectives, 26: 173–199. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Good News for the Disjunctivist about (one of) the Bad Cases”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86: 105–133. (Scholar)
- Loar, Brian, 2002, “Transparent Experience”, in A.
Jokic and Q.Smith eds. Consciousness: New Philosophical
Perspectives, 77–96, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lycan, W.G., 1996, Consciousness and Experience Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, Mind and Cognition, Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Mackie, Penelope, 2020, “Perception, Mind-Independence, and Berkeley”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(3): 449–464. (Scholar)
- Macpherson, Fiona, 2011, “Individuating the Senses”, in Macpherson (ed.) 2011a. (Scholar)
- ––– (ed.), 2011a, The Senses: Classical and
Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “The Philosophy and Psychology of Hallucination: An Introduction”, in F. Macpherson and D. Platchias 2013, 1–38. (Scholar)
- Macpherson, Fiona and Dimitris Platchias, (eds.) 2013, Hallucination, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Marcus, Eric 2006. “Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum”, Philosophical Quarterly 56: 321–339 (Scholar)
- Martin, M.G.F., 1992, “Sight and Touch”, in Crane (ed.) 1992, 196–215. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “The Rational Role of
Experience”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93:
71–88. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Perceptual Content”, in
Guttenplan (ed.) 1995, 459–62. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Setting Things Before the Mind”, in A. O’Hear (ed.) Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, 157–80, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Beyond Dispute: Sense-Data, Intentionality and the Mind-Body Problem”, in Crane and Patterson (eds.) 2000, 195–231. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002a, “The Transparency of Experience”, Mind and Language, 17: 376–425. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002b, “Particular Thoughts and Singular Thought”, in A. O’Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought, and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 173–214. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “The Limits of Self-Awareness”, Philosophical Studies, 120: 37–89. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Perception” in Jackson and Smith (eds.) 2005, 701–738. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “On Being Alienated”, in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.) 2006, 354–410. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “What’s in a
Look?”, in B. Nanay (ed.) 2010, 160–225. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Elusive Objects”, Topoi, 36: 247–271. (Scholar)
- Masrour, Farid, 2020, “On the Possibility of Hallucinations”, Mind, 129: 737–768. (Scholar)
- Matilal, Bimal Krishna, 1986, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- McCulloch, Greg, 2003, The Life of the Mind, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- McDowell, John, 1982, “Criteria, Defeasibility &
Knowledge”, Proceedings of the British Academy
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- –––, 1987, “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space”, in McDowell and Pettit (eds.) 1987. Reprinted in McDowell 1998. (Scholar)
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- –––, 1998, Meaning, Knowledge and Reality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Avoiding the Myth of the Given”, in Jakob Lindgaard (ed.), John McDowell: Experience, Norm, and Nature, 1–14, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- McGinn, Colin, 1989, Mental Content, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- McLaughlin, Brian, A. Beckermann and S. Walter (eds.), 2009,
Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford
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- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1945, The Phenomenology of Perception, translated by Colin Smith, London: Routledge 2002. (Scholar)
- Millikan, Ruth Garrett, 1987, Language, Thought and Other
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- Moore, G.E., 1905, “The Refutation of Idealism”, in Philosophical Studies. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Reprinted in Moore 1993, 23–44. (Scholar)
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in Moore 1993, 45–58. (Scholar)
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- Moran, Alex, 2019, “Naïve Realism, Hallucination, and Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97: 368–382. (Scholar)
- Nagel, Thomas, 1974, “What is it Like to be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review, 83: 435–50. (Scholar)
- Nanay, Bence (ed.), 2010, Perceiving the World. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Noë, Alva and Evan Thompson (eds.), 2002, Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Nudds, Matthew, 2001, “Experiencing the Production of Sounds”, European Journal of Philosophy, 9: 210–29. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “The significance of the
senses”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104:
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- –––, 2009, “Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents”, Analysis, 69: 334–6. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Naive Realism and Hallucinations”, in Macpherson and Platchias (eds.) 2013. (Scholar)
- Nudds, Matthew and O’Callaghan Casey, (eds.) 2009, Sounds
and Perception, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- O’Callaghan, Casey, 2007, Sounds: a Philosophical Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2019, A Multisensory Philosophy of Perception, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- O’Shaughnessy, Brian, 1980, The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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- –––, 2003, “Sense Data”, in Barry Smith (ed.) John Searle Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Pautz, Adam, 2010, “Why Explain Experience in Terms of
Content?”, in Nanay (ed.) 2010. (Scholar)
- –––, 2021, Perception, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, Christopher, 1983, Sense and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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- Perkins, Moreland, 1983, Sensing the World, Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
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- Pitcher, George, 1970, A Theory of Perception, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Price, H.H., 1932, Perception. London: Methuen. (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary, 1999, The Threefold Cord, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
- Raleigh, Thomas, 2014, “A New Approach to
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- Richardson, Louise, 2010, “Seeing Empty Space”, European Journal of Philosophy, 18: 227–243. (Scholar)
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- –––, 2013b, “Flavour, Taste and Smell”, Mind and Language, 28: 322–341. (Scholar)
- Robinson, Howard, 1985, “The General Form of the Argument for Berkeleian Idealism”, in Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration, edited by J. Foster and H. Robinson, 163–86. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
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- Russell, Bertrand. 1912, The Problems of Philosophy Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Sainsbury, Mark, 2010, “Intentionality without Exotica”, in Robin Jeshion, (ed.), Singular Thought: New Essays, 300–18, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Schellenberg, Susanna, 2018, The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Searle, John, 1983, Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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- Sethi, Umrao, 2020, “Sensible Overdetermination”, Philosophical Quarterly, 70(280): 588–616. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, Sydney, 1990 “Qualities and Qualia: What’s
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- Siegel, Susanna, 2004, “Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal”, Philosophical Studies, 120: 91–112. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination”, in Haddock and Macpherson (eds.) 2008. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, The Contents of Visual Experience New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Silins, Nico, 2011, “Seeing Through the ‘Veil of
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- Smith, A.D., 2002, The Problem of Perception, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (Scholar)
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- Smith, Barry, C, 2015, “The Chemical Senses”, in Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, 314–352, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Snowdon, P.F., 1979–80, “Perception, Vision and Causation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 81: 175–92. (Scholar)
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- –––, 1992, “How to Interpret ‘Direct
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- Spener, Maja, 2003, Gilding or Staining the Mind:
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- Stokes, Dustin, Matthen, Mohan, and Briggs, Stephen (eds.), 2015, Perception and Its Modalities, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Strawson, P.F., 1979, “Perception and its Objects”, in G. Macdonald (ed.) Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A.J. Ayer with His Replies, London: Macmillan; reprinted in Noë and Thompson (eds.) 2002. Page references to reprint. (Scholar)
- Stoljar, Daniel, 2004, “The Argument from Diaphanousness”, in M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton and C. Viger (eds.) New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary Volume), 341–90, Calgary: University of Calgary Press. (Scholar)
- Sturgeon, Scott, 2008, “Disjunctivism about Visual Experience”, in Haddock and Macpherson (eds.) 2008. (Scholar)
- Swartz, R.J. 1965, Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing, Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
- Thau, Michael, 2002, Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Tye, Michael, 1984, “The Adverbial Theory of Visual
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- –––, 1992, “Visual Qualia and Visual Content”, in Crane (ed.) 1992, 158–76. (Scholar)
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- –––, 2000, Consciousness, Color and Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Valberg, J.J., 1992, The Puzzle of Experience. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Zahavi, Dan, 2003, Husserl’s Phenomenology
Stanford: Stanford University Press. (Scholar)
Any serious attempt to master the literature on the problem of
perception should include a reading of Anscombe (1965), Armstrong
(1968: Chapter 10), Dretske (1969), Jackson (1977), Martin (2002),
Moore (1905), Peacocke (1983: Chapter 1), Robinson (1994), Russell
(1912), Smith (2002), Snowdon (1992), Strawson (1979), Tye (1992), and
Valberg (1992a). Useful collections: Swartz (1965), Dancy (1988),
Noë and Thompson (2002), Gendler and Hawthorne (2006), Haddock
and Macpherson (2008), Byrne and Logue (2009), Nanay (2010), and
Brogaard (2014). Matilal (1986) explores how issues around the Problem
of Perception and theories of experience play out in Classical Indian
philosophy.
For discussion of how the problem of perception, somewhat differently
construed, arises in the senses other than vision, see Perkins (1983).
There is much literature on non-visual perception, not all of it
addressing the problem of perception, but much of it will be relevant
to considering the problem of perception in non-visual modalities: on
sounds, see Nudds (2001), O’Callaghan (2007), Nudds and
O’Callaghan (2009); on smell, see Batty (2011), Richardson
(2013a, 2013b); on touch, see O’Shaughnessy (1989), Martin
(1992) and Fulkerson (2014); for the senses in general, see Nudds
(2003), Macpherson (2011, 2011a) and Stokes, Matthen, and Briggs
(2015)). On multisensory perception, see O’Callaghan (2019).