Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Phenomenal Intentionality" by David Bourget and Angela Mendelovici
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- Gertler, Brie, 2001, “The relationship between phenomenality and intentionality: Comments on Siewert’s The Significance of Consciousness”, Psyche, 7(17). URL=<http://journalpsyche.org/files/0xaa9a.pdf> (Scholar)
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- Gonzalez-Castan, Oscar L., 1999, “The connection principle and the classificatory scheme of reality”, Teorema, 18(1): 85–98. (Scholar)
- Graham, George , Terence E. Horgan, & John L. Tienson, 2007, “Consciousness and intentionality”, in Velmans & Schneider 2007: 468–484. (Scholar)
- Greenberg, Mark & Gilbert Harman, 2007, “Conceptual role semantics”, in Ernest LePore & Barry Smith (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 293–322. (Scholar)
- Harman, Gilbert, 1987, “(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics”, in Ernest LePore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics, New York: Academic Press, 55–81 (Scholar)
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- Hume, David, 1739/2000, A Treatise on Human Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Jackendoff, Ray, 1987, Consciousness and the Computational Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Jackson, Frank, 1982, “Epiphenomenal qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly, 32(April): 127–136. (Scholar)
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- Kaplan, David, 1977, “Demonstratives”, in Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan, Oxford University Press. 481–563. (Scholar)
- Kim, Jaegwon, 1998, Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Kriegel, Uriah, 2007, “Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality”, Philosophical Perspectives, 21(1): 307–340. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011a, The Sources of Intentionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011b, “Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content”, in Bayne & Montague 2011: 79–102. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0004 (Scholar)
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- –––, 2013a, “Phenomenal intentionality past and present: introductory”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12(3): 437–444. (Scholar)
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- Kripke, Saul A., 1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
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- Levine, Joseph, 1983, “Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64(October): 354–61. (Scholar)
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- Loar, Brian, 1987, “Subjective intentionality”, Philosophical Topics, 15(1): 89–124. (Scholar)
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- Lormand, Eric, 1996, “Nonphenomenal consciousness”, Noûs, 30(2): 242–61. (Scholar)
- Ludwig, Kirk A., 1996, “Explaining why things look the way they do”, in Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 18–60. (Scholar)
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- Mendelovici, Angela, 2010, Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics, Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University. (Scholar)
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- –––, 2018, The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Mendelovici, Angela & David Bourget, 2014, “Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories”, Philosophy Compass 9(5): 325–337. doi:10.1111/phc3.12123 (Scholar)
- Mendelovici, Angela & David Bourget, forthcoming, “Consciousness and intentionality”, in Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Consciousness, New York, USA: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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