Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Physicalism" by Daniel Stoljar

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Alter, T., 2016, ‘The Structure and Dynamics Argument against Materialism’, Noûs, 50(4): 794–815. (Scholar)
Armstrong, D., 1968, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Bacon, J., 1990, ‘Van Cleve Versus Closure’, Philosophical Studies, 58: 239–242. (Scholar)
Baltimore, J., 2013, ‘Stoljar’s Twin-physics World’, Philosophia, 41: 127–136. (Scholar)
Bennett, K., 2003, ‘Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable and How, Just Maybe, to Tract it’, Noûs, 37(3): 471–497. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, Making Things Up, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Berkeley, G., 1710, Principles of Human Knowledge, London: Penguin, 2004. (Scholar)
Berker, S., 2018, ‘The Unity of Grounding’, Mind, 127(507): 729–777. (Scholar)
Blackburn, S., 1992, ‘Filling in Space’, Analysis, 50(2): 60–65. (Scholar)
Block, N., 1980, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, in N. Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 268–306. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, ‘On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18(2): 227–287. (Scholar)
Block, N., and Stalnaker, R., 1999, ‘Conceptual Analysis, Dualism and the Explanatory Gap’, Philosophical Review, 108(1): 1–46. (Scholar)
Boyd, R., 1980, ‘Materialism Without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does not Entail’, in N. Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology Volume 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 76–106 (Scholar)
Braddon-Mitchell, D., and Jackson, F., 1996, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Broad, C.D., 1925, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Byrne, A., 1993, The Emergent Mind, Ph.D. Dissertation, Philosophy Department, Princeton University. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, ‘Cosmic Hermeneutics’, in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 347–83. (Scholar)
Carnap, R, 1932/33 ‘Psychology in Physical Language’, in A.J. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism, New York: The Free Press, 1959, pp. 165–198. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind, New York: Oxford University Press (Scholar)
–––, 1999, ‘Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 473–493. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary and Classical Readings, New York: Oxford University Press (Scholar)
–––, 2002a, ‘Consciousness and its Place in Nature’, in Chalmers 2002, pp. 102–142. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, ‘Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism’ in T. Alter and Y. Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 246–276. . (Scholar)
–––, 2020, ‘Spatiotemporal functionalism v. the Conceivability of Zombies’, Noûs, first online 28 April 2020. doi:10.1111/nous.12331 (Scholar)
Chomsky, N., 1994b, ‘Noam Chomsky’, in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 153–167. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, ‘Language and Nature’, Mind, 104(413): 1–61. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Correia, F and Schneider, B (eds.), 2012, Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Crane, T. and Mellor, D.H., 1990, ‘There is no Question of Physicalism’, Mind, 99: 185–206. (Scholar)
Daly, C. 1997, ‘What are Physical Properties?’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79(3): 196–217. (Scholar)
Dasgupta, S. 2015, ‘The Possibility of Physicalism’, Journal of Philosophy, 111: 557–592. (Scholar)
Davidson, D. 1970 . ‘Mental Events’, in D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 207–223. (Scholar)
Descartes, R., 1641, Meditations on First Philosophy, in Cottingham et al. (eds.), The Philosophical Writings of Rene Descartes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. (Scholar)
Dijksterhuis, E.J., 1961, The Mechanization of the World-Picture, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
Dowell, J.L., 2006a, ‘Formulating the Thesis of Physicalism’, Philosophical Studies, 131(1): 1–23. (Scholar)
–––, 2006b, ‘Physical: Empirical not Metaphysical’, Philosophical Studies, 131(1): 25–60. (Scholar)
Elpidorou, A., 2018a, ‘Introduction: The Character of Physicalism’, Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy, 37(3): 435–455. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 2018b, ‘Special Issue: The Character of Physicalism’, Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy, 37(3). (Scholar)
Feigl, H., 1967, ‘The “Mental” and the “Physical”’, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 370–497. (Scholar)
Feinberg, G., 1966, ‘Physics and the Thales Problem’, Journal of Philosophy, 63: 5–16. (Scholar)
Field, H., 1972, ‘Tarski’s Theory of Truth’, Journal of Philosophy, 69: 347–75. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, ‘Physicalism’, in J. Earman (ed.), Inference, Explanation and Other Frustrations, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 271–292. (Scholar)
Fine, K., 1994, ‘Essence and Modality’, in James Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and Language, 1: 1–16. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, ‘The Question of Realism’, Philosophers’ Imprint, 1: 1–30. (Scholar)
Fiorese, R., 2016, ‘Stoljar’s Dilemma and Three Conceptions of the Physical: A Defence of the Via Negativa’, Erkenntnis, 81: 201–229. (Scholar)
Fodor, J.A., 1974, ‘Special Sciences: Or, The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis’, reprinted in J. Fodor, Representations, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Scholar)
Foster, J., 1982, The Case for Idealism, London: Routledge (Scholar)
–––, 1991, The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J., 2004, Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press (Scholar)
Gillet, C. and Loewer, B., 2001, Physicalism and Its Discontents, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Goff, P., 2017, Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, New York: Oxford University Press (Scholar)
Haugeland, J., 1983, ‘Weak Supervenience’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 19: 93–103. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, J., 2002, ‘Blocking Definitions of Materialism’, Philosophical Studies, 110(2): 103–113 (Scholar)
Hellman, C., 1985, ‘Determination and Logical Truth’, The Journal of Philosophy, 82(11): 607–616. (Scholar)
Hempel, C. 1949, ‘The Logical Analysis of Psychology’, in H. Feigl and W. Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949, pp. 373–384; reprinted in N. Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 14–23. (Scholar)
–––, 1969, ‘Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets’, in S. Morgenbesser, et al. (eds.), Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, New York: St Martin’s Press, pp. 179–199. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, ‘Comments on Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking’, Synthese, 45: 139–199. (Scholar)
Hohwy, J., 1998, Meaning as Use, Ph.D Dissertation, Australian National University. (Scholar)
Horgan, T., 1983, ‘Supervenience and Microphysics’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 63: 29–43. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, ‘From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World’, Mind, 102(408): 555–586. (Scholar)
Horwich, P., 2000, Meaning, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hyslop, A., 1999, ‘Methodological Epiphenomenalism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78(1): 61–70. (Scholar)
Jackson, F., 1982, ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–36. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, ‘What Mary Didn’t Know’, Journal of Philosophy, 83: 291–5. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, ‘Armchair Metaphysics’, in J. Hawthorne and M. Michael (eds.), Philosophy in Mind, Amsterdam: Kluwer, pp. 23–42. (Scholar)
Jackson, F., and Pettit, P., 1992, ‘In Defense of Explanatory Ecumenism’, Economics and Philosophy, 8: 1–21. (Scholar)
Kim, J., 1993, Mind and Supervenience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Kripke, S., 1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Lange, F., 1865, A History of Materialism, London: Routledge, 1925. (Scholar)
Latham, N., 2001,‘Substance Physicalism’, in C. Gillett and B. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and Its Discontents, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 152–171. (Scholar)
Leuenberger, S., 2008, ‘Ceteris Absentibus Physicalism’, in D. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 145–170. (Scholar)
Lewis, D., 1970, ‘How to Define Theoretical Terms’, Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–46. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61(4): 343–377. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, ‘Reduction of Mind’, in S. Guttenplan (ed), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 412–431. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, ‘Naming the Colours’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342. (Scholar)
Loar, B., 1997, ‘Phenomenal States’, in N. Block, et al. (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Lockwood, M., 1989, Mind, Brain and Quantum, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Ludlow, P., Nagasawa, Y. and Stoljar, D., 2004, There’s something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Lycan, W., 1996, Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
McLaughlin, B., 1992, ‘The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism’, in A. Beckermann et al. (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?, Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 49–93. (Scholar)
Maudlin, T., 1996, ‘On the unification of physics’, Journal of Philosophy, 93: 129–144. (Scholar)
Meehl, P.E. and Sellars, W.S., 1956, ‘The Concept of Emergence’, in H. Feigl and M. Scriven (eds.), The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Volume 1), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 239–252. (Scholar)
Melnyk A., 1997, “How To Keep The ‘Physical’ in Physicalism”, Journal of Philosophy, 94: 622–637. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Scholar)
Montero, B., 1999, “The Body Problem”, Noûs, 33(2): 183–200. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “A Russellian Response the Structuralist Argument Against Physicalism”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17(3–4): 70–83. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Must Physicalism imply the supervenience of the mental on the physical?”, Journal of Philosophy, 110(2): 93–110. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Russellian Physicalism”, in T. Alter and Y. Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 209–223. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Should Physicalists Fear Abstracta?”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24(9–10): 40–49. (Scholar)
Montero, B. and Papineau, D., 2005, “A defense of the Via Negativa Argument for Physicalism”, Analysis, 65(3): 233–237. (Scholar)
Nagel, E., 1961, The Structure of Science, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. (Scholar)
Nagel, T., 1974, ‘What is it like to be a bat’, Philosophical Review, 4: 435–50. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, The View from Nowhere, New York: Oxford. (Scholar)
Nemirow, L., 1988, ‘Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance’, in W. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 490–499. (Scholar)
Neurath, O, 1931, ‘Physicalism: The Philosophy of the Vienna Circle’, in R.S. Cohen, and M. Neurath (eds.), Philosophical Papers 1913–1946, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983, pp. 48–51. (Scholar)
Ney, A., 2008, ‘Physicalism as an Attitude’, Philosophical Studies, 138: 1–15. (Scholar)
Papineau, D., 1996, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Paull, R. C., and Sider, T., 1992, ‘In Defense of Global Supervenience’, Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, 52: 833–854. (Scholar)
Poland, J., 1994, Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
Putnam, H., 1975, ‘Philosophy and our mental life’, in H. Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 291–303. (Scholar)
Rabin, G., 2020, ‘Fundamentality Physicalism’, Inquiry, first online 02 Jan 2020. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2019.1688177 (Scholar)
Rosen, G., 2010, ‘Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction’, in B. Hale and A. Hoffman (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 109–36 (Scholar)
Russell, B., 1917, ‘On the Notion of Cause’, in B. Russell, Mysticism and Logic, London: Penguin, 1963, pp. 180–208. (Scholar)
–––, 1927, The Analysis of Matter, London: Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Ryle, G., 1949, The Concept of Mind, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Schaffer, J., 2003, ‘Is There a Fundamental Level’, Noûs, 37(3): 298–517 (Scholar)
–––, 2009, ‘On What Grounds What’, in D. Chalmers, D. Manley, R. Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 247–383 (Scholar)
–––, 2016, ‘Ground Rules: Lessons from Wilson’, in K. Aizawa and C. Gillett (eds.), Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground, London: Palgrave, pp. 143–70. (Scholar)
Schiffer, S., 1987, Remnants of Meaning, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Schneider, S., 2017, “Does the Mathematical Nature of Physics Undermine Physicalism?”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24(9–10): 7–39. (Scholar)
Searle, J., 1992, The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World, New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
Shoemaker, S., 1994, ‘Phenomenal Character’, Noûs, 28: 21–38. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, Physical Realization, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Smart, J.J.C., 1959, ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, reprinted in D. Rosenthal (ed.), Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987. (Scholar)
–––, 1978, ‘The Content of Physicalism’, Philosophical Quarterly, 28: 239–41. (Scholar)
Smith, M., and Stoljar, D., 1998, ‘Global Response-Dependence and Noumenal Realism’, The Monist, 81(1): 85–111. (Scholar)
Stanley, J., and Williamson, T., 2001, ‘Knowing How’. Journal of Philosophy, 98: 411–444 (Scholar)
Stalnaker, R., 1996, ‘Varieties of Supervenience’, Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 221–241. (Scholar)
Steward, H., 1996, The Ontology of Mind, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
Stoljar, D., 1996, ‘Nominalism and Intentionality’, Noûs, 30(2): 261–281. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, ‘Physicalism and the Necessary A Posteriori’, Journal of Philosophy, 97(1): 33–54. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, ‘Two Conceptions of the Physical’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62: 253–281. (Scholar)
–––, 2001a, ‘The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical’, Philosophical Perspectives, 15: 393–413. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, Physicalism, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2015,‘Lewis on Experience and Materialism’, in B. Loewer and J. Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 519–532. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, ‘Chalmers v Chalmers’, Noûs, first online 29 April 2020. doi:10.1111/nous.12334 (Scholar)
Stroud, B., 1986, ‘The Physical World’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 87: 263–277. (Scholar)
Tiehen, J., 2018, ‘Physicalism’, Analysis, 78: 537–551. (Scholar)
Van Cleve, J., 1990, ‘Supervenience and Closure’, Philosophical Studies, 58: 225–283. (Scholar)
Van Fraassen, B., 2002, The Empirical Stance, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
Weisberg, M., 2013, Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Williams, B., 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London: Fontana. (Scholar)
Wilson, J., 1999, ‘How Superduper does a Physicalist Supervenience need to be?’, Philosophical Quarterly, 49: 33–52. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, ‘Supervenience-based formulations of Physicalism’, Noûs, 39(3): 426–459. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, ‘On Characterizing the Physical’, Philosophical Studies, 131: 61–99. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, ‘What is Hume’s Dictum and Why Believe it’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80: 595–637. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, ‘Non-reductive Realization and the Powers-based sub-set strategy’, The Monist, 94: 121–154. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘No work for a Theory of Grounding’, Inquiry, 57: 1–45. (Scholar)
Witmer, D.G., 2017, ‘Platonistic Physicalism without Tears’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24(9–10): 72–90. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, ‘Physicality for Physicalists’, Topoi, 37(3): 457–472. (Scholar)
Yablo, S., 1992, ‘Mental Causation’, The Philosophical Review, 101: 245–280. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, ‘Concepts and consciousness’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 455–464. (Scholar)
Yolton, R., 1983, Thinking Matter, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)

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