Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics" by Øystein Linnebo
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- Azzouni, Jody, 2004, Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Balaguer, Mark, 1998, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “A theory of mathematical
correctness and mathematical truth”, Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly, 82: 87–114.
- Benacerraf, Paul, 1965, “What numbers could not be”, Philosophical Review, 74: 47–73. (Scholar)
- –––, 1973, “Mathematical Truth”, Journal of Philosophy, 70(19): 661–679. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “What mathematical truth could
not be, i”, in Benacerraf and His Critics, A. Morton
and S. Stich, eds., Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Benacerraf, Paul and Putnam, Hilary (eds.), 1983, Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Second edition. (Scholar)
- Bernays, Paul, 1935, “On Platonism in Mathematics”,
Reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam (1983). (Scholar)
- Bigelow, John, 1988, The Reality of Numbers: A
Physicalist’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Oxford:
Clarendon. (Scholar)
- Burgess, John P., 1999, “Review of Stewart Shapiro, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 40(2): 283–91. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Review of Jody Azzouni,
Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism”,
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 10(4): 573–577. (Scholar)
- Burgess, John P. and Rosen, Gideon, 1997, A Subject with No Object, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Clarke-Doane, Justin, 2017, “What is the Benacerraf Problem?”, in New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity (Volume 28: Logic, Epistemology, and Unity of Science), F. Pataut (ed.), Cham: Springer, 17–43. (Scholar)
- Cole, Julian C., 2013, “Towards an Institutional Account of the Objectivity, Necessity, and Atemporality of Mathematics”, Philosophia Mathematica, 21(1): 9–36. (Scholar)
- Colyvan, Mark and Zalta, Edward N., 1999, “Mathematics: Truth and Fiction?”, Philosophia Mathematica, 7(3): 336–349. (Scholar)
- Donaldson, Thomas, 2017, “The (metaphysical) foundations of arithmetic?”, Noûs, 51(4): 775–801. (Scholar)
- Dummett, Michael, 1978a, “The philosophical basis of intuitionistic logic”, in Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 215–247; reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam (1983). (Scholar)
- –––, 1978b, Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, Frege: Philosophy of Language, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, second ed. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991a, Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991b, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Ebert, Philip and Rossberg, Marcus, 2007, “What is the purpose of neo-logicism?”, Travaux de Logique, 18: 33–61. (Scholar)
- Feferman, Solomon, 2009, “Conceptions of the continuum”, Intellectica, 51: 169–89. (Scholar)
- Field, Hartry, 1982, “Realism and Anti-Realism about Mathematics”, Philosophical Topics, 13(1): 45–69. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, Realism, Mathematics, and Modality, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Fine, Kit, 1994, “Ontological Dependence”,
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95:
269–290. (Scholar)
- Frege, Gottlob, 1953, Foundations of Arithmetic, Oxford:
Blackwell. Transl. by J.L. Austin. (Scholar)
- Gaifman, Haim, 1975, “Ontology and Conceptual Frameworks, Part I”, Erkenntnis, 9: 329–353. (Scholar)
- Gödel, Kurt, 1944, “Russell’s Mathematical
Logic”, In Benacerraf and Putnam (1983). (Scholar)
- –––, 1964, “What is Cantor’s
Continuum Hypothesis?”, In Benacerraf and Putnam (1983). (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Some basic theorems on the
foundations of mathematics and their implications”, in
Collected Words, S. Feferman et al, ed., Oxford: Oxford
University Press, vol. III, 304–323. (Scholar)
- Goodman, Nelson, 1956, “A World of Individuals”,
reprinted. in P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam, eds., Philosophy of
Mathematics: Selected Readings, 1st ed., Prentice-Hall. (Scholar)
- Hale, Bob, 1987, Abstract Objects, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin, 2000, “Implicit Definition and the A Priori”, in New Essays on the A Priori, Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Hale and Wright (2001). (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, Reason’s Proper Study,
Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- Hellman, Geoffrey, 1989, Mathematics without Numbers, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Three Varieties of Mathematical Structuralism”, Philosophia Mathematica, 9(3): 184–211. (Scholar)
- Hamkins, Joel David, 2012, “The Set-Theoretic Multiverse”, Review of Symbolic Logic, 5(3): 416–449. (Scholar)
- Hersh, Reuben, 1997, What is Mathematics, Really?, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hilbert, David, 1996, “Mathematical problems”, in
From Kant to Hilbert, William Ewald, ed., Oxford: Oxford
University Press, vol. 2, 1096–1105. (Scholar)
- Hofweber, Thomas, 2000, “Quantification and non-existent objects”, in Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzle of Non-Existence, Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, eds., Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 249–73. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Number determiners, numbers, and arithmetic”, Philosophical Review, 114(2): 179–225. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, Ontology and The Ambitions of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Isaacson, Daniel, 1994, “Mathematical intuition and objectivity”, in Mathematics and Mind, Alexander George, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, chap. 5. (Scholar)
- Jané, Ignasi, 2010, “Idealist and realist elements in
Cantor’s approach to set theory”, Philosophia
Mathematica, 18(2): 193–226. (Scholar)
- Kitcher, Philip, 1978, “The plight of the platonist”, Noûs, 12: 119–136. (Scholar)
- Kreisel, Georg, 1958, “Review of Wittgenstein’s
remarks on the foundations of mathematics”, British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science, 9: 135–158. (Scholar)
- Lear, Jonathan, 1980, “Aristotelian infinity”,
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 80:
187–210. (Scholar)
- Leng, Mary, 2010, Mathematics and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1991, Parts of Classes, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Linnebo, Øystein, 2006, “Epistemological challenges to mathematical platonism”, Philosophical Studies, 129(3): 545–574. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Structuralism and the notion of dependence”, Philosophical Quarterly, 58: 59–79. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Reference by
abstraction”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
112: 45–71. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “The potential hierarchy of sets”, Review of Symbolic Logic, 6(2): 205–228. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, Philosophy Of Mathematics, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, Thin Objects: An Abstractionist Account, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Linnebo, Øystein and Shapiro, Stewart, 2019, “Actual
and Potential Infinity”, Noûs, 53(1):
160–191. (Scholar)
- Linsky, Bernard and Zalta, Edward N., 1995, “Naturalized platonism versus platonized naturalism”, Journal of Philosophy, 92(10): 525–555. (Scholar)
- Linsky, Bernard and Zalta, Edward N., 2006, “What is neologicism?”, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 12(1): 60–99. (Scholar)
- MacBride, Fraser, 2005, “Structuralism Reconsidered”, in Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, Stewart Shapiro, ed., Oxford: Clarendon, 563–589. (Scholar)
- Maddy, Penelope, 1990, Realism in Mathematics, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, Naturalism in Mathematics, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- Martin, Donald A., 2001, “Multiple universes of sets and indeterminate truth values”, Topoi, 20(1): 5–16. (Scholar)
- Moltmann, Friederike, 2013, “Reference to numbers in natural language”, Philosophical Studies, 162: 499–536. (Scholar)
- Nutting, Eileen, 2020, “Benacerraf, Field, and the Agreement of Mathematicians”, Synthese, 197(5): 2095–2110. (Scholar)
- Parsons, Charles, 1977, “What is the Iterative Conception of
Set?” in Logic, Foundations of Mathematics, and
Computability Theory (The University of Western Ontario Series in
Philosophy of Science: Volume 9), R.E. Butts and J. Hintikka (eds.),
Dortrecht: Springer, 335–367. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, “Mathematical Intuition”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 80: 145–68. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, Mathematics in Philosophy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “The Structuralist View of Mathematical Objects”, Synthese, 84: 303–346. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Platonism and mathematical
intuition in Kurt Gödel’s thought”, Bulletin of
Symbolic Logic, 1(1): 44–74. (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V., 1969, “Existence and quantification”, in
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia
University Press, 91–113. (Scholar)
- Rayo, Agustín, 2008, “On specifying truth-conditions”, Philosophical Review, 117(3): 385–443. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, The Construction of Logical Space, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Rees, D.A., 1967, “Platonism and the platonic tradition”, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Paul Edwards, ed., New York: Macmillan, vol. 5, 333–341. (Scholar)
- Resnik, Michael, 1980, Frege and the Philosophy of Mathematics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, Mathematics as a Science of Patterns, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Restall, Greg, 2003, “Just what Is full-blooded platonism?”, Philosophia Mathematica, 11(1): 82–91. (Scholar)
- Rosen, Gideon, 2011, “The reality of mathematical objects”, in Meaning in Mathematics, J. Polkinghorne (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 113–132. (Scholar)
- Schiemer, Georg and Wigglesworth, John, 2019, “The Structuralist Thesis Reconsidered”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 70(4): 1201–1226. (Scholar)
- Schwartzkopff, Robert, 2011, “Numbers as Ontologically
Dependent Entities: Hume’s Principle Revisited”,
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 82(1): 353–373. (Scholar)
- Shapiro, Stewart, 1997, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Snyder, Eric, 2017, “Numbers and Cardinalities: What’s Really Wrong with the Easy Argument for Numbers?”, Linguistics and Philosophy, 40(4): 373–400. (Scholar)
- Studd, James, 2013, “The Iterative Conception of Set: a (Bi-)Modal Axiomatisation”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 42(5): 1–29. (Scholar)
- Wright, Crispin, 1983, Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Neo-Fregean Foundations for
Analysis: Some Reflections, Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic, 41(4): 317–334. (Scholar)
- Yablo, Stephen, 2005, “The Myth of the Seven”, in Fictionalism in Metaphysics, M. Kalderon (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 88–115. (Scholar)