Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Platonism in Metaphysics" by Mark Balaguer

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Adams, R., 1974, “Theories of Actuality,” Noûs, 8: 211–31. (Scholar)
Anderson, D. and Zalta, E., 2004, “Frege, Boolos, and Logical Objects,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 33: 1–26. (Scholar)
Armstrong, D.M., 1978, A Theory of Universals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Ayer, A.J., 1946, Language, Truth and Logic, 2^nd ed., New York: Dover Publications. (First published 1936.) (Scholar)
Azzouni, J., 1994, Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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Baker, A., 2005, “Are there Genuine Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena?,” Mind, 114: 223–38. (Scholar)
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Balaguer, M., 1995, “A Platonist Epistemology,” Synthese, 103: 303–25. (Scholar)
–––, 1998a, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998b, “Attitudes Without Propositions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58: 805–26. (Scholar)
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Bangu, S., 2008, “Inference to the Best Explanation and Mathematical Realism,” Synthese, 160: 13–20. (Scholar)
Barwise, J. and Perry, J., 1983, Situations and Attitudes, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Bealer, G., 1982, Quality and Concept, London: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Universals,” Journal of Philosophy, 90: 5–32. (Scholar)
Benacerraf, P., 1973, “Mathematical Truth,” Journal of Philosophy, 70: 661–79. (Scholar)
Benacerraf, P. and Putnam, H. (eds.), 1983, Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Bloomfield, L., 1933, Language, New York: Henry Holt. (Scholar)
Boolos, G., 1986–87, “Saving Frege From Contradiction,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 87: 137–51. (Scholar)
Braun, D., 1998, “Understanding Belief Reports,” Philosophical Review, 107: 555–95. (Scholar)
Brock, S., 2002, “Fictionalism About Fictional Characters,” Noûs, 36: 1–21. (Scholar)
Brouwer, L.E.J., 1912, “Intuitionism and Formalism,” reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam (1983), 77–89. (Scholar)
–––, 1948, “Consciousness, Philosophy, and Mathematics,” reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam (1983), 90–96. (Scholar)
Bueno, O., 2003, “Is it Possible to Nominalize Quantum Mechanics?,” Philosophy of Science, 70: 1424–36. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Dirac and the Dispensability of Mathematics,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 36: 465–90. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Mathematical Fictionalism,” in New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics, O. Bueno and Ø. Linnebo (eds.), Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 59–79. (Scholar)
Burgess, J., 1983, “Why I am not a Nominalist,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 24: 93–105. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Epistemology and Nominalism,” in Physicalism in Mathematics, A.D. Irvine (ed.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1–15. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Mathematics and Bleak House,” Philosophia Mathematica, 12: 18–36. (Scholar)
Burgess, J. and G. Rosen, 1997, A Subject With No Object, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Campbell, K., 1990, Abstract Particulars, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Carnap, R., 1934, Logische Syntax der Sprache. Translated by A. Smeaton as The Logical Syntax of Language, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1937. (Scholar)
–––, 1947, Meaning and Necessity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1956, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,” reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam (1983), 241–257. (Scholar)
Carson, E., 1996, “On Realism in Set Theory,” Philosophia Mathematica, 4: 3–17. (Scholar)
Chihara, C., 1990, Constructibility and Mathematical Existence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, A Structuralist Account of Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chisholm, R., 1976, Person and Object, La Salle: Open Court. (Scholar)
Chomsky, N., 1965, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Church, A., 1950, “On Carnap's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief,” Analysis, 10: 97–99. (Scholar)
–––, 1954, “Intensional Isomorphism and Identity of Belief,” Philosophical Studies, 5: 65–73. (Scholar)
Cole, J., 2009, “Creativity, Freedom, and Authority: A New Perspective on the Metaphysics of Mathematics,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87: 589–608. (Scholar)
Colyvan, M., 2001, The Indispensability of Mathematics, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Mathematics and Aesthetic Considerations in Science,” Mind, 111: 69–74. (Scholar)
Crimmins, M., 1998, “Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, Pretense, and Reference,” The Philosophical Review, 107: 1–47. (Scholar)
Crimmins, M. and J. Perry, 1989, “The Prince and the Phone Booth,” Journal of Philosophy, 86, 685–711. (Scholar)
Curry, H.B., 1951, Outlines of a Formalist Philosophy of Mathematics, Amsterdam: North-Holland. (Scholar)
Daly, C., 2008, “Fictionalism and the Attitudes,” Philosophical Studies, 139: 423–40. (Scholar)
Daly, C. and S. Langford, 2009, “Mathematical Explanation and Indispensability Arguments,” Philosophical Quarterly, 59: 641–58. (Scholar)
Davidson, D., 1967, “Truth and Meaning,” Synthese, 17: 304–23. (Scholar)
Devitt, M., 1980, “‘Ostrich Nominalism’ or ‘Mirage Realism’?,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 61: 433–39. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, ‘Postscript to “‘Ostrich Nominalism’ or ‘Mirage Realism’?”,’ in Putting Metaphysics First, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 20–30. (Scholar)
Dieterle, J. and Shapiro, S., 1993, Review of Maddy, Realism in Mathematics, Philosophy of Science, 60: 659–660. (Scholar)
Donnellan, K., 1966, “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” Philosophical Review, 75: 281–304. (Scholar)
Evans, G., 1981, “Understanding Demonstratives,” in H. Parret and J. Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and Understanding, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 280–303. (Scholar)
Field, H., 1980 Science Without Numbers, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, Realism, Mathematics, and Modality, New York: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Mathematical Objectivity and Mathematical Objects,” in Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics, C. MacDonald and S.Laurence (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 387–403. (Scholar)
Fodor, J., 1975, The Language of Thought, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, “Some Notes on What Linguistics is About,” in Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. II, N. Block (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 197–207. (Scholar)
–––, 1987, Psychosemantics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Forbes, G., 1987, “Indexicals and Intensionality: A Fregean Perspective,” The Philosophical Review, 96: 3–31. (Scholar)
Frege, G., 1884, Der Grundlagen die Arithmetik. Translated by J.L. Austin as The Foundations of Arithmetic, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953. (Scholar)
–––, 1892, “Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung.” Translated by H. Feigl as “On Sense and Nominatum,” in A.P. Martinich (ed.), The Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. (Scholar)
–––, 1893–1903, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Translated (in part) by M. Furth as The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964. (Scholar)
–––, 1894, Review of E. Husserl's Philosophie der Arithmetik, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und phil. Kritik, 103: 313–332. (Scholar)
–––, 1919, “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry,” reprinted in Essays on Frege, E.D. Klemke (ed.), Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1968, 507–35. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Gödel, K., (1951) “Some Basic Theorems on the Foundations of Mathematics and Their Implications,” in Gödel's Collected Works, Volume III, S. Peterman, J.W. Dawson, Jr., W. Goldfarb, C. Parsons, and R.N. Solovay (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 304–23. (Scholar)
–––1964, “What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?,” reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam (1983), 470–85. (Scholar)
Hale, R., 1987, Abstract Objects, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Harris, Z., 1954, “Distributional Structure,” Word, 10: 146–62. (Scholar)
Hellman, G., 1989, Mathematics Without Numbers, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Hempel, C., 1945, “On the Nature of Mathematical Truth,” reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam (1983), 377–393. (Scholar)
Heyting, A., 1956, Intuitionism, Amsterdam: North-Holland. (Scholar)
Hilbert, D., 1899, Grundlagen der Geometrie. Translated by E. Townsend as Foundations of Geometry, La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1959. (Scholar)
Hoffman, S., 2004, “Kitcher, Ideal Agents, and Fictionalism,” Philosophia Mathematica, 12: 3–17. (Scholar)
Hofweber, T., 2005, “Number Determiners, Numbers, and Arithmetic,” Philosophical Review, 114: 179–225. (Scholar)
Horwich, P., 1991, “On the Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment,” Philosophy of Science, 58: 1–14. (Scholar)
Husserl, E., 1891, Philosophie der Arithmetik, Leipzig: C.E.M. Pfeffer. (Scholar)
Kaplan, D., 1968–69, “Quantifying In,” Synthese, 19: 178–214. (Scholar)
Kaplan, D., 1989, “Demonstratives,” in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan, New York: Oxford University Press, 481–563. (Scholar)
Katz, J., 1981, Language and Other Abstract Objects, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “Why Intensionalists Ought Not Be Fregeans,” in Truth and Interpretation, E. LePore (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 59–91. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Realistic Rationalism, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
King, J., 1995, “Structured Propositions and Complex Predicates,” Noûs, 29: 516–35. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Naturalized Propositions,” in J. King, S. Soames, and J. Speaks, New Thinking About Propositions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kitcher, P., 1984, The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kripke, S., 1972, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1979, “A Puzzle About Belief,” in Meaning and Use, A. Margalit (ed.), Dordrecht: Reidel. (Scholar)
Langendoen, D.T., and Postal, P.M., 1985, The Vastness of Natural Languages Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Lavine, S. Review of Maddy, Realism in Mathematics, Journal of Philosophy, 89: 321–26.
Leeds, S., 1979, “Church's Translation Argument,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 9: 43–51. (Scholar)
Leng, M., 2005a, “Revolutionary Fictionalism: A Call to Arms,” Philosophia Mathematica, 13: 277–93. (Scholar)
–––, 2005b, “Mathematical Explanation,” in Mathematical Reasoning and Heuristics, C. Cellucci and D. Gillies (eds.), London: King’s College Publications, pp. 167–89. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, Mathematics and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Lewis, D., 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Noneism or Allism?,” Mind, 99: 23–31. (Scholar)
Liggins, D., 2010, “The Autism Objection to Pretence Theory,” Philosophical Quarterly, 60: 764–82. (Scholar)
Linnebo, O., 2006, “Epistemological Challenges to Mathematical Platonism,” Philosophical Studies, 129: 545–74. (Scholar)
Linsky, B. and Zalta, E., 1995, “Naturalized Platonism vs. Platonized Naturalism,” Journal of Philosophy, 92: 525–55. (Scholar)
Liston, M., 2003–04, “Thin- and Full-Blooded Platonism,” The Review of Modern Logic, 9: 129–61. (Scholar)
Maddy, P., 1990, Realism in Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “Indispensability and Practice,” The Journal of Philosophy, 89: 275–89. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, Naturalism in Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Malament, D., 1982, Review of Field, Science Without Numbers, Journal of Philosophy, 79: 523–34. (Scholar)
Mally, E., 1912, Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik, Leipzig: Barth. (Scholar)
Moltmann, F., 2013, “Reference to Numbers in Natural Language,” Philosophical Studies, 162: 499–536. (Scholar)
Marcus, R., 2015, Autonomy Platonism and the Indispensability Argument, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
McEvoy, M., 2005, “Mathematical Apriorism and Warrant: A Reliabilist-Platonist Account,” Philosophical Forum, 36: 399–417. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Platonism and the ‘Epistemic Role Puzzle’,” Philosophia Mathematica, 20: 289–304. (Scholar)
Meinong, A., 1904, “Ueber Gegenstandstheorie,” in Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie, A. Meinong (ed.), Leipzig: Barth. (Scholar)
Melia, J., 2000, “Weaseling Away the Indispensability Argument,” Mind, 109: 455–79. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Response to Colyvan,” Mind, 111: 75–79. (Scholar)
Mill, J.S., 1843, A System of Logic, London: Longmans, Green, and Company. (Scholar)
Milne, P., 1994, “The Physicalization of Mathematics,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45: 305–340. (Scholar)
O'Leary-Hawthorne, J., 1994, “What Does van Fraassen's Critique of Scientific Realism Show?,” The Monist, 77: 128–45. (Scholar)
Parsons, C., 1965, “Frege's Theory of Numbers,” in Philosophy in America, M. Black (ed.), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1971, “Ontology and Mathematics,” Philosophical Review, 80: 151–76. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, “Mathematical Intuition,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 80: 145–168. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Intuition and Number,” in Mathematics and Mind, A. George (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 141–57. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Platonism and Mathematical Intuition in Kurt Gödel’s Thought,” The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 1: 44–74. (Scholar)
Parsons, T., 1980, Nonexistent Objects, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
Peacock, H., 2009, “What’s Wrong With Ostrich Nominalism?,” Philosophical Papers 38: 183–217. (Scholar)
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Perry, J., 1979, “The Problem of the Essential Indexical,” Noûs, 13: 3–21. (Scholar)
Plantinga, A., 1974, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
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