This will gradually be supplemented by linked lists of suggested readings divided by subject.

Canonical Religious Texts, by Tradition

• Buddhist Canon (Theravadin, Pali in original), 1974 translation, (1st ed. this trans., 1900), A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, Being a Translation, now made for the First Time, from the Original Pali, of the First Book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka entitled Dhamma-sangani, Caroline A.F. Rhys Davids (ed.) and Introductory Essay and Notes, 3rd ed., London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul for the Pali Text Society.
• Buddhist Canon (Theravadin, Pali in original), 1995 translation, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, trans. Bhikkhu Ñānamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, Boston: Wisdom Publications. (Scholar)
• Christian Bible.
• Hebrew Bible.
• Upanishads.

References, by Author

• Adolphs, Ralph and Damasio, Antonio, 2001, “The Interaction of Affect and Cognition: A Neurobiological Perspective”, in Forgas 2001, pp. 27–49. (Scholar)
• Algra, Keimpe; Barnes, Jonathan; Mansfield, Jaap; and Schofield, Malcolm, 1999, The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Alston, William, 1967, “Pleasure”, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Paul Edwards (ed.), London and New York: Macmillan, Vol. 6, pp. 341–347. A clear and concise account of some reasons driving changes in philosophers’ and introspectionist psychologists’ views of Pleasure through the preceding century and also of some main competing views and objections to them, as seen at the time of writing. (Scholar)
• Anscombe, G.E.M., 1963/1957, Intention, 2nd ed. (1st ed., 1957), Oxford: Blackwell. Seminal work in philosophy of action by a leading disciple of Wittgenstein. A very short but deep and influential discussion of pleasure leads up to a dismissal of ethical hedonism in particular, and perhaps of any appeal to pleasure in theory quite generally, on p. 77. (Scholar)
• Anscombe, G.E.M., 1981a, The Collected Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, 3 vols., Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Anscombe, G.E.M., 1981b/1958 “Modern Moral Philosophy”, in Anscombe, 1981a, Vol. III, pp. 26–42. A summary version of the relevant 1963/1957 passage is in this paper’s seventh paragraph at p. 27. Original publication: Philosophy, 33(124) (1958): 1–16. (Scholar)
• Anscombe, G.E.M., 1981c/1967, “On the Grammar of Enjoy”, in 1981a, Vol. II, pp. 94–100. Original publication: Journal of Philosophy, 64(19): 607–614. (Scholar)
• Anscombe, G.E.M., 1981d/1978, “Will and Emotion”, in 1981a, Vol. I, pp. 100–107. Original publication: Grazer Philosophische Studien, 5 (1978): 139–148. (Scholar)
• Aquinas, Thomas, 1975 (written 1268–71), Summa Theologiæ (‘ST’) 1a 2æ (first division of second part), questions 31–39. The Blackfriars edition, vol. 20, “Pleasure”, has the Latin text and an English translation of these by Eric D’Arcy. New York: McGraw-Hill and London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. Also relevant is question 11 in vol. 17, on fruitio, enjoyment in possession of something prized as ultimately valuable (correctly, only of God, as by the saints in Heaven, in their beatific vision of God), following Augustine (see n. 20, para. 4). (Scholar)
• Argyle, Michael, 2001 (1st ed., 1987), The Psychology of Happiness, 2d ed., New York: Taylor and Francis; Hove, East Sussex: Routledge. Chs. 2 and 3 are cited as especially relevant; its subject is broader than ours.
• Aristotle, 1984, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• Aristotle, De Anima (‘DA’).
• Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics (‘EE’).
• Aristotle, Magna Moralia (‘MM’). II, 7.
• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. (‘NE’) VII, 11–14; X, 1–6.
• Aristotle, Politics.
• Aristotle, Protrepticus. Fragment B87 in its context, a reconstruction from quotations of this presumably relatively early popular work of Aristotle’s. B87 may be found in the 1984 Complete Works at p. 2414. (Scholar)
• Aristotle, Rhetoric I: 11 gives a version of the standard Platonic-Academic definition of pleasure rather than that of the ethical works listed just above. Book II: 1–11 discusses specific emotions, characterizing most as forms of pleasure and pain.
• Aristotle, Topica.
• Armstrong, D.M., 1968, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul and New York: The Humanities Press. Pp. 175–79 on pleasure and pp. 85–89 identifying dispositions with their categorical basis. (Scholar)
• Ashby, F. Gregory; Isen, Alice M; and Turken, And U., “A Neuropsychological Account of Positive Affect and Its Influence on Cognition”, Psychological Review, 106(3): 529–50. A dopamine-pleaure interpretation lies, in part, behind the title. (Scholar)
• Augustine, De Civitate Dei contra Paganos (The City of God, ‘CD’). XIV,vi on pleasure as belonging to the Will and XIV,vii elaborating this ethically and theologically as a form of love (into which is packed not only all motivation but all natural motion and a tie to the Holy Spirit of Trinitarian theology as well). Augustine’s sparse remarks here and elsewhere were taken as authoritative in the ensuing Western medieval Christian tradition. There are many editions and translations.
• Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana (On Christian Instruction/Doctrine/Teaching).
• Augustine, 1963, De Trinitate, trans. Stephen McKenna, The Trinity, Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. This translation is now available in a paperback edition from Cambridge University Press, 2002, with an editor’s note by Gareth Matthews on the merits and demerits of this and other English translations, p. xxxii. (Scholar)
• Aydede, Murat, 2000, “An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-à-Vis Pain”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXI(3): 537–70. Distinguishes affective reactions from sensory states in this discussion only of physical (bodily) pleasure, with reference especially to the 1949–1973 Anglo-American philosophical literature. (Scholar)
• Aydede, Murat, 2013, “Pain”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/pain/>. §§5 and 6.1 contain discussion of the distinction between pain sensation and pain affect discussed in n. 1; comprehensive pain bibliographies are linked to at that entry’s end. (Scholar)
• Bain, Alexander, 1876, The Emotions and the Will, 3rd ed., New York: D. Appleton and Co. (Scholar)
• Bargh, John A. and Deborah K. Apsley, 2002, Unraveling the Complexities of Social Life: A Festschrift in Honor of Robert B. Zajonc, Washington: American Psychological Association. (Scholar)
• Barrett, Lisa Feldman; Niedenthal, Paula M; and Winkielman, Piotr (eds.), 2005; Emotion and Consciousness, New York and London: The Guilford Press. (Scholar)
• Bartolic, E.I.; Basso, M. R.; Schefft, B.K.; Glauser, T.; Titanic-Schefft, M., 1999, “Effects of experimentally-induced emotional states on frontal lobe cognitive task performance”, Neuropsychologia, 37(6): 677–83. (Scholar)
• Beebe-Center, J.G., 1932 , The Psychology of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness, New York: Russell and Russell. Summarizes and discusses results and controversies in the introspectionist academic experimental psychology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. (Scholar)
• Beebe-Center, J.G., 1951, “Feeling and Emotion,” in Harry Helson (ed.), Theoretical Foundations of Psychology, New York: D Van Nostrand & Co., pp. 254–317. (Scholar)
• Berridge, Craig W.; España, Rodrigo A.; and Stalnaker, Thomas A., 2003, “Stress and Coping: Asymmetry of Dopamine Efferents within the Prefrontal Cortex”, in Hugdahl and Davidson 2003, pp. 69–103. (Scholar)
• Berridge, Kent C., 1996, “Food Reward: Brain Substrates of Wanting and Liking”, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 20(1): 1–25. (Scholar)
• Berridge, Kent C., 1999, “Pleasure, Pain, Desire and Dread”, in Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz, 1999, pp. 525–557. Excellent and accessible review emphasizing the distinction between consciously reportable affect and underlying ‘core processes’ that are supposedly in themselves unconscious. One wonders, however, whether Block’s (1995, 2002) phenomenal consciousness might be present in the activity of some of these. (Scholar)
• Berridge, Kent C., 2003a, “Comparing the Emotional Brains of Humans and other Animals,” in Davidson, Scherer, and Goldsmith 2003 (Handbook), pp. 25–51, (Scholar)
• Berridge, Kent C., 2003b, “Pleasures of the brain”, Brain and Cognition, 52: 106–128. Sophisticated review of the case for a distinction between ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’ within the supposedly unconscious ‘core processes’ of the brain. (Scholar)
• Berridge, Kent C., 2004, “Pleasure, Unfelt Affect, and Irrational Desire”, in Manstead, Frijda, and Fischer 2004, pp. 243–62. (Scholar)
• Berridge, Kent C. and Morten L. Kringelbach, 2015, “Pleasure Systems in the Brain”, Neuron 86:646–664. (Scholar)
• Berridge, Kent C. and Robinson, Terry E., 1998, “What is the role of dopamine in reward: hedonic impact, reward learning, or incentive salience?” Brain Research Reviews 28,3:309–69. After Robinson and Berridge 1993, perhaps still the best place for a rigorous statement of the theoretical approach behind the developing research program discussed in §3.3, last three paragraphs. (Scholar)
• Berridge, Kent C. and Robinson, Terry E., 2003, “Parsing Reward,” Trends in Neurosciences, 26(9): 507–13. (Scholar)
• Berridge, Kent C. and Winkielman, Piotr, 2003, “‘What is an unconscious emotion?’ (The case for unconscious ‘liking’)”, Cognition and Emotion, 17(2): 181–211. (Scholar)
• Block, Ned, 1995, “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 227–47. This is here followed by many peer commentaries and the author’s reply. Block’s paper is updated in Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge. Mass.: MIT Press, 1997. (Scholar)
• Block, Ned, 1997, “Biology versus computation in the study of consciousness”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20: 159–65. Contains responses to additional commentaries. (Scholar)
• Block, Ned, 2002, “Concepts of Consciousness”, in David Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 206–18. Abridged and revised from Block 1995. (Scholar)
• Bolles, Robert C. (ed.), 1991, The Hedonics of Taste, Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. (Scholar)
• Bourdon, 1893, “La Sensation de Plaisir”, Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger, 36: 225–37. (Scholar)
• Bramble, Ben, 2013, “The distinctive feeling of pleasure”, Philosophical Studies, 162: 201–17. (Scholar)
• Brandt, Richard B., 1979, A Theory of the Good and the Right, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Brandt, Richard B., 1982, “Two Concepts of Utility,” in Richard B. Brandt, 1992, Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 196–212. Original publication: Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Its Limits, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982, pp. 169–85. An objection to desire-fulfillment views of pleasure is based in desires’ changing over time. (Scholar)
• Brandt, Richard B., 1993, “Comments on Sumner” in Brad Hooker (ed.), Rationality, Rules, and Utility: New Esssays on the Moral Philosophy of Richard B. Brandt, Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 229–32. A reply to objections in a volume with a useful bibliography and critical papers, among which that by L.W. Sumner, “The Evolution of Utility: A Philosophical Journey”, pp. 97–114, traces changes in, and appraises, Brandt’s views bearing on our subject. (Scholar)
• Brentano, Franz, 1907/1979, Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie, 2nd ed., with additions, Roderick Chisholm and Reinhard Fabian (eds.), Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag (1st. ed.: Leipzig: von Duncker & Humblot, 1907). Note 39 on pp. 235–40 (pp. 119–25 of 1st ed.), referenced here, is key for a precise interpretation of Brentano’s views on pleasure and their divergence with those of his former protegé Karl Stumpf. The Brentano-Stumpf controversy obviously bears a close analogy and historical relation to medieval debates on pleasure such as those, mentioned in §2.3.1, ¶2 and in n. 20 ad loc., discussed in McGrade 1987. Many of the same questions explicitly or implicitly arise: Is pleasure a distinct act? If not, what is its relation to the acts to which it belongs? What are its relations to sensation and thought? Does a conscious act always or sometimes take itself as an object (in a different way from any others it has) or is another act always required to reflect on or take pleasure in it? (Scholar)
• Brentano, Franz, 1921/1969, “Loving and Hating”, Appendix IX, in his The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, (Oskar Kraus, ed., 3rd German edition, 1934), Roderick Chisholm (ed.), Roderick Chisholm and Elizabeth H. Schneewind (trans.), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul and New York: Humanities Press, pp. 137–60. Original German publication: “Vom Lieben und Hassen”, Anhang, IX, in Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, 2nd ed., Oskar Kraus, (ed.), Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1921; this was dictated by Brentano in 1907. A source especially for Brentano’s view of bodily pleasure being involved even in cognitive pleasure, by being caused by one’s judgment or loving, exposited with further references in Chisholm 1987. (Scholar)
• Brentano, Franz, 1929/1981, Sensory and Noetic Consciousness: Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint III, Oskar Kraus (ed.), Margarete Schättle and Linda L. McAlister (trans. ed.), Linda L. McAlister (trans.), London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul and New York: Humanities Press. Original German publication: Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewußtein, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1929. Pp. 14, 16, 59 in Part I, iii, 5 & 7 and Part II, i, 28 are a source for Brentano’s complex intentional theory of pleasure as loving one’s loving of one’s experiencing and also that experiencing itself, exposited with further references in Chisholm 1986 and 1987. (Scholar)
• Brink, David O., 1989, Moral realism and the foundations of ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Contains critical discussion of Moore’s naturalistic fallacy charge against value hedonism, at pp. 151–54. (Scholar)
• Broad, C.D., 1930, Five Types of Ethical Theory, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
• Bruder, Gerard E., 2003, “Frontal and Parietal Asymmetries in Depressive Disorders: Behavioral, Electrophysiologic, and Neuroimaging Findings”, in Hugdahl and Davidson, 2003, pp. 719–42. (Scholar)
• Brunschwig, Jacques, 1986, “The Cradle Argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism,” in Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker (eds.), The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, pp. 113–44. (Scholar)
• Buddhaghosa (c. 400 CE Buddhist), 1920–21, The Expositor (Atthasālīni: Buddhaghosa’s Commentary on the Dhammasangani, the First Book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka), 2 vols., Maung Tin (trans.), Mrs. Rhys Davids (ed. and rev.), London: Oxford University Press, for the Pali Text Society. (Scholar)
• Buddhaghosa (c. 400 CE Buddhist), 1979, The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), tr., Ñâṇamoli, 4th ed., Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. (Scholar)
• Butler, Joseph, 1726, Fifteen Sermons Preached in the Rolls Chapel. There have been full and partial reprintings of these sermons. Using the Augustinian language of love, he argues that self-interest (the object of self-love) is dependent on there being specific passions (i.e., desires, but perhaps in a richer than functionalist sense) to satisfy. Classic refutation of drawing selfish consequences from hedonistic egoism: satisfying altruistic desires may advance one’s happiness as much as any self-regarding project does. (Scholar)
• Cabanac, Michel, 1971, “Physiological role of pleasure”, Science, 173(2): 1103–1107. (Scholar)
• Cabib, Simona and Puglisi-Allegra, Stefano, 2004, “Opposite Responses of Mesolimbic Dopamine Neurons to Controllable and Uncontrollable Aversive Experiences”, The Journal of Neuroscience, 14(5): 3333–40. (Scholar)
• Cacioppo, John T., 1999, “Emotion”, Annual Review of Psychology, 50: 191–214. (Scholar)
• Campos, Belinda and Keltner, Dacher, 2014, “Shared and Differentiating Features of the Positive Emotion Domain”, in Gruber and Moskowitz 2014, 52-71. (Scholar)
• Caston, Victor, 2003, “Intentionality in Ancient Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/intentionality-ancient/>. (Scholar)
• Chisholm, Roderick M., 1986, Brentano on Intrinsic Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 3, pp. 17–32, is mainly a shorter, earlier version of his 1987; the rest provides context. (Scholar)
• Chisholm, Roderick M., 1987, “Brentano’s Theory of Pleasure and Pain”, Topoi, 6: 59–64. Accessible exposition of Brentano’s theory. (Scholar)
• Christiano, Thomas, 1992, “Sidgwick on desire, pleasure, and the good”, in Essays on Henry Sidgwick, Bart Schultz (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 261–78. (Scholar)
• Churchland, Paul M., 1979, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Cicero, de finibus bonorum et malorum (On Ultimate Goods and Ills). A recent translation is entitled On Moral Ends, Julia Annas (ed.), Raphael Woolf (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
• Clore, Gerald L. and Colcombe, Stanley, 2003, “The Parallel Worlds of Affective Concepts and Feelings”, in Musch and Klauer, 2003, pp. 335–69. (Scholar)
• Clore, Gerald L.; Gasper, Karen; and Garvin, Erika, “Affect as Information”, in Forgas 2001, pp. 121–44. (Scholar)
• Coan, James A. and Allen, John J.B., 2003, “The State and Trait Nature of Frontal EEG Asymmetry in Emotion”, in Hugdahl and Davidson, 2003, pp. 681–715. (Scholar)
• Cooper, John M., 1996a/1999, “An Aristotelian Theory of the Emotions”, in Essays in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Berkeley and London: University of California Press, pp. 238–57, repr. in Cooper 1999b, pp. 406–23. (Scholar)
• Cooper, John M., 1996b/1999, “Reason, Moral Virtue and Moral Value”, in Rationality in Greek Thought, Michael Frede and Gisela Striker, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 81–114, repr. in Cooper 1999b, pp. 253–80. See pp. 101–2/269–70 for citations on pleasure as an apparent good. (Scholar)
• Cooper, John M., 1998/1999, “Posidonius and the Emotions”, in The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 71–111; repr. in Cooper 1999b, pp. 449–84. (Scholar)
• Cooper, John M., 1999a, “Pleasure and Desire in Epicurus”, in 1999b, pp. 485–414. (Scholar)
• Cooper, John M., 1999b, Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• Craig, A.D., 2002,“How do you feel? Interoception: the sense of the physiological condition of the body”, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3: 655–666. (Scholar)
• Craig, A.D., 2009, “How do you feel – now? The anterior insula and human awareness“, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 10(1): 1059–70. (Scholar)
• Craig, A.D., 2015 , How Do You Feel? An Interoceptive Moment with Your Neurobiological Self, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• Craig, Wallace, 1918, “Appetites as Constitutents of Instincts”, Biological Bulletin, 34: 91–107. (Scholar)
• Crisp, Roger, 2006, Reasons and the Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, 1990, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, New York: Harper and Row. (Scholar)
• Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, 1996, Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention, New York: Harper Collins. A list of nine characteristics of ‘flow’, his longest I know of, is at pp. 123–24. (Scholar)
• Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, 1997, Finding Flow: The Psychology of Engagement with Everyday Life, New York: Harper Collins. Also published as: Living Well: The Psychology of Everyday Life, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997. (Scholar)
• Dalgleish, Tim and Mick J. Power (eds.), 1999, Handbook of Cognition and Emotion, Chichester, England and New York: Wiley. (Scholar)
• Damasio, Antonio R., 1994, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, New York: G.P. Putnam. (Scholar)
• Damasio, Antonio R., 1999, The feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness, New York: Harcourt Brace. (Scholar)
• Damasio, Antonio R., 2003, Looking for Spinoza: joy, sorrow, and the feeling brain, Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt. (Scholar)
• Darwall, Stephen; Gibbard, Allan; Railton, Peter, 1992, “Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends”, Philosophical Review, 101(1): 115–189. Reprinted in: their (as editors) Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 3–47. (Scholar)
• Darwin, Charles, 1998, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, 3rd ed., with Introduction, Afterword and Commentaries by Paul Ekman, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Now widely thought correct in its main direction, although of course dated in evidence and detail. But a great Darwin read! And Ekman brings the science almost up to date in his notes. (Scholar)
• Davidson, Richard J., 1994, “Asymmetric brain funtion, affective style and psychopathology: the role of early experience and plasticity”, Development and Psychopathology, 6: 741–758. (Scholar)
• Davidson, Richard J., 2000a, “Affective Style, Mood and Anxiety Disorders“, in Davidson 2000b, pp. 88–108. (Scholar)
• Davidson, Richard J. (ed.), 2000b, Anxiety, Depression and Emotion, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Davidson, Richard J., 2000c, “The Functional Neuroanatomy of Affective Style,” in Lane and Nadel, 2000, pp. 371–88. (Scholar)
• Davidson, Richard J., 2001, “Toward a Biology of Personality and Emotion”, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 935: 191–207. (Scholar)
• Davidson, Richard J., 2002, “Toward a Biology of Positive Affect and Compassion”, in Visions of Compassion: Western Scientists and Tibetan Buddhists Examine Human Nature, Richard J. Davidson and Anne Harrington, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 107–130. (Scholar)
• Davidson, Richard J., 2003, “Seven sins in the study of emotion: Correctives from affective neuroscience”, Brain and Cognition, 52(1): 129–32. (Scholar)
• Davidson, Richard J. and Irwin, William, 1999, “The functional neuroanatomy of emotion and affective style”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3: 11–21. (Scholar)
• Davidson, Richard J.; Jackson, Daren C.; and Kalin, Ned H., 2000, “Emotion, Plasticity, Context, and Regulation: Perspectives From Affective Neuroscience,” Psychological Bulletin, 126(6): 890–909. (Scholar)
• Davidson, Richard J.; Pizzagalli, Diego; and Nitschke, Jack B., 2002, “Depression: Perspectives from Affective Neuroscience,” Annual Review of Psychology, 53: 545–74 (Scholar)
• Davidson, Richard J.; Scherer, Klaus R. and Goldsmith, H. Hill, 2003, Handbook of Affective Sciences, New York: Oxford University Press. (‘Handbook’) (Scholar)
• Davidson, Richard J. and Sutton, Steven K., 1995, “Affective neuroscience: The emergence of a discipline”, Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 5: 217–24. (Scholar)
• Davis, Wayne, 1981a, “A Theory of Happiness,”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 18(2): 111–20. An analysis in terms of beliefs about the satisfaction of desires. However, while the self-report literature on subjective judgments of happiness often shows one component depending on beliefs about how well one’s life is objectively going, there are also other components reflecting how one feels that this analysis does not account for, and these others seem to be pain and pleasure (or feeling happy, where this is the same as experiencing pleasure). See Bibliography annotation to Strack, Argyle, and Schwarz 1991. (Scholar)
• Davis, Wayne, 1981b, “Pleasure and Happiness,” Philosophical Studies, 39: 305–17. (Identifies the two, so the analyses of the other papers, too, apply to our subject.) (Scholar)
• Davis, Wayne, 1982, “A Causal Theory of Enjoyment,” Mind, XCI: 240–56. Extends his 1981 to analyze enjoyment as experiences causing beliefs about the satisfaction of one’s desires. (Scholar)
• Depue, Richard and Paul F. Collins, 1999, with commentaries by others, “Neurobiology of the structure of personality: dopamine, foundations of incentive motivation and extraversion”, with extensive peer commentary, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22: 491–569. Defends a dopaminergic view of all these and, in part, of positive affect as well. (Scholar)
• Depue, Richard A. and Jeannine Morrone-Strupinsky, 2005, “A neurobehavioral model of affiliative bonding: implications for conceptualizing a human trait of affiliation”, with extensive peer commentary by many others, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(3): 313–95. Defends a μ-opioid-system theory of the trait of affiliation, while suggesting, more tentatively, such a view of similar consummatory-phase pleasure more generally. (Typesetting errors resulted in “u-opiates” and the like here for “μ-opiates” and the like in most places.)
• Descartes, René, 1984–91, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and (also, for Vol. III) Anthony Kenny, trans., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3 vols. (‘CSM’ in citations, where ‘AT’ precedes page numbers of the standard edition of the original French and Latin, often noted in the margins of this and other recent editions: Oeuvres de Descartes, Charles Adam & Paul Tannery, eds., J. Vrin, 1908–1957.) (Scholar)
• Diener, Ed; Sandvik, Ed and Pavot, William, 1991, “Happiness is the frequency, not the intensity, of positive versus negative affect”, in Strack et al. 1991, pp. 119–139. (Scholar)
• Diener, Ed (ed.), 1999, Special Section on the Structure of Emotion, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(5): 603–64. (Scholar)
• Drevets, Wayne C. and Raichle, Marcus E., 1998, “Reciprocal Suppression of Regional Cerebral Blood Flow during Emotional versus Higher Cognitive Processes: Implications for Interactions between Emotion and Cognition”, Cognition and Emotion, 12(3): 353–385. (Scholar)
• Duncker, Karl, 1941, “On Pleasure, Emotion and Striving,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1(4): 391–430. Classic paper on the relations of pleasure and motivation, by a psychologist well-versed in the history of thought about this topic generally and especially in the traditions of introspectionist psychology and phenomenology. His many distinctions seldom connect obviously to later neuroscience; any validity may come at higher levels of brain/mind organization than this has yet reached. A source for some early twentieth century psychological literature in German. Through this paper this German literature may have influenced philosophers writing in English in the following decades, and what they found to be obvious in experience or in ordinary English. (Scholar)
• Edwards, Rem B., 1979, Pleasures and Pains: A Theory of Qualitative Hedonism, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
• Ekman, Paul, 1999a, “Basic Emotions”, in Dalgleish and Power 1999, Ch. 3, pp. 45–60. (Scholar)
• Ekman, Paul, 1999b, “Facial Expressions”, in Dalgleish and Power 1999, Ch. 16, pp. 301–20. (Scholar)
• Ekman, Paul and Davidson, Richard J., eds., 1994, The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions, New York: Oxford University Press. Question 8: “Can Emotion Be Nonconscious?”, pp. 283–318, affords a mix of empirical and conceptual considerations. (Scholar)
• Ellsworth, Phoebe C. and Klaus R. Scherer, 2003, “Appraisal Processes in Emotion”, in Davidson et al. 2003, Handbook, pp. 572–95. (Scholar)
• Emilsson, Eyójolfur Kjalar, 1998, “Plotinus on the Emotions”, in Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, (eds.), The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 339–63. (Scholar)
• Empedocles (c. 500 B.C.), Fragments, in Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1983). Fragment 17, cited here, and others may be found also in other collections including selections from the presocratic Greek philosophers‘ surviving writings and in editions of Empedocles. (Scholar)
• Epicurus (d. 300 B.C.E.), 1994, The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia, Inwood, Brad and L.P. Gerson, eds. and trans., Indianapolis and Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett Publishing Company. (Scholar)
• Erler, Michael and Malcolm Schofield, , 1999, “Epicurean Ethics”, in Kempe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld & Malcolm Schofield (eds.), Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 642–674. (Scholar)
• Feldman, Fred, 1997a, “On the Intrinsic Value of Pleasures”, in Feldman 1997c, pp. 125–47. Original publication: Ethics, 107 (April 1997): 448–466. (Scholar)
• Feldman, Fred, 1997b, ”Two Questions about Pleasure,“ reprinted in Feldman, 1997c, pp. 79–105. Original publication: Philosophical Analysis: A Defense by Example, David Austin (ed.), Dordrecht: Reidel, 1988, pp. 59–81. Clearly reviews some main kinds of account given by twentieth century philosophers and proposes that the central kind of pleasure is a special attitude and that others are its intentional objects. (Scholar)
• Feldman, Fred, 1997c, Utilitarianism, Hedonism and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Feldman, Fred, 2001, “Hedonism”, in Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (eds.), Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2d edition, 3 vols., New York: Routledge, Vol. II, pp. 662–669. Clearly reviews some kinds of twentieth century philosophers’ views of pleasure including his own ‘attitudinal’ view, before going on to expound versions of hedonism based on them. (Scholar)
• Feldman, Fred, 2002, “The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV(3): 604–28. Part of a 2000 symposium at Brown University. (Scholar)
• Feldman, Fred, 2004, Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Findlay, J.N., 1961, Values and Intentions, New York: Macmillan. Pp. 175–78 argues against the mere feeling view of pleasure as nonexplanatory and running into what is here called ”the problem of good“. The argument is strongly reminiscent of one used by the psychologist William McDougall (e.g., in his 1911), on behalf of his Stoic-influenced hormic psychology, against the simple picture of pleasure. (Scholar)
• Forgas, Joseph P., ed., 2001, Handbook of Affect and Social Cognition, Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. (Scholar)
• Fox, Michael D., Abraham Z. Snyder, Justin L. Vincent, Maurizio Corbetta, David C. Van Essen, and Marcus E. Raichle, 2005, “The human brain is intrinsically organized into dynamic, anticorrelated functional networks”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 102: 9673–9678. (Scholar)
• Fredrickson, Barbara, 1998, “What Good Are Positive Emotions?” Review of Positive Psychology, 2(3): 300–19. Claims there are many positive emotions, although not as well discriminated as negative ones; joy, interest contentment and love (as a complex of these and others) are mentioned. Plausible but vague view that positive emotions serve to broaden attention and cognitive style, which seems to fit a broader range of phenomena than cited. While repeated in later publications, the view seems not yet to have been worked out in greater detail. (Scholar)
• Frijda, Nico, 1993, “Moods, Emotion Episodes and Emotions”, in Handbook of Emotions, Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland, eds., New York and London: The Guilford Presss, pp. 381–403. Not in the 2nd ed. of this. (Scholar)
• Frijda, Nico, 1999, “Emotions and Hedonic Experience”, in Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz, 1999, pp. 190–210. (Scholar)
• Frijda, Nico, 2001, “The Nature of Pleasure”, in Bargh and Appley, 2001, pp. 71–94. (Scholar)
• Frijda, Nico and Marcel Zellenberg, 2003, in Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theories, Methods, Research, Klaus R. Scherer, Angela Schorr and Tom Johnstone, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 141–55. (Scholar)
• Fuchs, Alan E., 1976, “The Production of Pleasure by Stimulation of the Brain: An Alleged Conflict between Science and Philosophy”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 36: 494–505. (Scholar)
• Gardiner, H.M., Ruth Clark Metcalf and John G. Beebe-Center, 1937, Feeling and Emotion: A History of Theories, New York: American Book Company. The most thorough historical account to date in English. (Scholar)
• Gardner, Eliot L. and James David, 1999a, “The Neuorobiology of Chemical Addiction”, in Getting Hooked: Rationality and Addiction, Jon Elster and Ole-dørgen Skog, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 93–136. (Scholar)
• Gardner, Eliot L., 1999b, “The Neurobiology and Genetics of Addiction: Implications of the ‘Reward Deficiency Syndrome’ for Therapeutic Strategies in Chemical Dependency”, Addiction: Entries and Exits, Jon Elster (ed.), New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 57–119. (Scholar)
• Gazzaniga, Michael (ed.), 2004, The Cogntive Neurosciences, 3rd ed., Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. (Scholar)
• Gibbard, Allan, 2003, Thinking how to live, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003. Ch. 2 has an excellent treatment of Moore’s criticism of value hedonism, distinguishing his well-supported claim for a conceptual distinction between pleasure and good from his further claim that these are distinct properties. (Scholar)
• Ginsborg, Hannah, 2014, “Kant’s Aesthetics and Teleology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/kant-aesthetics/>. §2.31 discusses aesthetic judgment’s relation to aesthetic pleasure and §2.33 whether, on Kant’s view of this, aesthetic pleasure is intentional. References to recent philosophical literature on these controversial questions are provided. (Scholar)
• Glare, P.G.W. (ed.), 1968–82, Oxford Latin Dictionary, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Good on etymology, too. (Scholar)
• Goldstein, Irwin, 1980, “Why People Prefer Pleasure to Pain”, Philosophy, 55: 349–62. (Scholar)
• Goldstein, Irwin, 1985, “Hedonic Pluralism”, Philosophical Studies, 48: 59–55. (Scholar)
• Goldstein, Irwin, 1989, “Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional Intrinsic Values”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50(2): 255–276. (Scholar)
• Goldstein, Irwin, 2000, “Intersubjective Properties by Which We specify Pain, Pleasure and Other Kinds of Mental States,” Philosophy, 75: 89–104. (Scholar)
• Goldstein, Irwin, 2002, “The Good’s Magnetism and Ethical Realism”, Philosophical Studies, 108(1–2): 1–14. (Scholar)
• Gosling, Justin, 1998, “Hedonism”, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge, ad loc. (Scholar)
• Gosling, J.C.B., 1969, Pleasure and Desire: The Case for Hedonism Reviewed, Oxford: Oxford University Press. The best introductory book on pleasure, too. Uncluttered and engagingly written, but with only a short select bibliography by way of references. The aim is to distinguish disparate uses and claims run together in the hedonist tradition, without denying the existence or importance of occurrent positive affect in our emotional or active lives. Distinctions made in the course of the twentieth century reaction against hedonism are used to dissect hedonist claims and arguments while excesses of the ordinary language literature (mentioned especially toward the end of n.1 above), then near the end of its run, are largely corrected. A work for undergraduates that wears its wisdom and scholarship lightly while attentive to the intuitive sources and motivations of hedonism in human life. (Scholar)
• Gosling, J.C.B. and Taylor, C.C.W., 1982, The Greeks on Pleasure, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thorough and scholarly, but sometimes the interpretations are controversial. (Scholar)
• Gruber, June and Moskowitz, Judith Tedlie, 2014, Positive Emotion: Integrating the Light Sides and Dark Sides, New York:Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Gusnard, Debra A., Erbil Akbudak, Gordon L, Shulman, and Marcus E. Raichle, 2001, “Medial prefrontal cortex and self-referential mental activity: Relation to a default mode of brain function”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the U.S.A., 98: 4259–4264. (Scholar)
• Gusnard, Debra A., and Marcus E. Raichle, “Functional Imagery, Neurophysiology, and the Resting State of the Brain”, in Gazzaniga 2004, pp. 1267–80. (Scholar)
• Haber, Suzanne N., Julie L. Fudge, and Nikolaus R. McFarland, “Striatonigrostriatal Pathways in Primates Form an Ascending Spiral from the Shell to the Dorsolateral Striatum”, The Journal of Neuroscience, 20(6): 2369–2382. (Scholar)
• Haidt, Jonathan, 2003, “The Moral Emotions,” in Davidson, Scherer, and Goldsmith (Handbook), pp. 852–70. Claims there are distinct moral emotions reflected to differing extents in different enculturated moralities. (Scholar)
• Halbfass, Wilhelm, 1997, “Happiness: A Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Perspective, in Mohanty, J.N. and Bilmoria, P., eds., Relativism, Suffering and Beyond: Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal, Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 150–163. (Scholar)
• Hamlyn, David, 1978, “The Phenomena of Love and Hate”, Philosophy, 53: 5–20. (Scholar)
• Harkins, Jean and Anna Wierzbicka (eds.), 2001, Emotions in Crosslinguistic Perspective, Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. (Scholar)
• Haybron, Daniel, 2001, “Happiness and Pleasure,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXII(3): 501–28. (Scholar)
• Haybron, Daniel, 2007, “Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of Affective Introspection and Recall”, Noûs, 41(3): 394–428 (Scholar)
• Haybron, Daniel, 2008, The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Heathwood, Chris, 2006, “Desire satisfactionism and hedonism”, Philosophical Studies, 128: 539–63. (Scholar)
• Heathwood, Chris, 2007, “The reduction of sensory pleasure to desire“, Philosophical Studies, 133: 23–44. (Scholar)
• Heilman, Kenneth M., 2000, “Emotional Experience: A Neurological Model”, in Lane and Nadel, 2000, pp. 328–44. Well-informed hypotheses on where to look in brain systems’ activity for dimensions of affect, similar to Wundt’s (1896/1897). (Scholar)
• Hejmadi, Ahalya, Richard J. Davidson and Paul Rozin, 2000, “Exploring Hindu Indian Emotion Expressions: Evidence for Accurate Recognition by Americans and Indians”. Psychological Science, 11(3): 183–187. Suggests there are a plurality of basic positive affects. Requires corroboration by other methods, if additions are to be regarded as affects and as basic, rather than just as social signals; e.g, of submission, which may secondarily feel good to people who have been socialized to regard it as appropriate to their age, sex, class or caste status. The classical Sanskrit treatise on dramaturgy Nāṭyaśāstra, cited as a source, may not support the whole list of principal affects it is credited with here, at least in all versions; its Chapter Seven seems not to mention dhyana, contemplation or meditation, translated as “peace” in this paper. See Nāṭyaśāstra: English translation with Critical Notes, rev. ed., 1996 (1st ed., 1986), trans. and notes, Adya Ragacharya, New Delhi: Munishiram Manoharlal, pp. 66ff.. (Scholar)
• Heller, Wendy; Koven, Nancy S.; and Miller, Gregory; 2003; “Regional Brain Activity in Anxiety and Depression”, in Hugdahl and Davidson, 2003, pp. 533–64. (Scholar)
• Helm, Bennett W., 1994, “The Significance of Emotions,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 31(4): 319–31. (Scholar)
• Helm, Bennett W., 2001a, Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Helm, Bennett W., 2001b, “Emotional and Practical Reason: Rethinking Evaluation and Motivation,” Noûs, 35(2): 190–213. (Scholar)
• Helm, Bennett W., 2002, “Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 39(1): 13–30. (Scholar)
• Helm, Bennett W., 2009, “Emotions as Evaluative Feelings”, Emotion Review, 1(3): 248–55. (Scholar)
• Hirvonen, Vesa, 2004, Passions in William Ockham’s Philosophical Psychology, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
• Hobbes, Thomas 1651/1994, Leviathan: with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668, Edwin Curley (ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
• Hobbes, Thomas, 1658/1991, Charles T. Wood, T. S. K. Scott-Craig, and Bernard Gert, trans., De Homine (in part), in Man and Citizen: Thomas Hobbes’s De Homine and De Cive, Indianapolis: Hackett. Contains translation of De Homine, chs. x–xv, drafted 1641, published 1658. (Scholar)
• Hoebel, Bart; Rada, Pedro V.; Mark, Gregory P.; and Pothos, Emmanuel N., 1999, “Neural Systems for Reinforcement and Inhibition of Behavior; Relevance to Eating, Addiction and Depression” in Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz 1999, pp. 558–77. (Scholar)
• Houk, James C.; Davis, Joel L., and Beiser, David G., 1995, Models of Information Processing in the Basal Ganglia, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
• Hugdahl, Kenneth and Davidson, Richard J., eds., 2003, The Asymmetrical Brain, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
• Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature.
• Hundert, E.J., 1994, The Enlightenment’s Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Hursthouse, Rosalind, 2002, “Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of Value”, Mind, 111: 418–422. A review of Helm 2001a. (Scholar)
• Ikemoto, Satoshi and Jaak Panksepp, 1999,“The role of nucleus accumbens dopamine in motivated behavior: a unifying interpretation with special reference to reward-seeking”, Brain Research Reviews, 31: 6–41. (Scholar)
• Isen, Alice. M., 2002, “A Role for Neuropsychology in Understanding the Facilitating Influence of Positive Affect on Social Behavior and Cognitive Processes”, in Handbook of Positive Psychology, eds., C.R. Snyder and Shane J. Lopez, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 528–40. (Scholar)
• Ito, Tiffany A. and Cacioppo, John T., 1999, “The Psychophysiology of Utility Appraisals”, in Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz 1999, pp. 470–88. (Scholar)
• Ito, Tiffany A. and Cacioppo, John T., 2001, “Affect and Attitudes: A Social Neuroscience Approach”, in Forgas 2001, pp. 51–74. (Scholar)
• Izard, Carroll E., 1991, The Psychology of Emotions, New York and London, Plenum. (Scholar)
• Jacob, Pierre, 2014, “Intentionality”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/intentionality/> (Scholar)
• Johnston, Victor S., 1999, Why We Feel: The Science of Human Emotions, A review of some relevant science by a research psychologist written for a general audience. More daring in its interpretations and evolutionary speculation than the literature written for scientists. (Scholar)
• Kagan, Shelly, 1992, “The Limits of Well-being”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 9: 169–89. Also published, with identical pagination, in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.); The Good Life and the Human Good, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 169–189. Section II, Hedonism, discusses well some options for relating pleasure and desire. (Scholar)
• Kahneman, Daniel, 1999, “Objective Happiness”, in Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz, 1999, pp. 3–25. A program for getting from momentary self-reports to somethingmore. Excellent and accessible. See §3.1, last ¶, n. 5 last ¶, and n. 28 on Kahneman’s motivational definition of “instant utility” (p. 4), which seems subject to the objections Sidgwick raised against its Victorian predecessors, 1907, p. 127. (Scholar)
• Kahneman, Daniel, 2000, “Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based Approach”, in Kahneman and Tversky, 2000, pp. 673–92. (Scholar)
• Kahneman, Daniel; Diener, Ed; and Schwarz, Norbert (eds.), 1999, Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Contains contributions from psychologists and others representing different subfields and literatures, generally more accessible than papers written for specialists. Probably the best single place to start reading scientfic literature on the subject. (Scholar)
• Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (eds.), 2000, Choices, Values, and Frames, New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Kahneman, Daniel, Wakker, Peter P., and Sarin, Rakesh, 1997, “Back to Bentham? Explorations of experienced utility”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 2: 375-406. (Scholar)
• Kant, Immanuel, 1790/2000, Kritik der Urteilskraft, trans. as Critique of the power of judgment, Paul Guyer (ed.); Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. See especially, with pages in the Academy edition, referenced in the entry just below, in parentheses: p. 33 (20: 231) from the First Introduction; pp. 105 (5: 220, 222) and Guyer’s notes at p. 361, n. 24 and p. 366, notes 3 and 4 for citations to other writings of Kant’s. For references to recent secondary literature on the relations of aesthetic judgment and aesthetic pleasure in Kant, and on the latter’s possible intentionality, see Ginsborg 2005. Kant’s First Introduction (which some editions follow Kant in omitting) gives his fullest account of the influential division of mind into Cognition, Conation or Desire, and Feeling (involving pleasure or pain). Adding the last of these formally to the medieval Intellect and Will may be new with him, although eighteenth century predecessors, perhaps especially J.G. Sulzer, came very close (Gardiner, Metcalf, and Beebe Center, 1937, ch. ix, pp. 244–75). (Scholar)
• Kant, Immanuel, 1800/1974 (first ed., 1798), Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, English trans.: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Mary Gregor, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. The relevant passage is on p. 100 there and at vol. VII, pp. 231–2 of the standard complete edition of Kant’s works, Gesammelte Schriften, Prussian/German Academy of Sciences, Berlin: G. Reimer/W. de Gruyter, 1902–    , the pagination of which is often included in the margins of later editions and translations.
• Kapur, Shitij, 2003, “Psychosis as a State of Aberrant Salience: A Framework Linking Biology, Phenomenology, and Pharmacology in Schizophrenia”, American Journal of Psychiatry, 160(1): 13–23. (Scholar)
• Katkov, G., 1940, “The Pleasant and the Beautiful”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XL (1939–40): 177–206. Pp. 179–87 may provide the account in English closest to Brentano’s intentions, based on the relevant passage of Brentano’s untranslated 1907 and other works that may yet be unpublished (Katkov’s note, pp. 178–79). The loving is itself part of the act of sensing at which it is directed. One suspects this may be all the reflexivity intended; Chisholm has a loving of a loving in his analysis, which seems a permissible, but not a mandatory, reading of other Brentano texts. (Scholar)
• Katz, Leonard D., 1982, “Hedonic arousal, memory and motivation,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5(1): 60. A commentary on Wise 1982 by a philosopher, showing how to interpret and state Wise’s scientific views in a way friendly to elements of the simple picture of pleasure. (Scholar)
• Katz, Leonard D., 1986, Hedonism as Metaphysics of Mind and Value. Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, published and distributed through ProQuest/UMI (URL = http://www.umi.com/umi/dissertations). An attempt to revive and reform pleasure-centered theorizing in both areas, in the spirit of the simple picture of pleasure. Includes discussion of the ancients, utilitarians, and of neuroscience through 1985. The last is updated in §3 below. Some points are used and some improved upon or corrected here. (Scholar)
• Katz, Leonard D., 2005a, Review of Fred Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005.03.02. [Available online] (Scholar)
• Katz, Leonard D., 2005b, “Opioid bliss as the felt hedonic core of mammalian prosociality – and of consummatory pleasure more generally?”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(3): 356. (Short commentary on Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky 2005 by a philosopher). (Scholar)
• Katz, Leonard D., 2005c, Review of Timothy Schroeder, Three Faces of Desire, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005.09.09. [Avaialble online] (Scholar)
• Katz, Leonard D., 2008, “Hedonic Reasons as Ultimately Justifying and the Relevance of Neuroscience”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders and Development, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, pp. 409–17. (Scholar)
• Kenny, Anthony, 1963, Action, Emotion and the Will, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch. VI, pp. 127–50, is most relevant and includes a pithy statement of Anscombe’s central point. (Scholar)
• Kirk, G.S.; Raven, J.E.; and Schofield, M., 1983, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with Selected Texts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1st ed., 1957. (Scholar)
• Knuuttila, Simo, 2004, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Kraye, Jill (ed.), 1997, Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts, Vol. I, Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Part VI translates extracts from works of Petrarch, Filelfo, Raimondi, and Quevedo partially rehabilitating Epicurean hedonism in a Christian context. (Scholar)
• Kringelbach, Morten. L., 2009, The Pleasure Center: Trust Your Animal Instincts, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Kringelbach, Morten L. and Kent C. Berridge (eds.), 2010, Pleasures of the Brain, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Kringelbach, Morten L. and Kent. C. Berridge, 2015, “Motivation and Pleasure in the Brain”, in Wilhelm Hofmann and Loran F. Nordgren (eds.), The Psychology of Desire, New York and London: The Guilford Press, 129–45. (Scholar)
• Labukt, Ivar, 2012, “Hedonic Tone and the Heterogeneity of Pleasure”, Utilitas, 24(2): 172–99. (Scholar)
• Lamme, Victor A. F., 2003, “Why Visual Attention and Awareness Are Different”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(1): 12–18. (Scholar)
• Lamme, Victor A. F., and P. R. Roelfsema, 2000, “The Distinct Modes of Vision Offered by Feedforward and Recurrent Processing” Trends in Neurosciences, 23(11): 571–579. (Scholar)
• Landfester, Manfred, 1966, Das griechische Nomen «philos» und seine Ableitungen, Hildesheim: Olms. (Scholar)
• Lane, Richard D., 2000, “Neural Corelates of Emotional Experience”, in Lane and Nadel, 2000, pp. 345–70. (Scholar)
• Lane, Richard D, and Nadel, Lynn, eds., 2000, Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Lane, Richard D., Lynn Nadel and Alfred Kaszniak, “Epilogue: The Future of Emotion Research from the Perspective of Cognitive Neuroscience”, in Lane and Nadel, 2000, pp. 407–12. (Scholar)
• Larue, Gerald A., 1991, “Ancient Ethics”, in A Companion to Ethics, Peter Singer (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 29– 40. (Scholar)
• LeDoux, Joseph, The Emotional Brain : The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life New York: Simon & Schuster.
• LeDoux, Joseph, 2002 The Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are, New York and London: Viking Penguin. Ch. 9, pp. 235–91 has further discussion and references on relevant neuroscience, especially of dopamine ‘reward’, by an affective neuroscientist who takes a fairly dim view of it – an eminent amygdala specialist who thinks that what pays off is studying specific emotion systems, such as that supposed to be specifically for fear conditioning in the amygdala. (Many now take a less specific view of amygdala function.) (Scholar)
• Liddell, Henry George and Robert Scott, rev. Henry Stuart Jones, 1940, 9th ed. (1st ed., 1843), A Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Lieh-tzu, 1960, The Book of Lieh-tzu: A Classic of the Tao, trans. A.C. Graham, New York: Columbia University Press. Reports of the naive libertine hedonism of Yang Chu, apparently rare in extant ancient Chinese prose, are in chapter 7. (Scholar)
• Locke, John, 1700/1979, reprinted with corrections from 1975 edition; following mainly 4th ed., 1700; 1st ed. 1689), An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Peter H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. II,xx and xxi are most relevant.
• Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N. (eds., trans., commentary and notes), 1987, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols., Vol. I containing English translations and Vol. II containing Greek texts. Texts and notes in §21 (Epicurean) and in §§57 and 65 (Stoic), in both volumes, are relevant. (Scholar)
• Lucretius (Titus Lucretius Carus, 1st c. B.C.E.), De rerum natura. This exposition of Epicureanism in verse is available in many editions and translations.
• Lycan, William, 2015, “Representational Theories of Consciousness”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/consciousness-representational/>. (Scholar)
• Lyons, William, 1980, Gilbert Ryle: An Introduction to his Philosophy, Brighton: Harvester and Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Humanities. Chapter 11 critically discusses Ryle 1954a and 1954b but overlooks the relevant chapter in his 1949. (Scholar)
• Madell, Geoffrey, 1996, “What Music Teaches about Emotion,” Philosophy, 71: 63–82. (Scholar)
• Madell, Geoffrey, 2002, Philosophy, Music and Emotion. 2002, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (Scholar)
• Manstead, Antony S. R.; Frijda, Nico and Fischer, Agneta (eds.), 2004, Feelings and Emotions: The Amsterdam Symposium, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Matilal, Bimal Krishna, 1986, Perception: An Essay in Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. (Scholar)
• McDougall, William, 1911, Body and Mind, New York: Macmillan. There have been several identically paginated reprint editions. (Scholar)
• McGrade, Arthur Stephen, 1981, “Ockham on Enjoyment: Toward an Understanding of Fourteenth Century Philosophy and Psychology,” Review of Metaphysics 33: 706–28. “Enjoyment” is the traditional but misleading translation of the technical use of “fruitio” and cognates in these medieval texts. In the text I prefer “valuing” for this act of the Will distinguishable from pleasure and arguably antecedent to and dissociable from it, as on Ockham’s own view. (Scholar)
• McGrade, Arthur Stephen, 1987, “Enjoyment at Oxford after Ockham,” in Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks, eds., From Ockham to Wyclif, Oxford: Blakwell, pp. 63–88. An excellent and clear discussion of the alternatives to Ockham’s view in the fourteenth century debates. But see note on his 1981 above. (Scholar)
• Merlan, Philip, 1960, “Hēdonē in Epicurus and Aristotle”, in his Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle (Klassich-Philologische Studien, Volume 22), Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, pp. 1–37. (Scholar)
• Mill, James, 1829/1869, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 2nd ed., 1869, John Stuart Mill (ed. and annot.) (1st ed., London: Baldwin and Cradock, 1829), London: Longmans Green Reader & Dyer, 2 vols. (Scholar)
• Mill, John Stuart, 1872/1979 (1st ed., 1865), An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy and of the Principal Questions Discussed in his Writings, 1872 4th ed. text, J. M. Robson (ed.), Toronto: University of Toronto Press and London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979. Chapter XXV, pp. 430–436, is the classic rejoinder to Aristotelian views in a principal but now little-read work of Mill’s.
• Mill, John Stuart, 1871 (1st ed., 1861), Utilitarianism, 4th ed., London: Longmans Green Reader & Dyer. Many recent editions based on this are available.
• Millgram, Elijah, 1997, Practical Induction Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 6, pp. 105–40, gives an indicator of well-being theory of pleasure. (Scholar)
• Millgram, Elijah, 2000, “What’s the Use of Utility?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 29,2:114–36. An indicator of change for the better account of pleasure. (Scholar)
• Mitsis, Phillip, 1987, Epicurus’ Ethical Theory, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
• Monier-Williams, Monier, 1899, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Etymologically and Philologically Arranged with special reference to Cognate European Languages, new ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press. This standard is available in both British and Indian reprints. (Scholar)
• Moore, George Edward (G.E.), 1903, Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. III, “Hedonism”, pp. 59–109 and especially the distinction between pleasure and consciousness of pleasure at pp. 87–89, influenced by Plato’s discussion in Philebus 21A. Plato’s distinction there between pure pleasure and cognition, however, may differ from Moore’s in leaving what Block calls “phenomenal consciousness” on the pleasure side. Moore uses an undifferentiated concept of consciousness. (Scholar)
• Moran, Richard, 2002, “Frankfurt on Identification: Ambiguities of Activity in Mental Life”, in Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, pp. 189–217. Pp. 209–14 contain a sensitive discussion of ways pleasure may be regarded as norm-governed and active, much in the spirit of Aristotle and of Anscombe. A controversial inference that pleasure cannot be the sort of thing that could be directly caused by drug action is drawn. (Scholar)
• Morillo, Carolyn R., 1990, “The Reward Event and Motivation”, Journal of Philosophy, 87(4): 169–186. Material from this is included in her 1995. (Scholar)
• Morillo, Carolyn R., 1992, “Reward Event Systems: Reconceptualizing the Explanatory Roles of Motivation, Desire and Pleasure,” Philosophical Psychology, 5(1): 7–32. Material from this is included in her 1995. (Scholar)
• Morillo, Carolyn, 1995, Contingent Creatures: A Reward-Event Theory of Motivation and Value, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. Includes material from her 1990 and 1992 in Chapter 2. Defends a hedonistic view of motivation and value (but an avowedly nonnormative and naturalist one) in the light of the brain reward and conditioning literature. Clearly develops a view of motivation like the motivation by pleasant thoughts view put forward by Schlick (1930/1939) and discussed by Gosling (1969), while also emphasizing that pleasure is itself intrinsic and nonrelational, as in her 1992. (Scholar)
• Moss, Jessica, 2006, “Pleasure and Illusion in Plato”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72: 503-35, (Scholar)
• Moss, Jessica, 2012, Arisotle on the Apparent Good: Perception, Phantasia, Thought, & Desire, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Mulligan, Kevin, 2004, “Brentano on the mind”, in Dale Jaquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 66–97. Pp. 83–86 summarize and reference Brentano’s views on pleasure and pain – his earlier views as well as the mature ones discussed in §2.3.1, ¶2 and n. 21. (Scholar)
• Murphy, Sheila T., Jennifer L. Monahan and R.B. Zajonc, 1995, “Additivity of Nonconscious Affect: Combined Effects of Priming and Exposure”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69(4): 589–602. (Scholar)
• Murphy, Sheila T. and R. B. Zajonc, 1993, “Affect, Cognition, and Awareness: Affective Priming With Optimal and Suboptimal Stimulus Exposures”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(5): 723–739. (Scholar)
• Murray, James Augustus Henry; Henry Bradley, William Alexander Craigie and Charles Talbut Onions (eds.), 1884–1928, The Oxford English Dictionary (original title: A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles), Oxford: Oxford University Press. ‘OED’. A uniform corrected edition appeared in 1933, a 2d ed. in 1989. (Scholar)
• Musch, Jochen and Klauer, Karl Christoph, 2003, The Psychology of Motivation: Affective Processes in Cognition and Emotion, Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. (Scholar)
• Nader, Karim; Bechara, Antoine; and van der Kooy, Derek, 1997, “Neurobiological Constraints on Behavioral Models of Motivation”, Annual Review of Psychology, 48: 85–114. (Scholar)
• Nettle, Daniel, 2005, Happiness: The Science behind Your Smile, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Neumann, Roland; Förster, Jens; Strack, Fritz, 2003, “Motor Compatibility: The Bidirectional Link between Behavior and Evaluation”, in Musch and Klauer, 2003, pp. 371–391. (Scholar)
• Nichols, Herbert, 1892, “The Origin of Pleasure and Pain, I”, The Philosophical Review, 1(4): 403–432. (Scholar)
• Nowell-Smith, Patrick Horace, 1954, Ethics, Harmondsworth: Middlesex. Especially pp. 111–115 on ‘pro-attitudes’, including pleasure, as explanatory (i.e., involving conation of various kinds, as it seems) and pp. 127–32 on enjoyment. He seems thus to seek some middle way between Ryle’s dispositional view and older experiential episode views, but to leave any filling out of the details to psychology. (Scholar)
• Nussbaum, Martha C., 1994, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• Nussbaum, Martha C., 2001, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Nyanatiloka, 1980, Buddhist Dictionary: Manual of Buddhist Terms and Doctrines, 4th ed., Nyanaponika, Kandy (ed. and rev.), Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society Valuable for its doctrinal summaries and translation suggestions, such as “joyful interest” for pīti, p. 168, adopted here; the work of Theravadin Buddhist monks of German and German-Jewish origin, respectively, a teacher-student pair; the original version was done by Nyanatiloka during their World War II internment as enemy aliens in British India. (Scholar)
• Ockham, see William of Ockham.
• Olds, James, 1958, “Self-Stimulation of the Brain: Its Use to Study Local Effects of Hunger, Sex, and Drugs”, Science, 127: 315–24. (Scholar)
• Olds, James, 1965, “Pleasure Centers in the Brain”, Scientific American, 195: 105–16. (Scholar)
• Olds, James, 1977, Drives and Reinforcements: Behavioral Studies of Hypothalamic Functions, New York: Raven Press. (Scholar)
• Olds, James and Milner, Peter, 1954, “Positive reinforcement produced by electrical stimulation of septal area and other regions of rat brain”, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 47: 419–27. (Scholar)
• Oliver, Alex, “Facts,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London and New York: Routledge, Vol. 3, pp. 535–37. (Scholar)
• Onions, C.T., 1966, The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Owen, G.E.L., 1971–72,“Aristotelian Pleasures,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 72: 135–52. Reprinted in his Logic, Science and Method: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy, Martha Nussbaum (ed.), Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996. (Scholar)
• Panksepp, Jaak, 1998, Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Panksepp, Jaak, 2000a, “Emotions as Natural Kinds within the Mammalian Brain”, ch. 9, in Handbook of Emotions, 2nd ed., Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones (eds.), New York and London, The Guilford Press, pp. 137–156. (Scholar)
• Panksepp, Jaak, 2000b, “The Riddle of Laughter: Neural and Psychoevolutionary Wellsprings of Joy”, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9(6): 183–186. (Scholar)
• Panksepp, Jaak, 2014, “Understanding the Neurobiology of Core Postive Emotions through Animal Models: Affective and Clinical Implications“, in Gruber and Moskowitz, 116-36. (Scholar)
• Panksepp, Jaak, Brian Knutson and Jeff Burgdorf, 2002, “The role of brain emotional systems in addictions: a neuro-evolutionary perspective and new ‘self-report’ animal model,” Addiction, 97: 450–469. (Scholar)
• Panksepp, Jaak, and Biven, Lucy, 2012, The Archaeology of Mind: Neuroevolutionary Origins of Human Emotions, New York: Norton. (Scholar)
• Parfit, Derek, 1984, Reasons and Persons, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Peciña, Susana and Berridge, Kent C., 2000, “Opioid site in nucleus accumbens shell mediates eating and hedonic ‘liking’ for food: map based on microinjection Fos plumes”, Brain Research, 863: 71–86. (Scholar)
• Peciña, Susana; Cagniard, Barbara; Berridge, Kent C.; Aldridge, J. Wayne; and Zhuang, Xiaoxi, 2003, ”Hyperdopaminergic Mutant Mice Have Higher “Wanting” But Not “Liking“ for Sweet Rewards,” The Journal of Neuroscience, 23(28): 9395–9402. (Scholar)
• Penelhum, Terence, 1957, “The Logic of Pleasure”, Philosophy and Phenomenlogical Research, XVII: 488–23. Classic critical discussion of Ryle, accepting his positive account of enjoyment as a form of effortless attention but rejecting his claim that this is always a disposition rather than an episode. (Scholar)
• Perry, David L., 1967, The Concept of Pleasure, The Hague: Mouton. Uses the method of British ordinary language philosophy but often takes issue with predecessors in it, as well as with the earlier hedonist tradition. (Scholar)
• Pfaffmann, Carl, 1960, “The pleasures of sensation”, Psychological Review, 67: 753–68. (Scholar)
• Pizzagalli, Diego; Shackman, Alexander J.; and Davidson, Richard J.; 2003, “The Functional Imaging of Human Emotion: Asymmetric Contributions of Cortical and Subcortical Circuitry”, in Hugdahl and Davidson, 2003, pp. 511–32. (Scholar)
• Plato, 1997, Complete Works, trans. by many hands, with notes by John M. Cooper (ed.); D. S. Hutchinson (assoc ed.), Indianapolis and Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett Publishing Company. (Scholar)
• Plato, Definitions. Generally regarded as not by Plato himself, but a record of work done by those in his circle. It is included in the 1997 Complete Works in a translation by D.S. Hutchinson. (Scholar)
• Plato, Gorgias, in Plato 1997.
• Plato, Philebus, trans. with notes and commentary by J.C.B. Gosling, London: Oxford University Press, 1975. A large and ongoing secondary literature debating the interpretation of the section on false pleasures exists.
• Plato, Protagoras, 1991/1976, trans. and notes, C.C.W. Taylor, Oxford: Oxford University Press, rev. ed., 1991 (1st ed., 1976). 352B–357E apparently adopts a summative hedonism about individual welfare and prudential rationality in this supposedly relatively early work, but likely only for the purposes of the argument, ironically or to lead protreptically toward views defended later; this hedonism seems to be rejected in the Gorgias and most explicitly at Phaedo 68Ef. and also seems clearly inconsistent with what are thought to be Plato’s later writings. A large and continuing secondary literature exists on the interpretation of this latter section of the dialogue and on whether and how it can be reconciled with view defended inj other dialogues.
• Plato, Republic, in Plato 1997.
• Potter, Karl (ed.), 1977, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol., II, Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṇgeśa, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass. (Scholar)
• Preston, Stephanie D. and Frans B.M. de Waal, 2002, “Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25: 1–72. With peer commentaries and the authors’ reply. (Scholar)
• Preuss, Peter, 1994, Epicurean Ethics: Katastematic Hedonism, Lewiston, New York; Queenston, Ontario; Lampeter, Wales: The Edwin Mellen Press. Ch. Six: Kinetic and Katastematic Pleasure, pp. 121–77, critically reviews earlier interpretations and presents his own at pp. 162–77. (Scholar)
• Prinz, Jesse, 2004, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Provine, Robert J., 2000, Laughter: A Scientific Investigation, New York: Viking. (Scholar)
• Puccetti, Roland, 1969, “The Sensation of Pleasure”, The British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 20(3): 239–245. (Scholar)
• Putnam, Hilary, 1975, Mind, Language and Reality (Philosophical Papers, Volume 2), London: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli and Moore, Charles A., eds., 1957, A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• Rachels, Stuart, 2004, “Six Theses about Pleasure”, Philosophical Perspectives, 18: 247–67. (Scholar)
• Rainville, Pierre, 2002, “Brain mechanisms of pain affect and pain modulation,” Current Opinion in Neuorbiology, 12: 195–204. (Scholar)
• Rawls, John, 1999, A Theory of Justice, 2nd ed. (1st ed., 1971); Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. §84 is most directly relevant. (Scholar)
• Rhys Davids, T.W. and Stede, William, Pali-English Dictionary, Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1921–1925, repr. 1998. There are also other reprint edition, British and Indian, of this old standard; a new dictionary in progress has not yet reached the terms of most interest here.
• Rilling, James K., David A. Gutman, Thorsten R. Zeh, Giuseppe Pagnoni, Gregory S. Berns, and Clinton D. Kilts, 2002, “ A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation”, Neuron, 35(2): 395–405. A study purporting to show how cooperating in a seeming Prisoner’s Dilemma really pays off because it makes cooperators happier than defectors. Based on interpretation of functional brain imaging supported by subjects’ self-reports. (Scholar)
• Robinson, Terry E. and Kent C. Berridge, 1993, “The neural basis of drug craving: an incentive-sensitization theory of addiction”, Brain Research Reviews, 18(3): 247–91. Probably their most explicit and interesting to philosophers; a useful Glosssary clearly explains both the standard uses of relevant terms in their field and their innovations, pp. 279–81. (Scholar)
• Robinson, Terry E. and Kent C. Berridge, 2000, “The psychology and neurobiology of addiction: an incentive-sensitization view”, Addiction, 95 (Supplement 2): S91–S117. (Scholar)
• Robinson, Terry E. and Kent C. Berridge, 2001, “Incentive-sensitization and addiction”, Addiction, 96: 103–114. A shorter version of their 2000. (Scholar)
• Rolls, Edmund T., 1999, The Brain and Reward, New York: Oxford University Press. This book is not really about emotion, as conceived by philosophers or in ordinary language, but mainly about brain systems for reward (what an animal can be trained to perform an operant task in order to get) and motivation, thoroughly reviewed by a senior experimenter on the brains of nonhuman animals – roughly, in older psychological jargon, the territory of reinforcement and drive. Chapter 9 is on pleasure. (Scholar)
• Rolls, Edmund T., 2000, ”The Orbitofrontal Cortex and Reward,“ Cerebral Cortex, 40: 284–94. (Scholar)
• Rosenkranz, Melissa A., Daren C. Jackson, Kim M. Dalton, Isa Dolski, Carol D. Ryff, Burt H. Singer, Daniel Muller, Ned H. Kalin, and Richard J. Davidson, 2003, “Affective style and in vivo immune response: Neurobehavioral mechanisms”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the U.S.A., 100: 11148–11152. (Scholar)
• Russell, Bertrand, 1921, The Analysis of Mind, London: Unwin and New York: Macmillan. Pp. 69–72 are relevant; Russell defines pleasure behaviorally and, quoting the neurologist Henry Head, adopts his distinction between pain and ‘discomfort’, based on observations of soldiers wounded in World War I. (Scholar)
• Russell, Bertrand, 1930/1968, The Conquest of Happiness, New York: Liveright, 1930 (New York: Bantam Books reprint, 1980). Ostensibly written as a self-help book free of deep philosophy, it is still worth reading, not only for its wise practical advice, nonetheless. (Scholar)
• Russell, Daniel, 2005, Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Russell, James A., 1991, “Culture and the Categorization of Emotions”, Psychological Bulletin, 110(3): 426–50. Survey of wide array of evidence supporting positive/negative categorization of affect, by a major and sophisticated proponent. Wierzbicka’s later synthesis of the linguistic data (1999) should be more up-to-date on that. (Scholar)
• Russell, James A., 2003, “Core Affect and the Psychological Construction of Emotion,” Psychological Review, 110(1): 145–72. Russell’s core affect is supposed to be in itself objectless but always conscious, whereas Berridge’s core affective processes are supposed to be in themselves unconscious as well. (Scholar)
• Russell, James A. and Barrett, Lisa Feldman, 1999, “Core affect, prototypical emotional episodes, and other things called emotion: Dissecting the elephant”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(5): 805–819. A sophisticated attempt to show how apparently competing approaches to the classification of emotion, the dimensional approach to which Russell is a major contributor and the discrete emotions approach supported, for example, by Ekman and Panksepp, can fit together. This special journal section (Diener 1999), mainly on the dimensional approach, is a good place to see the state of play then on Russell’s ‘bipolar’ (positive vs. negative affect on the same dimension) approach. (Scholar)
• Ryle, Gilbert, 1949, The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson, 1949. Chapter IV, ”Emotion“, and especially its §6, “Enjoying and Wanting”, started the mid-century Anglo-American literature with its quasi-behaviorist strong denial that there are occurrent episodes of pleasure. Often in an assertive rhetorical tone. (Scholar)
• Ryle, Gilbert, 1951, “Feelings”, Philosophical Quarterly 1,3:193–205, repr. in his 1971, pp. 272–86. (Scholar)
• Ryle, Gilbert, 1954a, “Pleasure”, Ch. 4 in Dilemmas: The Tarner Lectures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 54–67. His largest collection of considerations against the view that pleasure is an occurrence in experience, mainly at pp. 58–61. Some strong claims taken by followers to be obvious and based on ordinary English usage may, perhaps, be traced to other sources. That pleasure is inseparable from its object (p. 61) may derive (aside from grammatical transitivity) from the supposed results of intropectionist psychology reported in Duncker 1941 (see annotation there). The very strongly hedged claim, that pleasure is not an episode since it cannot be independently clocked and one cannot be pleased quickly (pp. 58–60), seems to draw a conclusion that pleasure is not an occurrent state in part from Aristotelian premises that do not, at least obviously, support it. The relevant Aristotelian view is that pleasure is not a process but an activity that, like seeing, is complete in each of its (experiential?) moments. E.g., at any moment of seeing or enjoying one can truly say that one has already seen or enjoyed oneself, while it is not generally true that when one is building a house that one has already built it (e.g., NE 1174a13–b14). It has not, apparently, been similarly argued on such grounds that there are no experiential episodes of seeing (an example of Aristotle’s which he sees as parallel to pleasure) or of tasting, or that a dispositionalist rather than an occurent state account of these is therefore true, although these would seem equally to follow. But Ryle may be more influenced by the difficulty of attending to describable features of pleasure (on which see §1.3, last two paragraphs) and by its consequences in introspectionist psychology.
• Ryle, Gilbert, 1954b, “Pleasure”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 28 (Supplementary Volume): 135–146; repr. in his 1971, pp. 325–35. Ryle’s most tentative yet most constructive treatment, emphasizing more than his other writings on pleasure his positive view that pleasure is a manner or kind of attention or interest. It is strongly reminiscent of Aristotle. (Scholar)
• Ryle, Gilbert, 1971, Collected Papers (Volume II: Collected Essays, 1929–1968), London: Hutchinson & Co. (Scholar)
• Scanlon, T.M., “Replies” Social Theory and Practice, 28(2): 337–58. (Scholar)
• Scherer, Klaus R., 2003, Introduction to “Cognitive Components of Emotion” section in Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith 2003, (Handbook), pp. 141–55 (Scholar)
• Schlick, Moritz, 1930/1939, Fragen der Ethik, Vienna: Springer, 1930. Trans. by David Rynin as Problems of Ethics, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939. The classic statement of the motivation by pleasant thoughts variety of hedonist motivation psychology is in Ch. II. (Scholar)
• Schroeder, Timothy, 2001, “Pleasure, Displeasure and Representation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 31(4): 507–30. (Scholar)
• Schroeder, Timothy, 2004, Three Faces of Desire, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Schultz, Wolfram, 2000, “Multiple Reward Signals in the Brain”, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 1: 201–7. (Scholar)
• Schultz, Wolfram and Dickinson, Anthony, 2000, “Neuronal Coding of Prediction Errors,” Annual Review of Neuroscience, 23: 473–500. Leading scientists review the literature on how dopamine neurons serve as teachers or critics in learning and also show this function is not unique to dopamine neurons but is widespread. (Scholar)
• Scitovsky, Tibor, 1992/1976, The Joyless Economy: The Psychology of Human Satisfaction, rev. ed, New York: Oxford University Press. An economist’s case against what he takes to be the counterproductive contemporary pursuit of stable comfort at the expense of pleasure, which he takes to be felt transition toward optimal arousal level. The revised edition contains no updating of the old science. Kahneman 1999, pp. 13ff., provides some discussion and references toward updating the science and reappraising Scitovsky’s claims, discussed briefly in n. 31. (Scholar)
• Sen, Amartya, 1985, Commodities and Capabilities Amsterdam: North-Holland. An Aristotelian-type view of well-being is deployed to produce a measure of social distributive justice. (Scholar)
• Seneca, Lucius Annaeus, 1917–25 (1st century B.C.E.), Ad lucilium epistolae morales, with trans. by Richard M. Gummere, 3 vols., Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press and London: Heinemann. The influential Roman Stoic’s mature reflections on ethics in the form of letters to a young friend.
• Shackman, Alexander J., “Anterior Cerebral Asymmetry, Affect, and Psychopathology: Commentary on the Approach-Withdrawal Model”, in Davidson 2000b, pp. 104–32. (Scholar)
• Sherrington, Charles, 1906/1947, The Integrative Action of the Nervous System, New Haven, Yale University Press. (Original publication: New York: Scribner, 1906.) Later reprints follow the pagination of the 1947 edition, which prefixes a new author’s Foreword to the reset 1906 text. (Scholar)
• Shizgal, Peter, 1997, “Neural basis of utility estimation”, Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 7: 198–208. (Scholar)
• Shizgal, Peter, 1999, “On the Neural Computation of Utility: Implications from Studies of Brain Stimulation Reward”, in Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz, 1999, pp. 500–524. (Scholar)
• Sidgwick, Henry, 1907, Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., London: Macmillan; 1st ed. 1874. The culminating work of the British hedonistic utilitarian tradition and one of the all-time greats of moral philosophy. Book I, ch. iv and Book II are especially relevant. (Scholar)
• Siewert, Charles, 2011, “Consciousness and Intentionality”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/consciousness-intentionality/>. (Scholar)
• Smith, Adam, 1790/1976, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, eds., London, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Smart, J.J.C. and Williams, Bernard, 1973, Utilitarianism: for and against, London: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Smuts, Aaron, 2011, “The feels good theory of pleasure”, Philosophical Studies, 155: 241–65. (Scholar)
• Sobel, David, 1999, “Pleasure as a Mental State”, Utilitas, 11(2) (July 1999): 230–234. Criticism of Katz 1986 and Kagan 1992 from a desire-based standpoint on both pleasure and reasons. (Scholar)
• Solomon, Robert C. and Stone, Lori D., 2002, “On ‘Positive’ and ‘Negative’ Emotions”, Journal of the Theory of Social Behavior, 32(2): 417–35. While many of their complaints about failures to distinguish different psychological and evaluative distinctions in the softer psychological literature and about the misleading terminology (seeming to presuppose these are opposite poles or contraries) are well-placed, the seeming rejection of the centrality of a single distinction between positive and negative affect in the affective sciences is at least very premature. The harder evidence supporting it (e.g., opposite immune system effects, cerebral asymmetries in studies of mood, temperament [see Rosenkranz et al. 2003 for recent results and earlier references] and psychopathology [Davidson and Pizzagalli 2002]) is not even considered here. (Scholar)
• Sorabji, Richard, 2000, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation: The Gifford Lectures, New York: Oxford University Press. Part I, Emotions as Judgments versus Irrational Forces, pp. 16–155, summarized in the Introduction at pp. 2–7, is a good discussion of whether all affect can be reduced to judgment. While Sorabji emphasizes the important ancient debate provoked by the claim of Chrysippus that emotions (including pleasure and joy) are judgments, there is some discussion of recent philosophical and scientific literature as well. (Scholar)
• Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch), 1677, Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata in Carl Gebhardt, 4 vols., Spinoza Opera, Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925. Cited passages in Vol. II, pp. 148–49, 191. Of the recent English translators, Richard Shirley (Hackett, 1982) and G.H.R. Parkinson (Oxford, 2000) translate Spinoza’s “laetitia” by “pleasure”, but Edwin Curley by “joy”, following the “joie” of Descartes’ Les Passions de l’Âme (Princeton University Press, in Collected Works, Vol. I, 1985, pp. 500–501, 531; also in his A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, Princeton, 1994). (Scholar)
• Stocker, Michael with Hegeman, Elizabeth, 1996, Valuing Emotions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Strack, Fritz; Argyle, Michael; and Schwarz, Norbert, eds., 1991, Subjective well-being: an interdisciplinary perspective, Oxford: Pergamon. Provides an entry into the social psychology self-report literature, some of which deals with pleasure. This literature tends to show subjects’ self-ratings of well-being or happiness are based partly on pleasure, partly on the absence of negative affect, and partly on their views of how well they are achieving the ends they regard as important in life (their ‘life satisfaction’). For new publications in this literature, check the Journal of Happiness Studies, (Kluwer, 2000+). (Scholar)
• Strick, Peter L., 2004, “Basal Ganglia and Cerebellar Circuits with the Cerebral Cortex”, in Gazzaniga 2004, pp. 453–61. (Scholar)
• Striker, Gisela, 1993, “Epicurean Hedonism”, in Passions and Perceptions; Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind; Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum, Jacques Brunschwig and Martha Nussbaum (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–18. Reprinted in her Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 196–208. (Scholar)
• Sumner, L. W., 1996, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 4, “Hedonism”, pp. 81–112 defends an attitude view (of ‘enjoyment’) and opposes others on the way to theses in ethics. (Scholar)
• Sutton, Steven K. and Davidson, Richard J., 1997, “Prefrontal brain asymmetry: A biological substrate of the behavioral approach and inhibition systems”, Psychological Science, 8(3): 204–10. (Scholar)
• Sutton, Steven K. and Davidson, Richard J, 2000, “Prefrontal brain electrical asymmetry predicts the evaluation of affective stimuli”, Neuropsychologia, 38(13): 1723–1733. (Scholar)
• Tanyi, Attila, 2010, “Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 14: 101–15. (Scholar)
• Taylor, C.C.W., 1963, “Pleasure”, Analysis, 23 (Supplement): 3–19. Refines Ryle’s account of enjoyment while admitting other supposedly less central or important kinds of Pleasure as well. (Scholar)
• Thayer, Robert E., 1989, The Biopsychology of Mood and Arousal, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Thayer, Robert E, 1996, The origin of everyday moods: understanding and managing energy and tension, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Titchener, Edward Bradford, 1908, Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention, New York: Macmillan. Ch. IV, “The Tridimensional Theory of Feeling and Emotion”, is a long, chatty, account of the evolution of Wundt’s writings and views, with extensive quotations in his original German, by the last major representative of the introspectionist school of early academic experimental psychology. (Scholar)
• Tomkins, Silvan S., 1962, Affect, Imagery, Consciousness, Vol. I: The Positive Affects, New York: Springer Publishing Company. (Scholar)
• Tracy, Jessica L. and Robins, Richard W., 2004, “Show Your Pride: Evidence for a Discrete Emotion Expression”, Psychological Science, 15(3): 194–97. (Scholar)
• Trigg, Roger, 1970, Pain and Emotion, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. VI, “Is Pleasure a Sensation”, pp. 102–24, is most relevant. The most substantial contribution of the ordinary language tradition to the study of affect. An excellent, underread book, perhaps still the best philosophical discussion of the dissociation of emotional reactions from sensory pain, which neurologists and some philosophers became saliently aware of in result of reactions to battlefield injury and evacuation in World War I. What he says about pain seems mainly to be consistent with science to date. (Scholar)
• Tye, Michael, 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind, Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. Pp. 128–30 are on our topic. (Scholar)
• Urry, Heather L.; Nichols, Jack B; Dolski, Isa; Jackson, Daren C.; Dalton, Kim M.; Mueller, Corrina J.; Rosenkranz, Melissa A.; Ryff, Carol D., Singer, Burton H.; and Davidson, Richard J., “Making a Life Worth Living: Neural Correlates of Well-Being”, Psychological Science, 15(6): 367–71. (Scholar)
• Van Riel, Gerd, 1999, “Does a Perfect Activity Necessarily Yield Pleasure? An Evaluation of the Relation between Pleasure and Perfect Activity in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII and X”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 7(2): 211–24. (Scholar)
• Van Riel, Gerd, 2000a, Pleasure and the Good Life: Plato, Aristotle, and the Neoplatonists, Leiden: Brill, 2000. Especially pp. 7–37 on Plato and 43–78 on Aristotle. Concise account of the Epicureans and Stoics, too. (Scholar)
• Van Riel, Gerd, 2000b, “Aristotle’s Definition of Pleasure: a Refutation of the Platonic Account”, Ancient Philosophy, 20(1): 119–138. (Scholar)
• Vasubandhu (c. 400 C.E. Buddhist), 1923–31. L’abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, tr. and annotated in French by Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Paris and Louvain: Paul Geuthner, 1923–31, 6 vols., repr. Brussells: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1971. A less satisfactory translation into English from this French translation, itself based mainly on an ancient Chinese translation from the original Sanskrit which has since been largely recovered, is that of L.M. Pruden, Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, Berkeley, California: Asian Humanities Press, 1988–90.
• Vasubandhu (c. 400 C.E. Buddhist), 1984, “A Discourse of the Five Aggregates” (Pañcaskandhaka), in Stefan Anacker (trans. and ed.), Seven Works of Vasubandhu, The Buddhist Psychological Doctor, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, pp. 65–82. (Scholar)
• Voruganti, Lakshmi; Slomka, Piotr;, Zabel, Pamela; Costa, Giuseppe; So, Aaron; Mattar, Adel; and Awad, George A., 2001, “Subjective Effects of AMPT-induced Dopamine Depletion in Schizophrenia: Correlation between Dysphoric Responses and Striatal D₂ Binding Ratios on SPECT Imaging”, Neuropsychopharmacology, 25(5): 642–50. Has relevant recent references. Supports the dopamine pleasure interpretation. Caution: Wise 1996 is reported in terms of pleasure, whereas he had by then abandoned such interpretation and uses there only the behavioral term “reward”. But in this study, with human patients, feeling bad when dopamine-depleted by anti-psychotic medication may be checked more directly than in Wise’s animal studies. (Scholar)
• Voznesensky, Andrei (1967/1966), “Oza”, in Antiworlds and the Fifth Ace: Poetry by Andrei Voznesensky: A Bilingual Edition, Patricia Blake and Max Hayward (eds.), New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
• Wacker, Jan; Heldmann, Marcus; Stemmler, Gerhard, 2003, “Separating Emotion and Motivational Direction in Fear and Anger: Effects on Frontal Asymmetry”, Emotion, 3(2): 167–193. (Scholar)
• Walther von der Vogelweide, c. 1227, “Elegie”. There are many editions and reprintings in anthologies. (Scholar)
• Warner, Richard, 1987, Freedom, Enjoyment, and Happiness: An Essay in Moral Psychology, Ithaca and London: Cornell Univeristy Press. A cognitive definition of enjoyment, in terms of belief and desire, is at p. 129. Purports to develop a ‘Kantian’ approach, but this is an analysis in terms of belief and desire quite unlike Kant’s own treatment, which provides rough functional characterizations but no analysis because he took pleasure to be undefinable. See under Kant for citations. (Scholar)
• Watkins, Calvert rev. and ed., 2000, The American Heritage Dictionary of Indo-European Roots, 2d ed. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000. Much of its content is available as an appendix to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. (Scholar)
• Watson, David, 2000, Mood and Temperament, New York and London: The Guilford Press. A very accessible summary of some of the easier relevant science. (Scholar)
• Wierzbicka, Anna, 1999, Emotions Across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme. (Scholar)
• Wierzbicka, Anna and Jean Harkins, 2001, Introduction to Harkins and Wierzbicka, 2001, pp. 1–34. (Scholar)
• William of Ockham, 2001, (c. 1317–26), “Using and Enjoying”, trans. Stephen Arthur McGrade, in Arthur Stephen McGrade, John Kilcullen and Matthew Kempshall, eds., The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, Vol. Two, Ethics and Political Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 351–417. This translates Questions 1–4 and 6 of Distinction 1 of his Ordinatio, a commentary on the first book of the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Original Latin text: Guillelmi de Ockham (William of Ockham), Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum Ordinatio, Gedeon Gál (ed. with the assistance of Stephen Brown), 4 vols., St. Bonaventure, New York: Franciscan Institute, 1967, Vol. I, Prologus et Distinctio Prima, pp. 371–447, 486–507. These are Vols. I-IV in their edition of Ockham’s Opera Theologica.
• Williams, Bernard, 1959, “Pleasure and Belief”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 73 (Supplement): 73–92; reprinted in Philosophy of Mind, Stuart Hampshire (ed.), Philosophy of Mind, New York: Harper and Row, 1966, pp. 225–42. (Scholar)
• Willner, Paul, 2002, “Dopamine and Depression”, in Gaetano Di Chiara (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Pharmacology, Vol. 154/II: Dopamine in the CNS II, Berlin: Springer, 2002, pp. 387–416. (Scholar)
• Winkielman, Piotr; Berridge, Kent C. 2004; “Unconscious Emotion”, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13(3): 120–23. (Scholar)
• Winkielman, Piotr; Berridge, Kent C; and Wilbarger, Julia L. 2005; “Emotion, Behavior, and Conscious Experience: Once More without Feeling”, in Barrett, Niedenthal, and Winkielman 2005, pp. 335–62. (Scholar)
• Wise, 1982, “Neuroleptics and operant behavior: the anhedonia hypothesis”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5(1): 39–87. With peer commentaries. A case for the pleasure interpretation of activity in the midbrain dopamine projections. The bold interpretation is withdrawn in his 1994 and 1999, which give some reasons, but others still hold similar views and there seems to be at least some causal connection. (Scholar)
• Wise, Roy A., 1994, “A brief history of the anhedonia hypothesis”, in Appetite: Neural and Behavioral Bases, Charles R. Legg and David Booth (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 243–63. A former leading advocate of the pleasure interpretation of the consequences of mesolimbic dopamine, in the 1980s, recants, with reasons, more of which may be found in his 1999.
• Wise, Roy A., 1999, “Cognitive factors in addiction and nucleus accumbens function: Some hints from rodent models”, Psychobiology, 27(2): 300–10. This journal issue has articles presenting various views on the functions of the mesolimbic dopamine system, none of which support the pleasure interpretation. (Scholar)
• Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1968, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 3rd ed., Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1980, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell. From his notebooks. Overlaps with material published as Zettel. (Scholar)
• Wolfsdorf, David, Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
• Wundt, Wilhelm, 1896/1897, Grundriß der Psychologie, 1896, Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann; Trans. as Outlines of Psychology, Charles Hubbard Judd, trans., Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1897. Many libraries have reprint editions. Later editions and other writings of Wundt’s are compared with this first edition’s original presentation of the tridimensional view of affect (in its §7; Judd trans., pp. 74–89, especially pp. 82–85) in Titchener, 1908, ch. IV. (Scholar)
• Young, Paul Thomas, 1959, “The role of affective processes in learning and motivation”, Psychological Bulletin, 66: 104–25. Distinguishes hedonic from sensory intensity. (Scholar)
• Zajonc, Robert B., 1980, “Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences”, American Psychologist, 35: 151–175. (Scholar)
• Zajonc, Robert B., 1984, “On the primacy of affect”, American Psychologist, 39: 117–124. (Scholar)
• Zajonc, Robert B., 1994, “Evidence for Nonconscious Emotions”, in The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions, Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson, eds., New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 293–97. (This and the other short papers and the editors’ Afterword in the same section of this reader, Question 8: “Can Emotion Be Nonconscious?”, pp. 283–318, afford a mix of empirical and conceptual considerations. The term “nonconscious” is sometimes misleading in the work of Zajonc and his collaborators when what is clearly established in the experimental results referred to seems to be rather affect that is not firmly bound to an object when explicit awareness was earlier lacking either of the thing that fails to be the affect’s object or of its causing the affect. Cf. Zajonc 2000, pp. 47–48; Berridge and Winkielman 2003, pp. 185–86; Berridge 2002. Some phenomena Zajonc is concerned with seem to be only nonconscious causation, or conditioning, of future emotional memory or reactions. But Zajonc, whose major 1980s claim was about the independence of affect from (sophisticated) cognition, apparently wants to emphasize that point by calling this fast and automatic processing of stimuli without awareness of these or of their result “emotion”. Beyond this, it may be necessary to distinguish different uses of “nonconscious emotion”, corresponding to distinctions between phenomenal and cognitive concepts of consciousness made, for example, in Block 1995 and 2002. For an empirically-founded attempt to connect a related distinction to the neurobiology of the cingulate cortex, see Lane 2000, pp. 358–60. For perspectives on relevant observations, beyond those cited by Zajonc, see the discussion in Berridge 1999, 2004 and Shizgal 1999.
• Zajonc, Robert B., 1998, “Emotions”, in The Handbook of Social Psychology, 2 vols., 4th ed., eds., Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske and Gardner Lindzey, Boston: McGraw-Hill, Vol. 1, pp. 591–632. Good overall review of the evidence for the relative independence of affect systems from sophisticated cognition by an early advocate of this in an introduction to many aspects of the subject, including cultural influences and the differences these may make for affect. (Scholar)
• Zajonc, Robert B., 2000, “Feeling and Thinking: Closing the Debate Over the Independence of Affect”, in Feeling and Thinking: The Role of Affect in Social Cognition, Joseph P. Forgas (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, pp. 31–58. (Scholar)