Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Possible Objects" by Takashi Yagisawa

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Adams, R., 1974, “Theories of Actuality”, Noûs, 8: 211–31. Reprinted in Loux 1979: 190–209. (Scholar)
–––, 1979, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity”, Journal of Philosophy, 76: 5–26. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, “Actualism and Thisness”, Synthese, 49: 3–41. (Scholar)
Armstrong, D., 1989, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Barcan, R., 1946, “A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 11: 1–16. Also see Marcus for her later publications under the name ‘Ruth Barcan Marcus’. (Scholar)
Bennett, K., 2006, “Proxy Actualism”, Philosophical Studies, 129: 263–94. (Scholar)
Berto, F. & Jago, M., 2019, Impossible Worlds, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Bigelow, J. & Pargetter, R., 1990, Science and Necessity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Braun, D., 1993, “Empty Names”, Noûs, 27: 449–69. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names”, Noûs, 39: 596–631. (Scholar)
Brock, S., 2004, “The Ubiquitous Problem of Empty Names”, The Journal of Philosophy, 101: 277–98. (Scholar)
Cameron, R., 2012, “Why Lewis’s Analysis of Modality Succeeds in Its Reductive Ambitions”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 12(8): 1–21. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “On Characterizing the Presentism/Eternalism and Actualism/Possibilism Debates”, Analytic Philosophy, 57(2): 110–40. (Scholar)
Carnap, R., 1947, Meaning and Necessity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Castañeda, H., 1974, “Thinking and the Structure of the World”, Philosophia, 4: 4–40. (Scholar)
–––, 1979, “Fiction and Reality: Their Basic Connections”, Poetics, 8: 31–62. (Scholar)
Chandler, H., 1976, “Plantinga and the Contingently Possible”, Analysis, 36: 106–9. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D. & Jackson, F., 2001, “Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation”, The Philosophical Review, 110: 315–60. (Scholar)
Chisholm, R. (ed.), 1960, Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, Glencoe, IL: Free Press. (Scholar)
Cresswell, M., 1972, “The World is Everything That is the Case”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 1–13. Reprinted in Loux 1979: 129–45. (Scholar)
Crittenden, C., 1991, Unreality: The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Cullison, A. & Caplan, B., 2011, “Descriptivism, Scope, and Apparently Empty Names”, Philosophical Studies, 156 (2): 283–88. (Scholar)
Currie, G., 1990, The Nature of Fiction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Davidson, D. & Harman, G. (eds.), 1972, Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
Divers, J., 2002, Possible Worlds, London and New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Donnellan, K., 1972, “Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions”, in Davidson and Harman 1972: 356–79. (Scholar)
Dupré, J., 1993, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Evans, G., 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Everett, A. & Hofweber, T. (eds.), 2000, Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence, Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
Fara, D. G., 2008 “Relative-Sameness Counterpart Theory”, Review of Symbolic Logic, 1: 167–89. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Possibility Relative to a Sortal”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 7: 3–40. (Scholar)
Findlay, J. N., 1963, Meinong’s Theory of Objects and Values, 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Fine, K., 1979, “First-Order Modal Theories II—Propositions”, Studia Logica, 39: 159–202. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, “First-Order Modal Theories I—Sets”, Noûs, 15: 117–206. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, “First-Order Modal Theories III—Facts”, Synthese, 53: 43–122. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, “Critical Review of Parsons’ Nonexistent Objects”, Philosophical Studies, 45: 95–142. (Scholar)
–––, 1985, “Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist Discourse” in J. Tomberlin & P. van Inwagen (eds.), Alvin Plantinga: A Profile, Dordrecht: Reidel, 145–86. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16. (Scholar)
–––, 1995a, “The Logic of Essence”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 24: 241–73. (Scholar)
–––, 1995b, “Senses of Essence”, in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Modality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 53–73. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Semantics for the Logic of Essence”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 29: 543–84. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “The Problem of Possibilia”, in Loux & Zimmerman 2003: 161–79. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, Modality and Tense, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Fitch, G. W., 1996, “In Defense of Aristotelian Actualism”, Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 53–71. (Scholar)
Forrest, P., 1986, “Ways Worlds Could Be”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 15–24. (Scholar)
Grossmann, R., 1974, Meinong, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Hayaki, R., 2003, “Actualism and Higher-Order Worlds”, Philosophical Studies, 115: 149–78. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Contingent Objects and the Barcan Formula”, Erkenntnis, 64: 87–95. (Scholar)
Hazen, A., 1976, “Expressive Completeness in Modal Languages”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 5: 25–46. (Scholar)
Hintikka, J., 1962, Knowledge and Belief, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Hintikka, J., Moravcsik, J., and Suppes, P. (eds.), 1973, Approaches to Natural Language, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
Howell, R., 1979, “Fictional Objects: How They Are and How They Aren’t”, Poetics, 8: 129–77. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, Review of Terence Parsons: Nonexistent Objects, Journal of Philosophy, 80: 163–73. (Scholar)
Jacquette, D., 1996, Meinongian Logic: The Semantics of Existence and Nonexistence, The Hague: Walter de Gruyter. (Scholar)
Jeffrey, R., 1965, The Logic of Decision, Chicago: McGraw-Hill. (Scholar)
Jubien, M., 1996, “Actualism and Iterated Modalities”, Philosophical Studies, 84: 109–25. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kaplan, D., 1973, “Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice”, in Hintikka, Moravcsik, and Suppes 1973: 490–518. (Scholar)
–––, 1975, “How to Russell a Frege-Church”, Journal of Philosophy, 72: 716–29. Reprinted in Loux 1979: 210–24. (Scholar)
Kripke, S., 1959, “A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 24: 1–15. (Scholar)
–––, 1963a, “Semantic Analysis of Modal Logic”, Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, 9: 67–96. (Scholar)
–––, 1963b, “Semantic Considerations on Modal Logic”, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 16: 83–94. Reprinted in Linsky 1971: 63–72. (Scholar)
–––, 1972, “Naming and Necessity”, in Davidson & Harman 1972: 252–355. Published as a book with the same title in 1980 with a substantial preface and seven addenda, from Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Lambert, K., 1983, Meinong and the Principle of Independence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, Philosophical Applications of Free Logic, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Lewis, D., 1968, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–26. Reprinted with postscripts in Lewis 1983: 26–46. (Scholar)
–––, 1970, “Anselm and Actuality”, Noûs 4: 175–88. Reprinted with postscripts in Lewis 1983: 10–25. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, Philosophical Papers, Volume I, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, London and New York: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Noneism or Allism?”, Mind, 99: 23–31. Reprinted in Lewis 1999: 152–63. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Linsky, B. and Zalta, E., 1994, “In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 431–58. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “In Defense of the Contingently Nonconcrete”, Philosophical Studies, 84: 283–94. (Scholar)
Linsky, L., 1971, Reference and Modality (ed.), London: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Loux, M. (ed.), 1979, The Possible and the Actual, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
––– & Zimmerman, D. (eds.), 2003, The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Lycan, W., 1979, “The Trouble with Possible Worlds”, in Loux 1979: 274–316. Reprinted with additional material as chapters 1, 3, and 4 in Lycan 1994. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, Modality and Meaning, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
––– & Shapiro, S., 1986, “Actuality and Essence”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 343–77. Reprinted in part with additional material in Lycan 1994: 95–134. (Scholar)
Mally, E., 1912, Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik, Leipzig: Barth. (Scholar)
Marcus, R., 1961, “Modalities and Intensional Languages”, Synthese, 13: 303–22. Reprinted in Marcus 1993: 3–35, with appendices. (Scholar)
–––, 1976, “Dispensing with Possibilia”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 49: 39–51. (Scholar)
–––, 1985/86, “Possibilia and Possible Worlds”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 25/26: 107–33. Reprinted in Marcus 1993: 189–213. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, Modalities: Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Also see Barcan for her earlier publications under the name ‘Ruth C. Barcan’. (Scholar)
McDaniel, K., 2004, “Modal Realism with Overlap”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 137–52. Reprinted in Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, F. Jackson and G. Priest (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. (Scholar)
McMichael, A., 1983, “A Problem for Actualism about Possible Worlds”, Philosophical Review, 92: 49–66. (Scholar)
Meinong, A., 1904, “Über Gegenstandstheorie”, in Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und1Psychologie, Leipzig: Barth. Translated as “On the Theory of Objects”, in Chisholm (ed.) 1960: 76–117. (Scholar)
Menzel, C., 1990, “Actualism, Ontological Commitment and Possible World Semantics”, Synthese, 85: 355–89. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, “In Defense of the Possibilism-Actualism Distinction”, Philosophical Studies, 177: 1971–97. (Scholar)
Murray, A. & Wilson, J., 2012, “Relativized Metaphysical Modality”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 7: 189–226. (Scholar)
Nelson, M. & Zalta, E., 2009, “Bennett and ‘Proxy Actualism’”, Philosophical Studies, 142: 277–92. (Scholar)
Oliver, A. & Smiley, T., 2013, “Zilch”, Analysis, 73 (4): 601–13. (Scholar)
Parsons, T., 1980, Nonexistent Objects, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, Review of Richard Routley: Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond, Journal of Philosophy, 80: 173–79. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Ruth Barcan Marcus and the Barcan Formula”, in Modality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, D. Raffman, and N. Asher (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3–11. (Scholar)
Peacocke, C., 1978, “Necessity and Truth Theories”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 7: 473–500. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Principles for Possibilia”, Noûs, 36: 486–508. (Scholar)
Piccinini, G. & Scott, S., 2010, “Recovering What is Said with Empty Names”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 40: 239–73. (Scholar)
Plantinga, A., 1974, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
–––, 1987, “Two concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”, Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231. Reprinted in Plantinga 2003: 192–228. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Priest, G., 2005, Towards non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Expanded second edition in 2016. (Scholar)
Prior, A. & Fine, K., 1977, Worlds, Times and Selves, Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press. (Scholar)
Quine, W., 1948, “On What There Is”, Review of Metaphysics. Reprinted in Quine 1953: 1–19. (Scholar)
–––, 1953, From a Logical Point of View, New York: Harper and Row. (Scholar)
–––, 1968, “Ontological Relativity”, Journal of Philosophy, 65: 185–212. (Scholar)
–––, 1976, “Worlds Away”, Journal of Philosophy, 73: 859–63. (Scholar)
Ramsey, F., 1931, “Theories”, in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 212–236. (Scholar)
Rapaport, W., 1978, “Meinongian Theories and a Russellian Paradox”, Noûs, 12: 153–80. (Scholar)
–––, 1985, “To Be and Not To Be”, Noûs, 19: 255–71. (Scholar)
Rodriguez-Pereyra, G., 2004, “Modal Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism”, Mind, 113: 683–704. (Scholar)
Roper, A., 1982, “Towards an Eliminative Reduction of Possible Worlds”, Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 45–59. (Scholar)
Routley, R., 1980, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond: An Investigation of Noneism and the Theory of Items, Departmental Monograph #3, Philosophy Department, Research School of Social Sciences, Canberra: Australian National University. (Scholar)
Russell, B., 1905, “On Denoting”, Mind, 14: 479–93. (Scholar)
Salmon, N., 1981, Reference and Essence, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints”, in P. French, T. Uehling, & H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 75–120. (Scholar)
–––, 1987, “Existence”, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 1, Metaphysics, 49–108. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “The Logic of What Might Have Been”, The Philosophical Review, 98: 3–34. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Nonexistence”, Noûs, 32: 277–319. (Scholar)
Scott, D., 1970, “Advice on Modal Logic”, in Philosophical Problems in Logic, K. Lambert (ed.), Dordrecht: Reidel, 143–73. (Scholar)
Searle, J., 1974, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse”, New Literary History, 6: 319–32. (Scholar)
Sider, T., 2002, “The Ersatz Pluriverse”, Journal of Philosophy, 99: 279–315. (Scholar)
Skyrms, B., 1981, “Tractarian Nominalism”, Philosophical Studies, 40: 199–206. (Scholar)
Stalnaker, R., 1976, “Possible Worlds”, Noûs, 10: 65–75. Reprinted in Loux 1979: 225–34. (Scholar)
Thomasson, A., 1999, Fiction and Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Vacek, M., 2017, “Extended Modal-Dimensionalism”, Acta Analytica, 32 (1): 13–28. (Scholar)
Van Inwagen, P., 1977, “Creatures of Fiction”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 14: 299–308. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, “Fiction and Metaphysics”, Philosophy and Literature, 7: 67–77. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 185–213. Reprinted in van Inwagen 2001: 206–42. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, Ontology, Identity, and Modality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Existence, Ontological Commitment, and Fictional Entities”, in Loux and Zimmerman 2003: 131–57. (Scholar)
Varzi, A., 2001, “Parts, Counterparts, and Modal Occurrents”, Travaux de Logique, 14: 151–71. (Scholar)
Walton, K., 1983, Review of Nicholas Wolterstorff: Works and Worlds of Art, Journal of Philosophy, 80: 179–93. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, Mimesis as Make Believe, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Williamson, T., 1998, “Bare Possibilia”, Erkenntnis, 48: 257–73. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Necessary Existents”, in A. O’Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:, 233–51. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Wolterstorff, N., 1980, Works and Worlds of Art, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Woods, J., 1974, The Logic of Fiction, the Hague: Mouton. (Scholar)
Yagisawa, T., 2002, “Primitive Worlds”, Acta Analytica, 17: 19–37. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “S4 to 5D”, Argumenta, 2(2): 241–61.
Zalta, E., 1983, Abstract objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality, Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book, the MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “The Road Between Pretense Theory and Abstract Object Theory”, in Everett and Hofweber 2000: 117–47. (Scholar)

Generated Mon Dec 2 16:38:08 2024

Applied ethics	Epistemology	History of Western Philosophy	Meta-ethics	Metaphysics	Normative ethics
Philosophy of biology	Philosophy of language	Philosophy of mind	Philosophy of religion	Science Logic and Mathematics	More ...