Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Practical Reason" by R. Jay Wallace

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

  • Anderson, E., 1993, Value in Ethics and Economics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
  • Anscombe, G. E. M., 1957, Intention, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
  • Blackburn, S., 1998, Ruling Passions, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • Bratman, M., 1987, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
  • Broome, J., 1999, ‘Normative Requirements’, Ratio, 12: 398–419. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2004, ‘Reasons’, in Reason and Value, R. J. Wallace, P. Pettit, M. Smith, and S. Scheffler (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • Dreier, J., 1997, ‘Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality’, in Ethics and Practical Reason, G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • Foot, P., 2001, Natural Goodness, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • Gauthier, D., 1986, Morals by Agreement, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • Gibbard, A., 1990, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2003, Thinking How to Live, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
  • Hampton, J., 1998, The Authority of Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Harman, G., 1986, Change in View, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
  • Harsanyi, J. C., 1982, ‘Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior’, in Utilitarianism and Beyond, A. Sen and B. Williams (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Hume, D., 1978, A Treatise of Human Nature, second edition, L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Niditch (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • Kolnai, A., 2001, ‘Deliberation is of Ends’, in Varieties of Practical Reasoning, E. Millgram (ed.), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
  • Kolodny, N., 2005, ‘Why be Rational?’, Mind 114: 509–63. (Scholar)
  • Korsgaard, C., 1996a, ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’, in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1996b, The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1997, ‘The Normativity of Instrumental Reason’, in Ethics and Practical Reason, G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • Lavin, D., 2004, ‘Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error’, Ethics, 114: 424–57. (Scholar)
  • Lawrence, G., 1995, ‘The Rationality of Morality’, in Virtues and Reasons, R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and W. Quinn (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • Mandler, M., 2001, ‘A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or Transitivity but not Both’, in Varieties of Practical Reasoning, E. Millgram (ed.), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
  • Millgram, E., 1995, ‘Was Hume a Humean?’, Hume Studies, 21: 75–93. (Scholar)
  • Moran, R., 2001, Authority and Estrangement, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Nagel, T., 1978, The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Nozick, R., 1993, The Nature of Rationality, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • O'Neill, O., 1989, ‘Consistency in Action’, in her Constructions of Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Parfit, D., 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1997, ‘Reasons and Motivation’, The Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 77: 99–130. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2011, On What Matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Pettit P., 1984, ‘Satisficing Consequentialism’, The Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume): 58: 165–76. (Scholar)
  • Pettit P. and M. Smith, 1997, ‘Parfit's P’, in Reading Parfit, J. Dancy (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
  • Quinn, W., 1993, ‘Putting Rationality in its Place’, in his Morality and Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Raz, J., 1999, Engaging Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2005, ‘The Myth of Instrumental Reason’, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 1 (1), electronic publication, [Available online]. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2011, From Normativity to Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Richardson, H. S., 1994, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Scanlon, T. M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2014, Being Realistic about Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Schroeder, M., 2007, Slaves of the Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Sen, A., 2000, ‘Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason’, Journal of Philosophy, 97: 477–502. (Scholar)
  • Slote, M., 1989, Beyond Optimizing, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
  • Smith, M., 1987, ‘The Humean Theory of Motivation’, Mind, 96: 36–61. (Scholar)
  • Street, S., 2008, 'Constructivism about Reasons', Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 3: 207–45. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2010, 'What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?', Philosophy Compass, 5: 363–84. (Scholar)
  • Taylor, C., 1985. ‘What is Human Agency’, in his Human Agency and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Thomson, J. J., 2008, Normativity, Chicago: Open Court. (Scholar)
  • Velleman, J. D., 2000, The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1989, Practical Reflection, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Wallace, R. J., 1999, ‘Three Conceptions of Rational Agency’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2: 217–42. (Scholar)
  • Wiggins, D., 1987, ‘Deliberation and Practical Reason’, in his Needs, Values, Truth, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
  • Williams, B., ‘Internal and External Reasons’, in his Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. (Scholar)

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