Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Practical Reason" by R. Jay Wallace and Benjamin Kiesewetter
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- Anderson, Elizabeth, 1993, Value in Ethics and Economics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Anscombe, G. E. M., 1957, Intention, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Berker, Selim, 2013, “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions”, The Philosophical Review, 122(3): 337–389. (Scholar)
- Bittner, Rüdiger, 2023, Good Things to Do: Practical Reason Without Obligation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Blackburn, Simon, 1998, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Boyle, Matthew, 2011, “‘Making Up Your Mind’ and
the Activity of Reason”, Philosopher’s Imprint,
11(17): 1–24.
[Boyle 2011 available online] (Scholar)
- Bratman, Michael E., 1981, “Intention and Means-End Reasoning”, The Philosophical Review, 90(2): 252–265. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-Governance”, Ethics, 119(3): 411–443. (Scholar)
- Broome, John, 1999, “Normative Requirements”, Ratio, 12(4): 398–419. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values?”, in Christopher W. Morris and Arthur Ripstein (eds.), Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 98–120. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, Rationality through Reasoning, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2021, “Practical Reason: Rationality
or Normativity but Not Both”, in Kurt Sylvan and Ruth Chang
(eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason, New York:
Routledge, pp. 38–51. (Scholar)
- Brunero, John, 2020, Instrumental Rationality: The Normativity of Means-End Coherence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Buchak, Lara, 2013, Risk and Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Chang, Ruth, 2013, “Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid”, Philosophical Studies, 164(1): 163–187. (Scholar)
- Corcilius, Klaus, 2008, “Two Jobs for Aristotle’s
Practical Syllogism?”, Logical Analysis and History of
Philosophy, 11: 163–184. (Scholar)
- Cuneo, Terence, 2007, The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Dancy, Jonathan, 1977, “The Logical Conscience”, Analysis, 37(2): 81–84. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Practical Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press; revised edition, 2002. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Darwall, Stephen, 2009, The Second-Person Standpoint:
Morality, Respect, and Accountability, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press. (Scholar)
- Dorsey, Dale, 2016, The Limits of Moral Authority, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Dreier, James, 1997, “Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality”, in Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason, New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 81–100; reprinted in Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, pp. 27–47. (Scholar)
- Enoch, David, 2006, “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity
Won’t Come from What Is Constitutive of Action”,
The Philosophical Review, 115(2): 169–198. (Scholar)
- Finlay, Stephen, 2009, “The Obscurity of Internal Reasons”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 9(7): 1–22. (Scholar)
- Fletcher, Guy, 2021, Dear Prudence: The Nature and Normativity of Prudential Discourse, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Foot, Philippa, 2001, Natural Goodness, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Frost, Kim, 2014, “On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit”, The Philosophical Review, 123(4): 429–484. (Scholar)
- Gauthier, David, 1986, Morals by Agreement, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Gibbard, Allan, 1990, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgement, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, Thinking How to Live, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Hampton, Jean E., 1998, The Authority of Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Harman, Gilbert, 1986, Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Harsanyi, John C., 1982, “Morality and the Theory of
Rational Behavior”, in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds.),
Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. 39–62. (Scholar)
- Hieronymi, Pamela, 2005, “The Wrong Kind of Reason”, Journal of Philosophy, 102(9): 437–457. (Scholar)
- –––, 2021, “Reasoning First”, in
Ruth Chang and Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of
Practical Reason, Routledge, pp. 349–365. (Scholar)
- Hume, David, 1739, A Treatise of Human Nature, Lewis A. Selby-Bigge and Peter H. Nidditch (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press (2012), 2nd edition. (Scholar)
- Jackson, Frank, 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kant, Immanuel, 1785, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor and Jens Timmerman (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2011, rev. ed. 2012). (Scholar)
- Kiesewetter, Benjamin, 2011, “‘Ought’ and the
Perspective of the Agent”, Journal of Ethics and Social
Philosophy, 5(3): 1–24.
[Kiesewetter 2011 available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, The Normativity of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2022a, “Are All Practical Reasons Based on Value?”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 17: 27–53. [available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2022b, “Are Epistemic Reasons
Normative?”, Noûs, 56(3): 670–695.
[available online] (Scholar)
- Kolnai, Aurel, 1962, “Deliberation is of Ends”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (New Series), 62: 195–218; reprinted in Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, pp. 259–278. (Scholar)
- Kolodny, Niko, 2005, “Why be Rational?”, Mind, 114(455): 509–563. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “The Myth of Practical Consistency”, European Journal of Philosophy, 16(3): 366–402 (Scholar)
- Korsgaard, Christine, 1986, “Skepticism about Practical Reason”, The Journal of Philosophy, 83(1): 5–25; reprinted in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996), pp. 311–334. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason”, in Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 215–254. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lavin, Douglas, 2004, “Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error”, Ethics, 114(3): 424–457. (Scholar)
- Lawrence, Gavin, 1995, “The Rationality of Morality”,
in Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn (eds.),
Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory, Oxford:
Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Lord, Errol, 2018, The Importance of Being Rational, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Maguire, Barry, 2016, “The Value-Based Theory of Reasons”, Ergo, 3(9): 233–262. (Scholar)
- Mandler, Michael, 2001, “A Difficult Choice in Preference Theory: Rationality Implies Completeness or Transitivity but not Both”, in Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 374–402. (Scholar)
- Markovits, Julia, 2014, Moral Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- McHugh, Conor, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting (eds.), 2018, Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- McHugh, Conor, and Jonathan Way, 2022, Getting Things Right: Fittingness, Reasons, and Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Millgram, Elijah, 1995, “Was Hume a Humean?”, Hume Studies, 21(1): 75–93. (Scholar)
- Moore, George E., 1903, Principia Ethica, Mineola, NY: Dover; reprinted in 2004. (Scholar)
- Moran, Richard, 2001, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Müller, Andreas, 2020, Constructing Practical Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Nagel, Thomas, 1978, The Possibility of Altruism,
Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Nozick, Robert, 1993, The Nature of Rationality, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- O’Neill, Onora, 1989, “Consistency in Action”,
in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s
Practical Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
81–104. (Scholar)
- Owens, David, 2012, Shaping the Normative Landscape, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Parfit, Derek, 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Reasons and Motivation”, The Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 77(1): 99–130. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, On What Matters (Volume 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Pettit, Philip, 1984, “Satisficing Consequentialism”, The Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 58(5): 165–176. (Scholar)
- Pettit, Philip and Michael Smith, 1997, “Parfit’s
P”, in Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit, Oxford:
Blackwell, pp. 71–95. (Scholar)
- Portmore, Douglas W., 2011, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Quinn, Warren, 1993, “Putting Rationality in its
Place”, in his Morality and Action, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 228–255. (Scholar)
- Raz, Joseph, 1986, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, Practical Reason and Norms,
Oxford: Oxford University Press; reprinted. 1999, 2nd edition. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “The Myth of Instrumental
Reason”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 1(1):
2–28.
[Raz 2005 available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, From Normativity to Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2022, The Roots of Normativity, Ulrike Heuer (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Richardson, Henry S., 1994, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Ridge, Michael, 2014, Impassioned Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Scanlon, Thomas M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, Being Realistic about Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Scheffler, Samuel, 1982, The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, “Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues”, in Samuel Scheffler (ed.), Consequentialism and Its Critics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 409–419. (Scholar)
- Schmidt, Thomas, 2023, “How Reasons Determine Moral Requirements”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 18: 97–115. (Scholar)
- –––, 2024, “The Balancing View of Ought”, Ethics, 134(2): 246–267. (Scholar)
- Schroeder, Mark, 2007a, Slaves of the Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007b, “Teleology, Agent-Relative Value, and ‘Good’”, Ethics, 117(2): 265–295. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, Being for: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Searle, John, 1983, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press. (Scholar)
- Sen, Amartya, 2000, “Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason”, Journal of Philosophy, 97(9): 477–502. (Scholar)
- Sidgwick, Henry, 1907, The Methods of Ethics, New York: Macmillan, 7th edition. (Scholar)
- Singer, Peter, 1972, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(3): 229–243. (Scholar)
- Skorupski, John, 2010, The Domain of Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Slote, Michael, 1989, Beyond Optimizing: A Study of Rational Choice, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Smith, Michael, 1987, “The Humean Theory of Motivation”, Mind, 96: 36–61. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Street, Sharon, 2008, “Constructivism about Reasons”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 3(1): 207–245. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?”, Philosophy Compass, 5(5): 363–384. (Scholar)
- Stroud, Sarah, 1998, “Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79(2): 170–189. (Scholar)
- Taylor, Charles, 1985, “What is Human Agency”, in his
Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers (Volume 1),
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Tenenbaum, Sergio, 2020, Rational Powers in Action: Instrumental Rationality and Extended Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Thompson, Michael, 2008, Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Thomson, Judith J., 1990, The Realm of Rights, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, Normativity, Chicago: Open Court. (Scholar)
- Velleman, David J., 1989, Practical Reflection, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Wallace, Jay R., 1999, “Three Conceptions of Rational Agency”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2: 217–242. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason”, Philosopher’s Imprint, 1(3): 1–26. [Wallace 2001 available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Reasons, Values, and Agent-Relativity”, dialectica, 64(4): 503–528. (Scholar)
- –––, 2019, The Moral Nexus, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Weber, Max, 1978, “The Nature of Social Action”, in
Walter G. Runciman (ed.), Eric Mathews (trans.), Weber: Selections
in Translation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
7–32. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, David, 1975, “Deliberation and Practical
Reason”, reprinted in Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of
Practical Reasoning, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, pp.
279–299. (Scholar)
- Williams, Bernard, 1973, “A Critique of
Utilitarianism”, in John J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams,
Utilitarianism: For and Against, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 77–150. (Scholar)
- –––, 1979, “Internal and External Reasons”, in Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action: Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–113; reprinted in B. Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 101–113. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame”, in William J. Prior (ed.), Reason and Moral Judgment, Logos, 10; reprinted in B. Williams, Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers 1982–1993, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 35–45. (Scholar)
- Worsnip, Alex, 2021, Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)