Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Prediction versus Accommodation" by Eric Christian Barnes

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Achinstein, Peter, 1994, “Explanation vs. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight”, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1994(2): 156–164. doi:10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192926 (Scholar)
–––, 2001, The Book of Evidence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195143892.001.0001 (Scholar)
Akaike, Hirotugu, 1973, “Information Theory as an Extension of the Maximum Likelihood Principle”, in B.N. Petrov and F. Csaki, (eds.) Second International Symposium on Information Theory, Budapest, Akademiai Kiado, pp. 267–281. (Scholar)
Akeroyd, F. Michael, 2003, “Prediction and the Periodic Table: A Response to Scerri and Worrall”, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 34(2): 337–355. doi:10.1023/b:jgps.0000005277.60641.ca (Scholar)
Alai, Mario, 2014, “Novel Predictions and the No Miracle Argument”, Erkenntnis, 79(2): 297–326. doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9495-7 (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “The No Miracle Argument and Strong Predictivism vs. Barnes”, in Lorenzo Magnini and Claudia Casadio (eds.), Model Based Reasoning in Science and Technology, (Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 27), Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, pp.541–556. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-38983-7_30 (Scholar)
Bamford, Greg, 1993, “Popper’s Explication of Ad Hocness: Circularity, Empirical Content, and Scientific Practice”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44(2): 335–355. doi:10.1093/bjps/44.2.335 (Scholar)
Barnes, Eric Christian, 1996a, “Discussion: Thoughts on Maher’s Predictivism”, Philosophy of Science, 63: 401–10. doi:10.1086/289918 (Scholar)
–––, 1996b, “Social Predictivism”, Erkenntnis, 45(1): 69–89. doi:10.1007/bf00226371 (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “The Quantitative Problem of Old Evidence”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 50(2): 249–264. doi:10.1093/bjps/50.2.249 (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Neither Truth Nor Empirical Adequacy Explain Novel Success”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80(4): 418–431. doi:10.1080/713659528 (Scholar)
–––, 2005a, “Predictivism for Pluralists”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56(3): 421–450. doi:10.1093/bjps/axi131 (Scholar)
–––, 2005b, “On Mendeleev’s Predictions: Comment on Scerri and Worrall”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 36(4): 801–812. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2005.08.005 (Scholar)
–––, 2008, The Paradox of Predictivism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487330 (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “The Roots of Predictivism”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 45: 46–53. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.10.002 (Scholar)
Brush, Stephen G., 1989, “Prediction and Theory Evaluation: The Case of Light Bending”, Science, 246(4934): 1124–1129. doi:10.1126/science.246.4934.1124 (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Prediction and Theory Evaluation: Alfvén on Space Plasma Phenomena”, Eos, 71(2): 19–33. doi:10.1029/eo071i002p00019 (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Prediction and Theory Evaluation: Cosmic Microwaves and the Revival of the Big Bang”, Perspectives on Science, 1(4):: 565–601. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Dynamics of Theory Change: The Role of Predictions”, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1994(2): 133–145. doi:10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192924 (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “The Reception of Mendeleev’s Periodic Law in America and Britain”, Isis, 87(4): 595–628. doi:10.1086/357649 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Predictivism and the Periodic Table”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 38(1): 256–259. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2006.12.007 (Scholar)
Campbell, Richmond and Thomas Vinci, 1983, “Novel Confirmation”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 34(4): 315–341. doi:10.1093/bjps/34.4.315 (Scholar)
Carman, Christián and José Díez, 2015, “Did Ptolemy Make Novel Predictions? Launching Ptolemaic Astronomy into the Scientific Realism Debate”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 52: 20–34. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.04.002 (Scholar)
Carrier, Martin, 2014, “Prediction in context: On the comparative epistemic merit of predictive success”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 45: 97–102. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.10.003 (Scholar)
Chang, Hasok, 2003, “Preservative Realism and Its Discontents: Revisiting Caloric”, Philosophy of Science, 70(5): 902–912. doi:10.1086/377376 (Scholar)
Christiansen, David, 1999, “Measuring Confirmation”, Journal of Philosophy, 96(9): 437–461. doi:10.2307/2564707 (Scholar)
Collins, Robin, 1994, “Against the Epistemic Value of Prediction over Accommodation”, Noûs, 28(2): 210–224. doi:10.2307/2216049 (Scholar)
Dawid, R. and Stephan Hartmann, 2017, “The No Miracles Argument without the Base-Rate Fallacy”, Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1408-x (Scholar)
Dellsen, Finnur, (forthcoming), “An Epistemic Advantage of Accommodation Over Prediction”, Philosophers' Imprint (Scholar)
Dicken, P., 2013, “Normativity, the Base-Rate Fallacy, and Some Problems for Retail Realism”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44 (4): 563–570. (Scholar)
Douglas, Heather and P.D. Magnus, 2013, “State of the Field: Why Novel Prediction Matters”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 44(4): 580–589. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.04.001 (Scholar)
Eells, Ellery and Branden Fitelson, 2000, “Measuring Confirmation and Evidence”, Journal of Philosophy, 97(12): 663–672. doi:10.2307/2678462 (Scholar)
Forster, Malcolm R., 2002, “Predictive Accuracy as an Achievable Goal of Science”, Philosophy of Science, 69(S3): S124–S134. doi:10.1086/341840 (Scholar)
Forster, Malcolm and Elliott Sober, 1994, “How to Tell when Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45(1): 1–35. doi:10.1093/bjps/45.1.1 (Scholar)
Frankel, Henry, 1979, “The Career of Continental Drift Theory: An application of Imre Lakatos’ analysis of scientific growth to the rise of drift theory”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 10(1): 21–66. doi:10.1016/0039-3681(79)90003-7 (Scholar)
Frisch, Mathias, 2015, “Predictivism and Old Evidence: A Critical Look at Climate Model Tuning”, European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 5(2): 171–190. doi:10.1007/s13194-015-0110-4 (Scholar)
Frost-Arnold, Greg, 2010, “The No-Miracles Argument for Scientific Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation”, Philosophy of Science, 77(1): 35–58. doi:10.1086/650207 (Scholar)
Gardner, Michael R., 1982, “Predicting Novel Facts”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 33(1): 1–15. doi:10.1093/bjps/33.1.1 (Scholar)
Giere, Ronald N., 1984, Understanding Scientific Reasoning, second edition, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. First edition 1979. (Scholar)
Glymour, Clark N., 1980, Theory and Evidence, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Review: The Paradox of Predictivism by Eric Christian Barnes”, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2008.06.13. [Glymour 2008 available online] (Scholar)
Good, I.J. 1967, “The White Shoe is a Red Herring”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17(4): 322. doi:10.1093/bjps/17.4.322 (Scholar)
Goodman, Nelson, 1983, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, fourth edition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. First edition 1950. (Scholar)
Grünbaum, Adolf, 1976, “Ad Hoc Auxiliary Hypotheses and Falsificationism”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 27(4): 329–362. doi:10.1093/bjps/27.4.329 (Scholar)
Hacking, Ian, 1979, “Imre Lakatos’s Philosophy of Science”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 30(4): 381–410. doi:10.1093/bjps/30.4.381 (Scholar)
Harker, David, 2006, “Accommodation and Prediction: The Case of the Persistent Head”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57(2): 309–321. doi:10.1093/bjps/axl004 (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “The Predilections for Predictions”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59(3): 429–453. doi:10.1093/bjps/axn017 (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Two Arguments for Scientific Realism Unified”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 41(2): 192–202. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.03.006 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Review: The Paradox of Predictivism by Eric Christian Barnes”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62(1): 219–223. doi:10.1093/bjps/axq027 (Scholar)
Hartman, Stephan and Branden Fitelson, 2015, “A New Garber-Style Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence”, Philosophy of Science, 82(4): 712–717. doi:10.1086/682916 (Scholar)
Healey, Richard, 2001, “Review: A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism by Jarrett Leplin”, Mind, 110(439): 777–780. doi:10.1093/mind/110.439.777 (Scholar)
Henderson, Leah, 2017, “The No Miracles Argument and the Base-Rate Fallacy”, Synthese (4): 1295–1302. (Scholar)
Hitchcock, Christopher and Elliott Sober, 2004, “Prediction versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55(1): 1–34. doi:10.1093/bjps/55.1.1 (Scholar)
Holton, Gerald, 1988, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein, revised edition, Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press. First edition 1973. (Scholar)
Howson, Colin, 1984, “Bayesianism and Support by Novel Facts”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 35(3): 245–251. doi:10.1093/bjps/35.3.245 (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “Accommodation, Prediction and Bayesian Confirmation Theory”, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1988, 2: 381–392. doi:10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1988.2.192899 (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Fitting Your Theory to the Facts: Probably Not Such a Bad Thing After All”, in Scientific Theories, (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XIV), C. Wade Savage (ed.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 224–244. [Howson 1990 available online] (Scholar)
Howson, Colin and Allan Franklin, 1991, “Maher, Mendeleev and Bayesianism”, Philosophy of Science, 58(4): 574–585. doi:10.1086/289641 (Scholar)
Hudson, Robert G., 2003, “Novelty and the 1919 Eclipse Experiments”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 34(1): 107–129. doi:10.1016/s1355-2198(02)00082-5 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “What’s Really at Issue with Novel Predictions?” Synthese, 155(1): 1–20. doi:10.1007/s11229-005-6267-1 (Scholar)
Hunt, J. Christopher, 2012, “On Ad Hoc Hypotheses”, Philosophy of Science, 79(1): 1–14. doi:10.1086/663238 (Scholar)
Iseda, Tetsuji, 1999, “Use-Novelty, Severity, and a Systematic Neglect of Relevant Alternatives”, Philosophy of Science, 66: S403–S413. doi:10.1086/392741 (Scholar)
Kahn, J.A., S.E. Landsberg, and A.C. Stockman, 1990, “On Novel Confirmation”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 43, 503–516. (Scholar)
Keynes, John Maynard, 1921, A Treatise on Probability, London: Macmillan. (Scholar)
Kish, Leslie, 1959, “Some Statistical Problems in Research Design”, American Sociological Review, 24(3): 328–338; reprinted in Denton E. Morrison and Ramon E. Henkel (eds.), The Significance Test Controversy: A Reader, Chicago: Aldine, pp. 127–141. doi:10.2307/2089381 (Scholar)
Kitcher, Philip, 1993, The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Ladyman, James, 1999, “Review: Jarrett Leplin, A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 50(1): 181–188. doi:10.1093/bjps/50.1.181 (Scholar)
Lakatos, Imre, 1970, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 91–196. doi:10.1017/cbo9781139171434.009 (Scholar)
–––, 1971, “History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions”, in Roger C. Buck and Robert S. Cohen (eds.), PSA 1970, (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 8), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, pp. 91–135. doi:10.1007/978-94-010-3142-4_7 (Scholar)
Lange, Marc, 2001, “The Apparent Superiority of Prediction to Accommodation: a Reply to Maher”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52(3): 575–588. doi:10.1093/bjps/52.3.575 (Scholar)
Laudan, Larry, 1981a, “The Epistemology of Light: Some Methodological Issues in the Subtle Fluids Debate”, in Science and Hypothesis: Historical Essays on Scientific Methodology (University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 19), Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 111–140. (Scholar)
–––, 1981b, “A Confutation of Convergent Realism”, Philosophy of Science, 48(1): 19–49. doi:10.1086/288975 (Scholar)
Leconte, Gauvain, 2017, “Predictive Success, Partial Truth, and Duhemian Realism”, Synthese, 194(9): 3245–3265. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1305-8 (Scholar)
Lee, Wang-Yen, 2012, “Hitchcock and Sober on Weak Predictivism”, Philosophia, 40(3): 553–562. doi:10.1007/s11406-011-9331-8 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Akaike’s Theorem and Weak Predictivism in Science” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44(4): 594–599. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.06.001 (Scholar)
Leplin, Jarrett, 1975, “The Concept of an Ad Hoc Hypothesis”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 5 No. 3: 309–345. doi:10.1016/0039-3681(75)90006-0 (Scholar)
–––, 1982, “The Assessment of Auxiliary Hypotheses”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 33(3): 235–249. doi:10.1093/bjps/33.3.235 (Scholar)
–––, 1987, “The Bearing of Discovery on Justification”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 17: 805–814. doi:10.1080/00455091.1987.10715919 (Scholar)
–––, 1997, A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Review: The Paradox of Predictivism by Eric Christian Barnes”, The Review of Metaphysics, 63(2): 455–457. (Scholar)
Lipton, Peter 1990, “Prediction and Prejudice”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 4(1): 51–65. doi:10.1080/02698599008573345 (Scholar)
–––, 1991, Inference to the Best Explanation, London/New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Lyons, Timothy D., 2006, “Scientific Realism and the Strategema de Divide et Impera”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57(3): 537–560. doi:10.1093/bjps/axl021 (Scholar)
Magnus, P.D., 2011, “Miracles, trust, and ennui in Barnes’ Predictivism”, Logos & Episteme, 2(1): 103–115. doi:10.5840/logos-episteme20112152 (Scholar)
Magnus, P.D. and Craig Callender, 2004, “Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy”, Philosophy of Science, 71(3): 320–338. doi:10.1086/421536 (Scholar)
Maher, Patrick, 1988, “Prediction, Accommodation, and the Logic of Discovery”, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988, 1: 273–285. doi:10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1988.1.192994 (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “How Prediction Enhances Confirmation”, in J. Michael Dunn and Anil Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 327–343. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Howson and Franklin on Prediction”, Philosophy of Science, 60(2): 329–340. doi:10.1086/289736 (Scholar)
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Mayo, Deborah G., 1991, “Novel Evidence and Severe Tests”, Philosophy of Science, 58(4): 523–552. doi:10.1086/289639 (Scholar)
–––, 1996, Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Novel Work on the Problem of Novelty? Comments on Hudson”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 34: 131–134. doi:10.1016/s1355-2198(02)00083-7 (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “How to Discount Double-Counting When It Counts: Some Clarifications”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59(4): 857–879. doi:10.1093/bjps/axn034 (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “An Ad Hoc Save of a Theory of Adhocness? Exchanges with John Worrall” in Mayo and Spanos 2010: 155–169. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Some surprising facts about (the problem of) surprising facts (from the Dusseldorf Conference, February 2011)”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 45: 79–86. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.10.005 (Scholar)
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