Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Prisoner's Dilemma" by Steven Kuhn

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

  • Aumann, Robert, 1995, “Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality,” Games and Economic Behavior, 8: 97–105. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1998, “Note on the Centipede Game,” Games and Economic Behavior, 23: 97–105. (Scholar)
  • Axelrod, Robert, 1981, “The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists,” The American Political Science Review, 75: 306–318. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1984, The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
  • Axelrod, Robert and Douglas Dion, 1988, “The Further Evolution of Cooperation,”Science, 242 (December 9): 1385–1390. (Scholar)
  • Axelrod, Robert and William Hamilton, 1981, “The Evolution of Cooperation,” Science, 211 (March 27): 1390–1396. (Scholar)
  • Batali, John and Philip Kitcher, 1995, “Evolution of Altruism in Optional and Compulsory Games,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 178: 161–171. (Scholar)
  • Becker, Neal and Ann Cudd, 1990, “Indefinitely Repeated Games: A Response to Carroll,” Theory and Decision, 28: 189–195. (Scholar)
  • Bendor, Jonathan, 1987, “In Good Times and Bad: Reciprocity in an Uncertain World,” American Journal of Political Science, 31: 531–558. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1993, “Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37: 709–733. (Scholar)
  • Bendor, Jonathan, and Piotr Swistak, 1995, “Types of Evolutionary Stability and the Problem of cooperations,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 92 (April): 3596–3600. (Scholar)
  • Bendor, Jonathan, and Piotr Swistak, 1996, “The Controversy about the Evolution of Cooperation and the Evolutionary Roots of Social Institutions,” in Gasparski, Wojciech et al (eds), Social Agency, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers. (Scholar)
  • Bendor, Jonathan, and Piotr Swistak, 1997, “The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperations,” American Political Science Review, 91 (2): 290–307. (Scholar)
  • Bendor, Jonathan, and Piotr Swistak, 1998, “Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications,” Theory and Decision, 45: 99–159. (Scholar)
  • Bendor, Jonathan, Roderick Kramer and Piotr Swistak, 1996, “Cooperation Under Uncertainty: What is New, What is True and What is Important?” American Sociological Review, 61 (April): 333–338. (Scholar)
  • Bergstrom, T., 2002, “Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection Models,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16: 231–238. (Scholar)
  • Bicchieri, Cristina, 1989, “Self-refuting Theories of Strategic Interaction,” Erkenntinis, 30: 69–85. (Scholar)
  • Binmore, Kenneth, 1992, Fun and Games, Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1994, Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract 1, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1997, “Rationality and Backward Induction,” Journal of Economic Methodology, 4: 23–41. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2005, Natural Justice, New York, NY: Oxford Univsity Press. (Scholar)
  • Boyd, Robert and Jeffrey Lorberbaum, 1987, “No Pure Strategy is Evolutionarily Stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game,” Nature, 327 (May 7): 58–59. (Scholar)
  • Carroll, J.W., 1987, “Indefinite Terminating Points and the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Theory and Decision, 22: 247–256. (Scholar)
  • Cambell, Richmond and Lanning Snowden, 1985, Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. (Scholar)
  • Danielson, Peter, 1992, Artificial Morality: Virtual Robots for Virtual Games, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
  • Davis, Laurence, 1977, “Prisoners, Paradox and Rationality,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 14: 319–327; reprinted in Campbell and Snowden, 45–58. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1985, “Is the Symmetry Argument Valid?,” in Campbell and Snowden 1985, 255–262. (Scholar)
  • Donninger, Christian, 1986, “Is It Always Efficient to be Nice?” in Dickman and Mitter (eds.), Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior, Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, 123–134. (Scholar)
  • Farrell, Joseph, and Roger Ware, 1989, “Evolutionary Stability in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,” Theoretical Population Biology, 36: 161–167. (Scholar)
  • Gauthier, David, 1986, Morals by Agreement, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • Grim, Patrick, Gary Mar and Paul St. Denis, 1998, The Philosophical Computer, Cambrige, Mass: MIT Press. (Scholar)
  • Hardin, Garret, 1968, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, 162 (December 13): 1243–1248. (Scholar)
  • Hilbe, Christian, Martin A. Nowak, and Karl Sigmund, 2013, “Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110 (17): 6913–6918. (Scholar)
  • Howard, Nigel, 1971, Paradoxes of Rationality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
  • Howard, J.V., 1988, “Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma,” Theory and Decision, 24: 203–213. (Scholar)
  • Hurley, S.L., 1991, “Newcomb's Problem, Prisoners' Dilemma, and Collective Action,” Synthese, 86: 173–196. (Scholar)
  • Joyce, James, 1999, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Kavka, Gregory, 1983, “Hobbes War of All Against All,” Ethics, 93: 291–310. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1986, Hobbesean Moral and Political Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1991, “Is Individual Choice Less Problematic than Collective Choice?Economics and Philosophy, 7: 291–310. (Scholar)
  • Kitcher, Philip, 1993, “The Evolution of Human AltruismJournal of Philosophy, 90: 497–516. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2011, The Ethical Project, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
  • Kollock, Peter, 1993, “An Eye For an Eye Leaves Everybody Blind: Cooperation and Accounting Systems,” American Sociological Review, 58: 768–786. (Scholar)
  • Kraines, David and Vivian Kraines, 1989, “Pavlov and the Prisoner's Dilemma,” Theory and Decision, 26: 47–79. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1993, “Learning to Cooperate with Pavlov: an Adaptive Strategy for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Noise,” Theory and Decision, 35: 107–150. (Scholar)
  • Kreps, David, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Robert Wilson, 1982, “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Theory, 27: 245–252. (Scholar)
  • Kuhn, Steven, 1996, “Agreement Keeping and Indirect Moral TheoryJournal of Philosophy, 93: 105–128. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2004, “Reflections on Ethics and Game TheorySynthese, 141: 1–44. (Scholar)
  • Kuhn, Steven, and Serge Moresi, 1995, “Pure and Utilitarian Prisoner's DilemmasEconomics and Philosophy, 11: 123–133. (Scholar)
  • Lewis, David, 1979, “Prisoner's Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 8: 235–240. (Scholar)
  • Linster, Bruce, 1992, “Evolutionary Stability in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Played by Two-State Moore Machines,” Southern Economic Journal, 58: 880–903. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1994, “Stochastic Evolutionary Dynamics in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma,” Economic Inquiry, XXXII: 342–357. (Scholar)
  • Maynard Smith, John, 1978, “The Evolution of Behavior,” Scientific American, 239: 176–192. (Scholar)
  • Molander, Per, 1985, “The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29 (December): 611–619. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1992, “The Prevalence of Free Riding,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36 (December): 756–771. (Scholar)
  • Mukherji, Arijit, Vijay Rajan and James Slagle, 1996, “Robustness of Cooperation,” Nature, 379 (January 11): 125–126. (Scholar)
  • Nowak, Martin, and Robert May, 1992, “Evolutionary Games and Spatial Chaos,”Nature, 359 (October 29): 826–829. (Scholar)
  • Nowak, Martin and Karl Sigmund, 1992, “Tit for Tat in Heterogeneous Populations,” Nature, 355 (January 16): 250–253. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1993, “A Strategy of Win-stay, Lose-shift that Outperforms Tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game,” Nature, 364 (July 1): 56–58. (Scholar)
  • Nowak, Martin, Robert May, and Karl Sigmund, 1995, “The Arithmetics of Mutual Help,” Scientific American, (June): 76–81. (Scholar)
  • Nozick, Robert, 1969, “Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice”, in N. Resher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 114–146; reprinted in Cambell and Snowden 1985, 107–132. (Scholar)
  • Orbell, John, and Robyn Dawes, 1993, “A ‘Cognitive Miser Miser’ Theory of Cooperative Advantage,” American Political Science Reveiw, 58: 787–800.
  • Orbell, John, and Robyn Dawes, 1993, “Social Welfare, Cooperators' Advantage and the Option of Not Playing the Game,” American Sociological Reveiw, 58: 787–800. (Scholar)
  • Pettit, Phillip, 1986, “Free Riding and Foul Dealing,” Journal of Philosophy, 83: 361–379. (Scholar)
  • Pettit, Phillip and Robert Sugden, 1989, “The Backward Induction Paradox,” Journal of Philosophy, 86: 169–182. (Scholar)
  • Poundstone, William, 1992, Prisoner's Dilemma New York: Doubleday. (Scholar)
  • Press, William and Freeman Dyson, 2012, “Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Contains Strategeis That Dominate Any Evolutionary Opponent,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109: 10409–10413. (Scholar)
  • Quinn, Warren, 1990, “The Paradox of the Self-Torturer,” Philosophical Studies, 59: 79–90. (Scholar)
  • Rabinowicz, Wlodek, 1998, “Grappling with the Centipede: Defense of Backward Induction for BI-Terminating Games,” Economics and Philosophy, 14: 95–126. (Scholar)
  • Rosenthal, R., 1981, “Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing, and the Chain Store,” Journal of Economic Theory, 25: 92–100. (Scholar)
  • Schelling, Thomas, 1978, Micromotives and Macrobehavior New York: Norton. (Scholar)
  • Segal, Nancy and Scott Hershberger, 1999, “Cooperation and Competition Between Twins: Findings from a Prisoner's Dilemma Game,” Evolution and Human Behavior, 20: 29–51 (Scholar)
  • Selten, Reinhard, 1975, “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept of Equilibrium in Extensive Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 4: 25–55. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1978, “The Chain-Store Paradox,” Theory and Decision, 9: 127–159. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1983, “Evolutionary Stability in Extensive Two-person Games,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 5: 269–363. (Scholar)
  • Sigmund, Karl, 1993, Games of Life: Explorations in Ecology Evolution and Behavior, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • Skyrms, Brian, 1990, The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1996, Evolution of the Social Contract, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1998, “The Shadow of the Future,” in Coleman and Morris (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka, New York, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2004, The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Sobel, J.H., 2005, “Backward Induction Without Tears?,” in D. Vanderveken (ed.), Logic, Thought and Action, Berlin: Springer, 433–461. (Scholar)
  • –––, 1993, “Backward Induction Arguments: A Paradox Regained,” Philosophy of Science, 60: 114–133. (Scholar)
  • Sober, Elliott and David Sloan Wilson, 1998, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
  • Stewart, Alexander and Joshua Plotkin, 2012, “Extortion and Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemm,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109: 10134–10135. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2013, “From Extortion to Generosity, Evolution in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemm,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110: 15348–15353. (Scholar)
  • Sugden, R., 1986, The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare, New York, Basil Blackwell; 2nd edition, 2004, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan. (Scholar)
  • Szabó:, György and Christoph Hauert, 2002, “Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Optional Participation,” Physical Review E, 66: 062903. (Scholar)
  • Taylor, Michael, 1987, The Possibility of Cooperation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Trivers, Robert, 1971, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” Quarterly Review of Biology, 46: 35–57. (Scholar)
  • Vanderschraaf, Peter, 1998, “The Informal Game Theory in Hume's Account of Convention,” Economics and Philosophy, 14: 215–247. (Scholar)
  • Williamson, Timothy, 1992, “Inexact Knowledge,” Mind, 101: 217–242. (Scholar)
  • Wilson, D.S. and E. Sober, 1994, “Reintroducing Group Selection to the Human Behavioral Sciences,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17: 585–654. (Scholar)

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