Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Interpretations of Probability" by Alan Hájek

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Albert, D., 2000, Time and Chance, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Arnauld, A., 1662, Logic, or, The Art of Thinking (“The Port Royal Logic”), tr. J. Dickoff and P. James, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964. (Scholar)
Bacon, A., 2014, “Giving Your Knowledge Half A Chance”, Philosophical Studies, 171 (2): 373–397. (Scholar)
Bartha, P. and Johns, R., 2001, “Probability and Symmetry”, Philosophy of Science, 68 (Proceedings): S109–S122. (Scholar)
Bell, E.T., 1945, The Development of Mathematics, 2nd edition, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company. (Scholar)
Billingsley, P., 1995, Probability and Measure, 3rd edition, New York: John Wiley & Sons. (Scholar)
Briggs, R. A., and R. Pettigrew, forthcoming, “An Accuracy-Dominance Argument for Conditionalization”, Noûs, first online 21 June 2018. doi:10.1111/nous.12258">10.1111/nous.12258 (Scholar)
Briggs, R., 2009, “The Anatomy of the Big Bad Bug”, Noûs, 43 (3): 428–449. doi:10.1111/nous.12258 (Scholar)
Buchak, L., 2016, “Decision Theory”, in Hájek and Hitchcock (eds.) 2016, 789–815. (Scholar)
Carnap, R., 1950, Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1952, The Continuum of Inductive Methods, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1963, “Replies and Systematic Expositions”, in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, P. A. Schilpp, (ed.), La Salle, IL: Open Court, 859–1013. (Scholar)
Childers, T., 2013, Philosophy and Probability, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Christensen, D., 2010, “Rational Reflection”, Philosophical Perspectives, 24 (1): 121–140. (Scholar)
Church, A., 1940, “On the Concept of a Random Sequence”, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 46: 130–135. (Scholar)
Cover, T. M., and J. A. Thomas, 1991, Elements of Information Theory, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Scholar)
Cozman, F. G., 2016, “Imprecise and Indeterminate Probabilities”, in Hájek and Hitchcock (eds.) 2016, 296–311. (Scholar)
De Bona, G. and J. Staffel, 2017, “Graded Incoherence for Accuracy Firsters”, Philosophy of Science, 284 (2): 189–213. (Scholar)
De Bona, G., and J. Staffel, 2018, “Why Be (Approximately) Coherent?”, Analysis 78 (3): 405–415. (Scholar)
de Finetti, B., 1937, “La Prévision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives”, Annales de l’Institut Henri Poincaré, 7: 1–68; translated as “Foresight. Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources”, in Studies in Subjective Probability, H. E. Kyburg, Jr. and H. E. Smokler (eds.), Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1980, 55–118. (Scholar)
–––, 1972, Probability, Induction and Statistics, New York: Wiley. (Scholar)
–––, 1990 [1974], Theory of Probability (Volume 1), New York: John Wiley & Sons. (Scholar)
de Moivre, A., 1718/1967, The Doctrine of Chances: or, A Method of Calculating the Probability of Events in Play, London: W. Pearson, 1718; 2nd edition, 1738; 3rd edition 1756; reprinted 1967, New York, NY: Chelsea. (Scholar)
De Morgan, A., 1847, Formal Logic, or, The Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable, London: Taylor and Walton. (Scholar)
Dogramaci, S., and S. Horowitz, 2016, “An Argument for Uniqueness about Evidential Support”, Philosophical Issues 26 (1): 130–147. (Scholar)
Eagle, A., 2010, Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Twenty-One Arguments Against Propensity Analyses of Probability”, Erkenntnis, 60: 371–416. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Probability and Randomness”, in Hájek and Hitchcock (eds.) 2016, 440–459. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Chance, Determinism, and Unsettledness”, Philosophical Studies, 1–22. (Scholar)
Earman, J., 1992, Bayes or Bust?, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Easwaran, K., 2013, “Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection”, Philosophy of Science 80 (1): 119–142. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities”, Noûs 50 (4): 816–853. (Scholar)
Eder A., forthcoming, “Evidential Probabilities and Credences”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. (Scholar)
Edwards, W., Lindman, H., and Savage, L. J., 1963, “Bayesian Statistical Inference for Psychological Research”, Psychological Review, 70: 193–242. (Scholar)
Elga, A., 2000, “Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem”, Analysis, 60 (2): 143–147. Also in Eagle 2010. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Infinitesimal Chances and the Laws of Nature”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82 (1): 67–76. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “The Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock and the New Rational Reflection Principle”, Philosophical Studies 164 (1): 127–139. (Scholar)
Eriksson, L. and A. Hájek, 2007, “What Are Degrees of Belief?”, Studia Logica (Special Issue, Formal Epistemology, Branden Fitelson, ed.), 86 (2): 185–215. (Scholar)
Feller, W., 1968, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, New York: John Wiley & Sons. (Scholar)
Festa, R., 1993, Optimum Inductive Methods: A Study in Inductive Probability, Bayesian Statistics, and Verisimilitude, Dordrecht: Kluwer (Synthese Library 232). (Scholar)
Fetzer, J. H., 1981, Scientific Knowledge: Causation, Explanation, and Corroboration (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 69), Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, “Probabilistic Explanations”, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of Philosophy of Science Association, 2: 194–207. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, “Probability and Objectivity in Deterministic and Indeterministic Situations”, Synthese, 57: 367–386. (Scholar)
Fine, T., 1973, Theories of Probability, Waltham, MA: Academic Press. (Scholar)
Fine, T., 2016, “Mathematical Alternatives to Standard Probability that Provide Selectable Degrees of Precision”, in Hájek and Hitchcock (eds.) 2016, 203–247. (Scholar)
Forster, M. and Sober, E., 1994, “How to Tell when Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories will Provide More Accurate Predictions”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45: 1–35. (Scholar)
Franklin, J., 2001, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (Scholar)
Frigg, R., 2016, “Chance and Determinism”, in Hájek and Hitchcock (eds.) 2016, 460–474. (Scholar)
Gaifman, H., 1988, “A Theory of Higher Order Probabilities”, in Causation, Chance, and Credence, B. Skyrms and W. L. Harper (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 191–219. (Scholar)
Galavotti, M. C., 2005, Philosophical Introduction to Probability, Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
Giere, R. N., 1973, “Objective Single-Case Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistics”, in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Volume IV), P. Suppes et al., (eds.), New York: North-Holland, 467-483. Also in Eagle 2010. (Scholar)
Gillies, D., 2000a, “Varieties of Propensity”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 51: 807–835. (Scholar)
–––, 2000b, Philosophical Theories of Probability, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, The Propensity Interpretation, in Hájek and Hitchcock (eds.) 2016, 406–422. (Scholar)
Goldstein, M., 1983, “The Prevision of a Prevision”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 78: 817–819. (Scholar)
Goodman, N., 1955, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 2nd edition, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965; 3rd edition Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973; 4th edition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983. (Scholar)
Greaves, H., and D. Wallace, 2006, “Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility”, Mind, 115 (459): 607–632. (Scholar)
Hacking, I., 1965, The Logic of Statistical Inference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Hájek, A., 1997, “‘Mises Redux’ — Redux. Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism”, Erkenntnis, 45: 209–227. Also in Eagle 2010. (Scholar)
–––, 2003 “What Conditional Probability Could Not Be”, Synthese, 137 (3): 273–323.. (Scholar)
Hájek, A., 2009a, “Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism”, Erkenntnis, 70: 211–235. Also in Eagle 2010. (Scholar)
–––, 2009b, “Arguments for—or Against—Probabilism?” In Degrees of Belief, 229–251. Springer. (Scholar)
–––, 2009c, “Dutch Book Arguments”, in The Oxford Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, P. Anand, P. Pattanaik, and C. Puppe (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 173–195. (Scholar)
Hájek, A., and Hitchcock, C. (eds.), 2016a, The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2016b, “Probability for Everyone—Even Philosophers”, in The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. (Scholar)
Hájek, A., and M. Smithson, 2012, “Rationality and Indeterminate Probabilities”, Synthese, 187 (1): 33–48. (Scholar)
Hall, N., 1994, “Correcting the Guide to Objective Chance” Mind, 103 (412): 505–518. (Scholar)
Hall, N., 2003, “Two Concepts of Causation”, in J. Collins, N. Hall, and L. Paul (eds.), Counterfactuals and Causation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 225–276. (Scholar)
Hall, N., 2004, “Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82 (1): 93–111. (Scholar)
Halpern, J., 2003, Reasoning About Uncertainty, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, J., 2016, “A Logic of Comparative Support: Qualitative Conditional Probability Relations Representable by Popper Functions”, in Hájek and Hitchcock (eds.) 2016, 277–295. (Scholar)
Hintikka, J., 1965, “A Two-Dimensional Continuum of Inductive Methods”, in Aspects of Inductive Logic, J. Hintikka and P. Suppes, (eds.), Amsterdam: North-Holland, 113–132. (Scholar)
Hitchcock, C., 2002, “Probability and Chance”, in the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Volume 18), London: Elsevier, 12,089–12,095. (Scholar)
Hoefer, C., 2007, “The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Skeptic’s Guide to Objective Chance”, Mind, 116 (2): 549–596. (Scholar)
Holton, R., forthcoming, “Intention as a Model for Belief”, in Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman, edited by Manuel Vargas and Gideon Yaffe. Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Howson, C. and Urbach, P., 1993, Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, La Salle, IL: Open Court, 2^nd edition. (Scholar)
Huber, F., 2018, A Logical Introduction to Probability and Induction, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Humphreys, P., 1985, “Why Propensities Cannot Be Probabilities”, Philosophical Review, 94: 557–70. Also in Eagle 2010. (Scholar)
Ismael, J., 2008, “Raid! Dissolving the Big, Bad Bug”, Noûs, 42 (2): 292–307. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Probability in Deterministic Physics”, The Journal of Philosophy, 106 (2): 89–108. (Scholar)
Jackson, F., 1997, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Jaynes, E. T., 1968, “Prior Probabilities” Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics, SSC-4: 227-241. (Scholar)
Jeffrey, R., 1965, The Logic of Decision, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2^nd edition, 1983. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, Probability and the Art of Judgment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Jeffreys, H., 1939, Theory of Probability; reprinted in Oxford Classics in the Physical Sciences series, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. (Scholar)
Johnson, W. E., 1921, Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Joyce, J., 1998, “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”, Philosophy of Science, 65 (4): 575–603. Also in Eagle 2010. (Scholar)
Joyce, J., 2004, “Williamson on Evidence and Knowledge”, Philosophical Books, 45 (4): 296–305. (Scholar)
Kahneman, D., Slovic P. and Tversky, A., (eds.), 1982, Judgment Under Uncertainty. Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Kelly, T., 2010, “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence”, in In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 183–217. (Scholar)
Kemeny, J., 1955, “Fair Bets and Inductive Probabilities”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 20: 263–273. (Scholar)
Keynes, J. M., 1921, A Treatise on Probability, London: Macmillan and Co. (Scholar)
Kieseppä, I. A., 2001, “Statistical Model Selection Criteria and Bayesianism”, Philosophy of Science, 68 (Proceedings): S141-S152. (Scholar)
Kolmogorov, A. N., 1933, Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeitrechnung, Ergebnisse Der Mathematik; translated as Foundations of Probability, New York: Chelsea Publishing Company, 1950. (Scholar)
–––, 1965, “Three Approaches to the Quantitative Definition of Information”, Problemy Perdaci Informacii, 1: 4–7. (Scholar)
Kopec, M., and M. G. Titelbaum, 2016, “The Uniqueness Thesis”, Philosophy Compass, 11 (4): 189–200. (Scholar)
Kraemer, D. M, 2015, “Natural Probabilistic Information”, Synthese, 192 (9): 2901–2919. (Scholar)
Kyburg, H. E., 1970, Probability and Inductive Logic, New York: Macmillan. (Scholar)
Kyburg, H. E. and Smokler, H. E., (eds.), 1980, Studies in Subjective Probability, 2nd edition, Huntington, New York: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Co. (Scholar)
La Caze, A., 2016, “Frequentism”, in Hájek and Hitchcock (eds.) 2016, 341–359. (Scholar)
Laplace, P. S., 1814/1999. Philosophical Essay of Probabilities, translated by Andrew Dale, New York: Springer. (Scholar)
Lasonen-Aarnio, M., 2015, “New Rational Reflection and Internalism about Rationality”, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 5: 145–171. (Scholar)
Levi, I., 1978, “Coherence, Regularity and Conditional Probability”, Theory and Decision, 9: 1–15. (Scholar)
Lewis, D., 1970, “How to Define Theoretical Terms”, Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446. (Scholar)
–––, 1973, Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1979,“Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”, Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance”, in Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.) Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Vol II., Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press; reprinted in Lewis 1986b, 263–294. Also in Eagle 2010. (Scholar)
–––, 1986a, “Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities II”, Philosophical Review, 95: 581–589. (Scholar)
–––, 1986b, Philosophical Papers: Volume II, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1994a, “Reduction of Mind”, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, S. Guttenplan (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431. (Scholar)
–––, 1994b, “Humean Supervenience Debugged”, Mind, 103: 473–490. (Scholar)
Li, M. and Vitányi, P., 1997, An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and Its Applications, 2^nd ed., New York: Springer. (Scholar)
Lin, Hanti, 2013, “Foundations of Everyday Practical Reasoning”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 42 (6): 831–862. (Scholar)
Loewer, B., 2004, “David Lewis’s Humean Theory of Objective Chance”, Philosophy of Science, 71 (5): 1115–1125. Also in Eagle 2010. (Scholar)
Loewer, B., 2012, “Two Accounts of Laws and Time”, Philosophical Studies, 160 (1), 115–137. (Scholar)
Lyon, A., 2011, “Deterministic Probability: Neither Chance nor Credence”, Synthese, 182 (3): 413–32. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “From Kolmogorov, to Popper, to Renyi: There’s No Escaping Humphreys’ Paradox (When Generalized)”, in Chance and Temporal Asymmetry, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Kolmogorov’s Axiomatization and Its Discontents”, in Hájek and Hitchcock (eds.) 2016, 155–166. (Scholar)
Maher, P., 2000, “Probabilities for Two Properties”, Erkenntnis, 52: 63–91. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Probabilities for Multiple Properties: The Models of Hesse and Carnap and Kemeny”, Erkenntnis, 55: 183–216. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Explication of Inductive Probability”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 39: 593–616. (Scholar)
Martin-Löf, P., 1966, “The Definition of Random Sequences”, Information and Control, 9: 602–619. (Scholar)
Meacham, C. J. G., 2008, “Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of de Se Beliefs”, Philosophical Studies, 138 (2): 245–269. (Scholar)
Meacham, C. J. G., and J. Weisberg, 2011, “Representation Theorems and the Foundations of Decision Theory”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89 (4): 641–663. (Scholar)
Mellor, D. H., 2005, Probability: A Philosophical Introduction, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Miller, D. W., 1994, Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence, Lasalle, Il: Open Court. (Scholar)
Norton, J. D., 2008, “Ignorance and Indifference”, Philosophy of Science, 75 (1): 45–68. (Scholar)
Paris J. and Vencovská A., 1997, “In Defence of the Maximum Entropy Inference Process”, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 17: 77–103. (Scholar)
Pearl, J., 2000, Causality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Peirce, C. S., 1957, “Notes on the Doctrine of Chances”, in Essays in the Philosophy of Science (The American Heritage Series), Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 74–84. (Scholar)
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Popper, K. R., 1957, “The Propensity Interpretation of the Calculus of Probability and the Quantum Theory”, in S. Körner (ed.), The Colston Papers, 9: 65–70. (Scholar)
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–––, 1959b, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York: Basic Books; reprinted, London: Routledge, 1992. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, A World of Propensities – Two New Views on Causality, Bristol: Thoemmes. (Scholar)
Ramsey, F. P., 1926, “Truth and Probability”, in Foundations of Mathematics and other Essays, R. B. Braithwaite (ed.), London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner, & Co., 1931, 156–198; reprinted in Studies in Subjective Probability, H. E. Kyburg, Jr. and H. E. Smokler (eds.), 2^nd edition, New York: R. E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1980, 23–52; reprinted in Philosophical Papers, D. H. Mellor (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 52–94. Also in Eagle 2010. (Scholar)
Ramsey, F. P., 1928/1990, “General Propositions and Causality”, Philosophical Papers, edited by D. H. Mellor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 145–163. (Scholar)
Reichenbach, H., 1949, The Theory of Probability, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
Rényi, A., 1970, Foundations of Probability, San Francisco: Holden-Day, Inc. (Scholar)
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Roeper, P. and Leblanc, H., 1999, Probability Theory and Probability Logic, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. (Scholar)
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Salmon, W., 1966, The Foundations of Scientific Inference, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 2019, “Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us about Irrelevant Influences on Belief”, in J. Fantl, M. McGrath, and E. Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Epistemology: An Anthology, Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 277–295. (Scholar)
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Williamson, T., 2000, Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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