Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Propositional Attitude Reports" by Michael Nelson

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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–––, 1993. ‘Sometimes a great notion: A critical notice of Mark Crimmins’, Talk about Beliefs’, Mind and Language, 8: 431–441. (Scholar)
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Barber, A., 2000. ‘A pragmatic treatment of simple sentences’, Analysis, 60: 300–308.
Barwise, J. and Perry, J., 1983. Situations and Attitudes, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 2006b. ‘Now you know who Hong Oak Yun is’, Philosophical Issues, 16: 24–42. (Scholar)
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–––, 2002. Thoughts and Utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 2016. ‘Linguistic conventions and the role of pragmatics’, Mind & Language, 31: 612–624. (Scholar)
Castañeda, H.-N., 1966. ‘“He”: A study in the logic of self-consciousness’, Ratio, 8: 130–157. (Scholar)
–––, 1967. ‘Indicators and quasi-indicators’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 4: 85–100. (Scholar)
–––, 1987. ‘Self-consciousness, demonstrative reference, and the self-ascription view of believing’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 405–454. (Scholar)
–––, 1999. The Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness, J. Hart and T. Kapitan (eds.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 1976b. Person and Object, La Salle, Ill.: Open Court. (Scholar)
–––, 1979. ‘Objects and Persons: Revisions and replies’, in E. Sosa (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, Amsterdam: Rodopi: 317–388. (Scholar)
–––, 1981. The First Person, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
Church, A., 1943. Review of Quine ‘Notes on existence and necessity’, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 8: 45–7. (Scholar)
–––, 1950. ‘On Carnap’s analysis of statements of assertion and belief’, Analysis, 10: 97–99. (Scholar)
–––, 1951. ‘A formulation of the logic of sense and denotation’, in P. Henle, M. Kallen, and S.K. Langer (eds.), Structure, Method, and Meaning: Essays in honor of Henry M. Scheffer, New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1951, 3–24.
Clapp, L., 1995. ‘How to be direct and innocent: A criticism of Crimmins and Perry’s theory of attitude ascriptions’ Linguistics and Philosophy, 18: 529–565. (Scholar)
–––, 2002. ‘Davidson’s program and interpreted logical forms’, Linguistics and Philosophy, 25: 261–97. (Scholar)
Corazza, E., 1994. ‘Perspectival thoughts and psychological generalizations’, Dialectica, 48: 307–336. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. Reflecting the Mind: Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007. ‘Thinking the unthinkable: An excursion into Z-land’, in M. O’Rourke and C. Washington (eds.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the work of John Perry, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 427–450. (Scholar)
Crane, T., 2011. ‘The singularity of singular thought’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 85: 21–43. (Scholar)
–––, 2013. The Objects of Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Cresswell, M., 1990. Entities and Indices, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. Semantic Indexicality, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
Crimmins, M., 1992a. Talk about Beliefs, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1992b. ‘Context in the attitudes’ Linguistics and Philosophy, 15: 185–198. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. ‘So-labeled neo-Fregeanism’ Philosophical Studies, 69: 265–79. (Scholar)
–––, 1995a. ‘Notional specificity’, Mind and Language, 10: 464–477. (Scholar)
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Crimmins, M. and J. Perry, 1989. ‘The prince and the phone booth: Reporting puzzling beliefs’, Journal of Philosophy, 86: 685–711. (Scholar)
Cumming, S., 2008. ‘Variabilism’, Philosophical Review, 117: 525–554. (Scholar)
Davidson, D., 1967. ‘Truth and meaning’ Synthese, 17: 304–23. (Scholar)
–––, 1968. ‘On saying that’, Synthese, 19: 130–146. (Scholar)
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Donnellan, K., 1990. ‘Genuine names and knowledge by acquaintance’, Dialectica, 44: 99–112. (Scholar)
Dummett, M., 1973. Frege: Philosophy of Language, London: Duckworth. (Scholar)
Evans, G., 1982. The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1985. Collected Papers, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 2014. ‘Recurrence: A rejoinder’ Philosophical Studies, 169: 425–428. (Scholar)
Fitch, G., 1984. ‘Two aspects of belief’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 45: 87–101. (Scholar)
–––, 1987. Naming and Believing, Dordrecht: Reidel. (Scholar)
Forbes, G., 1989. Languages of Possibility, Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1990. ‘The indispensability of Sinn’ Philosophical Review, 99: 535–563. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. ‘Reply to Marks’, Philosophical Studies, 69: 281–295. (Scholar)
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–––, 1997. ‘How much substitutivity’, Analysis, 57: 109–113. (Scholar)
–––, 1999. ‘Enlightened semantics for simple sentences’, Analysis, 59: 86–91. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. ‘Objectual attitudes’, Linguistics and Philosophy, 23: 141–183. (Scholar)
–––, 2002. ‘Intensionality’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplement), 76: 75–99. (Scholar)
Foster, J., 1976. ‘Meaning and truth theory’, in G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.). Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976, pp. 1–32. (Scholar)
Frege, G., 1892 [1948]. ‘Sense and reference’ Philosophical Review, 57 (1948): 209–230; originally published in 1892.
–––, 1904. Correspondence with Russell, in N. Salmon and S. Soames (eds.). Propositions and Attitudes, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p.56. (Scholar)
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Garcia-Carpintero, M., 2013. ‘The self file and immunity to error through misidentification’ Disputatio, 36: 191–206. (Scholar)
–––, 2017. ‘The philosophical significance of the de se’ Inquiry, 60: 253–276. (Scholar)
–––, 2017. ‘The Mill-Frege theory of proper names’ Mind, 127(508): 1107–1168 (Scholar)
Garcia-Carpintero, M. and S. Torre, 2016. About Oneself, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Grice, H.P., 1967 [1975]. ‘Logic and conversation’, in P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics, 3 (1975): 41–58; originally delivered as William James lectures at Harvard University in 1967.
–––, 1978. ‘Further notes on logic and conversation’, Syntax and Semantics, 9: 113–128. (Scholar)
–––, 1981. ‘Presupposition and conversational implicature’, in P. Cole (ed.), Radical Pragmatics, New York: Academic Press, pp. 183–198. (Scholar)
Harman, G., 1972. ‘Logical form’, Foundations of Language, 9: 38–65. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, J. and D. Manley, 2012. The Reference Book, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 2012. ‘Solving Frege’s puzzle’ Journal of Philosophy, 109: 132–174. (Scholar)
–––, 2014. ‘In defense of formal relationism’ Thought, 3: 243–250. (Scholar)
Higginbotham, J., 1991. ‘Belief and logical form’ Mind and Language, 6: 344–69. (Scholar)
Hintikka, J., 1969. ‘Semantics for propositional attitudes’, in J. Davis et al. (eds.), Philosophical Logic, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
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Jaszczolt, K. M., 1999. Discourse, Belief, and Intentions: Semantic defaults and propositional attitude ascriptions, Oxford: Elsevier Science. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. ‘The default-based context-dependence of belief reports’, in K. M. Jaszczolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports, Oxford: Elsevier Science, 169–185. (Scholar)
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Kaplan, D., 1969. ‘Quantifying in’, Synthese, 19: 178–214. (Scholar)
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Kazmi, A., 1987. ‘Quantification and opacity’ Linguistics and Philosophy, 10: 77–100. (Scholar)
Kripke, S., 1979. ‘A puzzle about belief’, in A. Margalit (ed.). Meaning and Use, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979, 239–283.
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–––, 2013. Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures, Oxford: Oxford University Press; originally delivered as a series of lecture at Oxford University in 1973. (Scholar)
Larson, R. and P. Ludlow, 1993. ‘Interpreted logical forms’, Synthese, 95: 305–55. (Scholar)
Larson, R. and G. Segal, 1995. Knowledge of Meaning: Semantic Value and Logical Form, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
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Lewis, D., 1972. ‘General semantics’, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 169–218. (Scholar)
–––, 1979. ‘Attitudes de dicto and de se’ Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. (Scholar)
–––, 1981. ‘What puzzling Pierre believes’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 59: 283–289. (Scholar)
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–––, 2000. ‘Interpreted logical forms, belief attribution, and the dynamic lexicon’, in M. Jaszczolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports, Oxford: Elsevier Science, 2000, 31–42. (Scholar)
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McFetridge, J., 1980. ‘Propositions and Davidson’s account of indirect discourse’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 76: 131–45. (Scholar)
McKay, T., 1981. ‘On proper names in belief ascriptions’, Philosophical Studies, 39: 287–303. (Scholar)
–––, 1986. ‘His burning pants’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 27: 393–400. (Scholar)
–––, 1991. ‘Representing de re beliefs’ Linguistics and Philosophy, 14: 711–739. (Scholar)
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Perry, J., 1977. ‘Frege on demonstratives’ Philosophical Review, 86: 474–97; reprinted in Perry 1993 and 2000. (Scholar)
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–––, 1979. ‘The problem of the essential indexical’, Noûs, 13: 3–21; reprinted in Perry 1993 and 2000. (Scholar)
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