Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Propositions" by Matthew McGrath and Devin Frank

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Adams, R. M., 1974, “Theories of Actuality,” Noûs, 8: 211–31. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, “Actualism and Thisness,” Synthese, 49: 3–41. (Scholar)
Alston, William, 1959, “Ontological Commitments,” Philosophical Studies, 9(1): 8–17. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, A Realist Conception of Truth, Ithaca: Cornell. (Scholar)
Armstrong, D. M., 1989, Universals, Boulder: Westview Press. (Scholar)
Bach, Kent, 1997, “Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 78: 215–41. (Scholar)
Balaguer, Mark, 1998a, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998b, “Attitudes Without Propositions” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58: 805–26. (Scholar)
Bealer, George, 1982, Quality and Concept, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Propositions,” Mind, 107: 1–32. (Scholar)
Beaney, Michael, 1997, The Frege Reader, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Bennett, Jonathan, 1988, Events and Their Names, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Blackburn, Simon, 1984, Spreading the Word, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, Essays in Quasi-Realism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Ruling Passions, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Brogaard, Berit, 2012, Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Caplan, Ben, Chris Tillman, Brian McLean, and Adam Murray, 2013, “Not the Optimistic Type,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 45(5–6): 575–589. (Scholar)
Carnap, Rudolf, 1956, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,” in his Meaning and Necessity, 2nd edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Cartwright, Richard, 1962, “Propositions,” in Analytical Philosophy, 1st series, R. J. Butler (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 81–103. (Scholar)
Crimmins, M. and J. Perry, 1989, “The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs,” The Journal of Philosophy, 86: 685–711. (Scholar)
Crisp, Thomas M., 2003, “Presentism” in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, edited by Michael J. Loux and Dean Zimmerman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 211–45. (Scholar)
David, Marian, 2009, “Defending Existentialism” in Maria Reicher, ed., States of Affairs, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, pp. 167–208. (Scholar)
Davidson, Donald, 1968, “On Saying That,” Synthese, 19: 130–46. (Scholar)
Dodd, Julian, 2000, The Identity Theory of Truth, London: MacMillan. (Scholar)
Dodd, Julian, 2007, Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Dummett, Michael, 1996, “The Myth of the Third Realm”, in his Frege and Other Philosophers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 248–62. (Scholar)
Eklund, Matti, 2007, “The Deflationary Conception of Ontology,” in T. Sider, J. Hawthorne, and D. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 382–96. (Scholar)
Fine, Kit, 1980, “Acts, Events, and Things,” in W. Leinfellner, E. Kraemer, and J. Schank (eds.), Language and Ontology: Proceedings of the Sixth International Wittgenstein Symposium, Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 97-105. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, “First-Order Modal Theories III — Facts,” Synthese, 53: 43–122. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, “First-Order Modal Theories II — Propositions,” Studia Logica, 39: 159–202. (Scholar)
Frege, Gottlob, 1984, “Thoughts,” in Gottlob Frege: Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, B. McGuinness (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 351–72. (Scholar)
Forbes, Graeme, 1995, “Review of R. Marcus Modalities,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 36(2): 336–9. (Scholar)
Gaskin, Richard, 2008, The Unity of the Proposition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Gibbard, Allan, 2003, Thinking How to Live, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Gilmore, Cody, 2014, “Parts of Propositions,” in Mereology and Location, S. Kleinschmidt (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 156–208. (Scholar)
Grover, Dorothy, 1992, A Prosentential Theory of Truth, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. (Scholar)
Hanks, Peter, 2011, “Structured Propositions as Types”, Mind, 120: 11–52. (Scholar)
Hanks, Peter, 2015, Propositional Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Harman, Gilbert, 2003, “Category Mistakes in M&E,” Philosophical Perspectives, 17(1): 165–80. (Scholar)
Higginbotham, James, 1991, “Belief and Logical Form,” Mind and Language, 6(4): 344–369. (Scholar)
Hofweber, Thomas, 2005, “A Puzzle about Ontology”, Noûs, 39(2): 256–83. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Inexpressible Properties and Propositions”, in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (Volume 2), D. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 155–206. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Horwich, Paul, 1993, “Gibbard’s Theory of Norms,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22(1): 67–79. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, Truth, New York: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Iacona, Andrea, 2002, Propositions, Genoa, Italy: Name. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Are There Propositions?,” Erkenntnis, 58: 325–351. (Scholar)
Katz, Jerrold, 1990, The Metaphysics of Meaning, Cambridge, MA: MIT. (Scholar)
Keller, Lorraine, 2013, “The Metaphysics of Propositional Constituency,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43(5–6): 655–678. (Scholar)
King, Jeffrey C., 1995, “Structured Propositions and Complex Predicates,” Noûs, 29(4): 516–535 (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Designating Propositions,” Philosophical Review, 111(3): 341–371. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Tense, Modality, and Semantic Value,” Philosophical Perspectives, 17: 195–246. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, The Nature and Structure of Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Naturalized Propositions,” in Jeffrey C. King, et al. (2014): 47–70. (Scholar)
King, Jeffrey C., Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks (eds.), 2014, New Thinking About Propositions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kretzmann, Norman, 1970, “Medieval Logicians on the Meaning of the Propositio”, The Journal of Philosophy, 67(20): 767–87. (Scholar)
Lehrer, Keith and McGee, Vann, 1992, “Particulars, Individual Qualities, and Universals,” in K. Mulligan (ed.), Language, Truth and Ontology (Philosophical Studies Series 51), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 37–47. (Scholar)
Lewis, David K., 1980, “Index, Context and Content,” in Lewis (1998), 21–44. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Papers in Philosophical Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Linsky, B., and Zalta, E.,, 1996, “In Defense of the Contingently Concrete”, Philosophical Studies, 84: 283–294. (Scholar)
Marcus, Ruth Barcan, 1993, Modalities: Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Matthews, F., 1994, “The Measure of Mind,” Mind, 103: 131–146. (Scholar)
McGlone, Michael, 2012, “Propositional Structure and Truth-Conditions,” Philosophical Studies, 157: 211–225. (Scholar)
McGrath, Matthew, 2003, “What the Deflationist May Say about Truthmaking,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66(3): 666–688. (Scholar)
McKinsey, Michael, 1999, “The Semantics of Belief Ascriptions,” Noûs, 33(4): 519–557. (Scholar)
Menzel, Christopher, 1986, “A Complete, Type-free ‘Second-order’ Logic and Its Philosophical Foundations,” Technical Report No. CSLI–86–40, Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information Publications. (Scholar)
Merricks, Trenton, 2015, Propositions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Moffett, Marc, 2003, “Knowing facts and believing propositions: A solution to the Problem of Doxastic Shift,” Philosophical Studies, 115: 81–97. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Constructing Attitudes”, Protosociology (Compositionality, Concepts and Representations I: New Problems in Cognitive Science), 21: 105–128. (Scholar)
Moltmann, Friederike, 2003, “Propositional Attitudes without Propositions,” Synthese, 135: 77–118. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Nonreferential complements, Nominalizations, and derived Objects,” Journal of Semantics, 21(1): 1–45 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, Abstract Objects and the Semantics of Natural Langage, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Moore, G. E., 1953, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, London: Unwin. (Scholar)
Moore, Joseph, 1999, “Propositions, Numbers, and the Problem of Arbitrary Identifications,” Synthese, 120(2): 229–63. (Scholar)
Newman, Andrew, 2002, The Correspondence Theory of Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Nuchelmans, Gabriel, 1973, Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity, Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, Studies on the History of Logic and Semantics, 12th-17th Centuries, E.P. Bos (ed.), Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate. (Scholar)
Parsons, Terence, 1993, “On Denoting Propositions and Facts” in Philosophical Perspectives 7: Language and Logic, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Ridgeview: Atascadero, 441–60. (Scholar)
Plantinga, Alvin, 1974, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, “On Existentialism”, Philosophical Studies, 44: 1–20. (Scholar)
Pollock, John, 1985, “Plantinga on Possible Worlds”, in Alvin Plantinga, eds. James Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 313–29. (Scholar)
Prior, A. N., 1947, “Facts, Propositions, and Entailment,” Mind, 57: 62–8. (Scholar)
Putnam, Hilary, 2004, Ethics without Ontology, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1987, The Many Faces of Realism, LaSalle, IL: Open Court. (Scholar)
Prior, A. N., 1971, Objects of Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Richard, Mark, 1982, “Tense, Propositions, and Meanings”, Philosophical Studies, 41: 337–51. (Scholar)
Richard, Mark, 2013, “What are Propositions?”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43(5–6): 702–719. (Scholar)
Quine, W.V.O., 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Recanati, Francois, 2000, Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta: An Essay on Metarepresentation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Restall, Greg, 2001, “Just What is Full-Blooded Platonism?” Philosophia Mathematica, 11: 82–91. (Scholar)
Rumfitt, Ian, 1993, “Content and Context: The Paratactic Theory Revisited and Revised,” Mind, 102(407): 429–454. (Scholar)
Russell, Bertrand, 1903, The Principles of Mathematics, London: Norton. (Scholar)
–––, 1910, On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, reprinted in Slater 1992, pp. 116–124. (Scholar)
–––, 1912, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1913, Theory of Knowledge, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 1918, “Lectures on Logical Atomism,” in R. Marsh (ed.), Logic and Knowledge, London: Allen and Unwin, 1956 (Scholar)
Salmon, Nathan, and Soames, Scott, 1988, Propositional Attitudes, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Salmon, Nathan, 1989, “Tense and Singular Propositions”, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Schiffer, Stephen, 1996, “Language-Created Language-Independent Entities.” Philosophical Topics, 24: 47–87. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, The Things We Mean, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Slater, John G., 1992, Russell: His Works (Volume 6: Logical and Philosophical Papers 1909–13), London and New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Speaks, Jeff, 2014, “Representational Entities and Representational Acts,” in King et al. (2014): 147–165. (Scholar)
Stalnaker, Robert, 1976, “Propositions,” in A.F. MacKay and D. D. Merrill (eds.), Issues in the Philosophy of Language, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 79–91. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, Inquiry, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Stanley, Jason, 2002, “Modality and What is Said,” Philosophical Perspectives, 16: 321–44. (Scholar)
Shier, David, 1996, “Direct Reference for the Narrow Minded,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 77: 225–48. (Scholar)
Stoljar, Daniel, 1993, “Emotivism and Truth Conditions,” Philosophical Studies, 70: 81–101. (Scholar)
Slote, Michael, 1974, Metaphysics and Essence, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Soames, Scott, 1987, “Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content,” Philosophical Topics, 15: 47–87. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions,” Noûs, 32(1): 1–22. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, Understanding Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, What is Meaning?, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, “Cognitive Propositions,” in Jeffrey C. King, et al. (2014): 91–124. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “Clarifying and Improving the Cognitive Theory,” in Jeffrey C. King, et al. (2014): 226–224. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Stenius, Erik, 1960, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Vendler, Zeno, 1967, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell. (Scholar)
Wilson, W. K., 1990, “Some reflections on the prosentential theory of truth,” in J. M. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 19–32. (Scholar)
Wood, Rega, 2003, ‘Adam Wodeham’, in Jorge Gracia and Timothy Noone (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, New York: Blackwell, 77–85. (Scholar)
Yablo, S., 2000, “A Paradox of Existence,” in T. Hofweber (ed.), Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzle of Existence, Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Go Figure: A Path Through Fictionalism,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 25: 72–102. (Scholar)
Yablo, S. and A. Gallois, 1998, “Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplement), 72: 229–261. (Scholar)
Yablo, S. and A. Rayo, 2001, “Nominalism Through De-Nominalization,” Noûs, 35: 74–92. (Scholar)
Zalta, Edward, 1983, Abstract Objects, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “Singular Propositions, Abstract Constituents and Attitudes,” in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)

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