Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Public Reason" by Jonathan Quong

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Baehr, A., 2008, “Perfectionism, Feminism, and Public Reason,” Law and Philosophy, 27(2): 193–222. (Scholar)
Bajaj, S., 2017, “Self-Defeat and the Foundations of Public Reason,” Philosophical Studies, 174(12): 3133–3151. (Scholar)
Barry, B., 1995, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” Ethics, 105(4): 874–915. (Scholar)
Bell, D., 2002, “How Can Political Liberals Be Environmentalists?” Political Studies, 50(4): 703–724. (Scholar)
Benhabib, S., 2002, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Billingham, P., 2016, “Convergence Justifications Within Political Liberalism: A Defence,” Res Publica, 22(2): 135–153. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Convergence Liberalism and the Problem of Disagreement Concerning Public Justification,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 47(4): 541–564. (Scholar)
Billingham, P. and A. Taylor, 2020, “A Framework for Analyzing Public Reason Theories,” European Journal of Political Theory, first online 24 June 2020. doi:10.1177/1474885120925381 (Scholar)
Bird, C., 2014, “Coercion and Public Justification,” Politics, Philosophy, & Economics, 13(3): 189–214. (Scholar)
Boettcher, J.W., 2012, “The Moral Status of Public Reason,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 20(2): 156–177. (Scholar)
Bohman, J., 1996, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Deliberative Toleration,” Political Theory, 31(3): 757–779. (Scholar)
Brower, B., 1994, “The Limits of Public Reason,” The Journal of Philosophy, 91(1): 5–26. (Scholar)
Caney, S., 1995, “Anti-Perfectionism and Rawlsian Liberalism,” Political Studies, 43(2): 248–264. (Scholar)
Chambers, C., 2018, Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defense of the Marriage-Free State, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chan, J., 2000, “Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 29(1): 5–42. (Scholar)
Carey, B., 2018, “Public Reason––Honesty not Sincerity,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 26(1): 47–64. (Scholar)
Chambers, S., 1996, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Cohen, J., 2008, “Truth and Public Reason,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 37(1): 2–42. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, The Arc of the Moral Universe and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
D’Agostino, F., 1996, Free Public Reason; Making it Up As We Go, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Donahue, S., 2020, “Public Justification and the Veil of Testimony,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 28(4): 378–396. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Powerful Deceivers and Public Reason Liberalism: An Argument for Externalization,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, first online 15 Oct 2021. doi:10.1080/00048402.2021.1989701 (Scholar)
Dryzek, J., 1990, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Ebels-Duggan, K., 2010, “The Beginning of Community: Politics in the Face of Disagreement,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 60(283): 50–71. (Scholar)
Eberle, C., 2002, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Enoch, D., 2013, “The Disorder of Public Reason,” Ethics, 123(1): 141–176. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Against Public Reason,” Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (Volume 1), D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne, and S. Wall (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 112–142. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Political Philosophy and Epistemology: The Case of Public Reason,” Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (Volume 3), D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne, and S. Wall (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 132–165. (Scholar)
Estlund, D., 1998, “The Insularity of the Reasonable: Why Political Liberalism Must Admit the Truth,” Ethics, 108(2): 252–275. (Scholar)
Freeman, S., 2007, Justice and the Social Contract: Essays in Rawlsian Political Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Friedman, M., 2000, “John Rawls and the Political Coercion of Unreasonable People,” in The Idea of a Political Liberalism: Essays on John Rawls, V. Davion and C. Wolf (eds.), Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 16–33. (Scholar)
Galston, W., 2002, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Gaus, G., 1996, Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “The Place of Religious Belief in Public Reason Liberalism,” in Multiculturalism and Moral Conflict, M. Dimova-Cookson and P. Stirk (eds.), New York: Routledge, pp. 19–37. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Sectarianism Without Perfection? Quong’s Political Liberalism,” Philosophy and Public Issues, 2(1): 7–15. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, The Tyranny of the Ideal, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Self-Organizing Moral Systems,” Politics, Philosophy, & Economics, first published online 29 August 2017. doi: 10.1177/1470594x17719425 (Scholar)
Gaus, G, and K. Vallier, 2009, “The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry, and Political Institutions,” Philosophy & Social Criticism, 35(1): 51–76. (Scholar)
Greenawalt, K., 1988, Religious Convictions and Political Choice, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1994. “On Public Reason.” Chicago-Kent Law Review, 69(3): 669–89. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, Private Consciences and Public Reasons, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Habermas, J., 1990, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholsen (trans.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Reconciliation Through the Public use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy, 92(3): 109–131. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, W. Rehg (trans.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, C. Cronin and HP. DeGreiff (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Hadfield, G. and S. Macedo, 2012, “Rational Reasonableness: Toward a Positive Theory of Public Reason,” Law and Ethics of Human Rights, 6(1): 6–46. (Scholar)
Hampton, J., 1989, “Should Political Philosophy be Done Without Metaphysics?” Ethics, 99(4): 791–814. (Scholar)
Hartley, C. and L. Watson, 2010, “Is a Feminist Political Liberalism Possible?” Journal Of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 5(1): 1–21. (Scholar)
Horton, J. 2003, “Rawls, Public Reason, and the Limits of Liberal Justification,” Contemporary Political Theory, 2(1): 5–23. (Scholar)
Kim, S., 2016, Public Reason Confucianism: Democratic Perfectionism and Constitutionalism in East Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Kramer, M., 2017, Liberalism With Excellence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kogelman, B. and S. Stich, 2016, “When Public Reason Fails Us: Convergence Discourse as Blood Oath,” American Political Science Review, 110(3): 717–730. (Scholar)
Larmore, C., 1996, The Morals of Modernity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy, 96(12): 599–625. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Public Reason,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, S. Freeman (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 368–393. (Scholar)
Lecce, S., 2008, Against Perfectionism: Defending Liberal Neutrality, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. (Scholar)
Leland, R.J., 2019, “Civic Friendship, Public Reason,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 47(1): 72–103. (Scholar)
Leland, R.J. and H. van Wietmarschen, 2012, “Reasonableness, Intellectual Modesty, and Reciprocity in Political Justification,” Ethics, 122(4): 721–747. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Political Liberalism and Political Community,” Journal of Moral Philosophy, 14(2): 142–167. (Scholar)
Lister, A., 2010, “Public Justification and the Limits of State Action,” Politics, Philosophy, & Economics, 9(2): 151–175. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, Public Reason and Political Community, London: Bloomsbury. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Public Reason and Reciprocity,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 25(2): 155–172. (Scholar)
Lloyd, S.A., 1998, “Toward a Liberal Theory of Sexual Equality,” Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 9: 203–224. (Scholar)
Mang, F., 2017, “Public Reason Can Be Reasonably Rejected,” Social Theory and Practice, 43(2): 343–367. (Scholar)
de Marneffe, P., 1994, “Rawls’s Idea of Public Reason,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75(3/4): 232–250. (Scholar)
McCabe, D., 2000, “Knowing About the Good,” Ethics, 110(2): 311–338. (Scholar)
McKinnon, C., 2002, Liberalism and the Defence of Political Constructivism, Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave. (Scholar)
Mendus, S., 2002, Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Muldoon, R., 2016, Social Contract Theory for a Diverse World: Beyond Tolerance, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Nagel, T., 1987, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 16(3): 215–240. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, Equality and Partiality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Neufeld, B., 2022, Public Reason and Political Autonomy: Realizing the Ideal of a Civic People, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Neufeld, B.E. and C. Van Schoelandt, 2014, “Political Liberalism, Ethos Justice, and Gender Equality,” Law and Philosophy, 33(1): 75–104. (Scholar)
Otsuka, M., 2003, Libertarianism Without Inequality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Pallikkathayil, J., 2019, “Disagreement and the Duties of Citizenship,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 56(1): 71–82. (Scholar)
Porter, T., 2012, “Rawls, Reasonableness, and International Toleration,” Politics, Philosophy, & Economics, 11(4): 382–414. (Scholar)
Quong, J., 2011, Liberalism Without Perfection, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Liberalism Without Perfection: Replies to Gaus, Colburn, Chan, Bocchiola,” Philosophy & Public Issues, 2(1): 51–79. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “On The Idea of Public Reason,” in The Blackwell Companion to Rawls, J. Mandle and D. Reidy (eds.), Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 265–280. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “What is the Point of Public Reason?” Philosophical Studies, 170(3): 545–553. (Scholar)
Rawls, J., 1996, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999a, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999b, Collected Papers, S. Freeman (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Raz, J., 1990, “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 19(1): 3–46. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Disagreement in Politics,” The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 43: 25–52. (Scholar)
Reidy, D., 2000, “Rawls’s Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough,” Res Publica, 6(1): 49–72. (Scholar)
Sandel, M., 1998, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice: Second Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Schouten, G., 2013, “Restricting Justice: Political Interventions in the Home and in the Market,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 41(4): 357–388. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Citizenship, Reciprocity, and the Gendered Division of Labor: A Stability Argument for Gender Egalitarian Interventions,” Politics, Philosophy, & Economics, 16(2): 174–209. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Schwartzman, M., 2004, “The Completeness of Public Reason,” Politics, Philosophy, & Economics, 3(2): 191–220. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “The Sincerity of Public Reason,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 19(4): 375–398. (Scholar)
Simmons, A. J., 1999, “Justification and Legitimacy,” Ethics, 109(4): 739–771. (Scholar)
Smith, S. D., 2010, The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Smith, W., 2011, “Deliberation Beyond Borders: The Public Reason of a Society of Peoples,” Journal of International Political Theory, 7(2): 117–139. (Scholar)
Stout, J., 2004, Democracy and Tradition, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Tahzib, C., 2019, “Do The Reactive Attitudes Justify Public Reason?” European Journal of Political Theory, first online 18 November 2019. doi:10.1177/1474885119886205 (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Perfectionism: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 47(2): 144–178. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Is Anti-Sectarianism a Desideratum of a Public Reason View?” Public Affairs Quarterly, 35(3): 228–246. (Scholar)
Taylor, A., 2018, “Public Justification and the Reactive Attitudes,” Politics, Philosophy, & Economics, 17(1): 97–113. (Scholar)
Thrasher, J. and K. Vallier, 2015, “The Fragility of Consensus: Public Reason, Diversity and Stability,” European Journal of Philosophy, 23(4): 933–954. (Scholar)
Vallier, K., 2011, “Against Public Reason Liberalism’s Accessibility Requirement,” Journal of Moral Philosophy, 8(3): 366–389. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, Liberalism and Public Faith: Beyond Separation, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Public Justification vs Public Deliberation: The Case for Divorce,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 45(2): 139–158. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “On Jonathan Quong’s Sectarian Political Liberalism,” Criminal Law and Philosophy, 11(1): 175–194. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, Must Politics Be War? Restoring Our Trust in the Open Society, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Vallier, K., and R. Muldoon, 2021, “In Public Reason, Diversity Trumps Coherence,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 29(2): 211–230. (Scholar)
Van Schoelandt, C., 2015, “Justification, Coercion, and the Place of Public Reason,” Philosophical Studies, 172(4): 1031–1050. (Scholar)
Waldron, J., 1999, Law and Disagreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Wall, S., 1998, Liberalism, Perfectionism, and Restraint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Is Public Justification Self-Defeating?” American Philosophical Quarterly, 39(4): 385–394. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Public Reason and Moral Authoritarianism,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 63(250): 160–169. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Perfectionism in Moral and Political Philosophy,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/perfectionism-moral/>. (Scholar)
Watson, L., and C. Hartley, 2018, Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: A Feminist Political Liberalism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Weithman, P., 2002, Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, Why Political Liberalism? New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Wenar, L., 1995, “Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique,” Ethics, 106(1): 32–62. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Why Rawls is Not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian,” in Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?, R. Martin and D.A. Reidy (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 95–113. (Scholar)
van Wietmarschen, H., 2021, “Political Liberalism and Respect,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 29(3): 353–374. (Scholar)
Williams, A., 2000, “The Alleged Incompleteness of Public Reason,” Res Publica, 6(2): 199–211. (Scholar)
Williams, J., 2015, “Public Reason and Prenatal Moral Status,” The Journal of Ethics, 19(1): 23–52. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “War and Global Public Reason,” Utilitas, 29(4): 398–422. (Scholar)

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