Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Qualia: The Knowledge Argument" by Martine Nida-Rümelin and Donnchadh O Conaill

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Alter, T., 1995, “Mary’s New Perspective”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 73: 582–584 (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument”, Philosophical Studies, 90: 35–56. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument?” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 65–76. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Social Externalism and the Knowledge Argument”, Mind, 122: 481–496. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “The Structure and Dynamics Argument against Materialism”, Noûs, 50: 794–815. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Conceptual Mastery, Social Externalism, and Mary’s New Knowledge”, in Coleman (ed.) 2019, 141–160. (Scholar)
–––, 2023, The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Alter, T. & S. Walter (eds.), 2007, Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Ball, D., 2009, “There are no Phenomenal Concepts”, Mind, 118: 935–962. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Consciousness and Conceptual Mastery”, Mind, 122: 497–508. (Scholar)
Balog, K., 2012a, “Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem”, in C. Hill & S. Gozzano (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 16–42. (Scholar)
–––, 2012b, “In Defence of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy”, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 84: 1–23. (Scholar)
Bigelow, J. & R. Pargetter, 1990, “Acquaintance with Qualia”, Theoria, 61: 129–147. (Scholar)
Blaesi, Z., 2022, “The Moral Parody Argument Against Panpsychism”, Philosophical Studies 179: 1821–1852. (Scholar)
Block, N., 2007, “Max Black’s Objection to Mind-Body Identity,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 249–306. (Scholar)
Broad, C.D., 1925, The Mind and its Place in Nature, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Byrne, A., 2002, “Something about Mary”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 62: 123–140. [Preprint available online] (Scholar)
Byrne, D., 2021, “Anti-Individualism and Phenomenal Content”, Erkenntnis, 86: 1733–1755. (Scholar)
Cath, Y., 2009, “The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowledge-How”, Noûs, 43: 137–156. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”, in Smith, Q. & A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 220–272. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument,” in P. Ludlow, et al., 2004: 269–298. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 167–194. (Scholar)
–––, 2010a, “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”, in D. Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 103–139. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “Afterword to ‘The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism’”, in D. Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 192–206. (Scholar)
Churchland, P., 1985, “Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States”, Journal of Philosophy 82: 8–28 (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson”, in P. Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 67–76. (Scholar)
Coleman, S. (ed.), 2019, The Knowledge Argument, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2022, “Fred’s Red: On the Objectivity and Physicality of Mental Qualities”, Synthese, 200: 1–27. (Scholar)
Conee, E., 1994, “Phenomenal Knowledge”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 136–150. (Scholar)
Crane, T., 2003, “Subjective Facts”, in H. Lillehammer & G. Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 68–83. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap”, in C. MacDonald & G. MacDonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 22–34. (Scholar)
Demircioglu, E., 2013, “Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts”, Philosophical Studies, 165: 257–277. (Scholar)
Dennett, D., 1991, Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “What RoboMary Knows”, in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 15–31. (Scholar)
Dunne, J. W., 1929, An Experiment With Time (second edition), London: A & C Black. (Scholar)
Farrell, B. A., 1950, “Experience”, Mind, 59: 170–198. (Scholar)
Feigl, H., 1958, “The Mental and the Physical”, in H. Feigl, M. Scriven & G. Maxwell (eds.), Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Volume II), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 370–497. (Scholar)
Flanagan, O., 1992, Consciousness Reconsidered, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press. (Scholar)
Furash, G., 1989, “Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument Against Materialism,” Dialogue, 32: 1–6. (Scholar)
Fürst, M., 2011, “What Mary’s Aboutness is About”, Acta Analytica, 26: 63–74. (Scholar)
Gertler, B., 1999, “A Defense of the Knowledge Argument”. Philosophical Studies, 93: 317–336. (Scholar)
Goff, P., 2017, Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Graham, G. & T. Horgan, 2000, “Mary Mary, Quite Contrary”, Philosophical Studies, 99: 59–87. (Scholar)
Gregory, D., Hendrickx, M. & Turner, C., 2022, “Who Knows What Mary Knew? An Experimental Study”, Philosophical Psychology, 35: 522–545. (Scholar)
Grzankowski, A., & M. Tye, 2019, “What Acquaintance Teaches”, in J. Knowles & T, Raleigh (ed.) Acquaintance: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hardin, C.L., 1992, “Physiology, Phenomenology and Spinoza’s True Colors”, in A. Beckermann, H. Flohr & J. Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction: Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin: De Gruyter, 201–219. (Scholar)
Harman, G., 1990, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience”, Philosophical Perspectives, 4: 31–52. (Scholar)
Hellie, B., 2004, “Inexpressible Truth and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument”, in P. Ludlow, et al., 2004: 333–364. (Scholar)
Horgan, T., 1984, “Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–136. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World”, Mind, 102: 555–586. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness”, in R.C. Koons & G. Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 309–330. (Scholar)
Howell, R., 2007, “The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity”, Philosophical Studies, 135: 145–177. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “The Knowledge Argument and the Self”, in Coleman (ed.) 2019, 254–268. (Scholar)
–––, 2023, Self-Awareness and the Elusive Subject, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Jackson, F., 1982, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–136. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “What Mary Didn’t Know”, Journal of Philosophy, 83: 291–295 (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Postscript on ‘What Mary Didn’t Know’”, in P. Moser & J. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism, London: Routledge, 184–189. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Postscript on Qualia”, in F. Jackson, Mind, Methods and Conditionals, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism”, in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.), 2007: 52–64. (Scholar)
Jacquette, D., 1995, “The Blue Banana Trick: Dennett on Jackson’s Color Scientist”, Theoria, 61: 217–230. (Scholar)
Kallestrup, J., 2006, “Epistemological Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 43: 1–23. (Scholar)
Kind, A., 2019, “Mary’s Powers of Imagination” in Coleman (ed.) 2019, 161–179. (Scholar)
Leibniz, G. W., 1998, Philosophical Texts, R. S. Woolhouse & Richard Francks (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Levin, J., 1986, “Could Love Be Like a Heat Wave? Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience”, Philosophical Studies, 49: 245–261. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “What is a Phenomenal Concept?” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 87–110. (Scholar)
Levine, J., 1997, “Recent Work on Consciousness”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 397– 404. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 145–166. (Scholar)
Lewis, D., 1983, “Postscript to ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’”, in D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers (Volume 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 130–132. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “What Experience Teaches”, Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 13: 29–57; reprinted in W. G. Lycan, 1990b, 499–519, and in P. Ludlow, et al, 2004, 77–103. (Scholar)
Loar, B., 1990 [1997], “Phenomenal States”, Phenomenal Perspectives 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (1990), 81–108; revised version in N. Block, O. Flanagan & G. Güzeldere (eds.) The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, 597–616. [Preprint of Loar 1990 [1997] available online] (Scholar)
Ludlow, P., Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar (eds.), 2004, There’s Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Lycan, W. G., 1990a, “What is the Subjectivity of the Mental”, Philosophical Perspectives, 4: 109–130. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 1990b, Mind and Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Lynch, K., 2020, “Knowing What an Experience is Like and the Reductive Theory of Knowledge-Wh”, Analytic Philosophy, 61: 252–275. (Scholar)
Maloney, C., 1985, “About Being a Bat”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 63: 26–49. (Scholar)
McClelland, T., 2019, “The Knowledge Argument is Either Indefensible or Redundant”, in Coleman (ed.) 2019, 180–197. (Scholar)
McConnell, J., 1994, “In Defense of the Knowledge Argument,” Philosophical Topics, 22: 157–187. (Scholar)
McMullen, C., 1985, “‘Knowing What it’s Like’ and the Essential Indexical”, Philosophical Studies, 48: 211–233. (Scholar)
Maxwell, N., 1965, “Physics and Common Sense”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 16: 295–311. (Scholar)
–––, 1965, “Understanding Sensations”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 46: 127–145. (Scholar)
Meehl, P. E., 1966, “The Compleat Autocerebroscopist: A Thought-Experiment on Professor Feigl’s Mind-Body Identity Thesis”, in P. K. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell (eds.), Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
Mellor, D. H., 1993, “Nothing Like Experience,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93: 1–15. (Scholar)
Moran, A., 2023, “Grounding Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument”, Philosophical Perspectives, 37(1): 269–289. (Scholar)
Mørch, H. H., 2019, “Phenomenal Knowledge Why: The Explanatory Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism”, in Coleman (ed.) 2019, 223–253. (Scholar)
Nagel, T., 1974, “What is it Like to be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review, 83: 435–450. (Scholar)
Nanay, B., 2009, “Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating: Reconsidering the Ability Hypothesis” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 79: 699–717. (Scholar)
Nemirow, L., 1980, “Review of Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions,” Philosophical Review, 89: 473–477. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance,” in W. G. Lycan, 1990b: 490–499. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “So This is What it’s Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis”, in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 32–51. (Scholar)
Nida-Rümelin, M., 1996, “What Mary Couldn’t Know”, in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Paderborn: Schöningh/Imprint Academic, 219–241. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “On Belief About Experiences: An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58: 51–73. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Grasping Phenomenal Properties,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 307–349. (Scholar)
Nida-Rümelin, M. & O’Conaill, D., forthcoming, “Is Dualism Compatible with Consciousness Being Grounded in the Physical?”, in G. Rabin (ed.) Grounding and Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Nordby, K., 2007, “What is This Thing you call Color? Can a Totally Color Blind Person Know about Color?”, in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007, 77–83. (Scholar)
O’Conaill, D., 2020, “Review of Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, published 16 March 2020. [O’Conaill 2020 available online] (Scholar)
Papineau, D., 1996, “The Antipathetic Fallacy”, in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Paderborn: Schöningh/Imprint Academic, 259–270. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 111–144. (Scholar)
Pelczar, M., 2009, “The Knowledge Argument, the Open Question Argument, and the Moral Problem”, Synthese, 171: 25–45. (Scholar)
Pereboom, D., 1994, “Bats, Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 315–329. (Scholar)
Perry, J., 2001, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Rabin, G., 2019, “Mastering Mary”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 361–370. (Scholar)
Raymont, P., 1995, “Tye’s Criticism of the Knowledge Argument”, Dialogue, 24: 713–726. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “The Know-How Response to Jackson’s Knowledge Argument”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 24: 113–126. (Scholar)
Renero, A., 2023, “Kripke’s Knowledge Argument Against Materialism”, Philosophical Perspectives, 37(1): 370–387. (Scholar)
Robinson, H., 1982, Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Dennett on the Knowledge Argument”, Analysis, 53: 174–177. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “The Anti-Materialist Strategy and the Knowledge Argument”, in H. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 159–183. (Scholar)
Ross, A., 2018, “Destabilizing the Knowledge Argument and Modal Argument”, Inquiry, 61: 499–519. (Scholar)
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Stoljar, D., 2006, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “On the Self-Locating Response to the Knowledge Argument”, Philosophical Studies, 155: 437–443. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Physicalism”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Physicalism/">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/Physicalism/>. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “The Knowledge Argument and Two Interpretations of ‘Knowing What it’s Like’”, in D. Jacquette (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Consciousness, London/New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018, 108–125. (Scholar)
Stoljar, D. & Nagasawa, Y., 2004, “Introduction”, in P. Ludlow, et al., 2004: 1–36. (Scholar)
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Teller, P., 1992, “Subjectivity and Knowing What it’s Like”, in A. Beckermann, H. Flohr & J. Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin: De Gruyter, 180–200. (Scholar)
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–––, 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Knowing What it is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument”, in Tye, M., Consciousness, Color, and Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 3–20. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Knowing What it is Like”, in J. Bengson & M. A. Moffett (eds.) Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind and Action, New York: Oxford University Press, 300–313. (Scholar)
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