Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Qualia: The Knowledge Argument" by Martine Nida-Rümelin and Donnchadh O Conaill

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Alter, T., 1995, “Mary’s New Perspective”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 73: 582–584 (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument”, Philosophical Studies, 90: 35–56. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument?” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 65–76. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Social Externalism and the Knowledge Argument”, Mind, 122: 481–496. (Scholar)
Alter, T. & S. Walter (eds.), 2007, Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Ball, D., 2009, “There are no Phenomenal Concepts”, Mind, 118: 935–962. (Scholar)
Balog, K., 2012a, “Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem”, in C. Hill & S. Gozzano (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 16–42. (Scholar)
–––, 2012b, “In Defence of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy”, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 84: 1–23. (Scholar)
Block, N., 2007, “Max Black’s Objection to Mind-Body Identity,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 249–306. (Scholar)
Bigelow, J. & R. Pargetter, 1990, “Acquaintance with Qualia”, Theoria, 61: 129–147 (Scholar)
Broad, C.D., 1925, The Mind and its Place in Nature, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Byrne, A., 2002, “Something about Mary”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 62: 123–140. [Preprint available online] (Scholar)
Cath, Y., 2009, “The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowledge-How”, Noûs, 43: 137–156. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”, in Smith, Q. & A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 220–272. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument,” in P. Ludlow, et al., 2004: 269–298. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 167–194. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Afterword to ‘The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism’”, in D. Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 192–206. (Scholar)
Churchland, P., 1985, “Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States”, Journal of Philosophy 82: 8–28 (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson”, in P. Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 67–76. (Scholar)
Conee, E., 1994, “Phenomenal Knowledge”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 136–150. (Scholar)
Crane, T., 2003, “Subjective Facts”, in H. Lillehammer & G. Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 68–83. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap”, in C. MacDonald & G. MacDonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 22–34. (Scholar)
Demircioglu, E., 2013, “Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts”, Philosophical Studies, 165: 257–277. (Scholar)
Dennett, D., 1991, Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “What RoboMary Knows”, in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 15–31. (Scholar)
Dunne, J. W., 1929, An Experiment With Time (second edition), London: A & C Black. (Scholar)
Farrell, B. A., 1950, “Experience”, Mind, 59: 170–198. (Scholar)
Feigl, H., 1958, “The Mental and the Physical”, in H. Feigl, M. Scriven & G. Maxwell (eds.), Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Volume II), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 370–497. (Scholar)
Flanagan, O., 1992, Consciousness Reconsidered, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press. (Scholar)
Furash, G., 1989, “Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument Against Materialism,” Dialogue, 32: 1–6. (Scholar)
Fürst, M., 2011, “What Mary’s Aboutness is About”, Acta Analytica, 26: 63–74. (Scholar)
Gertler, B., 1999, “A Defense of the Knowledge Argument”. Philosophical Studies, 93: 317–336. (Scholar)
Goff, P., 2017, Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Graham, G. & T. Horgan, 2000, “Mary Mary, Quite Contrary”, Philosophical Studies, 99: 59–87. (Scholar)
Hardin, C.L., 1992, “Physiology, Phenomenology and Spinoza’s True Colors”, in A. Beckermann, H. Flohr & J. Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction: Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin: De Gruyter, 201–219. (Scholar)
Harman, G., 1990, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience”, Philosophical Perspectives, 4: 31–52. (Scholar)
Hellie, B., 2004, “Inexpressible Truth and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument”, in P. Ludlow, et al., 2004: 333–364. (Scholar)
Horgan, T., 1984, “Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–136. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World”, Mind, 102: 555–586. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness”, in R.C. Koons & G. Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 309–330. (Scholar)
Howell, R., 2007, “The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity”, Philosophical Studies, 135: 145–177. (Scholar)
Jackson, F., 1982, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–136. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “What Mary Didn’t Know”, Journal of Philosophy, 83: 291–295 (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Postscript on ‘What Mary Didn’t Know’”, in P. Moser & J. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism, London: Routledge, 184–189. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Postscript on Qualia”, in F. Jackson, Mind, Methods and Conditionals, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism”, in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.), 2007: 52–64. (Scholar)
Jacquette, D., 1995, “The Blue Banana Trick: Dennett on Jackson’s Color Scientist”, Theoria, 61: 217–230. (Scholar)
Kallestrup, J. (2006), “Epistemological Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 43: 1–23. (Scholar)
Leibniz, G. W., 1998, Philosophical Texts, R. S. Woolhouse & Richard Francks (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Levin, J., 1986, “Could Love Be Like a Heat Wave? Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience”, Philosophical Studies, 49: 245–261. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “What is a Phenomenal Concept?” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 87–110. (Scholar)
Levine, J., 1997, “Recent Work on Consciousness”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 397– 404. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 145–166. (Scholar)
Lewis, D., 1983, “Postscript to ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’”, in D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers (Volume 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 130–132. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “What Experience Teaches”, Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 13: 29–57; reprinted in W. G. Lycan, 1990b, 499–519, and in P. Ludlow, et al, 2004, 77–103. (Scholar)
Loar, B., 1990 [1997], “Phenomenal States”, Phenomenal Perspectives 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (1990), 81–108; revised version in N. Block, O. Flanagan & G. Güzeldere (eds.) The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, 597–616. [Preprint available online] (Scholar)
Ludlow, P., Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar (eds.), 2004, There’s Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Lycan, W. G., 1990a, “What is the Subjectivity of the Mental”, Philosophical Perspectives, 4: 109–130. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 1990b, Mind and Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Maloney, C., 1985, “About Being a Bat”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 63: 26–49. (Scholar)
McConnell, 1994, “In Defense of the Knowledge Argument,” Philosophical Topics, 22: 157–187. (Scholar)
McMullen, C., 1985, “‘Knowing What it’s Like’ and the Essential Indexical”, Philosophical Studies, 48: 211–233. (Scholar)
Maxwell, N., 1965, “Physics and Common Sense”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 16: 295–311. (Scholar)
–––, 1965, “Understanding Sensations”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 46: 127–145. (Scholar)
Meehl, P. E., 1966, “The Compleat Autocerebroscopist: A Thought-Experiment on Professor Feigl’s Mind-Body Identity Thesis”, in P. K. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell (eds.), Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
Mellor, D. H., 1993, “Nothing Like Experience,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93: 1–15. (Scholar)
Nagel, T., 1974, “What is it Like to be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review, 83: 435–450. (Scholar)
Nanay, B., 2009, “Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating: Reconsidering the Ability Hypothesis” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 79: 699–717. (Scholar)
Nemirow, L., 1980, “Review of Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions,” Philosophical Review, 89: 473–477. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance,” in W. G. Lycan, 1990b: 490–499. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “So This is What it’s Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis”, in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 32–51. (Scholar)
Nida-Rümelin, M., 1996, “What Mary Couldn’t Know”, in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Paderborn: Schöningh/Imprint Academic, 219–241. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “On Belief About Experiences: An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58: 51–73. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Grasping Phenomenal Properties,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 307–349. (Scholar)
Nordby, K., 2007, “What is This Thing you call Color? Can a Totally Color Blind Person Know about Color?”, in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007, 77–83. (Scholar)
Papineau, D., 1996, “The Antipathetic Fallacy”, in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Paderborn: Schöningh/Imprint Academic, 259–270. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 111–144. (Scholar)
Pereboom, D., 1994, “Bats, Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 315–329. (Scholar)
Perry, J., 2001, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Raymont, P., 1995, “Tye’s Criticism of the Knowledge Argument”, Dialogue, 24: 713–726. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “The Know-How Response to Jackson’s Knowledge Argument”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 24: 113–126. (Scholar)
Robinson, H., 1982, Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Dennett on the Knowledge Argument”, Analysis, 53: 174–177. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “The Anti-Materialist Strategy and the Knowledge Argument”, in H. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 159–183. (Scholar)
Russell, B., 1998 [1912], The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Shepard, R., 1993, “On the Physical Basis, Linguistic Representation, and Conscious Experience of Colors”, in G. Harman (ed.), Conceptions of the Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller, Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 217–246. (Scholar)
Stalnaker, R. C., 2008, Our Knowledge of the Internal World, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Stanley, J. & Williamson, T., 2001, “Knowing How”, Journal of Philosophy, 98: 411–444. (Scholar)
Stoljar, D., 2011, “On the Self-Locating Response to the Knowledge Argument”, Philosophical Studies, 155: 437–443. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Physicalism”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Physicalism/">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/Physicalism/>. (Scholar)
Stoljar, D. & Nagasawa, Y., 2004, “Introduction”, in P. Ludlow, et al., 2004: 1–36. (Scholar)
Sundström, P., 2011, “Phenomenal Concepts”, Philosophy Compass, 6: 267–281. (Scholar)
Teller, P., 1992, “Subjectivity and Knowing What it’s Like”, in A. Beckermann, H. Flohr & J. Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin: De Gruyter, 180–200. (Scholar)
Tye, M., 1986, “The Subjective Qualities of Experience”, Mind, 95: 1–17. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, The Metaphysics of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Knowing What it is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument”, in Tye, M., Consciousness, Color, and Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 3–20. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Van Gulick, R., 2004, “So Many Ways of Saying No to Mary”, in P. Ludlow, et al., 2004: 365–405. (Scholar)
Warner, R. 1986, “A Challenge to Physicalism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 249–265. (Scholar)
Watkins, M., 1989, “The Knowledge Argument Against the Knowledge Argument”, Analysis, 49: 158–160. (Scholar)
White, S. L. (2007), “Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (eds.) 2007: 210–248. (Scholar)
Zhao, Y., 2012, “The Knowledge Argument against Physicalism: Its Proponents and Its Opponents”, Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 7: 304–316. (Scholar)

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