Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Qualia" by Michael Tye

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Block, N., 1980, “Troubles with Functionalism,” in Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (Volume 1), N. Block (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 268–305. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Inverted Earth,” Philosophical Perspectives (Volumes 4), J. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Mental Paint and Mental Latex,” Philosophical Issues (Volume 7), E. Villenueva (ed.), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Mental Paint,” Essays in Honor of Tyler Burge, M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Brewer, B., 2011, Perception and its Objects, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Byrne, A., 2001, “Intentionalism Defended,” Philosophical Review, 110: 199–240. (Scholar)
Byrne, A. and Tye, M., 2006, “Qualia ain’t in the Head,” Noûs, 40: 241–255. (Scholar)
Campbell, J., 2002, Reference and Consciousness, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Campbell, J., 2009, “Consciousness and Reference,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann & S. Walter (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D., 1995, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2: 200–219. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4(1): 3–46. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 473–493. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “The Representational Character of Experience,” The Future for Philosophy, B. Leiter (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap,” in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, T. Alter and W. Walter (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Churchland, P., 1985, “Reduction, Qualia, and Direct Introspection of Brain States,” Journal of Philosophy, 82: 8–28. (Scholar)
Coleman, S., 2006, “Being Realistic: Why Physicalism May Entail Panexperientialism,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13: 40–52. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-subjects, and Emergence,” Erkenntnis, 79: 19–44. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Neuro-Cosmology,” in Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness, P. Coates & S. Coleman (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Davies, M. and Humphreys, G., 1993, Consciousness, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Davidson, D., 1986, “Knowing One’s Own Mind,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60: 441–458. (Scholar)
DeBellis, M., 1991, “The Representational Content of Musical Experience,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51: 303–324. (Scholar)
Dennett, D., 1990, “Quining Qualia,” in Mind and Cognition, W. Lycan (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 519–548. [Preprint available online] (Scholar)
–––, 1991, Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26: 48–58. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, “A History of Qualia,” Topoi, 39: 5–12. (Scholar)
Dretske, F., 1995, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Bradford Books. (Scholar)
Fish, W., 2009, “Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability and the Nature of Hallucination,” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge, A. Haddock and F. Macpherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Frankish, K., 2016, “Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23: 11–39. (Scholar)
Garcia-Carpintero, M., 2003, “Qualia that it is right to Quine,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67: 357–377. (Scholar)
Gibbons, J., 2005, “Qualia: They’re not what they seem,” Philosophical Studies, 126: 397–428. (Scholar)
Goff, P., 2006, “Experiences Don’t Sum,” in Consciousness and Its Place in Nature, A. Freeman (ed.), Exeter: Imprint Academic. (Scholar)
Harman, G., 1990, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” in Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 4), J. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company. (Scholar)
Hardin, C., 1993, Color for Philosophers, Cambridge: Hackett. (Scholar)
Harrison, B., 1973, Form and Content, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Haugeland, J., 1985, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Bradford Books. (Scholar)
Hinton, J.M., 1973, Experiences, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Hill, C., 1991, Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Horgan, T., 1984, “Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 147–83. (Scholar)
Horgan, T. and Tienson, J., 2002, “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality,” in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, D. Chalmers (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 520–33. (Scholar)
Horgan, T. and Kriegel, U., 2007, “Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness that We may Know it so Well?” Philosophical Issues, 17: 123–144. (Scholar)
Jackson, F., 1982, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–136. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Armchair Metaphysics,” in Philosophy of Mind, J. O’Leary-Hawthorne and M. Michael (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
Kammerer, F., 2021, “The Illusion of Conscious Experience,” Synthese, 198: 845–866. (Scholar)
Kriegel, U. and Williford, K. (eds.), 2006, Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Bradford Books. (Scholar)
Kripke, S., 1972, “Naming and Necessity,” in Semantics of Natural Language, D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 253–355. (Scholar)
Levine, J., 1983, “Materialism and Qualia : The Explanatory Gap,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64: 354–361. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Conscious Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Lewis, C. I., 1929, Mind and the World Order, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. (Scholar)
Lewis, D., 1990, “What Experience Teaches,” in Mind and Cognition: A Reader, W. Lycan (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Lewtas,P., 2013, “What It is like to Be a Quark,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20: 39–64. (Scholar)
Loar, B., 1990, “Phenomenal States,” in Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 4), J. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Phenomenal States (Revised Version)” in The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Qualia, properties, modality,” Philosophical Issues, 1: 113–29. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Transparent experience and the availability of qualia,” in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Q. Smith & A. Jokic (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Lycan, W., 1987, Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Mandler, G., 2005, “The consciousness continuum: From ”qualia“ to ”free will“,” Psychological Research/Psychologische Forschung, 69 (5–6): 330–337. (Scholar)
Maxwell, G., 1978, “Rigid Designators and Mind-Brain Identity,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 9: 395–403. (Scholar)
McDowell, J., 1994, “The Content of Perceptual Experience,” Philosophical Quarterly, 44: 190–205. (Scholar)
McGinn, C., 1991, The Problem of Consciousness, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
McKinsey, M., 2005, “A refutation of qualia physicalism,” in Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry, M. O’Rourke & C. Washington (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Marr, D., 1982, Vision, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company. (Scholar)
Martin, M., 1997, “The Reality of Appearances” in Thought and Ontology, M. Sainsbury (ed.), Milan: Franco/Angeli. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “The Limits of Self-Awareness,” Philosophical Studies, 120: 37–89. (Scholar)
Montero, B., 2010, “A Russellian Response to the Structural Argument against Physicalism,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17: 1–34. (Scholar)
Moore, G. E., 1922, “The Refutation of Idealism,” in his Philosophical Studies, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Nagel, T., 1974, “What is it like to be a Bat?” Philosophical Review, 83: 435–456. (Scholar)
Nemirow, L., 1990, “Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance,” in Mind and Cognition: A Reader, W. Lycan (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Nida-Rümelin, M., 2007, “Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness,” Philosophical Perspectives, 21: 429–455. (Scholar)
Papineau, D., 1994, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford. (Scholar)
Pautz, A., 2006, “Sensory Awareness is not a Wide Physical Relation,” Noûs, 40: 205–240. (Scholar)
Pautz, A., 2010, “Why Explain Visual Experience in terms of Content,” in Perceiving the World, B. Nanay (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Peacocke, C., 1983, Sense and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Peirce, C. S., 1866 [1982], “Lowell Lecture” (ix), Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, M. H. Fisch (ed.), Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. (Scholar)
Perry, J., 2001, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Raffman, D., 1995, “On the Persistence of Phenomenology,” in Conscious Experience, T. Metzinger (ed.), Paderborn: Schöningh. (Scholar)
Rey, G., 1992, “Sensational Sentences Switched,” Philosophical Studies, 68: 289–319. (Scholar)
Roelofs, L., 2019, Combining Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Russell, B., 1927, The Analysis of Matter, London: Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Sacks O., 1996, The Island of the Colorblind, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. (Scholar)
Searle, J., 1992, The Rediscovery of Mind Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Siegel, S., 2009, “The Epistemic Conception of hallucination,” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge, A. Haddock and F. Macpherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, The Contents of Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Siewert, C., 1998, The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Shoemaker, S., 1975, “Functionalism and Qualia,” Philosophical Studies, 27: 291–315. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, “The Inverted Spectrum,” Journal of Philosophy, 79: 357–381. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Qualities and Qualia : What’s in the Mind,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Supplement), 50: 109–131. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Two Cheers for Representationalism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58: 671–678. (Scholar)
Shoemaker, S., 2007, “A case for qualia,” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Brian McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell.
Snowdon, P., 1990, “The Objects of Direct Experience,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 64: 121–150. (Scholar)
Stoljar, D., 2001, “Two Conceptions of the Physical,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62: 253–81. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “The Argument from Diaphonousness,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Special Issue: Language, Mind and World), 34: 341–390. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Comments on Galen Strawson: ‘Realistic Monism: why Physicalism entails Panpsychism’,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13: 170–176. (Scholar)
Strawson, G., 1994, Mental Reality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13: 3–31. (Scholar)
Sturgeon, S., 2000, Matters of Mind, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Thau, M., 2001, Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Tye, M., 1986, ‘The Subjective Qualities of Experience’, Mind, 95: 1–17. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything it is Like to be a Honey-bee?”, Philosophical Studies, 88: 289–317. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, Consciousness, Color, and Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts,” Philosophy, 53: 91–105. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Philosophical Review, 115: 139–168. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts: A New Perspective on the Major Puzzles of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs: Are Animals Conscious?, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness: Through the Looking Glass, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
White, S., 1995, “Color and the Notional Content,” Philosophical Topics, 22: 471–503. (Scholar)
Van Gulick, R., 2007, “Functionalism and qualia,” The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)

Generated Mon Sep 16 22:07:51 2024

Applied ethics	Epistemology	History of Western Philosophy	Meta-ethics	Metaphysics	Normative ethics
Philosophy of biology	Philosophy of language	Philosophy of mind	Philosophy of religion	Science Logic and Mathematics	More ...