Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Instrumental Rationality" by Niko Kolodny and John Brunero

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Andreou, C., 2005, “The Voices of Reason,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 42(1): 33–45. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Might Intentions Be the Only Source of Practical Imperatives?,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 9(3): 311–325. (Scholar)
Anscombe, E., 1957, Intention, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Archer, A., 2018, “Trying Cognitivism: A Defense of the Strong Belief Thesis,” Theoria, 84(2): 140–156. (Scholar)
Beardman, S., 2007, “The Special Status of Instrumental Reasons,” Philosophical Studies, 124(2): 255–287. (Scholar)
Bedke, M., 2009, “The Iffiest Oughts: A Guise of Reasons Account of End-Given Conditionals,” Ethics, 119(4): 672–698. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Ends to Means: A Probability-Raising Account of Means and the Weight of Reasons to Take Them,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 12(1): 6–28. (Scholar)
Bennett, J., 1983, “Positive and Negative Relevance,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 20(2): 185–194. (Scholar)
Binkley, R., 1965, “A Theory of Practical Reason,” The Philosophical Review, 74(4): 423–448. (Scholar)
Bratman, M., 1987, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009a, “Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality,” in D. Sobel and S. Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 13–36. (Scholar)
–––, 2009b, “Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical,” in S. Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 29–62. (Scholar)
–––, 2009c, “Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-Governance,” Ethics, 119(3): 411–443. (Scholar)
–––, 2009d, “Intention Rationality,” Philosophical Explorations, 12(3): 227–242. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, Planning, Time and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Broome, J., 1997, “Reason and Motivation,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 71: 131–146. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Normative Requirements,” Ratio, 12(3): 398–419. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values?,” in C. Morris and A. Ripstein (eds.), Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 98–120. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Practical Reasoning,” in J. Bermùdez and A. Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 85–112. (Scholar)
–––, 2005a, “Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?,” Philosophical Issues, 15: 321–337. (Scholar)
–––, 2005b, “Have We Reason to Do as Rationality Requires?—A Comment on Raz,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Symposium 1: 1–8. (Scholar)
–––, 2008a, “Is Rationality Normative?,” Disputatio, 11: 153–171. (Scholar)
–––, 2008b, “Reply to Southwood, Kearns and Star, and Cullity,” Ethics, 119: 96–108. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “The Unity of Reasoning?,” in S. Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 62–92. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, Rationality Through Reasoning, Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. (Scholar)
Brunero, J., 2005a, “Instrumental Rationality and Carroll’s Tortoise,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 8: 557–569. (Scholar)
–––, 2005b, “Two Approaches to Instrumental Rationality and Belief Consistency,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 1(1): 1–20. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Are Intentions Reasons?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 88(4): 424–444. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality,” Philosophical Studies, 146(3): 311–325. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Self-governance, Means-end Coherence, and Unalterable Ends,” Ethics, 120(3): 579–591. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Instrumental Rationality, Symmetry and Scope,” Philosophical Studies, 157(1): 125–140. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Cognitivism about Practical Rationality,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 9), Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 18–44. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, Instrumental Rationality: The Normativity of Means-Ends Coherence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Carroll, L., 1895, “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles,” Mind, 4(14): 278–80. (Scholar)
Cheng-Guajardo, L., 2014, “The Normative Requirement of Means-end Rationality and Modest Bootstrapping,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 17(3): 487–503; first published online 2013. doi:10.1007/s10677-013-9455-y (Scholar)
Cullity, G., 2008, “Decisions, Reasons, and Rationality,” Ethics, 119(1): 57–95. (Scholar)
Darwall, S., 1983, Impartial Reason, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Davidson, D., 2004, “Incoherence and Irrationality” in Problems of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 189–98. (Scholar)
Dreier, J., 2001, “Humean Doubts about Categorical Imperatives,” in E. Millgram (ed.) Varieties of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 27–49. (Scholar)
Ellis, S., 2008, “The Varieties of Instrumental Rationality,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 46(2): 199–220. (Scholar)
Fink, J., forthcoming, “The Essence of Structural Irrationality: The Impossibility of Attitudinal Success,” Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy. (Scholar)
Finlay, S., 2009, “Against All Reason? Skepticism About the Instrumental Norm,” in Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume, Motivation and Virtue, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 155–178. (Scholar)
Fogal, D., 2018, “On the Scope, Jurisdiction, and Application of Rationality and the Law,” Problema, 12: 21–57. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, “Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure,” Mind, 129(516): 1033–1070. (Scholar)
Fogal, D. & A. Worsnip, 2021, “Which Reasons? Which Rationality?” Ergo, 8(11): 306–343 (Scholar)
Foot, P., 1972, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” The Philosophical Review, 81(3): 305–316. (Scholar)
Fullhart, S., and C. Martinez, forthcoming, “Coherence as Joint Satisfiability,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. (Scholar)
Gertken, J. and B. Kiesewetter, 2021, “How Do Reasons Transmit to Non-Necessary Means?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99(2): 271–285. (Scholar)
Greenspan, P., 1975, “Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives,” The Journal of Philosophy, 72(10): 259–276. (Scholar)
Grice, P., 1971, “Intention and uncertainty,” Proceedings of the British Academy, 57: 263–279. (Scholar)
Hampshire, S. and H. L. A. Hart, 1958, “Decision, Intention, and Uncertainty,” Mind, 67: 1–12. (Scholar)
Hampton, J., 1995, “Does Hume have an Instrumental Conception of Practical Reason?,” Hume Studies, 21(1): 57–74. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, The Authority of Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Harcourt, E., 2004, “Instrumental Desires, Instrumental Rationality,” in Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 78(1): 111–130. (Scholar)
Harman, G., 1976, “Practical Reasoning,” Review of Metaphysics, 29(3): 431–463. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Hill, T., 1973, “The Hypothetical Imperative,” The Philosophical Review, 82(4): 429–450. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory, New York: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Holton, R., 2008, “Partial Belief, Partial Intention,” Mind, 117(1): 27–58. (Scholar)
Hubin, D., 1999, “What’s Special about Humeanism,” Noûs, 33(1): 30–45. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality,” The Journal of Philosophy, 98(9): 445–468. (Scholar)
Hume, D., 1739–40, Treatise of Human Nature. L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), 2nd. ed., revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon, 1975. (Scholar)
Jackson, F. and R. Pargetter, 1986, “Ought, Options, and Actualism,” Philosophical Review, 95(2): 233–255. (Scholar)
Jollimore, T., 2005, “Why Is Instrumental Rationality Rational?,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 35(2): 289–308. (Scholar)
Kant, I., 1785, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, transl. by James Ellington, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993. [Citations to this text are given using the standard volume and page numbers from the Akademie Edition.] (Scholar)
Kamm, F., 2007, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kamm, F., 2000, “The Doctrine of Triple Effect and Why a Rational Agent Need Not Intend the Means to His End,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 74: 21–39. (Scholar)
Kelly, T., 2003, “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66(3): 612–640. (Scholar)
Kenny, A.J., 1966, “Practical Inference,” Analysis, 26(3): 65–75. (Scholar)
Kiesewetter, B., 2015, “Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle,” Ethics, 125(4): 921–946. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, The Normativity of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Contrary-to-Duty Scenarios, Deontic Dilemmas, and Transmision Principles,” Ethics, 129: 98–115. (Scholar)
Kolnai, A., 1962, “Deliberation is of Ends,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 62: 195–218. (Scholar)
Kolodny, N., 2005, “Why be Rational?,” Mind, 114(455): 509–563. (Scholar)
–––, 2007a, “State or Process Requirements?,” Mind, 116(462): 371–385. (Scholar)
–––, 2007b, “How does Coherence Matter?,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 107(1–Part 3): 229–263. (Scholar)
–––, 2008a, “The Myth of Practical Consistency,” European Journal of Philosophy, 16(3): 366–402. (Scholar)
–––, 2008b, “Why be Disposed to Be Coherent?” Ethics, 188(3): 437–463. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Instrumental Reasons,” in D. Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Korsgaard, C., 1986, “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” Journal of Philosophy, 83(1): 5–25. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason,” in G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 215–254. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Lavin, D., 2004, “Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error,” Ethics, 114(3): 424–57. (Scholar)
Lee, W., 2018, “Willing the End Means Willing the Means: An Overlooked Reading of Kant,” Ergo, 5(16): 419–444. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “The Independence of (In)coherence,” Synthese 199: 6563–6584. (Scholar)
–––, 2022, “The Real Myth of Coherence,” Erkenntnis 87: 1211–1230. (Scholar)
Liberman, A. and M. Schroeder, 2016, “Commitment: Worth the Weight,” in E. Lord and B. Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Lord, E., 2011, “Violating Requirements, Exiting from Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality,” Philosophical Quarterly, 61(243): 392–399. (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, “The Coherent and the Rational,” Analytic Philosophy, 55(2): 151–175. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “The Real Symmetry Problem(s) for Wide-Scope Accounts of Rationality,” Philosophical Studies, 170(3): 443–464. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What you Ought to Do (Are The Same Thing!),” Mind, 126(504): 1109–1154. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism about Practical Reason,” in C. McHugh, J. Way, and D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Practical and Epistemic, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, The Importance of Being Rational, Oxford, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Millgram, E., 1995, “Was Hume a Humean?,” Hume Studies, 21(1): 75–94. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Practical Reasoning: The Current State of Play,” in E. Millgram (ed.) Varieties of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 1–26. (Scholar)
Morton, J., 2011, “Towards an Ecological Theory of the Norms of Practical Deliberation,” European Journal of Philosophy, 19(4): 561–584. (Scholar)
Nozick, R., 1993, The Nature of Rationality, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Nuñez, C., 2020, “Requirements of Intention in Light of Belief,” Philosophical Studies, 177(9): 2471–2492. (Scholar)
Parfit, D., 2006, “Normativity,” in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 325–380. (Scholar)
Price, A., 2008a, Contextuality in Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008b, “Against Requirements of Rationality,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 108: 157–76. (Scholar)
Quinn,W., 1992, “Rationality and the Human Good,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 9(2): 81–95. Reprinted in W. Quinn, 1993, Morality and Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Railton, P., 1997, “On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action,” in G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 52–79. (Scholar)
Raz, J., 2003, “Numbers, With and Without Contractualism,” Ratio, 16(4): 346–367. (Scholar)
–––, 2005a, “Instrumental Rationality: A Reprise,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Symposium 1: 1–19. (Scholar)
–––, 2005b, “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 1(1): 1–28. (Scholar)
Reisner, A., 2009, “Unifying the Requirements of Rationality,” Philosophical Explorations 12(3): 243–260. (Scholar)
Richardson, H., 1994, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Rippon, S., 2011, “In Defense of the Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 5(2): 1–21. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Were Kant’s Hypothetical Imperatives Wide-Scope Oughts?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92(4): 783–788. (Scholar)
Ross, J., 2009, “How to be a Cognitivist about Practical Reason,” in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 4, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 243–282. (Scholar)
Scanlon, T., 2007, “Structural Irrationality,” in G. Brennan, G. Robert, J. Frank, and S. Michael (eds.), Common Minds: Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Schroeder, M., 2004, “The Scope of Instrumental Reason,” Philosophical Perspectives, 18: 337–364. (Scholar)
–––, 2005a, “Instrumental Mythology,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Symposium 1: 1–12. (Scholar)
–––, 2005b, “The Hypothetical Imperative?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83(3): 357–372. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, Slaves of the Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Means-end Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons,” Philosophical Studies, 143(2): 223–248. (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, “Hypothetical Imperatives, Scope, and Jurisdiction” in Explaining the Reasons We Share: Explanation and Expression in Ethics (Volume 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 216–226. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “Scope for Rational Autonomy” in Explaining the Reasons We Share: Explanation and Expression in Ethics (Volume 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 227–239. (Scholar)
Schwartz, J., 2008, “Do Hypothetical Imperatives Require Categorical Imperatives?,” European Journal of Philosophy, 18: 84–107. (Scholar)
Schwitzgebel, E., 2010, “Introspection,” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), [Introspection/" target="other">Schwitzgebel 2010 available online]. (Scholar)
Searle, J., 2001, Rationality in Action, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Setiya, K., 2004, “Hume on Practical Reason,” Philosophical Perspectives, 18: 365–389. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Is Efficiency a Vice?,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 42(4): 333–339. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason,” Ethics, 117(4): 649–673. (Scholar)
Shafer-Landau, R., 2006, “Ethics as Philosophy,” in T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.), Metaethics after Moore, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 209–232. (Scholar)
Shaver, R., 2006, “Korsgaard on Hypothetical Imperatives,” Philosophical Studies, 129: 335–347. (Scholar)
Shpall, S., 2013, “Wide and Narrow Scope,” Philosophical Studies, 163: 717–736. (Scholar)
Smith, M., 2004, “Instrumental Desires, Instrumental Rationality,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 78(1): 93–109. (Scholar)
Sobel, D., 2005, “Instrumental Rationality—Not Dead Yet,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Symposium 1: 1–12. (Scholar)
Southwood, N., 2008, “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Ethics, 119(1): 9–30. (Scholar)
Tenenbaum, S., 2021, Rational Powers in Action: Instrumental Rationality and Extended Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Titelbaum, M., 2015, “How to Derive a Narrow-scope Requirement from Wide-scope Requirements,” Philosophical Studies, 172(2): 535–542. (Scholar)
Thompson, M., 2008, Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Valaris, M., 2014, “Instrumental Rationality,” European Journal of Philosophy, 22(3): 443–462. (Scholar)
Velleman, J.D., 1989, Practical Reflection, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “What Good is a Will?,” in A. Leist and H. Baumann (eds.), Action in Context, Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 193–215. (Scholar)
Vogler, C., 2002, Reasonably Vicious, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Wallace, R. J., 2005, “Comment on Raz,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Symposium 1: 1–4. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason,” reprinted with a postscript in Normativity and the Will: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Way, J., 2010, “Defending the Wide-scope Approach to Instrumental Reason,” Philosophical Studies, 147(2): 213–233. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “The Symmetry of Rational Requirements,” Philosophical Studies, 155(2): 227–239. (Scholar)
–––, 2012a, “Explaining the Instrumental Principle,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(3): 487–506. (Scholar)
–––, 2012b, “Instrumental Rationality,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. doi: 10.4324/9780415249126-l148-1. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Intentions, Akrasia, and Mere Permissibility,” Organon F, 20(4): 588–611. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Reasons and Rationality,” in D. Star (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Wedgwood, R., 2003, “Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly,” in S. Stroud and C. Tappolet (eds.) Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 201–229. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Railton on Normativity,” Philosophical Studies, 126(3): 463–479. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, The Nature of Normativity, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Instrumental Rationality,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 6: 280–309. (Scholar)
White, S., 2017, “Transmission Failures,” Ethics, 127(3): 719–732. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Intention and Prediction in Means-Ends Reasoning,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(3): 251–266. (Scholar)
Worsnip, A., 2015, “Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers” Synthese, 192(8): 2617–2646. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “What is (in)coherence?” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 13: 184–206. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)

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