Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Expected Utility" by R. A. Briggs
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Allais M., 1953, “Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'École Americaine”, Econometrica, 21: 503–546. (Scholar)
- Bell, R., 1987, “Decision Theory and Due Process: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Lawmaking for Burdens of Proof”, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 78: 557-585. (Scholar)
- Bentham, J., 1961. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Garden City: Doubleday. Originally published in 1789. (Scholar)
- Bernoulli, D., 1738, “Specimen theoriae novae de mensura sortis”, Commentarii Academiae Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae 5. Translated by Louise Somer and reprinted as “Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk” 1954, Econometrica, 22: 23–36. (Scholar)
- Bolker, E., 1966, “Functions Resembling Quotients of Measures”, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, 2: 292–312. (Scholar)
- Bradley, R., 2004, “Ramsey's representation theorem”, Dialectica, 58: 483–497. (Scholar)
- Burch-Brown, J.M., 2014, “Clues for Consequentialists”, Utilitas, 26: 105-119. (Scholar)
- Buchak, L., 2013, Risk and Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Colyvan, M., 2006, “No Expectations”, Mind, 116: 695–702. (Scholar)
- Colyvan, M., 2008, “Relative Expectation Theory”, Journal of Philosophy, 105: 37–44. (Scholar)
- Easwaran, K., 2014, “Regularity and Hyperreal Credences”, The Philosophical Review, 123: 1–41. (Scholar)
- Easwaran, K., 2008, “Strong and Weak Expectations”, Mind, 117: 633–641. (Scholar)
- Elliott, E., 2017, “Ramsey without Ethical Neutrality: A New Representation Theorem”, Mind, 126: 1-51. (Scholar)
- Ellsberg, D., 1961, “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75: 643–669. (Scholar)
- Feldman, F. 2006, “Actual utility, the objection from impracticality, and the move to expected utility”, Philosophical Studies, 129 : 49–79. (Scholar)
- Fine, T., 2008, “Evaluating the Pasadena, Altadena, and St Petersburg Gambles”, Mind, 117: 613–632. (Scholar)
- Good, I.J., 1967, “On the Principle of Total Evidence”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17: 319–321 (Scholar)
- Greaves, H. 2016, “Cluelessness”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 116: 311-339. (Scholar)
- Hampton, J., “The Failure of Expected-Utility Theory as a Theory of Reason”, Economics and Philosophy, 10: 195–242. (Scholar)
- Harsanyi, J.C., 1953, “Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of risk-taking”, Journal of Political Economy, 61: 434–435. (Scholar)
- Herfeld, C., “From Theories of Human Behavior to Rules of Rational Choice: Tracing a Normative Turn at the Cowles Commission, 1943-1954”, History of Political Economy, 50: 1-48. (Scholar)
- Howard, R.A., 1980, “On Making Life and Death Decisions”, in R.C. Schwing and W.A. Albers, Societal Risk Assessment: How Safe is Safe Enough?, New York: Plenum Press. (Scholar)
- Howard-Snyder, F., 1997, “The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism”, Utilitas, 9: 241–248. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 1991, “Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection”, Ethics, 101: 461–482. (Scholar)
- Jeffrey, R., 1983, The Logic of Decision, 2nd edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Jevons, W.S., 1866, “A General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 29: 282–287. (Scholar)
- Joyce, J., 1999, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Kahneman, D. & Tversky A., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaplan, J., 1968, “Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process”, Stanford Law Review, 20: 1065-1092. (Scholar)
- Kolmogorov, A. N., 1933, Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeitrechnung, Ergebnisse Der Mathematik; translated as Foundations of Probability, New York: Chelsea Publishing Company, 1950. (Scholar)
- Laudan, L., 2006, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Lenman, J., 2000. “Consequentialism and cluelessness”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29(4): 342–370. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1981, “Causal Decision Theory”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 59: 5–30. (Scholar)
- Levi, I., 1991, “Consequentialism and Sequential Choice”, in M. Bacharach and S. Hurley (eds.), Foundations of Decision Theory, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 92–12. (Scholar)
- Lindblom, C.E., 1959, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’”, Public Administration Review, 19: 79–88. (Scholar)
- Loomes, G. And Sugden, R., 1986, “Disappointment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice Under Uncertainty”, The Review of Economic Studies, 53(2): 271–282. (Scholar)
- Maher, P., 1993, Betting on Theories, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- March, J.G. and Simon, H., 1958, Organizations, New York: Wiley. (Scholar)
- Mason, E., 2013, “Objectivism and Prospectivism About Rightness”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 7: 1–21. (Scholar)
- Mayo, D., 1996, Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- McAskill, W., 2015, Doing Good Better, New York: Gotham Books. (Scholar)
- McGee, V., 1991, “We Turing Machines Aren't Expected-Utility Maximizers (Even Ideally)”, Philosophical Studies, 64: 115-123. (Scholar)
- Meacham, C. and Weisberg, J., 2011, “Representation Theorems and the Foundations of Decision Theory”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89: 641–663. (Scholar)
- Menger, K., 1871, Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre, translated by James Dingwall and Bert F. Hoselitz as Principles of Economics, New York: New York University Press, 1976; reprinted online, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007. (Scholar)
- Mill, J. S., 1861. Utilitarianism. Edited with an introduction by Roger Crisp. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. (Scholar)
- von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O., 1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Nover, H. & Hájek, A., 2004, “Vexing expectations”, Mind, 113: 237–249. (Scholar)
- Nozick, R., 1969, “Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice,” in Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, Dordrecht: Reidel, 114–115. (Scholar)
- Oliver, A., 2003, “A quantitative and qualitative test of the Allais paradox using health outcomes”, Journal of Economic Psychology, 24: 35–48. (Scholar)
- Pope, R., 1995, “Towards a More Precise Decision Framework: A Separation of the Negative Utility of Chance from Diminishing Marginal Utility and the Preference for Safety”, Theory and Decision, 39: 241–265. (Scholar)
- Raiffa, H., 1968, Decision analysis: Introductory lectures on choices under uncertainty, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. (Scholar)
- Ramsey, F. P., 1926, “Truth and Probability”, in Foundations of Mathematics and other Essays, R. B. Braithwaite (ed.), London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner, & Co., 1931, 156–198; reprinted in Studies in Subjective Probability, H. E. Kyburg, Jr. and H. E. Smokler (eds.), 2nd edition, New York: R. E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1980, 23–52; reprinted in Philosophical Papers, D. H. Mellor (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. (Scholar)
- Savage, L.J., 1972, The Foundations of Statistics, 2nd edition, New York: Dover Publications, Inc. (Scholar)
- Sen, A., 1977, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6: 317–344. (Scholar)
- Shafer, G., 2007, “From Cournot’s principle to market efficiency”, in Augustin Cournot: Modelling Economics, Jean-Philippe Touffut (ed.), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 55–95. (Scholar)
- Sidgwick, H., 1907. The Methods of Ethics, Seventh Edition. London: Macmillan; first edition, 1874. (Scholar)
- Simon, H., 1956, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69: 99–118. (Scholar)
- Skyrms, B., 1980. Causal Necessity: A Pragmatic Investigation of the Necessity of Laws, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
- Smith, H.M., “Subjective Rightness”, Social and Political Philosophy, 27: 64-110. (Scholar)
- Sobel, J.H., 1994, Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Spohn, W., 1977, “Where Luce and Krantz do really generalize Savage's decision model”, Erkenntnis, 11: 113–134. (Scholar)
- Srinivasan, A., 2015, “Normativity Without Cartesian Privilege”, Noûs, 25: 273-299. (Scholar)
- Suppes, P., 2002, Representation and Invariance of Scientific Structures, Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
- Thalos, M. and Richardson, O., 2013, “Capitalization in the St. Petersburg game: Why statistical distributions matter”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 13: 292-313. (Scholar)
- Weinstein, M.C., Torrence, G., and McGuire, A., 2009 “QALYs: the basics”, Value in Health, 12: S5–S9. (Scholar)
- Weirich, P., 1986, “Expected Utility and Risk”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 37: 419–442. (Scholar)
- Zynda, L., 2000, “Representation Theorems and Realism about Degrees of Belief”, Philosophy of Science, 67: 45–69. (Scholar)
