Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Challenges to Metaphysical Realism" by Drew Khlentzos

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Azzouni, Jody, 1997, “Applied Mathematics, Existential Commitment and the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Thesis,” Philosophia Mathematica, 5: 193–209. (Scholar)
Barrett, Thomas William, and Halvorson, Hans, 2017, “From Geometry to Conceptual Relativity,” Erkenntnis, 82(5): 1043–1063. (Scholar)
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Bennett, Karen, 2015, “‘Perfectly Understood, Unproblematic and Certain’: Lewis on Mereology,” in Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis, Oxford and New York: Blackwell. (Scholar)
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Berger, A. “Kripke on the Incoherency of Adopting a Logic,” in Berger, A. (ed.) 177–210. (Scholar)
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Blackburn, S. and Simmons, K. (eds.), 2000, Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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Brandom, R. (ed.), 2000, Rorty and His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Brueckner, A., 1986, “Brains in a Vat,” Journal of Philosophy, 83(3): 148–167. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “If I’m a Brain in a Vat then I’m Not a Brain in a Vat,” Mind, 101: 123–28. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Conceptual Relativism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79(4): 295–301. (Scholar)
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Button, T., 2013, The Limits of Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Brains in vats and model theory” in S. Goldberg (ed.) 2015, pp. 131–154. (Scholar)
Carnap, R., 1950, “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4: 20–40. (Scholar)
Carnap, R., 1963, “Replies and Systematic Expositions”in Schilpp, P. (ed.) 859–1013. (Scholar)
Cartwright, Nancy, 1983, How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chakravartty, Anjan, 2007, A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unknowable, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Chalmers, David, 2009, “Ontological Anti-Realism” in D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman (eds.) 2009, 77–129. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, The Character of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D., Manley, D., and Wasserman, R. (eds.), 2009, Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chomsky, Noam, 1986, Knowledge of Language, Westport, CT: Prager. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, Language and Mind, 3rd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Cogburn, Jon, 2005, “The Logic of Logical Revision: formalizing Dummett’s argument,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83(1): 15–32. (Scholar)
Cozzo, Cesare, 1994, “Are Dummett’s Requirements on a Theory of Meaning Sufficient for Rejecting Classical Logic?” Erkenntnis, 40(2): 243–263. (Scholar)
Crain, Stephen, 2012, The Emergence of Meaning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Crain, Stephen and Khlentzos, Drew, 2010, “The Logic Instinct,” Mind and Language, 25(1): 30–65. (Scholar)
David, Marian, 1991, “Neither Mentioning ‘Brains in a Vat’ nor Mentioning Brains in a Vat Will Prove That We Are Not Brains in a Vat,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51(4): 891–896. (Scholar)
Davidson, Donald, 1973, “On The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47: 5–20. (Scholar)
–––, 1979, “The Inscrutability of Reference,” Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 10(2): 7–19. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth,” Journal of Philosophy, 93(6): 263–79. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Truth Rehabilitated,” in Brandom (ed.) 2000, 65–73. (Scholar)
Devitt, Michael, 1983, “Realism and the Renegade Putnam: A Critical Study of Meaning and the Moral Sciences,” Noûs, 17(2): 291–301. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, Realism and Truth, Second Edition, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Dolev, Yuval, 2007, Time and Realism: Philosophical and Anti-Philosophical Perspectives, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Dorr, Cian, 2011, “Physical Geometry and Fundamental Metaphysics,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 111(1): 135–179. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Quantifier Variance and the Collapse Theorems,” The Monist, 97: 503–570. (Scholar)
Douven, Igor, 1999, “Putnam’s Model-Theoretic Argument Reconstructed,” Journal of Philosophy, 96(9): 479–490. (Scholar)
Dummett, Michael, 1978, Truth and Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, “Objections to Chomsky,” London Review of Books, 3(16), September 3, 1981 [available online]. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, The Seas of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Is Time a Continuum of Instants?,” Philosophy, 75: 497–515. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Of What Kind of Thing is Truth a Property?” in Blackburn and Simmons 2000, 264–281. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Victor’s Error,” Analysis, 62(2): 1–2. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, Truth and the Past, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, Thought and Reality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Ebbs, Gary, 1992, “Skepticism, Objectivity and Brains in Vats,” Philosophical Topics, 20(1): 1–33. (Scholar)
Edgington, Dorothy, 1981, “Meaning, Bivalence and Realism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1980–1981, Vol. 81: 153–173. (Scholar)
Einstein, A., Podolsky, B, and Rosen, N., 1935, “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?” Physical Review, 47(10): 777–780. (Scholar)
Eklund, Matti, 2006, “Meta-Ontology” Philosophy Compass, 3: 317–334. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “The Picture of Reality as an Amorphous Lump” in Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell, 382–396. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Carnap and Ontological Pluralism” in D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman (eds.) 2009, pp. 130–156. (Scholar)
Field, Hartry, 1978, “Mental Representation,” Erkenntnis, 13: 9–61. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Some Thoughts on Radical Indeterminacy,” The Monist, 81(2): 253–273. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, Truth and The Absence of Fact, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Fodor, Jerry, 1975, The Language of Thought, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, The Modularity of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, The Language of Thought Revisited, Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Fodor, Jerry and Lepore, Ernest, 2002, The Compositionality Papers, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Forbes, Graeme, 1995, “Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited”Journal of Philosophy, 92(4), 205 – 222. (Scholar)
Gaiffman, Haim, 1996, “Is the ‘Bottom-Up’ Approach from the Theory of Meaning to Metaphysics Possible?” Journal of Philosophy, 93(8): 373–407. (Scholar)
George, Alexander, 1993, “How Not to Refute Realism,” Journal of Philosophy, 90(2): 53–72. (Scholar)
Gödel, Kurt, 1949, “A Remark About the Relationship between Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy,” in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (The Library of Living Philosophers: Volume 7), P.A. Schilpp (ed.), Evanston, IL: Open Court, 558. (Scholar)
Goldberg, S. (ed.), 2015, The Brain in a Vat, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Hale, B. and Wright, C., 1997, “Putnam’s Model-Theoretic Argument against Metaphysical Realism,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.) Oxford: Blackwell, 427–457. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “The Metaontology of Abstraction,” in D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman (eds.) 2009, pp. 178–212. (Scholar)
Hand, Michael, 2003, “Knowability and Truth,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(2): 216–228. (Scholar)
Hauser, Kai, 2001, “Objectivity over Objects: A Case Study in Theory Formation” Synthese, 128: 245–285. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, John, 2006, “Plenitude, Convention and Ontology,” in J. Hawthorne, Metaphysical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 53–69. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Superficialism in Ontology,” in D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman (eds.) 2009, pp. 213–230. (Scholar)
Hazen, Allen, 2012, “Intuitionism,” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language (Chapter 5.8), Gillian Russell and Delia Graff Farra (eds.), New York: Routledge, 667–677. (Scholar)
Hellman, Geoffrey, 1989, “Never Say ‘Never!’ On the Communication Problem between Intuitionism and Classicism,” Philosophical Topics, 17(2): 47–67. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “The Boxer and His Fists: The Constructivist in the Arena of Quantum Physics,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 66: 61–77. (Scholar)
Huemer, Michael, 2016, “Serious Theories and Skeptical Theories: Why You Are Probably Not a Brain in a Vat,” Philosophical Studies, 173(4): 1031–1052. (Scholar)
Hirsch, Eli, 1993, Dividing Reality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Quantifier Variance and Realism,” Philosophical Issues, 12: 51–73. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Physical Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes and Common Sense,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70(1): 67–97. (Scholar)
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–––, 2011, Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Meta-Ontology, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Horgan, T. and Timmons, M., 2002, “Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism,” Noûs, 36(1): 74–96. (Scholar)
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Jackson, Alexander, 2015, “How You Know You Are Not a Brain in a Vat,” Philosophical Studies, 172(10): 2799–2822. (Scholar)
Jackson, Frank, 2000, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Jenkins, C.S., 2010, “What Is Ontological Realism?,” Philosophy Compass, 5/10:880–890. (Scholar)
Khlentzos, Drew, 2004, Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Naturalism and the Question of Realism” in K. J. Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 150–67. (Scholar)
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Lewis, David, 1983, “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–77. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, “Putnam’s Paradox,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62: 221–36. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, Parts of Classes, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
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Linnebo, O., 2018, “Dummett on Indefinite Extensibility,” Philosophical Issues, 28(1): 196–220. (Scholar)
Lynch, Michael (ed.), 2001, The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Lynch, Michael, 1998, Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Lowe, E. J. and Ramichandran, A. (eds.), 2009, Truth and Truthmaking, Stockfield: Acumen. (Scholar)
Michael, Michaelis, 1999, “Dummett’s Argument against Classical Logic,” Philosophia, 27(3–4): 359–382. (Scholar)
Maudlin, Tim, 2007, The Metaphysics within Physics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
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McDowell, John, 1976, “Truth-conditions, Bivalance and Verificationism,” in G. Evans & J. McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 42–66. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, Mind and World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
McGee, Vann, 2015, “Inscrutability and its Discontents,” Noûs, 39(3): 397–425. (Scholar)
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–––, 1979, “An Apriori Argument for Realism,” Journal of Philosophy, 76: 113–33. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, “Realist Semantics and Content Ascription,” Synthese, 52: 113–34. (Scholar)
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Moretti, Luca, 2014, “Global Scepticism, Underdetermination and Metaphysical Possibility” Erkenntnis, 79(2): 381–403. (Scholar)
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–––, 1987, “Dummett on a theory of meaning and its impact on logic,” in B. Taylor (ed.), Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. (Scholar)
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