Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Realism and Theory Change in Science" by Stathis Psillos

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Ainsworth, Peter M., 2009, “Newman’s Objection”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 60(1): 135–171. doi:10.1093/bjps/axn051 (Scholar)
Alai, Mario, 2017, “Resisting the Historical Objections to Realism: Is Doppelt’s a Viable Solution?” Synthese, 194(9): 3267–3290. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1087-z (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “The Historical Challenge to Realism and Essential Deployment”, in T.D. Lyons and P. Vickers (eds.), Contemporary Scientific Realism: The Challenge from the History of Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 183–215. (Scholar)
Anonymous, 1889, “Causerie Bibliographique”, Revue Scientifique, No. 7, August 17 1889. [Anonymous 1889: 215 available online] (Scholar)
Berthelot, Marcelin, 1897, Science et Morale, Paris: Calmann Levy. [Berthelot 1897 available online] (Scholar)
Boge, Florian, J., 2021, “Incompatibility and the Pessimistic Induction: A Challenge for Selective Realism”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 11(2): 1–31. doi:10.1007/s13194-021-00367-4 (Scholar)
Boltzmann, Ludwig, 1901, “The Recent Development of Method in Theoretical Physics”, The Monist, 11(2): 226–257. doi:10.5840/monist190111224 (Scholar)
Brunetière, Ferdinand, 1889, “Revue Littéraire—A propos du Disciple de Paul Bourget”, Revue des Deux Mondes, 94: 214–226. [Brunetière 1889 available available online] (Scholar)
–––, 1895, “Après une visite au Vatican”,Revue des Deux Mondes, 127: 97–118. [Brunetière 1895 available online] (Scholar)
Chakravartty, Anjan, 2008, “What you don’t Know can’t Hurt you: Realism and the Unconceived”, Philosophical Studies, 137: 149–158. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9173-1 (Scholar)
Chang, Hasok, 2003, “Preservative Realism and its Discontents: Revisiting Caloric”, Philosophy of Science, 70(5): 902–912. doi:10.1086/377376 (Scholar)
Cordero, Alberto, 2011, “Scientific Realism and the Divide et Impera Strategy: The Ether Saga Revisited”, Philosophy of Science, 78(5): 1120–1130. doi:10.1086/662566 (Scholar)
Cruse, Pierre, 2005, “Ramsey-sentences, Structural Realism and Trivial Realisation”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 36(3): 557–576. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2005.07.006 (Scholar)
Cruse, Pierre & David Papineau, 2002, “Scientific Realism Without Reference”, in Michele Marsonet (ed.) The Problem of Realism, Aldershot: Ashgate. (Scholar)
Demopoulos, William, 2003, “On the Rational Reconstruction of Our Theoretical Knowledge”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54(3): 371–403. doi:10.1093/bjps/54.3.371 (Scholar)
Devitt, Michael, 2007, “Scientific Realism”, In Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Are Unconceived Alternatives a Problem for Scientific Realism?” Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 42(2): 285–293. doi:10.1007/s10838-011-9166-9 (Scholar)
Doppelt, Gerald, 2007, “Reconstructing Scientific Realism to Rebut the Pessimistic Meta-induction”, Philosophy of Science, 74(1): 96–118. doi:10.1086/520685 (Scholar)
Duhem, Pierre Maurice Marie, 1906 [1954], Théorie physique: son objet et sa structure, Paris. Translated from the 1914 second edition as The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Philip P. Wiener (trans.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954. (Scholar)
–––, 1906 [2007], La Théorie Physique: son objet, sa structure, Paris: Vrin. (Scholar)
Fahrbach, Ludwig, 2011, “How the Growth of Science Ends Theory Change”, Synthese, 180(2): 139–155. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9602-0 (Scholar)
French, Steven, 2014, The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684847.001.0001 (Scholar)
Frost-Arnold, Greg, 2014, “Can the Pessimistic Induction be Saved from Semantic Anti-Realism about Scientific Theory?”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 65(3): 521–548. doi:10.1093/bjps/axt013 (Scholar)
Guegeun, Marie & Stathis Psillos, 2017, “Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem’s Philosophy of Science”, Transversal, 2: 54–73. doi:10.24117/2526-2270.2017.i2.06 (Scholar)
Hesse, Mary B., 1976, “Truth and Growth of Knowledge”, in F. Suppe & P.D. Asquith (eds), PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, volume 2, pp. 261–280, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association. doi:10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1976.2.192385 (Scholar)
Kitcher, Philip, 1993, The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195096533.001.0001 (Scholar)
Kripke, Saul, 1972, “Naming and Necessity”, in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (eds), Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: Reidel pp. 253–355, 763–769. (Scholar)
Ladyman, James, 1998, “What is Structural Realism?”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 29(3): 409–424. doi:10.1016/s0039-3681(98)80129-5 (Scholar)
Ladyman, James & Don Ross, 2007, Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalised, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.001.0001 (Scholar)
Lalande, André, 1913, “Philosophy in France in 1912”, The Philosophical Review, 22(4): 357–374. doi:10.2307/2178386 (Scholar)
Laudan, Larry, 1981, “A Confutation of Convergent Realism”, Philosophy of Science, 48(1): 19–49. doi:10.1086/288975 (Scholar)
Lewis, Peter J., 2001, “Why the Pessimistic Induction Is a Fallacy”, Synthese, 129(3): 371– 380. doi:10.1023/a:1013139410613 (Scholar)
Lyons, Timothy D., 2002, “Scientific Realism and the Pessimistic Meta-Modus Tollens”, in S. Clarke and T.D. Lyons (eds.), Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science: Scientific Realism and Commonsense, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 63–90. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Scientific Realism and the Stratagema de Divide et Impera”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57(3): 537–560, doi:10.1093/bjps/axl021 (Scholar)
–––, 2016a, “Structural Realism versus Deployment Realism: A Comparative Evaluation”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 59: 95–105. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2016.06.006 (Scholar)
–––, 2016b, “Scientific Realism”, in Paul Humphreys (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 564–584. (Scholar)
Magnus, P.D. & Craig Callender, 2004, “Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy”, Philosophy of Science, 71(3): 320–338. doi:10.1086/421536 (Scholar)
Maxwell, Grover, 1970a, “Theories, Perception and Structural Realism”, in Robert Colodny (ed.) The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, (University of Pittsburgh series in the philosophy of science, 4 ), Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 3–34. (Scholar)
–––, 1970b, “Structural Realism and the Meaning of Theoretical Terms”, in Michael Radner and Stephen Winokur (eds), Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology, (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 4), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 181–192. (Scholar)
Mizrahi, Moti, 2013, “The Pessimistic Induction: A Bad Argument Gone Too Far”, Synthese, 190(15): 3209–3226. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0138-3 (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “The History of Science as a Graveyard of Theories: A Philosophers’ Myth?”, International Studies in Philosophy of Science, 30(3): 263–278. doi:10.1080/02698595.2017.1316113 (Scholar)
Müller, Florian, 2015, “The Pessimistic Meta-induction: Obsolete Through Scientific Progress?”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 29(4): 393–412. doi:10.1080/02698595.2015.1195144 (Scholar)
Newman, M.H.A., 1928, “Mr. Russell’s ‘Causal Theory of Perception’”, Mind, 37(146): 137–148. doi:10.1093/mind/xxxvii.146.137 (Scholar)
Newman, Mark, 2005, “Ramsey Sentence Realism as an Answer to the Pessimistic Meta-Induction”, Philosophy of Science, 72(5): 1373–1384. doi:10.1086/508975 (Scholar)
Newton-Smith, W.H., 1981, The Rationality of Science, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Papineau, David, 2010, “Realism, Ramsey, Sentences and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 41(4): 375–385. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.10.002 (Scholar)
Park, Seungbae, 2011, “A Confutation of the Pessimistic Induction”, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 42(1): 75–84. doi:10.1007/s10838-010-9130-0 (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Refutations of the Two Pessimistic Inductions”, Philosophia, 44(3): 835–844. doi:10.1007/s11406-016-9733-8 (Scholar)
Paul, Harry W., 1968, “The Debate over the Bankruptcy of Science in 1895”, French Historical Studies, 5(3): 299–327. doi:10.2307/286043 (Scholar)
Peters, Dean, 2014, “What Elements of Successful Scientific Theories Are the Correct Targets for ‘Selective’ Scientific Realism?”, Philosophy of Science, 81(3): 377–397. doi:10.1086/676537 (Scholar)
Poincaré, Henri, 1900, “Sur les Rapports de la Physique Expérimentale et de la Physique Mathématique”, in Rapports Présentés au Congrès International de Physique, Vol.XCVI: 245–263. (Scholar)
–––, 1902, La Science et L’Hypothese, (1968 reprint) Paris: Flammarion. (Scholar)
Prevost, Jean Louis, and Dumas, Jean-Baptiste André, 1823, “Examen du Sang et de son Action dans les Divers Phènoménes de la Vie”, Journal de Physique, De Chimie et d’Histoire Naturelle, XCVI: 245–263. [Prevost & Dumas 1823 available online] (Scholar)
Psillos, Stathis, 1994, “A philosophical study of the transition from the caloric theory of heat to thermodynamics: Resisting the pessimistic meta-induction”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 25(2): 159–190. doi:10.1016/0039-3681(94)90026-4 (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Scientific Realism and the ‘Pessimistic Induction’”, Philosophy of Science, 63: S306–14. doi:10.1086/289965 (Scholar)
–––, 1999, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth, London & New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, Knowing the Structure of Nature: Essays on Realism and Explanation, London: Palgrave/MacMillan. doi:10.1057/9780230234666 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Moving Molecules above the Scientific Horizon: On Perrin’s Case for Realism”, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 42(2): 339–363. doi:10.1007/s10838-011-9165-x (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Causal-descriptivism and the Reference of Theoretical Terms”, in Athanassios Raftopoulos & Peter Machamer (eds), Perception, Realism and the Problem of Reference, Cambridge University Press, pp. 212–238. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511979279.010 (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Conventions and Relations in Poincaré’s, Philosophy of Science”, Methode-Analytic Perspectives, 3(4): 98–140. (Scholar)
Putnam, Hilary, 1973, “Explanation and Reference”, in Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds), Conceptual Change, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 199–221. doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2548-5_11 (Scholar)
–––, 1975, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, in Keith Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge, (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 131–93. (Scholar)
–––, 1978, Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Ramsey, Frank Plumpton, 1929, “Theories”, in his The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Essays, R. B. Braithwaite (ed.), (1931) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Richet, Charles, 1895, “La Science a-t-elle fait banqueroute?”, Revue Scientifique, No. 3, 12 January 1895, 33–39. [Richet 1895 available online]
Russell, Bertrand, 1927, The Analysis of Matter, London: George Allen & Unwin. (Scholar)
Ruttkamp-Bloem, Emma, 2013, “Re-enchanting Realism in Debate with Kyle Stanford”, Journal of General Philosophy of Science, 44(1): 201–224. doi:10.1007/s10838-013-9220-x (Scholar)
Saatsi, Juha, 2019, “Historical Inductions, Old and New”, Synthese, 196: 3979–3993. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0855-5 (Scholar)
Smith, George E., 2010, “Revisiting Accepted Science: The Indispensability of the History of Science”, The Monist, 93(4): 545–579. doi:10.5840/monist201093432 (Scholar)
Stanford, P. Kyle, 2006, Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195174089.001.0001 (Scholar)
Tolstoy, Leo, 1904, Essays & Letters, Aylmer Maud (trans.), New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company. (Scholar)
Tulodziecki, Dana, 2021 “Theoretical Continuity, Approximate Truth, and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction: Revisiting the Miasma Theory”, in T.D. Lyons and P. Vickers (eds.), Contemporary Scientific Realism: The Challenge from the History of Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 11–32. (Scholar)
Vickers, Peter, 2013, “A Confrontation of Convergent Realism”, Philosophy of Science, 80(2): 189–211. doi:10.1086/670297 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Understanding the Selective Realist Defence Against the PMI”, Synthese, 194(9): 3221–3232. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1082-4 (Scholar)
Worrall, John, 1989, “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?”, Dialectica, 43(1–2): 99–124. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00933.x (Scholar)
Wray, K. Brad, 2013, “The Pessimistic Induction and the Exponential Growth of Science Reassessed”, Synthese, 190(18): 4321–4330. doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0276-2 (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Pessimistic Inductions: Four Varieties”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 29(1): 61–73. doi:10.1080/02698595.2015.1071551 (Scholar)
Zahar, Elie, 2001, Poincaré’s Philosophy: From Conventionalism to Phenomenology, LaSalle IL: Open Court. (Scholar)

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