Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Realism" by Alexander Miller

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Alston, W., 1958. “Ontological Commitment,” Philosophical Studies, 9: 8–17. (Scholar)
Ayer, A.J., 1946. Language, Truth, and Logic, New York: Dover Publications, 2nd edition. (Scholar)
Benacerraf, P., 1965. “What Numbers Could Not Be,” Philosophical Review, 74: 47–73. (Scholar)
–––, 1973. “Mathematical Truth,” Journal of Philosophy, 70: 661–679. (Scholar)
Berkeley, G., 1710. The Principles of Human Knowledge, many editions. (Scholar)
Bird, A., 1998. The Philosophy of Science, London: UCL Press. (Scholar)
Blackburn, S., 1984. Spreading The Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998. Ruling Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Brink, D., 1984. “Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62: 112–25. (Scholar)
Brock, S and Mares, E., 2007. Realism and Antirealism, Chesham: Acumen. (Scholar)
Byrne, D., 2005. “Compositionality and the Manifestation Challenge,” Synthese, 144: 101–136. (Scholar)
Churchland, P., 1981. “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,” Journal of Philosophy, 78: 67–90. (Scholar)
Coliva, A. (ed.), 2012. Mind, Meaning and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Cuneo, T., 2007. The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Devitt, M., 1983. “Dummett’s Anti-Realism,” Journal of Philosophy, 80: 73–99. (Scholar)
–––, 1991a. Realism and Truth, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2nd edition. (Scholar)
–––, 1991b. “Aberrations of the Realism Debate,” Philosophical Studies, 61: 43–63. (Scholar)
Divers, J., 2002. Possible Worlds, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Divers, J. and Miller, A., 1995. “Platitudes and Attitudes: A Minimalist Conception of Belief,” Analysis, 55: 37–44. (Scholar)
–––, 1999. “Arithmetical Platonism: Reliability and Judgement-Dependence,” Philosophical Studies, 95: 277–310. (Scholar)
Dummett, M., 1973. Frege: Philosophy of Language, London: Duckworth. (Scholar)
–––, 1978. Truth and Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. The Seas of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Dyke, H., 2008. Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Field, H., 1980. Science Without Numbers, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1989. Realism, Mathematics, and Modality, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Fine, K., 2001. “The Question of Realism”Philosopher’s Imprint, Volume 1, Number 1. (Scholar)
Fodor, J., 1987. Psychosemantics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Frege, G., 1892. “On Sinn and Bedeutung,” in M. Beaney (ed.) The Frege Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, pp.151–171. (Scholar)
Geach, P., 1965. “Assertion,” Philosophical Review, 74: 449–465. (Scholar)
Gibbard, A., 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003. Thinking How To Live, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Gödel, K., 1983. “What is Cantor’s Continuum Problem?” in P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam (eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 470–485. (Scholar)
Goldschmidt, T. and Pearce, K. (eds.), 2017. Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Greenough, P. and Lynch, M. (eds.), 2006. Truth and Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press). (Scholar)
Hale, B., 1987. Abstract Objects, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. “Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?” in J. Haldane and C. Wright (eds.), Reality, Representation, and Projection, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 337–363. (Scholar)
–––, 1994. “Is Platonism Epistemologically Bankrupt?” Philosophical Review, 103: 299–325. Reprinted in Hale and Wright 2001. (Scholar)
–––, 2002. “Can Arboreal Knotwork Help Blackburn Out of Frege’s Abyss?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV: 144–149. (Scholar)
–––, 2017. “Realism and its Oppositions,” in B. Hale, A. Miller and C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 2nd edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 493–525. (Scholar)
Hale, B. and Wright, C., 2001. The Reason’s Proper Study, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2017. “Putnam’s Model-Theoretic Argument Against Metaphysical Realism,” in B. Hale, A. Miller and C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 2nd edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 703–730. (Scholar)
Harman, G., 1977. The Nature of Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Joyce, R., 2001. The Myth of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Kalderon, M., 2005. Moral Fictionalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Kirk, R., 1999. Relativism and Reality, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Kölbel, M., 2002. Truth Without Objectivity, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Kripke, S., 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Kusch, M., 2006. A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules, Chesham: Acumen. (Scholar)
Lillehammer, H., 2007. Companions in Guilt: Arguments for Ethical Objectivity, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. (Scholar)
Lowe, E.J., 2002. A Survey of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
McDowell, J., 1994. Mind and World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998. Mind, Value, and Reality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009.“Wittgensteinian Quietism,”, Common Knowledge, 15: 365–372. (Scholar)
Mackie, J. L., 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin. (Scholar)
Melia, J., 2003. Modality, Chesham: Acumen. (Scholar)
Mellor, D.H. and Oliver, A., 1997. Properties, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Miller, A., 2002. “What is the Manifestation Argument?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 83: 352–383. (Scholar)
–––, 2003a. “The Significance of Semantic Realism,” Synthese, 136: 191–217. (Scholar)
–––, 2003b. “What is the Acquisition Argument?” in A. Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 459–495. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. “Differences with Wright”, Philosophical Quarterly, 54: 595–603. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. “Realism and Antirealism”, in E. Lepore and B. Smith (eds.), A Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 983–1005. (Scholar)
–––, 2013a. Contemporary Metaethics: An Introduction, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2nd edition. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b. “Ethics and Minimalism About Truth”, in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, H. Lafollette (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 2015. “Rule-Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 23: 323–336. (Scholar)
–––, 2018. Philosophy of Language, 3rd edition, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Miller, A. and Wright, C. (eds.), 2002. Rule-Following and Meaning, London: Acumen. (Scholar)
Musgrave, A., 2001. ‘Metaphysical Realism Versus Word-Magic’, Realismus Disziplin Interdisziplinaritat, Amsterdam and Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 29–54. (Scholar)
Olson, J., 2014. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Paseau, A., 2012. ‘Against the Judgement-Dependence of Mathematics and Logic’, Erkenntnis, 76: 23–40. (Scholar)
Pettit, P., 1991. ‘Realism and Response-Dependence’, Mind, 100: 587–626. (Scholar)
Piazza, T., 2011. ‘An epistemology for the Platonist? Platonism, Field’s Dilemma, and Judgement-Dependent Truth’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 83: 67–92. (Scholar)
Putnam, H., 1981. Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1983. Realism and Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Railton, P., 1986. “Moral Realism,” Philosophical Review, 95: 163–207. (Scholar)
–––, 1989. “Naturalism and Prescriptivity,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 7: 151–174. (Scholar)
Rosen, G., 1994. “Objectivity and Modern Idealism: What is the Question?”, in M. Michael and J. O’Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 277–319. (Scholar)
Schroeder, M., 2008. ‘What is the Frege-Geach Problem?’, Philosophy Compass, 3(4). (Scholar)
–––, 2009. Noncognitivism in Ethics, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Shapiro, S., 2007. ‘The Objectivity of Mathematics’, Synthese, 156. (Scholar)
Shapiro, S., and Taschek, W., 1996. “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and Cognitive Command,” Journal of Philosophy, 93: 74–88. (Scholar)
Sinclair, N., 2009. “Recent Work on Expressivism”, Analysis Reviews, 69 (1): 136–147. (Scholar)
Smith, M., 1994. The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Sosa, E., 2002. “Reliability and the A Priori”, in Conceivability and Possibility, Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 368–384. (Scholar)
Sturgeon, N., 1988. “Moral Explanations,” in G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 229–255. (Scholar)
Weiss, B., 2002. Michael Dummett, Chesham: Acumen. (Scholar)
Wittgenstein, L., 1958. Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Wright, C., 1983. Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1988. “Moral Values, Projection, and Secondary Qualities,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 62: 1–26. (Scholar)
–––, 1989. “Meaning and Intention as Judgement-Dependent,” reprinted in Miller and Wright, pp. 129–140. (Scholar)
–––, 1992. Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. Realism, Meaning, and Truth, Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd edition. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. “Truth in Ethics,” in B. Hooker (ed.), Truth in Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1–18. (Scholar)
–––, 2001. “Truth as Sort of Epistemic: Putnam’s Peregrinations”, Journal of Philosophy, 97: 335–364. (Scholar)
–––, 2003. Saving The Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007. “Rule-Following Without Reasons: Wittgenstein’s Quietism and the Constitutive Question”, Ratio (new series), 20: 481–502. (Scholar)

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