Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Defeasible Reasoning" by Robert Koons

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  • –––, 1986, “Belief revisions and the Ramsey test for conditionals”, Philosophical Review, 95: 81–93. (Scholar)
  • Geffner, H. A., 1992, Default Reasoning: Causal and Conditional Theories, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
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  • Gelfond, Michael and Lifschitz, Vladimir, 1988, “The stable model semantics for logic programming”, Logic Programming: Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference and Symposium, Robert A. Kowalski and Kenneth A. Bowen (eds.), Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, pp. 1070–1080. (Scholar)
  • Gilio, Angelo, 2005, “Probabilistic Logic under Coherence, Conditional Interpretations, and Default Reasoning”, Synthese, 146: 139–152. (Scholar)
  • Ginsberg, M. L., 1987, Readings in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, San Mateo, Calif.: Morgan Kaufmann. (Scholar)
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  • Koons, Robert C., 2000, Realism Regained: An Exact Theory of Causation, Teleology and the Mind, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • –––, 2001, “Defeasible Reasoning, Special Pleading and the Cosmological Argument: Reply to Oppy”, Faith and Philosophy, 18: 192–203. (Scholar)
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