Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral vs. Agent-Relative" by Michael Ridge

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Broome, John, 1995. “Skorupski on agent-neutrality”, Utilitas, 7: 315–17. [Preprint available online] (Scholar)
Buckland, J., 2019. “Skorupski and Broome on the Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction”, Utilitas, 31(1): 59–82. (Scholar)
Castaneda, H.-N., 1975. Thinking and Doing, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. (Scholar)
Cummiskey, D, 1996. Kantian Consequentialism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
D’Agostino, F. and Guas, G., 1998. Public Reason, Aldershot, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company. (Scholar)
Dancy, J., 1993. Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. Ethics Without Principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Dougherty, Tom. 2013. “Agent-Neutral Deontology”, Philosophical Studies, 163: 527–537. (Scholar)
Dreier, James, 1993. “Structures of Normative Theories”, The Monist, 76: 22–40. [Preprint available online (in PDF)] (Scholar)
–––, 1996. “Accepting Agent Centred Norms”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 409–422. [Preprint available online (in PDF)] (Scholar)
Hammerton, M., 2018. “Distinguishing Agent-Relativity From Agent-Neutrality”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97(2): 239–250. (Scholar)
Hare, R.M., 1963. Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Herman, B., 1993a. The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993b. “Leaving Deontology Behind”, in Herman 1993a: 208–240. (Scholar)
Huckfeldt, V., 2007. “Categorical and Agent-Neutral Reasons in Kantian Justifications of Morality,” Philosophia, 35 (1): 23–41. (Scholar)
Hurley, P., 1997. “Agent-Centered Restrictions: Clearing the Air of Paradox”, Ethics, 108(1): 120–146. (Scholar)
Kagan, S., 1989. The Limits of Morality, Clarendon Press: Oxford. (Scholar)
Korsgaard, C., 1996a. Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1996b. The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Kripke, S., 1972. Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Löschke, J., 2020. “Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50(4): 477–491. (Scholar)
–––, 2021. “Agent-Relative Reasons and Normative Force”, Philosophia, 49: 359–372. (Scholar)
Mack, Eric, 1989. “Against Agent-Neutral Value” Reason Papers, 14: 76–85. [Preprint available online (in PDF)] (Scholar)
–––, 1998. “Deontic Restrictions are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 15: 61–83. (Scholar)
McKeever, S. and Ridge, M., 2005a. “The Many Moral Particularisms”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 35(1): 83–106. (Scholar)
–––, 2005b. “What Does Holism Have to Do With Particularism?” Ratio, 18(1): 93–103. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2016. “Moral Particularism and Moral Generalism”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-particularism-generalism/> (Scholar)
McNaughton, D., 1988. Moral Vision, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
McNaughton, D. and Rawling, P., 1991. “Agent-Relativity and the Doing-Happening Distinction”, Philosophical Studies, 63: 167–185. (Scholar)
–––, 1995a. “Value and Agent-Relative Reasons”, Utilitas, 7(1): 31–47. (Scholar)
–––, 1995b. “Agent-Relativity and Terminological Inexactitudes”, Utilitas, 7(2): 319–325. (Scholar)
Medlin, B., 1957. “Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 35: 111–118. (Scholar)
Moore, G.E., 1903. Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Nagel, T., 1970. The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1986. The View From Nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Parfit, D., 1984. Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Pettit, P., 1987. “Universality Without Utilitarianism”, Mind, 72: 74–82. (Scholar)
Portmore, Douglas, 2001. “McNaughton and Rawling on the Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction”, Utilitas, 13(3): 350–356. (Scholar)
Postema, G., 1998. “Public Practical Reason: An Archeology”, in D’Agostino and Gaus 1998, pp. 425–468. (Scholar)
Ridge, M., 2001a. “Agent-Neutral Consequentialism From the Inside-Out: Concern For Integrity Without Self indulgence,” Utilitas 13: 236–254. [Preprint available online (in PDF)] (Scholar)
–––, 2001b. “Saving Scanlon: Contractualism and Agent-Relativity”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 9: 472–481. [Preprint available online (in PDF)] (Scholar)
–––, 2009. “Consequentialist Kantianism,” Philosophical Perspectives, 23: 421–438. (Scholar)
Ronnow-Rasmussen, Toni, 2009. “Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy”, Philosophia, 37: 227–243. (Scholar)
Scanlon, T.M., 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Scheffler, S., 1994. The Rejection of Consequentialism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Sellars, W.F., 1968. Science and Metaphysics, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Sidgwick, H., 1907. The Methods of Ethics, 7th edition. Chicago: University of Chicago. (Scholar)
Smith, Michael. 2009. Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection, in Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Ian Ravenscroft (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Sturgeon, N., 1974. “Altruism, Solipsism, and the Objectivity of Reasons”,Philosophical Review, 83: 374–402. (Scholar)
–––, 1994. “Moral Disagreement and Moral Relativism”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 11(1): 80–115. (Scholar)
Williams, B., 1981a. Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1981b. “Internal and External Reasons”, reprinted in Williams 1981a, 101–13. (Scholar)

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