Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation" by Maria Alvarez
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- Alvarez, M., 2007, “The Causalism / Anti-Causalism Debate in the Theory of Action: What it is and why it matters”, in Action in Context, A. Leist (ed.), Berlin/NY: De Gruyter, 103–123. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009a, “How Many Kinds of Reasons?”, Philosophical Explorations, 12: 181–93. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009b, “Reasons and the Ambiguity of “Belief”,’, Philosophical Explorations, 11: 53–65. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, Kinds of Reasons: An Essay on the Philosophy of Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Anscombe, G.E.M., 1957, Intention, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Aquinas, St T., Summa Theologiae, T. Gilby (ed.), 1960–73, London: Blackfriars. (Scholar)
- Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, J. Barnes (ed.), 1984, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Audi, R., 1993, Action, Intention, and Reason, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, The Architecture of Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Austin, J.L., 1957, “A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57: 1–30. (Scholar)
- Baier, K., 1958, The Moral Point of View, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Bittner, R., 2001, Doing Things for Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Brown, J., 2008, “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning”, Nous, 42: 167–189. (Scholar)
- Cohen, S., 1984, “Justification and Truth”, Philosophical Studies, 46: 279–295. (Scholar)
- Comesaña, J. and M. McGrath, 2014, “Having False Reasons”, in Littlejohn and Turri 2014: 59–78. (Scholar)
- Cuneo, T., 2007, The Normative Web. An Argument for Moral Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Dancy, J., 1995, “Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95: 1–18. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Practical Reality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, Ethics Without Principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Acting in the Light of the Appearances”, in McDowell and His Critics, C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 121–134. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “On How to Act—Disjunctively”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, A. Haddock and F. MacPherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 262–279. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Acting in Ignorance”, Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 6(3): 345–357. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “On Knowing One’s Own Reasons”, in Littlejohn and Turri 2014: 81–96. (Scholar)
- Darwall, S., 1983, Impartial Reason, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Desires, Reasons and Causes”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67: 435–443. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D., 1963, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, The Journal of Philosophy, 60(23): 685–700; reprinted in his 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 3–21. (Scholar)
- Dorsch, F. and J. Dutant (eds.), forthcoming, The New Evil Demon Problem, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fantl, J. and M. McGrath, 2009, Knowledge in an Uncertain World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Gert, J., 2004, Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Gettier, E.L., 1963, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis, 23: 121–23. (Scholar)
- Gibbons, J., 2010, “Things that Make Things Reasonable”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81: 335–361. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A.H., 2009, Reasons from Within: Desires and Values, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A., 1967, “A Causal Theory of Knowing”, The Journal of Philosophy, 64: 357–372. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, J., 2004, Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Heuer, U., 2004, “Reasons for Actions and Desires”, Philosophical Studies, 121: 43–63. (Scholar)
- Hieronymi, P., 2011, “Reasons for Action”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 111: 407–27. (Scholar)
- Hirstein, B., 2009, “Confabulation” in The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans, and P. Wilken (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hornsby, J., 2007, “Knowledge, Belief, and Reasons for Acting”, in Explaining the Mental, C. Penco, M. Beaney, M. Vignolo (eds), Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 88–105. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, A. Haddock and F. MacPherson (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 244–261. (Scholar)
- Hutcheson, F., 1971 [1730], Illustrations on the Moral Sense, B. Peach (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Hyman, J., 1999, “How Knowledge Works”, Philosophical Quarterly, 49(197): 433–451. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Acting for Reasons: Reply to Dancy”, Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 6: 3, 358–368. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, Action, Knowledge, and Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kolodny, N., 2005, “Why be Rational?”, Mind, 114 (455): 509–563. (Scholar)
- Korsgaard, C., 1996, The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Littlejohn, C., 2012, Justification and the Truth Connection, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Littlejohn, C. and J. Turri (eds.), 2014, Epistemic Norms, New Essays on Action, Belief and Assertion, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Locke, D., 2015, “Knowledge, Explanation and Motivating Reasons”, American, Philosophical Quarterly, 52(3): 215–232. (Scholar)
- Mackie, J.L., 1977, Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong, London: Pelican Books. (Scholar)
- Mantel, S., 2014, “No Reason for Identity: on the Relation between Motivating and Normative Reasons”, Philosophical Explorations, 17: 49–62. (Scholar)
- McDowell, J., 1978, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 52: 13–29. (Scholar)
- –––,1982, “Reasons and Actions”, Philosophical Investigations, 5: 301–305. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Acting in the Light of a Fact”, in Thinking About Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, D. Bakhurst, B. Hooker, and M.O. Little (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 13–28. (Scholar)
- Mele, A., 2003, Motivation and Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Actions, Explanations and Causes”, in Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anti-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action, G. D’Oro and C. Sandis (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 160–174. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T., 1970, The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, The View from Nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Neta, R., 2009, “Treating Something as a Reason for Action”, Noûs, 43(4): 684–699. (Scholar)
- Nisbett, R.E. and T.D. Wilson, 1977, “Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes”, Psychological Review, 84(3): 231–259. (Scholar)
- Parfit, D., 1997, “Reasons and Motivation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 71: 99–129. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Rationality and Reasons”, in Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values D. Egonsson, J. Josefsson, B. Petersson, and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen (eds.), Ashgate, 2001, 19–39. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, On What Matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Plato, Palto: Complete Works, Cooper, John M. (ed.), 1997, Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
- Price, A., 2011, Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Quinn, W., 1993, “Putting Rationality in its Place”, reprinted in his 1994, Morality and Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 228–255. (Scholar)
- Raz, J., 1975, Practical Reasoning and Norms, London: Hutchinson & Co., reprinted, Oxford University Press, 1990 and 1999. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “When We Are Ourselves: The Active and the Passive”, revised and reprinted in Engaging Reason, J. Raz, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 5–22. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Ruben, D.H., 2009, “Con Reasons as Causes”, in C. Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 62–74. (Scholar)
- Sandis, C., 2015, “Verbal Reports and “Real Reasons”: Confabulation and Conflation”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 18: 267–280. (Scholar)
- Scanlon, T.M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Reasons: A Puzzling Duality”, in R.J. Wallace, S. Scheffler, and M. Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 231–246. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, Being Realistic About Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Schroeder, M., 2007, Slaves of the Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Having Reasons”, Philosophical Studies, 139: 57–71. (Scholar)
- Schueler, G.F., 2003, Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Setiya, K., 2007, Reasons without Rationalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Skorupski, J., 2002, “The Ontology of Reasons”, Topoi 21: 113–124. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, The Domain of Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Smith, M., 1994, The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Stout, R. , 1996, Things that Happen Because They Should: A Teleological Approach to Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Stoutland, F., 1998, “The Real Reasons”, in Human Action, Deliberation and Causation, J. Bransen and S.E. Cuypers (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 43–66. (Scholar)
- Strawson, P.F., 1949, “Truth”, Analysis, 9(6): 83–97. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, “Causation and Explanation”, reprinted in his 1992, Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 109–31. (Scholar)
- Unger, P., 1975, Ignorance. A Case for Scepticism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Williams, B.A.O, 1979, “Internal and External Reasons”, reprinted in his 1981, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 101–113. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame”, in reprinted in his 1995, Making Sense of Humanity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 35–45. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T., 2000, Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, “Acting on Knowledge”, in J.A. Carter, E. Gordon, and B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge-First, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wilson, T.D. and R.E. Nisbett, 1978, “The Accuracy of Verbal Reports About the Effects of Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior”, Social Psychology, 41(2): 118–131. (Scholar)
