Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation" by Maria Alvarez and Jonathan Way

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Alvarez, Maria, 2007, “The Causalist/Anti-Causalist Debate in the Theory of Action: What It Is and Why It Matters”, in Action in Context, Anton Leist (ed.), Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 103–123. doi:10.1515/9783110898798.103 (Scholar)
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Anderson, Elizabeth, 1993, Value in Ethics and Economics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Anscombe, G. E. M., 1957, Intention, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
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Arpaly, Nomy, 2002, “Moral Worth”, The Journal of Philosophy, 99(5): 223–245. doi:10.2307/3655647 (Scholar)
Arpaly, Nomy and Timothy Schroeder, 2014, In Praise of Desire (Oxford Moral Theory), New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199348169.001.0001 (Scholar)
Audi, Robert, 1993, Action, Intention, and Reason, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Austin, J.L, 1956, “Ifs and Cans”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 42: 109–132; reprinted in Philosophical Papers, 3rd edition, Austin, J.L, J.O.Urmson, and G.J. Warnock (eds), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, 205–232. doi.org/10.1093/019283021X.001.0001 (Scholar)
Bader, Ralf, 2016, “Conditions, Modifiers, and Holism”, in Lord and Maguire 2016: 27–55 (ch. 2). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.003.0002 (Scholar)
Baier, Kurt, 1958, The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics (Contemporary Philosophy), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Bennett, Christopher, 2021, “The Problem of Expressive Action”, Philosophy, 96(2): 277–300. doi:10.1017/s0031819120000467 (Scholar)
Berker, Selim, 2007, “Particular Reasons”, Ethics, 118(1): 109–139. doi:10.1086/521586 (Scholar)
Bittner, Rüdiger, 2001, Doing Things for Reasons, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195143647.001.0001 (Scholar)
Brown, Jessica, 2008, “Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning”, Noûs, 42(2): 167–189. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00677.x (Scholar)
Broome, John, 2013, Rationality through Reasoning (The Blackwell/Brown Lectures in Philosophy 4), Chichester/Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781118609088 (Scholar)
Brunero, John, 2013, “Reasons as Explanations”, Philosophical Studies, 165(3): 805–824. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9982-8 (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Fittingness and Good Reasoning”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 16(2): 133–143. doi:10.26556/jesp.v16i2.782 (Scholar)
Comesaña, Juan and Matthew McGrath, 2014, “Having False Reasons”, in Littlejohn and Turri 2014: 59–79. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.003.0004 (Scholar)
Copp, David and David Sobel, 2002, “Desires, Motives, and Reasons: Scanlon’s Rationalistic Moral Psychology”, Social Theory and Practice, 28(2): 243–276. doi:10.5840/soctheorpract200228210 (Scholar)
Cullity, Garrett, 2018, “Weighing Reasons”, in Star 2018b: 423–442 (ch. 18). (Scholar)
Dancy, Jonathan, 1995, “Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95(1): 1–18. doi:10.1093/aristotelian/95.1.1 (Scholar)
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–––, 2008, “On How to Act—Disjunctively”, in Haddock and MacPherson 2008: 262–280 (ch. 11). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0012 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Acting in Ignorance”, Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 6(3): 345–357. doi:10.1007/s11466-011-0143-5 (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “On Knowing One’s Reason”, in Littlejohn and Turri 2014: 80–96. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.003.0005 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805441.001.0001 (Scholar)
Darwall, Stephen L., 1983, Impartial Reason, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Davidson, Donald, 1963, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, The Journal of Philosophy, 60(23): 685–700; reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, 3–21. doi:10.2307/2023177 (Scholar)
Fantl, Jeremy and Matthew McGrath, 2009, Knowledge in an Uncertain World, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.001.0001 (Scholar)
Finlay, Stephen, 2014, Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language (Oxford Moral Theory), Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347490.001.0001 (Scholar)
Fogal, Daniel and Alex Worsnip, 2021, “Which Reasons? Which Rationality?”, Ergo: an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 8: 306–343 (article 11). doi:10.3998/ergo.1148 (Scholar)
Foot, Philippa, 1972, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”, The Philosophical Review, 81(3): 305–316. doi:10.2307/2184328 (Scholar)
Gert, Joshua, 2003, “Two Concepts of Rationality”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 41(3): 367–398. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2003.tb00958.x (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons”, The Philosophical Review, 116(4): 533–562. doi:10.1215/00318108-2007-013 (Scholar)
Gettier, Edmund L., 1963, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis, 23(6): 121–123. doi:10.1093/analys/23.6.121 (Scholar)
Gibbons, John, 2010, “Things That Make Things Reasonable”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(2): 335–361. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00373.x (Scholar)
Goldman, Alan H., 2009, Reasons from within: Desires and Values, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576906.001.0001 (Scholar)
Goldman, Alvin I., 1967, “A Causal Theory of Knowing”, The Journal of Philosophy, 64(12): 357–372. doi:10.2307/2024268 (Scholar)
Graham, Peter A., 2011, “‘Ought’ and Ability”, The Philosophical Review, 120(3): 337–382. doi:10.1215/00318108-1263674 (Scholar)
Gregory, Alex, 2021, Desire as Belief: A Study of Desire, Motivation, and Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198848172.001.0001 (Scholar)
Haddock, Adrian and Fiona MacPherson (eds), 2008, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001
Hampton, Jean, 1998, The Authority of Reason, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625213 (Scholar)
Hawthorne, John, 2004, Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford: Clarendon. doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001 (Scholar)
Hawthorne, John and Ofra Magidor, 2018, “Reflections on the Ideology of Reasons”, in Star 2018b: 113–140 (ch. 5). (Scholar)
Heuer, Ulrike, 2004, “Reasons for Actions and Desires”, Philosophical Studies, 121(1): 43–63. doi:10.1023/b:phil.0000040381.54358.08 (Scholar)
Hieronymi, Pamela, 2011, “Reasons for Action”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 111(3pt3): 407–427. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00316.x (Scholar)
Hooker, Brad, 1987, “Williams’ Argument against External Reasons”, Analysis, 47(1): 42–44. doi:10.1093/analys/47.1.42 (Scholar)
Hornsby, Jennifer, 2007, “Knowledge, Belief and Reasons for Acting”, in Explaining the Mental: Naturalist and Non-Naturalist Approaches to Mental Acts and Processes, Carlo Penco, Massimiliano Vignolo, and Michael Beaney (eds), Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 88–105. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons”, in Haddock and MacPherson 2008: 244–261 (ch. 10). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0011 (Scholar)
Horty, John Francis, 2012, Reasons as Defaults, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744077.001.0001 (Scholar)
Howard, Nathan Robert, 2021, “Ambidextrous Reasons (or Why Reasons First’s Reasons Aren’t Facts)”, Philosopher’s Imprint, 21: article 30. [Howard 2021 available online] (Scholar)
Hursthouse, Rosalind, 1991, “Arational Actions”, The Journal of Philosophy, 88(2): 57–68. doi:10.2307/2026906 (Scholar)
Hutcheson, Francis, 1728, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense, London; second edition 1730, London; third edition 1742, London; reprinted in Aaron Garrett (ed.), An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002. [Essay 1742 [2002] available online] (Scholar)
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Isserow, Jessica, 2019, “Moral Worth and Doing the Right Thing by Accident”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97(2): 251–264. doi:10.1080/00048402.2018.1463270 (Scholar)
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Kiesewetter, Benjamin, 2016, “You Ought to ϕ Only If You May Believe That You Ought to ϕ”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 66(265): 760–782. doi:10.1093/pq/pqw012 (Scholar)
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Lord, Errol and Barry Maguire, 2016a, “An Opinionated Guide to the Weight of Reasons”, in Lord and Maguire 2016: 3–24 (ch. 1). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.003.0001 (Scholar)
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