Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Reference" by Eliot Michaelson

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Abbott, B., 2008. ‘Issues in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Definite Descriptions in English,’ in J. Gundel & N. Hedberg (eds.), Reference: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Bach, K., 1992. ‘Intentions and Demonstrations,’ Analysis, 52(3): 140–146. (Scholar)
–––, 2017. ‘Reference, Intention, and Context: Do Demonstratives Really Refer?,’ in M. de Ponte and K. Korta (eds.), Reference and Representation in Thought and Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Burge, T., 1973. ‘Reference and Proper Names,’ Journal of Philosophy, 70(14): 425–439. (Scholar)
Chastain, C., 1975. ‘Reference and Context,’, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Volume VII), Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
Cohen, J. and E. Michaelson, 2013. ‘Indexicality and the Answering Machine Paradox,’ Philosophy Compass, 8(6): 580–592. (Scholar)
Devitt, M., 1997. ‘Meaning and Psychology: A Response to Richard,’ Noûs, 31(1): 115–131. (Scholar)
–––, 2022. ‘The Irrelevance of Intentions to Refer: Demonstratives and Demonstrations,’ Philosophical Studies, 179(3): 995–1004. (Scholar)
Dickie, I., 2015. Fixing Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Donnellan , K., 1966. ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions,’ Philosophical Review, 75(3): 281–304. (Scholar)
–––, 1968. ‘Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again,’ Philosophical Review, 77(2): 203–215. (Scholar)
–––, 1970. ‘Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions,’ Synthese, 21(3–4): 335–358. (Scholar)
Evans, G., 1973. ‘The Causal Theory of Names,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 47: 187–208. (Scholar)
–––, 1982. The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Fara, D. Graff, 2015. ‘Names are Predicates,’ Philosophical Review, 124(1): 59–127. (Scholar)
von Fintel, K., 2004. ‘Would you Believe It? The King of France is Back! (Presuppositions and Truth-Value Intuitions),’ in A. Bezuidenhout and M. Reimer (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays on Definite and Indefinite Descriptions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Fodor, J.D., and I. Sag, 1982. ‘Referential and Quantificational Indefinites,’ Linguistics and Philosophy, 5(3): 355–398. (Scholar)
Frege, G., 1892. ‘On Sense and Reference,’ in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.) Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Oxford: Blackwell (1952). (Scholar)
García-Carpintero, M., 1998. ‘Indexicals as Token-Reflexives,’ Mind, 107(427): 529–564. (Scholar)
Gauker, C., 2008, ‘Zero Tolerance for Pragmatics,’ Synthese, 165(3): 359–371. (Scholar)
Geach, P., 1969. ‘The Perils of Pauline,’ Review of Metaphysics, 23(2): 287–300. (Scholar)
–––, 1980. Reference and Generality, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Gray, A., 2014. ‘Name-Bearing, Reference, and Circularity,’ Philosophical Studies, 171(2): 207–231. (Scholar)
–––, 2015. ‘Lexical Individuation and Predicativism About Names,’ Thought, 4(2): 113–123. (Scholar)
Gómez-Torrente, M., 2019. Roads to Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Grice, P., 1957. ‘Meaning,’ Philosophical Review, 66(3): 377–388. (Scholar)
Heck, R.K., 2014, ‘Semantics and Context-Dependence: Towards a Strawsonian Account,’in A. Burgess and B. Sherman (eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning, Oxford: Oxford University Press (originally published under the name ‘R.G. Heck Jr.’). (Scholar)
Jeshion, R., 2015. ‘Names Not Predicates,’ in A. Bianchi (ed.), On Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kaplan, D., 1978. ‘Dthat,’ in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1989a. ‘Afterthoughts,’ in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1989b. ‘Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals,’ in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1990. ‘Words,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 64: 93–119. (Scholar)
Keiser, J., 2023. Non-Ideal Foundations of Language, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
King, J., 2013. ‘Supplementives, the Coordination Account, and Conflicting Intentions,’ Philosophical Perspectives, 27(1): 288–311. (Scholar)
–––, 2014. ‘Speaker Intentions in Context,’ Noûs, 48(2): 219–237. (Scholar)
Kripke, S., 1972. Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1977. ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference,’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2: 255–76. (Scholar)
Lewis, D., 1993. ‘Many, but Almost One,’ in J. Bacon (ed.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D M Armstrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Ludlow, P. and G. Segal, 2004. ‘On a Unitary Semantical Analysis for Definite and Indefinite Descriptions,’ in A. Bezuidenhout and M. Reimer (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays on Definite and Indefinite Descriptions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
MacKay, A., 1968. ‘Mr. Donnellan and Humpty Dumpty on Referring,’ Philosophical Review, 77(2): 197–202. (Scholar)
Marcus, R. Barcan, 1947. “The Identity of Individuals in a Strict Functional Calculus of Second Order,” Journal of Symbolic Logic, 12(1): 12–15. (Scholar)
–––, 1961. ‘Modalities and Intensional Languages,’ Synthese, 13(4): 303–322. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. Modalities, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
McGinn, C., 1981. ‘The Mechanism of Reference,’ Synthese, 49(2): 157–186. (Scholar)
Meinong, A., 1904. ‘The Theory of Objects,’ in Meinong (ed.) Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie, Barth: Leipzig. (Scholar)
Mill, J. S., 1867. A System of Logic, London: Longmans. (Scholar)
Michaelson, E., 2022. ‘Speaker’s Reference, Semantic Reference, Sneaky Reference,’ Mind and Language, 37(5): 856–875. (Scholar)
–––, 2023. ‘The Vagaries of Reference,’ Ergo, 9(52): 1433–1448. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming. ‘Unspeakable Names,’Synthese, first online 13 February 2023. doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04038-0 (Scholar)
Michaelson, E. and E. Nowak, 2022. ‘On Salience-Based Theories of Demonstratives,’ in S. Archer (ed.) Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Mount, A., 2008. ‘Intentions, Gestures, and Salience in Ordinary and Deferred Demonstrative Reference,’ Mind and Language, 23(2): 145–164. (Scholar)
Neale, S., 2004. ‘This, That, and The Other,’ in A. Bezuidenhout and M. Reimer (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays on Definite and Indefinite Descriptions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Nelson, M., 2002. ‘Descriptivism Defended,’ Noûs, 36(3): 408-435. (Scholar)
Nowak, E., 2020, ‘No Context, No Content, No Problem,’ Mind and Language, 36(2): 189–220. (Scholar)
Nowak, E. and E. Michaelson, 2020. ‘Discourse and Method,’ Linguistics and Philosophy, 43(2): 119–138. (Scholar)
–––, 2021. ‘Who’s Your Ideal Listener?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99(2): 257–270. (Scholar)
–––, 2022. ‘Meta-Metasemantics, or the Quest for the One True Metasemantics,’ Philosophical Quarterly, 72(1): 135–154. (Scholar)
Perry, J., 2001. Reference and Reflexivity, Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
Pelczar, M. and Rainsbury, J., 1998. ‘The Indexical Character of Names,’ Synthese, 114(2): 293–317. (Scholar)
Predelli, S., 2002. ‘Intentions, Indexicals, and Communication,’ Analysis, 62(4): 310–316. (Scholar)
Quine, W.V.O., 1960. Word and Object, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Radulescu, A., 2018. ‘The Difference Between Indexicals and Demonstratives,’ Synthese, 195(7): 3173–3196. (Scholar)
–––, 2019. ‘A Defense of Intentionalism about Demonstratives,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97(4): 775–791. (Scholar)
Rami, D., 2014. ‘The Use-Conditional Conception of Proper Names,’ Philosophical Studies, 168(1): 119–150. (Scholar)
Recanati, F., 1997. Direct Reference: From Language to Thought, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Reichenbach, H., 1947. Elements of Symbolic Logic, New York: Dover. (Scholar)
Reimer, M., 1991. ‘Demonstratives, Demonstrations, and Demonstrata,’ Philosophical Studies, 63(2): 187–202. (Scholar)
–––, 1992. ‘Three Views of Demonstrative Reference,’ Synthese, 93(3): 373–402. (Scholar)
Russell, B., 1905. ‘On Denoting,’ Mind, 14(56): 479–93. (Scholar)
–––, 1911. ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11: 108–128. (Scholar)
Schiffer, S., 1981. ‘Indexicals and the Theory of Reference,’ Synthese, 49: 43–100. (Scholar)
Schoubye, A., 2011. On Describing, Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Philosophy, St. Andrews University. (Scholar)
Searle, J., 1983. Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Soames, S., 2002. Beyond Rigidity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Speaks, J., 2016. ‘The Role of Speaker and Hearer in the Character of Demonstratives,’ Mind, 125(498): 301–229. (Scholar)
–––, 2017. ‘A Puzzle About Demonstratives and Semantic Competence,’ Philosophical Studies, 174(3): 709–734. (Scholar)
Stebbing, S., 1943. A Modern Elementary Logic, London: Methuen. (Scholar)
Stine, G., 1978. ‘Meaning Other Than What We Say and Referring,’ Philosophical Studies, 33(4): 319–337. (Scholar)
Stójnic, U., Stone, M., and E. Lepore, 2013. ‘Deixis (Even Without Pointing),’ Philosophical Perspectives, 27(1): 502–525. (Scholar)
–––, 2017. ‘Discourse and Logical Form: Pronouns, Attention, and Coherence,’ Linguistics and Philosophy, 40(5): 519–547. (Scholar)
Stokke, A., 2010. ‘Intention-Sensitive Semantics,’ Synthese, 175(3): 383–404. (Scholar)
Strawson, P., 1950. ‘On Referring,’ Mind, 59(235): 320–44. (Scholar)
–––, 1959. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London: Methuen. (Scholar)
Unger, P., 1980. ‘The Problem of the Many,’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5(1): 411–468. (Scholar)
Unnsteinsson, E., 2022. Talking About: An Intensionalist Theory of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Wittgenstein, L., 1958. The Blue and the Brown Books, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Wettstein, H., 1984. ‘How to Bridge the Gap between Meaning and Reference,’ Synthese, 58(1): 63–84. (Scholar)

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