Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Repugnant Conclusion" by Gustaf Arrhenius, Jesper Ryberg and Torbjörn Tännsjö

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Adler, M., 2012, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Anglin, B., 1977, “The Repugnant Conclusion,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7 (4): 745–754. (Scholar)
Arrhenius, G., 2000a, “An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiology”, Economics and Philosophy, 16: 247–266. (Scholar)
–––, 2000b, Future Generations: A Challenge for Moral Theory, F.D. Dissertation, Uppsala: University Printers. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Feldman’s Desert-Adjusted Utilitarianism and Population Ethics”, Utilitas, 15 (2): 225–236. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “The Paradox of Future Generations and Normative Theory”, in J. Ryberg and T. Tännsjö (eds.) 2004. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Superiority in Value”, Philosophical Studies, 123 (1-2): 97–114; reprinted in M. Zimmerman and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, Dordrecht: Springer, 2006. (Scholar)
–––, 2009a, “Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?” in M. Roberts & D. Wassermand (eds.) 2009. (Scholar)
–––, 2009b, “Egalitarianism and Population Change” in A. Gosseries & L. Meyer (eds.) 2009. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “The Impossibility of a Satisfactory Population Ethics” in H. Colonius & E. Dzhafarov (eds.) 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “The Affirmative Answer to the Existential Question and the Person Affecting Restriction,” in I. Hirose and A. Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 110–128. (Scholar)
Arrhenius, G. & Rabinowicz, W., 2015, “The Value of Existence,” in I. Hirose and J. Olson (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Value Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 424–444. (Scholar)
Bayles, M.D., 1975–76, “Harm to the Unconceived”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 5: 292–304. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, Morality and Population Policy, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. (Scholar)
Benatar, D., 2006, Better Never to have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Bigelow, J., and Pargetter, R., 1988 “Morality, Potential Persons and Abortion”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 25 (2): 173–81. (Scholar)
Blackorby, C., W. Bossert and D. Donaldson, 1997, “Critical Level Utilitarianism and the Population-ethics Dilemma”, Economics and Philosophy, 13: 197–230. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Critical-Level Population Principles and the Repugnant Conclusion”, in J. Ryberg and T. Tännsjö (eds.) 2004. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics, and Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Blackorby, C., and D. Donaldson, 1984, “Social Criteria for Evaluating Population Change”, Journal of Public Economics, 25: 13–33. (Scholar)
Boonin-Vail, D., 1996, “Don’t Stop Thinking About Tomorrow: Two Paradoxes About Duties to Future Generations”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 25 (4): 267–307. (Scholar)
Bradley, B., 2010, “Benatar and the Logic of Betterness,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, March: 1–5; available online. (Scholar)
Broad, C. D., 1930 (1979), Five Types of Ethical Theory, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Broome, J., 1992, Counting the Cost of Global Warming, Cambridge: The White Horse Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, Ethics out of Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, Weighing Lives, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Should We Value Population?,”The Journal of Political Philosophy 13 (4): 399–413 (Scholar)
Bykvist, K., 1998, Changing Preferences: A Study in Preferentialism, F.D. Dissertation, Uppsala University. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ethically Neutral,” Economics and Philosophy, 23: 97–105. (Scholar)
–––, 2007b, “Violations of Normative Invariance: Some Thoughts on Shifty Oughts,” Theoria, 73: 98–120. (Scholar)
–––, 2007c, “The Benefits of Coming into Existence,” Philosophical Studies, 135 (3): 335–362. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Being and Wellbeing,” in I. Hirose and A. Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 87–94. (Scholar)
Carlson, E., 1995, Consequentialism Reconsidered, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics,” Economics and Philosophy, 14: 283–306. (Scholar)
Colonius, H. & Dzhafarov, E. (eds.), 2011, Descriptive and Normative Approaches to Human Behavior, Advanced Series on Mathematical Psychology, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company. (Scholar)
Crisp, R., 1988, Ideal Utilitarianism: Theory and Practice, D. Phil. Dissertation, University of Oxford. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “Utilitarianism and the Life of Virtue”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 42: 139–160. (Scholar)
Dasgupta, P., 1988, “Lives and Well-Being”, Social Choice and Welfare, 5: 103–126. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Savings and Fertility: Ethical Issues”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 23: 99–127. (Scholar)
Edwards, R. B., 1979, Pleasures and Pains: A Theory of Qualitative Hedonism, New York: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Fehige, C., 1998, “A Pareto Principle for Possible People”, in C. Fehige and U. Wessels, eds., Preferences, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 508–543. (Scholar)
Fehige, C. and U. Wessels: 1998, “Preferences—An Introduction”, in C. Fehige and U. Wessels, eds., Preferences, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, xx–xliii. (Scholar)
Feldman, F., 1995, “Justice, Desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion”, Utilitas, 7: 189–206. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Fleurbaey, M. & Voorhoeve, A., 2015, “On the Social and Personal Value of Existence,” in I. Hirose and A. Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 95–109. (Scholar)
Glover, J., 1977, Causing Death and Saving Lives, UK: Penguin Books. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “Future People, Disability, and Screening”, in P. Laslett and J.S. Fishkin (eds.), Justice Between Age Groups and Generations, New Haven: Yale University Press, 127–14 (Scholar)
Gosseries, A. & Meyer, L. (eds.), 2009, Intergenerational Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Griffin, J., 1986, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Hanser, M., 1990, “Harming Future People”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 47–70. (Scholar)
Hare, C., 2007, “Voices from Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not, and Will Never, Exist?,” Ethics, 117: 498–523. (Scholar)
Hare, R., 1993, “Possible People” in his Essays on Bioethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 67–83. (Scholar)
Heller, J. C., & N. Fotion (eds.), 1997, Contingent Future Persons, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. (Scholar)
Heyd, D., 1989, “Procreation and Value: Can Ethics Deal With Futurity Problems?”, Philosophia, 18: 151–170. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, Genethics. Moral Issues in the Creation of People, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
Holtug, N., 2004, “Person-Affecting Moralities,” in J. Ryberg and T. Tännsjö (eds.) 2004, 129–162. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, Persons, Interests, and Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Howard-Snyder, F., 2008, “Damned If You Do; Damned If You Don’t!,” Philosophia, 36: 1–15. (Scholar)
Hudson, J. L., 1987, “The Diminishing Marginal Value of Happy People,” Philosophical Studies, 51: 123–137. (Scholar)
Huemer, M., 2008, “In Defence of Repugnance,” Mind, 117 (468): 899–933. (Scholar)
Hurka, T., 1983, “Value and Population Size”, Ethics, 93: 496–507. (Scholar)
Kavka, G.S., 1982, “The Paradox of Future Individuals”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 11: 93–112. (Scholar)
Kitcher, P., 2000, “Parfit’s Puzzle”, Noûs, 34: 550–577. (Scholar)
Klint Jensen, K., 1996, Om afvejning af værdier, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Copenhagen. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Millian Superiorities and the Repugnant Conclusion,” Utilitas, 20: 279–300. (Scholar)
Lemos, N. M., 1993, “Higher Goods and the Myth of Tithonus”, The Journal of Philosophy, 90 (9): 482–496. (Scholar)
Locke, D., 1987, “The Parfit Population Problem”, Philosophy, 62: 131–157. (Scholar)
Mackie, J. L., 1985, “Parfit’s Population Paradox”, in J. Mackie & P. Mackie (eds.) Persons and Values, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
McMahan, J., 1981, “Problems of Population Policy”, Ethics, 92: 96–127. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Asymmetries in the Morality of Causing People to Exist”, in M. Roberts & D. Wasserman(eds.) Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem, Berlin: Springer. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Causing People to Exist and Saving People’s Lives,” The Journal of Ethics, 17: 5–35. (Scholar)
McTaggart, J. M. E., 1927, The Nature of Existence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Narveson, J., 1967, “Utilitarianism and New Generations”, Mind, 76: 62–72. (Scholar)
–––, 1976, “Moral Problems of Population.”, in M.D. Bayles, ed., Ethics and Population, Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company Inc., 59–80 (Scholar)
–––, 1978, “Future People and Us.”, in R.I. Sikora and B. Barry, eds., Obligations to Future Generations, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 38–60. (Scholar)
Ng, Y.-K., 1989, “What Should We Do About Future Generations? Impossibility of Parfit’s Theory X”, Economics and Philosophy, 5: 135–253. (Scholar)
Österberg, J, 1996, “Value and Existence: the Problem of Future Generations” in S. Lindström, R. Sliwinski, and J. Österberg (eds.) Odds and Ends (Uppsala Philosophical Studies), Uppsala: Department of Philosopy, Uppsala University, 1996. (Scholar)
Parfit, D., 1976, “On Doing the Best for Our Children.”, in M.D. Bayles, ed., Ethics and Population, Cambridge, Mass.; Schenkman Publishing Company Inc., 100–115. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, “Future Generations: Further Problems”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 11: 113–172. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “Overpopulation and the Quality of Life.”, in P. Singer, ed., Applied Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 145–164. Reprinted in J. Ryberg and T. Tännsjö (eds.) 2004. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. “Postscript”, in J. Ryberg and T. Tännsjö (eds.) 2004, 257. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion? ”, Theoria, 82 (2): 110–27. (Scholar)
Parson, J., 2002, “Axiological Actualism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80 (2): 137–147. (Scholar)
Persson. I., 2004, “The Root of the Repugnant Conclusion and its Rebuttal”, in J. Ryberg and T. Tännsjö (eds.) 2004, 187–200. (Scholar)
Portmore, D. W., 1999, “Does the Total Principle Have Any Repugnant Implications?” Ratio, 12 (1): 80–98. (Scholar)
Pummer, T., 2013, “Intuitions about large number cases” Analysis, 73 (1): 80–98. (Scholar)
Rabinowicz, W., 2003, “Ryberg’s Doubts About Higher and Lower Pleasures—Put to Rest?”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 6: 231–7. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality”, Philosophical Issues, 19 (1): 389–411. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Value Relations Revisited”, Economics and Philosophy, 28 (2): 133–164. (Scholar)
Rachels, S., 2001, “A Set of Solutions to Parfit’s Problems”, Noûs, 35: 214–238. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Repugnance or Intransitivity: A Repugnant but Forced Choice”, in J. Ryberg and T. Tännsjö (eds.) 2004, 163–186. (Scholar)
Riley, J., “On Quantities and Qualities of Pleasure”, Utilitas, 5: 291–300, 1993. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Is Qualitative Hedonism Incoherent?”, Utilitas, 11: 347–58. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Millian Qualitative Superiorities and Utilitarianism, Part I”, Utilitas, 20: 257–78. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Millian Qualitative Superiorities and Utilitarianism, Part II”, Utilitas, 21: 127–43. (Scholar)
Roberts, M. A., 1998, Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “A New Way of Doing the Best That We Can: Person-based Consequentialism and the Equality Problem”, Ethics, 112: 315–350. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Person-Based Consequentialism and the Procreation Obligation”, in J. Ryberg and T. Tännsjö (eds.) 2004, 99–128. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “The Non-Identity Fallacy: Harm, Probability and Another Look at Parfit’s Depletion Example,” Utilitas, 19 (3): 267–311. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “The Asymmetry: A Solution,” Theoria, 77: 333–367. (Scholar)
Roberts, M. A. & Wassermand, D., 2009 (eds.) Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem, Springer.
Ryberg, J., 1996a, “Is the Repugnant Conclusion Repugnant?”, Philosophical Papers, 25: 161–177. (Scholar)
–––, 1996b, “Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 46 (183): 202–213. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Generation-Relative Ethics – A Critical Note on Dasgupta”, Theoria, 69 (1): 23–33. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Higher and Lower Pleasures – Doubts on Justification”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 5: 415–29. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “The Repugnant Conclusion and Worthwhile Living”, in J. Ryberg and T. Tännsjö (eds.) 2004, 239–256. (Scholar)
Ryberg, J. and T. Tännsjö, 2004 (eds.), The Repugnant Conclusion. Essays on Population Ethics, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Ryberg, J. and T. Tännsjö, 2004, “Introduction”, in J. Ryberg and T. Tännsjö (eds.) 2004, 1–6. (Scholar)
Sider, T. R., 1991, “Might Theory X be a Theory of Diminishing Marginal Value?”, Analysis, 51: 265–71. (Scholar)
Sidgwick, H., 1907, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edition, London: Macmillan. (Scholar)
Sikora, R. I., 1975, “Utilitarianism: The Classical Principle and the Average Principle,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 5: 409–419. (Scholar)
–––, 1978, “Is It Wrong to Prevent the Existence of Future Generations?” In R. I. Sikora and B. Barry (eds.) 1978, 112–166. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, “Classical Utilitarianism and Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion: A Reply to McMahan,” Ethics, 92: 128–133. (Scholar)
Sikora, R. I. & Barry, B. (eds.), 1978, Obligations to Future Generations, Philadelphia: The White Horse Press. (Scholar)
Singer, P., 1980, “A Utilitarian Population Principle”, in Bayles (ed.) 1980, 81–99. (Scholar)
–––, 1993 Practical Ethics, 2^nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Sprigge, T.L.S., 1968, “Professor Narveson’s Utilitarianism”, Inquiry, 11: 332–346. (Scholar)
Tännsjö, T., 1992, “Who are the Beneficiaries?”, Bioethics, 6: 288–296. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Doom Soon?”, Inquiry, 40: 243–252. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Hedonistic Utilitarianism, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion”, Utilitas, 14, 339–359, reprinted in J. Ryberg and T. Tännsjö (eds.) 2004, 219–238. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Egalitarianism and the Putative Paradoxes of Population Ethics”, Utilitas, 20: 187–198. (Scholar)
Temkin, L.S., 1987, “Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16: 138–187. (Scholar)
–––, 1993a, Inequality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993b, “Harmful Goods, Harmless Bads.”, in R.G. Frey and C.W. Morris (eds.), Value, Welfare, and Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 291–324. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 25: 175–210. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning”, in J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit, Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 290–301. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Vallentyne, P., 1995, “Taking Justice Too Seriously”, Utilitas, 7: 207–216. (Scholar)
––– 2000, “Melinda Roberts, Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law”, Noûs, 34: 634–647. (Scholar)
Warren, M., 1978, “Do Potential People Have Moral Rights?”, pp. 14–30 in R. I. Sikora and B. Barry (eds.) Obligations to Future Generations, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. (Scholar)
Woodward, J., 1986, “The Non-Identity Problem”, Ethics, 96: 804–831. (Scholar)

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