Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Rights" by Leif Wenar

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Ackerly, B., 2013, “Feminist and Activist Approaches to Human Rights,” in M. Goodhart (ed.), Human Rights: Politics and Practice, Second ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 28–43. (Scholar)
Andersson, A-K., 2013, “Choices, Interests, and Potentiality: What Distinguishes Bearers of Rights?” Journal of Value Inquiry, 47: 175–90. (Scholar)
Bentham, J., 1796, Anarchical Fallacies, in Waldron 1987a, pp. 46–76. (Scholar)
Brett, A., 1997, Liberty, Right, and Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Campbell, T., 2006, Rights: A Critical Introduction, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Cornell, N., 2015, “Wrongs, Rights, and Third Parties,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 43: 109–143. (Scholar)
Cruft, R., 2004, “Why is it Disrespectful to Violate Rights?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 113: 201–24. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “On the Non-Instrumental Value of Basic Rights,” Journal of Moral Philosophy, 7: 441–61. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, Human Rights, Ownership, and the Individual, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Darwall, S., 2006, The Second-Person Standpoint, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Bipolar Obligation,” in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 7: 333–357. (Scholar)
Donahue, Jr., Charles, 2010, “Ius in Roman Law,” in J. Witte, Jr. and F. Alexander (eds.), Christianity and Human Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 64–80. (Scholar)
Dworkin, R., 1984, “Rights as Trumps,” in Waldron 1984, pp. 153–67. (Scholar)
Edmundson, W., 2012, An Introduction to Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition. (Scholar)
Enoch, D., 2002, “A Right to Violate One’s Duty,” Law and Philosophy, 21: 376–78. (Scholar)
Feinberg, J., 1970, “The Nature and Value of Rights,” Journal of Value Inquiry, 4: 243–257. (Scholar)
–––, 1973, Social Philosophy, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Finnis, J., 1980, Natural Law and Natural Right, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Forst, R., 2012, The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice, J. Flynn (trans.), New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, Justice, Democracy and the Right to Justification: Rainer Forst in Dialogue, London: Bloomsbury. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “The Justification of Basic Rights: A Discourse-Theoretical Approach,” Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, 45: 7–28 (Scholar)
Frederick, D., 2014, “Pro-Tanto Versus Absolute Rights,” Philosophical Forum, 45: 275–94. (Scholar)
Frey R., 1985, “Act-Utilitarianism, Consequentialism, and Moral Rights,” in R. Frey (ed.), Utility and Rights, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, pp. 61–85. (Scholar)
Frydrych, D., 2018, “The Theories of Rights Debate,” Jurisprudence, 9(3): 566–588. (Scholar)
Gewirth, A., 1981, “Are There any Absolute Rights?” in Waldron 1984, pp. 81–109. (Scholar)
Gilabert, P., 2010, “The Importance of Linkage Arguments for the Theory and Practice of Human Rights: A Response to James Nickel,” Human Rights Quarterly, 32: 425–38. (Scholar)
Gilbert, M., 2004, “Scanlon on Promissory Obligation: The Problem of Promisees’ Rights,” The Journal of Philosophy, 101: 83–109. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, Rights and Demands: A Foundational Inquiry, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Gilligan, C., 1993, In a Different Voice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Glendon, M., 1991, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse, New York: Free Press. (Scholar)
Glick, J., 2010, “Justification and the Right to Believe,” Philosophical Quarterly, 60: 532–44. (Scholar)
Graham, P. and N. Pedersen (eds.), 2012, Epistemic Entitlement, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Griffin, J., 1989, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Gutmann, A., 1985, “Communitarian Critics of Liberalism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14: 308–322. (Scholar)
Halpin, A., 2017, “The Value of Hohfeldian Neutrality when Theorising about Legal Rights,” in McBride (ed.) 2017, pp. 1–30. (Scholar)
Harel, A., 2005, “Theories of Rights,” in M. Golding and W. Edmundson (eds.), Blackwell’s Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, pp. 191–206. (Scholar)
Hart, H., 1961, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Hayward, T., 2013, “On Prepositional Duties,” Ethics, 123: 264–91. (Scholar)
Herstein, O., 2012, “Defending a Right to Do Wrong,” Law and Philosophy, 31: 343–65. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “A Legal Right to Do Legal Wrong,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 34: 1–25. (Scholar)
Hohfeld, W., 1919, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, W. Cook (ed.), New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
Holmes, S., and C. Sunstein, 1999, The Costs of Rights, New York: W.W. Norton. (Scholar)
Ignatieff, M., 2003, “Human Rights, Sovereignty, and Intervention,” in N. Owen (ed.), Human Rights and Human Wrongs: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Ivison, D., 2007, Rights, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. (Scholar)
James, W., 1897, The Will to Believe; page references in the text are to W. James, The Will to Believe and Human Immortality, New York: Dover, 1956. (Scholar)
Jones, P., 1994, Rights, New York: St. Martin’s Press. (Scholar)
Kamm, F., 1992, “Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21: 354–89. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Rights,” in J. Coleman and S. Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 486–513. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, Intricate Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kramer, M., 2001, “Getting Rights Right”, in M. Kramer (ed.), Rights, Wrongs, and Responsibilities, London: Macmillan, pp. 28–95. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory,” Ethics, 123: 245–63. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “In Defence of the Interest Theory of Right-Holding: Rejoinders to Leif Wenar on Rights,” in McBride (ed.) 2017, pp. 49–84. (Scholar)
Kramer, M., N. Simmonds, and H. Steiner, 1998, A Debate Over Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kramer, M., and H. Steiner, 2007, “Theories of Rights: Is There a Third Way?” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 27: 281–310. (Scholar)
Kurki, V., 2018, “Rights, Harming, and Wronging: A Restatement of the Interest Theory,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 38: 430–50. (Scholar)
Liberto, H., 2014, “The Moral Specification of Rights: A Restricted Account,” Law and Philosophy, 33: 175–206. (Scholar)
Lisska, A. and B. Tierney, 2015, “Philosophy of Law in the Later Middle Ages,” in F. Miller and C.-A. Biondi (eds.), A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics, second edition, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 311–33. (Scholar)
Louden, R., 1983, “Rights Infatuation and the Impoverishment of Moral Theory,” Journal of Value Inquiry, 17: 87–102. (Scholar)
Lyons, D., 1970, “The Correlativity of Rights and Duties,” Noûs, 4: 45–57. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, Rights, Welfare and Mill’s Moral Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
MacCormick, N., 1977, “Rights in Legislation”, in P. Hacker and J. Raz, (eds.), Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A Hart, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 189–209. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, Legal Right and Social Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Mackie, J., 1979, “Can There be a Rights-Based Moral Theory?” in Waldron 1984, pp. 168–81. (Scholar)
Martin, R., 1993, A System of Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1985, Rawls and Rights, Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. (Scholar)
Marx, K., 1844, “On the Jewish Question”; page reference in the text is to the reprint in Waldron 1987a, pp. 137–50. (Scholar)
May, S., 2012, “Moral Status and the Direction of Duties,” Ethics, 123: 113–28. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Directed Duties,” Philosophy Compass, 10: 523–32. (Scholar)
McBride, M. (ed.), 2017, New Essays on the Nature of Rights, London: Bloomsbury. (Scholar)
Mill, J., 1859, On Liberty; page reference in the text is to the reprint in J. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, S. Collini (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. (Scholar)
–––, 1861, Utilitarianism; page reference in the text is to the reprint in J. Mill, Utilitarianism, G. Sher (ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002. (Scholar)
Montague, P., 2015, “Specification and Moral Rights,” Law and Philosophy, 34: 241–56. (Scholar)
Mulhall, S., and Swift, A., 1992, Liberals and Communitarians, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Mullins, R., forthcoming, “Moral Conflict and the Logic of Rights,” Philosophical Studies, first online 14 November 2018. doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1197-1 (Scholar)
Nagel, T., 2002, Concealment and Exposure, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Narveson, J., 2001, The Libertarian Idea, Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview. (Scholar)
Nickel, J., 2008, “Rethinking Indivisibility: Towards a Theory of Supporting Relations between Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 30: 984–1001. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Indivisibility and Linkage Arguments: A Reply to Gilabert,”, Human Rights Quarterly, 32: 439–46. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Can a Right to Health Care be Justified by Linkage Arguments?” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 37: 293–306. (Scholar)
Oberdiek, J., 2008 “Specifying Rights Out of Necessity,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 28: 127–46. (Scholar)
O’Neill, O., 1996, Toward Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, A Question of Trust, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Osiel, M., 2019, The Right to Do Wrong: Morality and the Limits of Law, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Otsuka, M., 2003, Libertarianism Without Inequality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Pallikkathayil, J., 2016, “Revisiting the Interest Theory of Rights: Discussion of The Morality of Freedom,” Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, 14: 147–57. (Scholar)
Pettit, P., 1988, “The Consequentialist can Recognize Rights,” Philosophical Quarterly, 38: 42–55. (Scholar)
Plamenatz, J., 1938, Consent, Freedom, and Political Obligation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Quinn, W., 1993, Morality and Action, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Quong, J. and R. Stone, 2015, “Rules and Rights,” in D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne, and S. Wall (eds.), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (Volume 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Rainbolt, G., 2006, The Concept of Rights, Dordrecht: Springer. (Scholar)
Rawls, J., 1971, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Raz, J., 1975, Practical Reason and Norms, London: Hutchinson. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, Ethics in the Public Domain, (Revised Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Sandel, M., 1982, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Scanlon, T., 1977, “Rights, Goals, and Fairness,” in Waldron 1984, pp. 137–52. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, The Difficulty of Tolerance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Reply to Leif Wenar”, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 10: 400–05. (Scholar)
Schaab, J., 2018, “Why is it Disrespectful to Violate Rights: Contractualism and the Kind-Desire Theory,” Philosophical Studies, 175: 97–116. (Scholar)
Schauer, F., 1984, “Can Rights Be Abused?” Philosophical Quarterly, 31: 225–30. (Scholar)
Schneider, E., 1986, “The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement,” New York University Law Review, 14: 589–652. (Scholar)
Sen, A., 1982, “Rights and Agency,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 11: 3–39. (Scholar)
Sen, A., 1999, Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Shafer-Landau, R., 1995, “Specifying Absolute Rights,” Arizona Law Review, 37: 209–24. (Scholar)
Shapiro, I., 1986, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory: An Essay in Critical Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Shue, H., 1996, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Siedentop, L., 2014, Inventing the Individual, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Sinnott-Armstrong, W., 1996, “Moral Dilemmas and Rights”, in H. E. Mason (ed.), Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 48–65. (Scholar)
Skorupski, J., 2010, The Domain of Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Sreenivasan, G., 2005, “A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 25: 257–74. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Duties and Their Direction,” Ethics, 120 (3): 465–494. (Scholar)
Steiner, H., 1994, An Essay on Rights, Oxford, Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Directed Duties and Inalienable Rights,” Ethics, 123: 230–44. (Scholar)
Sumner, L., 1987, The Moral Foundations of Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Taylor, C., 1979, “Atomism,” in A. Kontos (ed.), Powers, Possessions, and Freedom, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. (Scholar)
Thompson, M., 2004, “What is It to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle About Justice,” in R.J. Wallace, P. Pettit, S., Scheffler, and M. Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
Thomson, J., 1990, The Realm of Rights, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Tierney, B., 1997, The Idea of Natural Rights, Atlanta: Scholars Press. (Scholar)
Tushnet, M., 1984, “An Essay on Rights,” Texas Law Review, 62: 1363–1403. (Scholar)
Vallentyne, P., and H. Steiner (eds.), 2000, Left Libertarianism and its Critics: The Contemporary Debate, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
Van Duffel, S., 2012a, “In Defense of the Will Theory of Rights,” Res Publica, 18: 231–31. (Scholar)
–––, 2012b, “The Nature of Rights Debate Rests on a Mistake,” Philosophical Quarterly, 93: 104–23. (Scholar)
Waldron, J. (ed.), 1984, Theories of Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, (ed.), 1987a, Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke, and Marx on the Rights of Man, London: Methuen. (Scholar)
–––, 1987b, “Nonsense Upon Stilts?—A Reply,” in Waldron 1987a, pp. 151–209. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981–1991, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Walen, A., 2019, The Mechanics of Claims and Permissible Killing in War, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Wellman, C., 1985, A Theory of Rights, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, Real Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, An Approach to Rights, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
Wellman, C. H., 2017, Rights, Forfeiture, and Punishment, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Wenar, L., 2003, “Legal Rights and Epistemic Rights,” Analysis, 63: 142–46. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “The Nature of Rights,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33: 223–53. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “The Analysis of Rights,” in M. Kramer, C. Grant, B. Colburn, and A. Hatzistavrou (eds.), The Legacy of H. L. A. Hart, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 251–73. (Scholar)
–––, 2013a, “Rights and What We Owe to Each Other,” Journal of Moral Philosophy, 10: 375–99. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “The Nature of Claim-Rights,” Ethics, 123: 202–29. (Scholar)
Whelan, D., 2010, Indivisible Human Rights: A History, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. (Scholar)
Williams, G., 1968, “The Concept of a Legal Liberty”, in R. Summers (ed.), Essays in Legal Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 121–44. (Scholar)

Generated Tue Oct 8 11:02:13 2024

Applied ethics	Epistemology	History of Western Philosophy	Meta-ethics	Metaphysics	Normative ethics
Philosophy of biology	Philosophy of language	Philosophy of mind	Philosophy of religion	Science Logic and Mathematics	More ...