Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Russellian Monism" by Torin Alter and Derk Pereboom

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Adams, Robert Merrihew, 1994, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195126491.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Idealism Vindicated”, in Persons: Human and Divine, Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 35–54. (Scholar)
Alter, Torin, 2009, “Does the Ignorance Hypothesis Undermine the Conceivability and Knowledge Arguments?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(3): 756–765. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00303.x (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “The Structure and Dynamics Argument against Materialism”, Noûs, 50(4): 794–815. doi:10.1111/nous.12134 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Are There Brute Facts about Consciousness?”, in Brute Facts, Elly Vintiadis and Constantinos Mekios (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 130–154. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198758600.003.0008 (Scholar)
–––, 2023, The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Alter, Torin and Sam Coleman, 2020a, “Panpsychism and Russellian Monism”, in The Routledge Companion to Panpsychism, William Seager (ed.), New York: Routledge. [Alter & Coleman 2020a available online] (Scholar)
–––, 2020b, “Russellian Physicalism and Protophenomenal Properties”, Analysis, 80(3): 409–417. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Russellian Monism and Causation”, Noûs, 55(2): 409–25. [Alter & Coleman 2021 available online] (Scholar)
Alter, Torin and Yujin Nagasawa, 2012, “What Is Russellian Monism?”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 19(9–10): 67–95. (Scholar)
––– (eds.), 2015, Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism, (Philosophy of Mind), New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Alter, Torin and Derk Pereboom, “Russellian Monism and Structuralism about Physics”, Erkenntnis, 88(4): 1409–1428. (Scholar)
Aquinas, Thomas, 1252–56, 1273, Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements: A Translation and Interpretation of the “De Principiis Naturae” [1252–1256] and the “De Mixtione Elementorum” [1273] of St. Thomas Aquinas, Joseph Bobik (ed.), South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998. (Scholar)
Armstrong, D.M., 1968, A Materialist Theory of Mind, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Bolender, John, 2001, “An Argument for Idealism”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(4): 37–61. (Scholar)
Botin, Marcelino, 2023, “Russellian Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong”, Philosophical Studies, 180(7): 1829–1848. (Scholar)
Brown, Christopher Devlin, 2017, “A Properly Physical Russellian Monism”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24(11–12): 31–50. (Scholar)
–––, 2023, “Consciousness and Categorical Properties”, Erkenntnis, 88(1): 365–387. (Scholar)
Brüntrup, Godehard and Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), 2017, Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.001.0001 (Scholar)
Chalmers, David J., 1996, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1997a, “Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4(1): 3–46. (Scholar)
–––, 1997b, “Reply to Searle’s review of The Conscious Mind”, The New York Review of Books, 15 May 1997; reprinted in Searle 1997: pp. 164–167. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” in Conceivability and Possibility, Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 145–200. (Scholar)
–––, 2003 [2002], “Consciousness and Its Place in Nature”, in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 102–142; reprinted in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, David J. Chalmers (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 247–272. doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 (Scholar)
–––, 2010, The Character of Consciousness, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2012, Constructing the World, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013 [2015], “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”, Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 8; reprinted in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: pp. 246–276. [Chalmers 2013 available online] (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “The Combination Problem for Panpsychism”, in Brüntrup and Jaskolla 2017: 179–214. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0002 (Scholar)
Chan, Lok-Chi, 2020, “Can the Russellian Monist Escape the Epiphenomenalist’s Paradox?”, Topoi, 39(5):1093-1102. doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9579-8 (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Russellian Physicalism and its Dilemma”, Philosophical Studies, 178: 2043–2062. (Scholar)
[Clarke-Collins Correspondence] Clarke, Samuel and Anthony Collins, 1707–1708 [1731], A Letter ot Mr. Dodwell wherein All the Arguments in his Epistolary Discourse against the Immortality of the SOUL are particularly answered, sixth edition, Knapton. [Clarke 1731 available online] (Scholar)
Coleman, Sam, 2012, “Mental Chemistry: Combination for Panpsychists”, Dialectica, 66(1): 137–166. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01293.x (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Microsubjects, and Emergence”, Erkenntnis, 79(1): 19–44. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Neuro-Cosmology”, in Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness, Paul Coates and Sam Coleman (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 66–102. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0003 (Scholar)
Copenhaver, Rebecca, 2020, “The Idealisms of Bishop Berkeley and Abate Rosmini”, in La Filosofia Italiana, Fabrizio Meroi and Sophia Catalano (eds.), Olschki Press. [Copenhaver 2020 available online] (Scholar)
Cutter, Brian, 2019, “Against the Middle Ground: Why Russellian Monism is Unstable”, Analytic Philosophy, 60(2): 109–129. (Scholar)
Descartes, René, 1644, Principia Philosophiæ (Principles of Philosophy), Paris. Translated in Descartes 1984–91: volume 1, pages 177–291. (Scholar)
[AT] Oeuvres De Descartes, 11 vols., edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1983.
–––, 1984–91. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (trs.), 3 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Eddington, Arthur, 1928, The Nature of the Physical World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Goff, Philip, 2009, “Why Panpsychism Doesn’t Help Us Explain Consciousness”, Dialectica, 63(3): 289–311. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01196.x (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Against Constitutive Russellian Monism”, in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: pp. 370–400. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190677015.001.0001 (Scholar)
Gundersen, Ståle, 2015, “Russellian Monism and Epistemic Pessimism”, SATS, 16(1): 27–48. doi:10.1515/sats-2015-0006 (Scholar)
Hawthorne, John, 2001, “Causal Structuralism”, Philosophical Perspectives, 15: 361–378. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.35.s15.16 (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Advice For Physicalists”, Philosophical Studies, 109(1): 17–52. doi:10.1023/a:1015731311853 (Scholar)
Heil, John, 2003, From an Ontological Point of View, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199259747.001.0001 (Scholar)
Hiddleston, Eric, 2019, “Dispositional and Categorical Properties, and Russellian Monism”, Philosophical Studies, 176(1): 65–92. doi:10.1007/s11098-017-1006-2 (Scholar)
Holden, Thomas, 2004, The Architecture of Matter: Galileo to Kant, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199263264.001.0001 (Scholar)
Holman, Emmett, 2008, “Panpsychism, Physicalism, Neutral Monism and the Russellian Theory of Mind”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15(5): 48–67. (Scholar)
Howell, Robert, 2015, “The Russellian Monist’s Problems with Mental Causation”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 65(258): 22–39. doi:10.1093/pq/pqu058 (Scholar)
Jackson, Frank, 1982, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127): 127–136. doi:10.2307/2960077 (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “What Mary Didn’t Know”, Journal of Philosophy, 83(5): 291–295. doi:10.2307/2026143 (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Postscript”, in Contemporary Materialism: A Reader, Paul Moser and J. D. Trout (eds.), New York: Routledge, pp. 184–189. (Scholar)
Jacobs, Jonathan D., 2011, “Powerful Qualities, Not Pure Powers”, The Monist, 94(1): 81–102. doi:10.5840/monist20119415 (Scholar)
James, William, 1890, The Principles of Psychology, New York: Henry Holt and Co. (Scholar)
Jaworski, William, 2016, Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind: How Hylomorphism Solves the Mind-Body Problem, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198749561.001.0001 (Scholar)
Jorati, Julia, 2018, “Leibniz’s Ontology of Force”, Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume VIII, Daniel Garber and Donald Rutherford (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 189–224. (Scholar)
Kadić, Nino, 2017, “The Grounding Problem for Panpsychism and the Identity Theory of Powers”, Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 17(1): 45–55. (Scholar)
Kant, Immanuel, 1781/87 [1987], Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (trs.), Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. References are in the standard pagination of the 1st (A) and 2nd (B) editions. Quotations from Kant are based on this translation with amendments by the authors of this entry. (Scholar)
–––, 1786 [2004], Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Michael Friedman (tr.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. (Scholar)
Kim, Jaegwon, 1989, “Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion”, Philosophical Perspectives, 3: 77–108. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Kind, Amy, 2006, “Panexperientialism, Cognition, and the Nature of Experience”, Psyche, 12. [Kind 2006 available online] (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Pessimism about Russellian Monism”, in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: pp. 401–421. (Scholar)
Kriegel, Uriah (ed.), 2014, Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, London: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203116623 (Scholar)
Kripke, Saul A., 1972 [1980], “Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium”, in Semantics of Natural Language, Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (eds.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, pp. 253–355; reprinted as Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980. doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 (Scholar)
Ladyman, James, and Don Ross, with David Spurrett and John Collier, 2007, Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.001.0001 (Scholar)
Langton, Rae, 1998, Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199243174.001.0001 (Scholar)
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 1686, Discours de métaphysique (Discourse on Metaphysics), G, IV. (Scholar)
–––, 1698, “On Nature Itself, or on the Inherent Force and Actions of Created Things”, Acta Eruditorum, September 1698 [G., IV, 504–516]; English translations: Leibniz 1969, pp. 498–508, Leibniz 1989, pp. 155–166. (Scholar)
[G]–––, 1875–1890 [1965], Die philosophischen Schriften, 7 vols., C. I. Gerhardt (ed.); reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1965. (Scholar)
–––, 1969, Philosophical Papers and Letters, second edition, Leroy E. Loemker (tr. and ed.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, Philosophical Essays, Roger Ariew and Dan Garber (tr. and ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. (Scholar)
Lewis, David K., 1966, “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, Journal of Philosophy, 63(1): 17–25. doi:10.2307/2024524 (Scholar)
–––, 1972, “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50(3): 249–258. doi:10.1080/00048407212341301 (Scholar)
–––, 1980, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain”, in Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, volume 1, Ned Block (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 216–222. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Ramseyan Humility”, in Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 203–222. (Scholar)
Liu, Haoying, 2021, Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness?, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts/Amherst. [Liu 2021 available online] (Scholar)
Locke, John, 1690, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P. H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. (Scholar)
Lockwood, Michael, 1989, Mind, Brain, and Quantum, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1992 [2015], “The Grain Problem”, in Objections to Physicalism, Howard Robinson (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 271–292; reprinted in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: pp. 143–160. (Scholar)
Maxwell, Grover, 1978, “Rigid Designators and Mind-Brain Identity”, Perception and Cognition Issues in the Foundations of Psychology (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Volume 9), C. Wade Savage (ed.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 365–403; reprinted in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: pp. 121–142. (Scholar)
McClelland, Tom, 2013, “The Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20(3–4): 125–151. (Scholar)
McKitrick, Jennifer, 2003, “The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Dispositions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66(2): 349–369. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00265.x (Scholar)
Mendelow, Justin, forthcoming, “Russellian Monism and Ignorance of Non-Structural Properties”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy. [Preprint available online] (Scholar)
Montero, Barbara Gail, 2010, “A Russellian Response to the Structural Argument against Physicalism”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17(3–4): 70–83. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Russellian Physicalism”, in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: pp. 209–223. (Scholar)
Mørch, Hedda Hassel, 2014, Panpsychism and Causation: A New Argument and a Solution to the Combination Problem, Ph.D. thesis, University of Oslo. [March 2014 available online] (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?”, Erkenntnis, 84(5): 1065–1085. (Scholar)
Morris, Kevin, 2016, “Russellian Physicalism, Bare Structure, and Swapped Inscrutables”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(9–10): 180–198. (Scholar)
Nagel, Thomas, 1974, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, The Philosophical Review, 83(4): 435–450. doi:10.2307/2183914 (Scholar)
–––, 1986, The View From Nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem”, Philosophy, 73(3): 337–352. (Scholar)
Ney, Alyssa, 2015, “A Physicalist Critique of Russellian Monism”, in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: pp. 346–369. (Scholar)
Papineau, David, 2002, Thinking about Consciousness, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001 (Scholar)
Pasnau, Robert, 2009. “Form and Matter”, in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, Robert Pasnau and Christine Van Dyke (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, vol. 2: 635–646. (Scholar)
Pereboom, Derk, 1985, Kant on Concept and Intuition, PhD Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles. (Scholar)
–––, 1991a, “Is Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy Inconsistent?” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 8(4): 357–72. (Scholar)
–––, 1991b, “Kant’s Amphiboly”, Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie, 73(1): 50–70. doi:10.1515/agph.1991.73.1.50 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764037.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Russellian Monism and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties”, in Kriegel 2014: pp. 40–69. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Consciousness, Physicalism, and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties”, in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: pp. 300–323. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Illusionism and Anti-Functionalism about Phenomenal Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11–12): 172–185. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Russellian Monism, Introspective Inaccuracy, and the Illusion Meta–Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26: 182–193. (Scholar)
Place, U. T., 1956, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology, 47(1): 44–50. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1956.tb00560.x (Scholar)
Robinson, Denis, 1993, “Epiphenomenalism, Laws & Properties”, Philosophical Studies, 69(1): 1–34. doi:10.1007/bf00989622 (Scholar)
Robinson, William S., 2018, “Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 99(1): 100–117. doi:10.1111/papq.12138 (Scholar)
Rosenberg, Gregg H., 2004, A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168143.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Causality and the Combination Problem”, in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: pp. 224–245. (Scholar)
Russell, Bertrand, 1927a, The Analysis of Matter, London: Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
–––, 1927b, An Outline of Philosophy, Unman Hyman Ltd. (Scholar)
–––, 1948, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 1959, My Philosophical Development, London: Routledge, 1995 edition. (Scholar)
Schneider, Susan, 2018, “Idealism, or Something Near Enough”, in Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth L. Pearce (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746973.003.0017 [Schneider 2018 preprint available online] (Scholar)
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1818 [1961], Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Leipzig: Brockhaus. Translated as The World as Will and Idea, three volumes, R. B Haldane and J. Kemp (trs.), London: Routledge & Kegan, 1883; reprinted as The World as Will and Representation, Garden City: Doubleday, 1961. Quotations from Schopenhauer are based on this translation with amendments by the authors of this entry. (Scholar)
Seager, William E., 1995, “Consciousness, Information, and Panpsychism”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3): 272–288. (Scholar)
Searle, John, 1997, The Mystery of Consciousness: John R. Searle and Exchanges with Daniel C. Dennett and David Chalmers, New York: The New York Review of Books. (Scholar)
Shoemaker, Sydney, 1980, “Causality and Properties”, in Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, D. Reidel. pp. 109–135. (Scholar)
Skrbina, David, 2005, Panpsychism in the West, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Smart, J. J. C., 1959, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, The Philosophical Review, 68(2): 141–156. doi:10.2307/2182164 (Scholar)
Stoljar, Daniel, 2001, “Two Conceptions of the Physical”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62(2): 253–281. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00056.x (Scholar)
–––, 2006, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195306589.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Response to Alter and Bennett”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(3): 775–784. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00305.x (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Four Kinds of Russellian Monism”, in Kriegel 2014: pp. 17–39. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Russellian Monism or Nagelian Monism?” in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: pp. 324–345. (Scholar)
Strawson, Galen, 2003 [2015], “Real Materialism”, in Chomsky and His Critics, Louise M. Antony and Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 49–88; reprinted with new postscript in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: pp. 161–208. doi:10.1002/9780470690024.ch3 (Scholar)
–––, 2006a, “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism”, in Strawson 2006c: pp. 3–31. (Scholar)
–––, 2006b, “Panpsychism? Reply to Commentators with a Celebration of Descartes”, in Strawson 2006c: pp. 184–280. (Scholar)
–––, 2006c, Consciousness and its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?, Anthony Freedman (ed.), Exeter: Imprint Academic. (Scholar)
Stubenberg, Leopold, 2015, “Russell, Russellian Monism, and Panpsychism”, in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: pp. 58–90. (Scholar)
Unger, Peter, 2006, All the Power in the World, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195155617.001.0001 (Scholar)
Van Cleve, James, 1988, “Inner States and Outer Relations: Kant and the Case for Monadism”, in Doing Philosophy Historically, Peter H. Hare (ed.), Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, pp. 231–247. (Scholar)
Wishon, Donovan, 2015, “Russell on Russellian Monism”, in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: pp. 91–118. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Panpsychism, Panprotopsychism, and Neutral Monism”, in Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks: Philosophy of Mind, Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), London: Macmillan, pp. 51–70. (Scholar)

Generated Mon Sep 9 13:42:13 2024

Applied ethics	Epistemology	History of Western Philosophy	Meta-ethics	Metaphysics	Normative ethics
Philosophy of biology	Philosophy of language	Philosophy of mind	Philosophy of religion	Science Logic and Mathematics	More ...