Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Scientific Realism" by Anjan Chakravartty
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- Alai, Mario, 2014, “Novel Predictions and the No Miracle Argument”, Erkenntnis, 79(2): 297–326. doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9495-7 (Scholar)
- Alcoff, Linda and Elizabeth Potter (eds.), 1993, Feminist Epistemologies, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Almeder, Robert, 2007, “Pragmatism and Philosophy of Science: A Critical Survey”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 21(2): 171–195. doi:10.1080/02698590701498100 (Scholar)
- Aronson, Jerrold L., 1990, “Verisimilitude and Type Hierarchies”, Philosophical Topics, 18(2): 5–28. doi:10.5840/philtopics19901821 (Scholar)
- Aronson, Jerrold L., Rom Harré, and Eileen Cornell Way, 1994, Realism Rescued: How Scientific Progress is Possible, London: Duckworth. (Scholar)
- Asay, Jamin, 2013, “Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account”: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 27(1): 1–21. doi:10.1080/02698595.2013.783971 (Scholar)
- Barnes, Barry, David Bloor and John Henry, 1996, Scientific Knowledge, London: Athlone. (Scholar)
- Barnes, E.C., 2002, “The Miraculous Choice Argument for Realism”, Philosophical Studies, 111(2): 97–120. doi:10.1023/a:1021204812809 (Scholar)
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- Ben-Menahem, Yemima, 2006, Conventionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Bird, Alexander, 2000, Thomas Kuhn, Chesham: Acumen. (Scholar)
- Blackburn, Simon, 2002, “Realism: Deconstructing the Debate”, Ratio, 15(2): 111–133. doi:10.1111/1467-9329.00180 (Scholar)
- Boyd, Richard N., 1983, “On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism”, Erkenntnis, 19(1/3): 45–90. doi:10.1007/bf00174775 (Scholar)
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- –––, 1990, “Realism, Approximate Truth and Philosophical Method”, in Savage 1990: 355–391. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Kinds as the
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Kinds”, in J. Nida-Rümelin (ed.), Rationalität,
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- –––, 2009, “Underdetermination and Rational Choice of Theories”, Philosophia, 37(1): 55–65. doi:10.1007/s11406-008-9133-9 (Scholar)
- Carnap, Rudolf, 1950, “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology”, Revue Intérnationale de Philosophie, 4: 20–40. Reprinted in Rudolph Carnap, 1956, Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantic and Modal Logic, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Cartwright, Nancy, 1983, How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: Clarendon. doi:10.1093/0198247044.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Chakravartty, Anjan, 1998, “Semirealism”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 29: 391–408. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007a, A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007b, “Six Degrees of Speculation: Metaphysics in Empirical Contexts”, in Monton 2007: 183–208. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218844.003.0010 (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “What You Don’t Know Can’t Hurt You: Realism and the Unconceived”, Philosophical Studies, 137(1): 149–158. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9173-1 (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Truth and Representation in Science: Two Inspirations from Art”, in Roman Frigg & Matthew Hunter (eds.), Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science, (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science), Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 33–50. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, Scientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Chang, Hasok, 2003, “Preservative Realism and Its Discontents: Revisiting Caloric”, Philosophy of Science, 70(5): 902–912. doi:10.1086/377376 (Scholar)
- Churchland, Paul M., 1985, “The Ontological Status of
Observables: In Praise of the Superempirical Virtues”, in
Churchland & Hooker 1985: 35–47. (Scholar)
- Churchland, Paul M. and Clifford A. Hooker (eds.), 1985, Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, (with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Clarke, Steve, 2001, “Defensible Territory for Entity Realism”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52(4): 701–722. doi:10.1093/bjps/52.4.701 (Scholar)
- Collins, Harry and Trevor Pinch, 1993, The Golem: What Everyone Should Know About Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Cordero, Alberto, 2011, “Scientific Realism and the Divide et Impera Strategy: The Ether Saga Revisited”, Philosophy of Science, 78(5): 1120–1130. doi:0.1086/662566 (Scholar)
- Crasnow, Sharon L., 2000, “How Natural Can Ontology Be?”, Philosophy of Science, 67(1): 114–132. doi:10.1086/392764 (Scholar)
- Cruse, Pierre and David Papineau, 2002, “Scientific Realism Without Reference”, in Michele Marsonet (ed.), The Problem of Realism, London: Ashgate, pp. 174–189. (Scholar)
- Day, Mark and George S. Botterill, 2008, “Contrast, Inference and Scientific Realism”, Synthese, 160(2): 249–267. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9117-x (Scholar)
- Day, Timothy and Harold Kincaid, 1994, “Putting Inference to the Best Explanation in its Place”, Synthese, 98(2): 271–295. doi:10.1007/bf01063944 (Scholar)
- Dellsén, Finnur, 2016, “Explanatory Rivals and the Ultimate Argument”, Theoria, 82(3): 217–237. doi:10.1111/theo.12084 (Scholar)
- Devitt, Michael, 1991, Realism and Truth, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Scientific Realism”, in Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 767–791. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.003.0026 (Scholar)
- Dicken, Paul, 2013, “Normativity, the Base-rate Fallacy, and Some Problems for Retail Realism”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44(4): 563–570. (Scholar)
- Dicken, Paul and Peter Lipton, 2006, “What can Bas Believe? Musgrave and van Fraassen on Observability”, Analysis, 66(291): 226–233. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8284.2006.00619.x (Scholar)
- Doppelt, Gerald, 2007, “Reconstructing Scientific Realism to Rebut the Pessimistic Meta-Induction”, Philosophy of Science, 74(1): 96–118. doi:10.1086/520685 (Scholar)
- Duhem, Pierre Maurice Marie, [1906] 1954, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Philip P. Wiener (tr.), Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Dupré, John, 1993, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Earman, John, 1993, “Underdetermination, Realism, and Reason”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 18: 19–38. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1993.tb00255.x (Scholar)
- Egg, Matthias, 2012, “Causal Warrant for Realism about Particle Physics”, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 43(2): 259–280. doi:10.1007/s10838-012-9202-4 (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Expanding Our Grasp: Causal Knowledge and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 67(1): 115–141. doi:10.1093/bjps/axu025 (Scholar)
- Ellis, Brian, 1988, “Internal Realism”, Synthese, 76(3): 409–434. doi:10.1007/bf00869609 (Scholar)
- Elsamahi, Mohamed, 1994, “Could Theoretical Entities Save Realism?”, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting, 1994(1): 173–180. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “A Critique of Localised Realism”, Philosophy of Science, 72(5): 1350–1360. doi:10.1086/508973 (Scholar)
- Eronen, Markus I., 2015, “Robustness and Reality”, Synthese, 192(12): 3961–3977. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0801-6 (Scholar)
- Fahrbach, Ludwig, 2011, “How the Growth of Science Ends Theory Change”, Synthese, 180(2): 139–155. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9602-0 (Scholar)
- Fine, Arthur, 1986a, “Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Antirealist Attachments to Science”, Mind, 95(378): 149–177. doi:10.1093/mind/xcv.378.149 (Scholar)
- –––, [1986b] 1996, The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism and The Quantum Theory, 2nd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “Piecemeal Realism”, Philosophical Studies, 61(1): 79–96. doi:10.1007/bf00385834 (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “Fictionalism”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 18: 1–18. (Scholar)
- Forbes, Curtis, forthcoming, “A Pragmatic, Existentialist
Approach to the Scientific Realism Debate”, Synthese,
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- Franklin, Allan, 1986, The Neglect of Experiment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- French, Steven, 1998, “On the Withering Away of Physical Objects”, in E. Castellani (ed.), Interpreting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 93–113. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Structure as a Weapon of the Realist”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 106(1): 170–187. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2006.00143.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- French, Steven and H. Kamminga (eds.), 1993, Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- Friedman, Michael, 1999, Reconsidering Logical Positivism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Frigg, Roman and Ioannis Votsis, 2011, “Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Structural Realism but were Afraid to Ask”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 1(2): 227–276. doi:10.1007/s13194-011-0025-7 (Scholar)
- Frost-Arnold, Greg, 2010, “The No-Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation”, Philosophy of Science, 77(1): 35–58. doi:10.1086/650207 (Scholar)
- Giere, Ronald N., 1988, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Giere, Ronald N. and Alan W. Richardson, 1997, Origins of
Logical Empiricism (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
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- Godfrey-Smith, Peter, 2008, “Recurrent Transient Underdetermination and the Glass Half Full”, Philosophical Studies, 137(1): 141–148. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9172-2 (Scholar)
- Hacking, Ian, 1982, “Experimentation and Scientific Realism”, Philosophical Topics, 13(1): 71–87. doi:10.5840/philtopics19821314 (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985, “Do We See Through a Microscope?”, in Churchland & Hooker 1985: 132–152. (Scholar)
- Haraway, Donna, 1988, “Situated Knowledges”, Feminist Studies, 14(3): 575–600. doi:10.2307/3178066 (Scholar)
- Hardin, Clyde L. and Alexander Rosenberg, 1982, “In Defence of Convergent Realism”, Philosophy of Science, 49(4): 604–615. doi:10.1086/289080 (Scholar)
- Harding, Sandra, 1986, The Science Question in Feminism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Harker, David, 2008, “On the Predilections for Predictions”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59(3): 429–453. doi:10.1093/bjps/axn017 (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Two Arguments for Scientific Realism Unified”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 41: 192–202. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “How to Split a Theory: Defending Selective Realism and Convergence without Proximity”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64(1): 79–106. doi:10.1093/bjps/axr059 (Scholar)
- Harman, Gilbert H., 1965, “The Inference to the Best Explanation”,Philosophical Review, 74(1): 88–95. doi:10.2307/2183532 (Scholar)
- Hitchcock, Christopher and Elliott Sober, 2004, “Prediction versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55(1): 1–34. doi:10.1093/bjps/55.1.1 (Scholar)
- Horwich, Paul (ed.), 1993, World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Hoyningen-Huene, Paul, 1993, Reconstructing Scientific
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- Howson, Colin, 2000, Hume’s Problem: Induction and the
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- Humphreys, Paul, 2004, Extending Ourselves: Computational Science, Empiricism, and Scientific Method, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195158709.001.0001 (Scholar)
- James, William, [1907] 1979, Pragmatism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Jones, Roger, 1991, “Realism About What?”, Philosophy of Science, 58(2): 185–202. doi:10.1086/289611 (Scholar)
- Keller, Evelyn Fox, 1985, Reflections on Gender and Science, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
- Khalifa, Kareem, 2010, “Default Privilege and Bad Lots: Underconsideration and Explanatory Inference”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 24(1): 91–105. doi:10.1080/02698590903467135 (Scholar)
- Kitcher, Philip, 1993, The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy”, The Philosophical Review, 110(2): 151–197. doi:10.2307/2693674 (Scholar)
- Kochan, Jeff, 2010, “Contrastive Explanation and the
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- Knorr-Cetina, Karin D., 1981, The Manufacture of Knowledge, Oxford: Pergamon. (Scholar)
- Kourany, Janet A., 2010, Philosophy of Science after Feminism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul A., 1980, Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Kuhn, Thomas S., [1962] 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
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- Kukla, Andre, 1998, Studies in Scientific Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kusch, Martin, 2002, Knowledge by Agreement: the Programme of Communitarian Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199251223.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Ladyman, James, 1998, “What is Structural Realism?”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 29: 409–424. (Scholar)
- Ladyman, James, Igor Douven, Leon Horsten, and Bas C. van
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- Laudan, Larry, 1981, “A Confutation of Convergent Realism”, Philosophy of Science, 48: 19–48. (Scholar)
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- Magnus, P.D. and Craig Callender, 2004, “Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy”, Philosophy of Science, 71(3): 320–338. doi:10.1086/421536 (Scholar)
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- McAllister, James W., 1993, “Scientific Realism and the Criteria for Theory-Choice”, Erkenntnis, 38(2): 203–222. doi:10.1007/bf01128980 (Scholar)
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