Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Self-Knowledge" by Brie Gertler
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Works Cited
- Anscombe, G.E.M., 1981, “The First Person”, in The Collected Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, vol. II: Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D., 1968/1993, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Arnauld, A., 1641/1984, excerpts from “Fourth Set of Objections and Replies”, in Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch (trans.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Ashwell, L., 2013a, “Deep, Dark, …or Transparent? Knowing Our Desires”, Philosophical Studies, 165: 245–256. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013b, “Review of Jordi Fernández, Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge”, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2013.08.34, available online. (Scholar)
- Aydede, M., 2003, “Is Introspection Inferential?”, in Gertler 2003: 55–64 (Scholar)
- Bar-On, D., 2004, Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Bayne, T. and M. Montague (eds.), 2004, Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Berker, S., 2008, “Luminosity Regained”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 8: 1–22. (Scholar)
- Bermúdez, J.L., 1998, The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Bilgrami, A., 2006, Self-Knowledge and Resentment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Boghossian, P., 1989, “Content and Self-Knowledge”, Philosophical Topics, 17: 5–26. (Scholar)
- Boyle, M., 2009, “Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78: 133–164. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Transparent Self-Knowledge”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 85: 223–241. (Scholar)
- Brewer, B., 1995, “Bodily Awareness and the Self”, in Bermúdez, Marcel, and Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 291–303. (Scholar)
- Burge, T., 1988, “Individualism and Self-Knowledge”, The Journal of Philosophy, 85: 649–663. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “Content Preservation”, The Philosophical Review, 102: 457–488. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96: 91–116. (Scholar)
- Byrne, A., 2005, “Introspection”, Philosophical Topics, 33(1): 79–104. [Introspection.pdf" target="other">Byrne 2005 available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2011a, “Transparency, Belief, Intention”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 85: 201–221. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011b, “Knowing That I Am Thinking”, in Hatzimoysis (ed.) 2011: 105–124. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012a, “Review of Peter Carruthers, The Opacity of Mind”, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2012.05.11, available online. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012b, “Knowing What I See”, in Smithies and Stoljar 2012: 183–210. (Scholar)
- Carruthers, P., 2011, The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Cassam, Q., 1997, Self and World, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Knowing What You Believe”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 111: 1–23. (Scholar)
- Castañeda, H-N., 1966, “‘He’: A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness”, Ratio, 8: 130–157. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D., 2003, “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”, in Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays, Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 220–271. (Scholar)
- Coliva, A., 2008, “Peacocke’s Self-Knowledge”, Ratio, 21: 13–27. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012a, “One Variety of Self-Knowledge: Constitutivism as Constructivism”, in Coliva 2012b: 212–242. (Scholar)
- ––– (ed.), 2012b, The Self and Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Conee, E., 2005, “The Comforts of Home”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70: 444–451. (Scholar)
- Cunning, D., 1999, “Agency and Consciousness”, Synthese, 120: 271–294. (Scholar)
- Dainton, B. and T. Bayne, 2005, “Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83: 549–571. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D., 1991, Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown & Company. (Scholar)
- DeRose, K. 2002, Review of T. Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 53: 573–77. (Scholar)
- Descartes, R., 1641/1984, “Meditations on First Philosophy”, in Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch (trans.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1644/1984, “Principles of Philosophy”, in Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch (trans.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Dretske, F., 1994, “Introspection”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 94: 263–278. (Scholar)
- Evans, G., 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press (ed. J. McDowell). (Scholar)
- Fernández, J., 2003, “Privileged Access Naturalized”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 53: 352–72. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Finkelstein, D., 2003, Expression and the Inner, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Frankfurt, H., 1971, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Journal of Philosophy, 68: 5–20. (Scholar)
- Fumerton, R., 2005, “Speckled Hens and Objects of Acquaintance”, Philosophical Perspectives, 19: 121–39. (Scholar)
- Gallois, A., 1996, The Mind Within, The World Without, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Gertler, B., 2001, “Introspecting Phenomenal States”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 305–328. (Scholar)
- ––– (ed.), 2003, Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011a, Self-Knowledge, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011b, “Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief”, in Hatzimoysis 2011: 125–145. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Renewed Acquaintance”, in Smithies and Stoljar 2012: 89–123. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A., 2004, “Epistemology and the Evidential Status of Introspective Reports”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11(7–8): 1–16. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, Simulating Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hatzimoysis, A. (ed.), 2011, Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar) (Scholar)
- Heil, J., 1988, “Privileged Access”, Mind, 97: 238–251. (Scholar)
- Hill, C., 1991, Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T. and U. Kriegel, 2007, “Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It So Well?” Philosophical Issues, 17: 123–144. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T., 2012, “Introspection About Phenomenal Consciousness”, in Smithies and Stoljar 2012: 405–421. (Scholar)
- Howell, R., 2006, “Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72: 44–70. (Scholar)
- Hume, D., 1739–1740/1978, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.); revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hurlburt, R. and E. Schwitzgebel, 2007, Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic, MIT Press. (Scholar)
- James, W., 1884, “On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology”, Mind, 33: 1–11. (Scholar)
- Kind, A., 2003, “Shoemaker, Self-Blindness, and Moore’s Paradox”, Philosophical Quarterly, 53: 39–48. (Scholar)
- Korsgaard, C.M., 2009, “The Activity of Reason”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 83(2): 23–43. (Scholar)
- Kriegel, U., 2013 (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kripke, S., 1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Lawlor, K., 2009, “Knowing What One Wants”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79: 47–75. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1979, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”, Philosophical Review, 88: 513–43. (Scholar)
- Locke, J., 1689/1975, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P.H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lycan, W.G., 1996, Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- McElvie, S.J., 1995, “The VVIQ as a psychometric test of individual differences in visual imagery vividness: A critical quantitative review and plea for direction”, Journal of Mental Imagery, 19: 1–106. (Scholar)
- McHugh, C., 2012, “Reasons and Self-Knowledge”, in Coliva 2012b: 139–163. (Scholar)
- Meyers, D. T., 2002, Gender in the Mirror: Cultural Imagery and Women’s Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Mill, J.S., 1865, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, London: Longmans. (Scholar)
- Moran, R., 2001, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Responses to O’Brien and Shoemaker”, European Journal of Philosophy, 11: 402–19. (Scholar)
- Neisser, U. and D. Jopling (eds.), 1997, The Conceptual Self in Context: Culture, Experience, Self-Understanding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Nichols, S. and S. Stich, 2003, Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Nisbett, R. and T. Wilson, 1977, “Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes”, Psychological Review, 84: 231–259. (Scholar)
- Nozick, R., 1981, Philosophical Explanations, Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- O’Brien, L., 2003, “Moran on Agency and Self-Knowledge”, European Journal of Philosophy, 11: 375–90. (Scholar)
- Paul, S., 2012, “How We Know What We Intend”, Philosophical Studies, 161: 327–346. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, C., 1999, Being Known, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Perry, J., 1979, “The Problem of the Essential Indexical”, Noûs, 13: 3–21 (Scholar)
- Pitt, D., 2004, “The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What is it Like to Think that P?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69: 1–36. (Scholar)
- Reed, B., 2010, “Self-Knowledge and Rationality”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80: 164–181. (Scholar)
- Rovane, C., 1993, “Self-Reference: the radicalization of Locke”, Journal of Philosophy, 60: 73–97 (Scholar)
- Russell, B., 1917, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, in Mysticism and Logic, London: George Allen and Unwin. (Scholar)
- Ryle, G., 1949, The Concept of Mind, New York: Barnes and Noble. (Scholar)
- Schultheiss, O. and J. Brunstein, 1999, “Goal imagery: Bridging the gap between implicit motives and explicit goals”, Journal of Personality, 67: 1–38. (Scholar)
- Schwitzgebel, E., 2002, “How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Visual Imagery”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(5–6): 35–53. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “The Unreliability of Naïve Introspection”, Philosophical Review, 117: 245–273. (Scholar)
- Searle, J., 1983, Intentionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Shah, N. and D. Velleman, 2005, “Doxastic Deliberation”, Philosophical Review, 114: 497–534. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S., 1968, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness”, Journal of Philosophy, 65: 555–567. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, “On Knowing One’s Own Mind”, Philosophical Perspectives 2: 183–209. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “Self-Knowledge and ‘Inner Sense’”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 249–314. (Scholar)
- Siewert, C., 1998, The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Self-Knowledge and Rationality: Shoemaker on Self-Blindness”, in Gertler 2003: 131–145. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “On the Phenomenology of Introspection”, in Smithies and Stoljar 2012: 129–168. (Scholar)
- Silins, N., 2012, “Judgment as a Guide to Belief”, in Smithies and Stoljar 2012: 295–328. (Scholar)
- Smithies, D., 2012, “A Simple Theory of Introspection”, in Smithies and Stoljar 2012: 259–294. (Scholar)
- Smithies, D. and D. Stoljar (eds.), 2012, Introspection and Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Snowdon, P., 2012, “How to Think about Phenomenal Self-Knowledge”, in Coliva 2012b: 243–262. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E., 2003, “Reply to BonJour”, In BonJour and Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Malden, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Stich, S., 1983, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Strawson, G., 1997, “The Self”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4(5/6): 405–28. [Strawson 1997 available online]. (Scholar)
- Taylor, C., 1985, “Self-Interpreting Animals”, ch. 2 of his Human Agency and Language, (Philosophical Papers, vol. I), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Valaris, M. 2011, “Transparency as Inference: Reply to Alex Byrne”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 111: 319–24. (Scholar)
- Velleman, J.D., 1989, Practical Reflection, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Weatherson, B., 2004, “Luminous Margins”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 373–83. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T., 2000, Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wilson, T., 2002, Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Wilson, T. and E.W. Dunn, 2004, “Self-Knowledge: Its Limits, Value, and Potential for Improvement”, Annual Review of Psychology, 55: 493–518. (Scholar)
- Wilson, T., and D. Kraft, 1993, “Why Do I Love Thee? Effects of Repeated Introspections about a Dating Relationship on Attitudes toward the Relationship”, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19: 409–441. (Scholar)
- Winkler, K., 1991, “Locke on Personal Identity”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 29: 201–26. (Scholar)
- Wittgenstein, L., 1953, Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Wright, C., 1989, “Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy, and Intention”, Journal of Philosophy, 86: 622–634. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Self-Knowledge: the Wittgensteinian Legacy”, in Knowing our Own Minds, C. Wright, B. Smith, and C. Macdonald (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press: 13–45. (Scholar)
- Zimmerman, A., 2006, “Basic Self-Knowledge: Answering Peacocke’s Criticisms of Constitutivism”, Philosophical Studies, 128: 337–379. (Scholar)
Further Reading
Anthologies on self-knowledge:
- Cassam, Q. (ed.), 1994, Self-Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Coliva, A. (ed.), 2012, The Self and Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Gertler, B. (ed.), 2003, Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. (Scholar)
- Hatzimoysis, A. (ed.), 2011, Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- D. Smithies and D. Stoljar (eds.), 2012, Introspection and Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (Scholar)
- Wright, C., B. Smith, and C. Macdonald, (eds.), 1998, Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)