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Further Reading

Anthologies on self-knowledge:

• Cassam, Q. (ed.), 1994, Self-Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Coliva, A. (ed.), 2012, The Self and Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Gertler, B. (ed.), 2003, Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. (Scholar)
• Hatzimoysis, A. (ed.), 2011, Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• D. Smithies and D. Stoljar (eds.), 2012, Introspection and Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (Scholar)
• Wright, C., B. Smith, and C. Macdonald, (eds.), 1998, Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)