Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Self-Reference and Paradox" by Thomas Bolander

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Abad, Jordi Valor, 2008, “The inclosure scheme and the solution to the paradoxes of self-reference”, Synthese, 160(2): 183–202. (Scholar)
Abramsky, Samson, and Jonathan Zvesper, 2015, “From Lawvere to Brandenburger-Keisler: Interactive forms of diagonalization and self-reference”, Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 81(5): 799–812. (Scholar)
Achourioti, T. et al. (eds.), 2015, Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, vol. 36 of Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, Springer. (Scholar)
Badici, Emil, 2008, “The liar paradox and the inclosure schema 1”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86(4): 583–596. (Scholar)
Başkent, Can, 2016, “A Yabloesque paradox in epistemic game theory”, Synthese 1–24. (Scholar)
Bartlett, S.J. (ed.), 1992, Reflexivity—A Source-Book in Self-Reference, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co. (Scholar)
Bartlett, S.J. and Peter Suber (eds.), 1987, Self-Reference—Reflections on Reflexivity, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. (Scholar)
Barwise, J. and J. Etchemendy, 1987, The Liar—An Essay on Truth and Circularity, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Barwise, J. and L. Moss, 1996, Vicious Circles—On the Mathematics of Non-Wellfounded Phenomena, Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
Beall, Jc, 2009, Spandrels of truth, OUP Oxford. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, Revenge of the Liar: New essays on the paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, “Finding tolerance without gluts”, Mind 123(491): 791–811. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “End of inclosure”, Mind 123(491): 829–849. (Scholar)
Beringer, T. and Schindler, T., 2017, “A Graph-Theoretic Analysis of the Semantic Paradoxes”, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 24(4): 442–892. (Scholar)
Bernardi, Claudio, 2001, “Fixed points and unfounded chains”, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 109(3): 163–178. (Scholar)
Bolander, Thomas, 2002, “Self-reference and logic”, Phi News, 1: 9–44. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Logical Theories for Agent Introspection ”, Ph.D. Thesis, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark. (Scholar)
Bolander, T. and V.F. Hendricks and S.A. Pedersen (eds.), 2006, Self-Reference, Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
Boolos, G., 1993, The Logic of Provability, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Brandenburger, Adam and Keisler, H. Jerome, 2006, “An impossibility theorem on beliefs in games”, Studia Logica, 84(2): 211–240. (Scholar)
Bruni, Riccardo and Lorenzo Rossi, 2023, “Truth Meets Vagueness. Unifying the Semantic and the Soritical Paradoxes”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 52: 1637–1671. (Scholar)
Buridan, John, [SD], Summulae de Dialectica–An annotated translation, with a philosophical introduction by Gyula Klima, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001.
Butler, Jesse M., 2017, “An entirely non-self-referential Yabloesque paradox”, Synthese 1–13. (Scholar)
Cantini, Andrea, 2009, “Paradoxes, self-reference and truth in the 20th century”, Handbook of the History of Logic, 5: 875–1013. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, Logical Frameworks for Truth and Abstraction—An Axiomatic Study, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Paradoxes, self-reference and truth in the 20th century”, Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. V, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 875–1013. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “On stratified truth”, in Unifying the philosophy of truth, Netherlands: Springer. (Scholar)
Cantor, Georg, 1895, “Beiträge zur Begründung der transfiniten Mengenlehre”, Mathematische Annalen, 46(4): 481–512. (Scholar)
–––, 1891, “Über eine Elementare Frage der Mannigfaltigkeitslehre,” Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung, 1: 75–78. (Scholar)
Cieśliński, C. and R. Urbaniak, 2013, “Gödelizing the Yablo Sequence”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 42(5): 679–695. (Scholar)
Caret, Colin R. and Zach Weber, 2015, “A Note on Contraction-Free Logic for Validity”, Topoi 34(1): 63–74. (Scholar)
Chapuis, A. and A. Gupta, 2000, Circularity, Definition and Truth, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. (Scholar)
Cobreros, Pablo, Paul Égré, David Ripley, and Robert van Rooij, 2013, “Reaching Transparent Truth”, Mind 122(488): 841–866. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Vagueness, Truth and Permissive Consequence”, in T. Achourioti et al. (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, Dordrecht: Springer, 409–430. (Scholar)
Colyvan, Mark, 2009, “Vagueness and Truth”, in Dyke, Heather (ed.): From Truth to Reality: New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics, Oxford: Routledge. (Scholar)
Cook, Roy, 2007, “Embracing revenge: on the indefinite extensibility of language”, Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Patterns of paradox”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 69(3): 767–774. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “What is a truth value and how many are there?”, Studia Logica, 92(2): 183–201. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, Paradoxes, Polity Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, The Yablo paradox: An essay on circularity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Dyrkolbotn, S. and M. Walicki, 2014, “Propositional discourse logic”, Synthese, 191(5): 863–899. (Scholar)
Erickson, G. W. and J. A. Fossa, 1998, Dictionary of Paradox, Lanham: University Press of America. (Scholar)
Feferman, S., 1984, “Kurt Gödel: conviction and caution”, Philosophia Naturalis, 21: 546–562. (Scholar)
–––, 1984a, “Toward useful type-free theories I”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 49: 75–111. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “Reflecting on incompleteness”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 56: 1–49. (Scholar)
Field, Hartry, 2003, “A revenge-immune solution to the semantic paradoxes”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 32(2): 139–177.
–––, 2008, Saving truth from paradox, Oxford University Press, USA. (Scholar)
Fitting, M., 1986, “Notes on the mathematical aspects of Kripke’s theory of truth”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 27(1): 75–88. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “A theory of truth that prefers falsehood”, The Journal of Philosophical Logic, 26(5): 477–500.
–––, 2006, “Bilattices are nice things.”, in Bolander, Hendricks, Pedersen (eds.), Self-reference, Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
Forster, T. E., 1995, Set Theory with a Universal Set, New York: The Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
French, Rohan, 2016, “Structural reflexivity and the paradoxes of self-reference”, Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3. (Scholar)
Gaifman, Haim, 1988, “Operational pointer semantics: Solution to self-referential puzzles i”, in Proceedings of the 2nd Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 43–59. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “Pointers to truth”, The Journal of Philosophy, 89(5): 223–261. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Pointers to propositions”, in A. Chapuis and A. Gupta, Circularity, definition and truth, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 79–121. (Scholar)
Gilmore, P. C., 1974, “The consistency of partial set theory without extensionality”, Axiomatic set theory (Proc. Sympos. Pure Math., Vol. XIII, Part II), pp. 147–153, Providence RI: Amer. Math. Soc. (Scholar)
Gödel, K., 1931, “Über formal unentscheidbare Satze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I”, Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik, 38: 173–198. (Scholar)
Grabmayr, Balthasar, Volker Halbach, and Lingyuan Ye, 2023, “Varieties of Self-Reference in Metamathematics”. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 52: 1005–1052. (Scholar)
Grabmayr, Balthasar, and Albert Visser, 2023, “Self-reference upfront: A study of self-referential Gödel numberings”. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 16(2): 385–424. (Scholar)
Gupta, A. and N. Belnap, 1993, The Revision Theory of Truth, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Gupta, A. and S. Standefer, 2017, “Conditionals in theories of truth”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 46(1): 27–63. (Scholar)
Halbach, Volker, 2008, “On a side effect of solving Fitch’s paradox by typing knowledge”, Analysis, 68(298): 114–120. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, Axiomatic theories of truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Halbach, Volker, and Albert Visser, 2014a, “Self-reference in Arithmetic I”, The Review of Symbolic Logic 7(4): 671–691. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “Self-reference in arithmetic II”, The Review of Symbolic Logic 7(4): 692–712. (Scholar)
Halbach, Volker, and Shuoying Zhang, 2017, “Yablo Without Gödel”, Analysis 77(1): 53–59. (Scholar)
Hsiung, Ming, 2017, “Boolean Paradoxes and Revision Periods”, Studia Logica, 105(5): 881–914. (Scholar)
–––, 2022, “From Paradoxicality to Paradox”, Erkenntnis, first online 06 December 2022. doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00640-9 (Scholar)
van Heijenort, J., 1967, From Frege to Gödel. A source book in mathematical logic, 1879–1931, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Horsten, Leon, 2011, The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Hughes, G.E., 1982, John Buridan on self-reference–Chapter Eight of Buridan’s ‘Sophismata’, with a Translation, an Introduction, and a Philosophical Commentary, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Kaplan, David, and Richard Montague, 1960, “A paradox regained”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 1(3): 79–90
Kripke, S., 1975, “Outline of a Theory of Truth”, The Journal of Philosophy, 72: 690–716. (Scholar)
–––, 2023, “Gödel’s theorem and direct self-reference”. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 16(2): 650–654.
Leach-Krouse, Graham, 2014, “Yablifying the Rosser sentence”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 43(5): 827–834. (Scholar)
Leitgeb, Hannes, 2008, “On the probabilistic convention t”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 1(02): 218–224. (Scholar)
Mares, Edwin and Francesco Paoli, 2014, “Logical Consequence and the Paradoxes”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 43(2–3): 439–469. (Scholar)
Martin, R. L., 1984, Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Martin, R. L. and P. W. Woodruff, 1975, “On representing ‘True-in-L’ in L”, Philosophia, 5: 213–217. (Scholar)
McGee, V., 1990, Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox—An Essay on the Logic of Truth, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “Maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski’s Schema (T)”, The Journal of Philosophical Logic, 21(3): 235–241. (Scholar)
Montague, R., 1963, “Syntactical treatment of modality, with corollaries on reflection principles and finite axiomatizability”, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 16: 153–167. (Scholar)
Morreau, Michael and Sarit Kraus, 1998, “Syntactical treatments of propositional attitudes”, Artificial Intelligence, 106(1): 161–177. (Scholar)
Murzi, Julien, and Massimiliano Carrara, 2015, “Paradox and logical revision. A short introduction”, Topoi 34(1): 7–14. (Scholar)
Odintsov, Sergei P. and Heinrich Wansing, 2015, “The logic of generalized truth values and the logic of bilattices.” Studia Logica, 103(1): 91–112. (Scholar)
Pacuit, Eric, 2007, “Understanding the Brandenburger-Keisler paradox”, Studia Logica, 86(3): 435–454. (Scholar)
Pelling, Charlie, 2011, “A self-referential paradox for the truth account of assertion”, Analysis, 71(4): 688–688.
Perlis, D. and V. S. Subrahmanian, 1994, “Meta-languages, Reflection Principles and Self-Reference”, Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, 2: 323–358. (Scholar)
Picollo, Lavinia, 2013, “Yablo’s paradox in second-order languages: Consistency and unsatisfiability”, Studia Logica, 101(3): 601–617. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Reference in arithmetic”. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 11(3): 573–603. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, “Alethic reference”. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 49(3): 417–438. (Scholar)
Priest, Graham, 2010a, “Badici on inclosures and the liar paradox”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88(2): 359–366. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “Inclosures, vagueness, and self-reference”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 51(1): 69–84. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Vague Inclosures”, in Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications, Netherlands: Springer. (Scholar)
–––, 1987, In Contradiction—A Study of the Transconsistent, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “The Structure of the Paradoxes of Self-Reference”, Mind, 103: 25–34. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, Beyond the Limits of Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Yablo’s paradox”, Analysis 57(4): 236–242. (Scholar)
Quine, W.V., 1937, “New foundations for mathematical logic”, American Mathematical Monthly, 44: 70–80. (Scholar)
–––, 1976, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Rabern, Landon, and Brian Rabern and Matthew Macauley, 2013, “Dangerous reference graphs and semantic paradoxes”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 42(5): 727–765. (Scholar)
de Revières, J., and H.J. Levesque, 1988, “The consistency of syntactical treatments of knowledge”, Computational Intelligence, 4: 31–41. (Scholar)
Rosado Haddock, G. E., 2001, “Recent truth theories: A case study”, Axiomathes, 12(1): 87–115. (Scholar)
Russell, B., 1905, “On some difficulties in the theory of transfinite numbers and order types”, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 4: 29–53. (Scholar)
Schindler, Thomas, 2017, “Some Notes on Truths and Comprehension”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 1–31. (Scholar)
Schlenker, Philippe, 2010, “Super liars”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 1(1): 1–41. (Scholar)
Shapiro, Lionel, 2015, “Naive Structure, Contraction and Paradox”, Topoi, 34(1): 75–87. (Scholar)
Sheard, M., 1994, “A guide to truth predicates in the modern era”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 59(3): 1032–1054.
Simmons, K., 1993, Universality and the Liar—An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Slater, Hartley, 2002, “The Fallacy in Russell’s Schema”, Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, 22(2): 4. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “What Priest (amongst many others) has been missing”, Ratio, 23(2): 184–198. (Scholar)
Smullyan, R. M., 1992, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 1994, Diagonalization and self-reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Self-Reference in All Its Glory!”, in Bolander, Hendricks, Pedersen (eds.), Self-reference, Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
Snapper, Jeff, 2012, “The liar paradox in new clothes”, Analysis, 72(2): 319–322. (Scholar)
Sorensen, Roy A., 2003, A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Tarski, A., 1935, “Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen”, Studia Philosophica, 1: 261–405. (Scholar)
–––, 1968, Undecidable Theories, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co. (Scholar)
Thomason, R., 1980, “A note of syntactical treatments of modality”, Synthese, 44: 391–395.
Tourville, Nicholas, and Roy T. Cook, “Embracing the Technicalities: Expressive Completeness and Revenge”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 9(2): 325–358. (Scholar)
Turing, A.M., 1936, “On Computable Numbers, With an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem”, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 42(2): 230–265; correction ibid., 43: 544–546 (1937). (Scholar)
Tucker, Dustin and Richmond H. Thomason, 2011, “Paradoxes of intensionality”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 4(03): 394–411. (Scholar)
Urbaniak, Rafał, 2009, “Leitgeb, ‘about,’ Yablo”, Logique & Analyse, 207: 239–254. (Scholar)
Visser, A., 1989, “Semantics and the liar paradox”, Handbook of Philosophical Logic (Vol. IV), Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 617–706. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “From Tarski to Gödel – or how to derive the second incompleteness theorem from the undefinability of truth without self-reference”, Journal of Logic and Computation, 29(5): 595–604. (Scholar)
Walicki, Michał, 2009, “Reference, paradoxes and truth”, Synthese, 171(1): 195–226. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Kernels of digraphs with finitely many ends”, Discrete Mathematics 342: 473–486. (Scholar)
Weber, Zach, 2010a, “Explanation and solution in the inclosure argument”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88(2): 353–357. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “A Paraconsistent Model of Vagueness”, Mind 119: 1026–1045. (Scholar)
Weber, Zach, et al., 2014, “Tolerating gluts”, Mind 123(491): 813–828. (Scholar)
Wintein, Stefan, 2012, “Assertoric semantics and the computational power of self-referential truth”, Journal of philosophical logic, 41(2): 317–345. (Scholar)
Yablo, Stephen, 1985, “Truth and reflection”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 14(3): 297–349. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Paradox without self-reference”, Analysis, 53: 251–252. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Circularity and Paradox”, in Bolander, Hendricks, Pedersen (eds.), Self-reference, Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
Zardini, Elia, 2011, “Truth without contra(di)ction”, Review of Symbolic Logic, 4(4): 498–535. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Substructural approaches to paradox: an introduction to the special issue”, Synthese, 199(3): 493–525. (Scholar)
Zhong, Haixia, 2012, “Definability and the structure of logical paradoxes”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(4): 779–788. (Scholar)
Zwicker, W.S., 1987, “Playing Games with Games: The Hypergame Paradox,” The American Mathematical Monthly, 94(6): 507–514. (Scholar)

Other Internet Resources

Logical Paradoxes, by B. Hartley Slater, in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Truth, by Bradley Dowden and Norman Swartz, in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Generated Mon Sep 30 23:26:58 2024

Applied ethics	Epistemology	History of Western Philosophy	Meta-ethics	Metaphysics	Normative ethics
Philosophy of biology	Philosophy of language	Philosophy of mind	Philosophy of religion	Science Logic and Mathematics	More ...