Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Shared Agency" by Abraham Sesshu Roth

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Alonso, Facundo, 2009. “Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations”, Ethics, 119: 444–475. (Scholar)
Anderson, Elizabeth, 2001. “Unstrapping the Straightjacket of ‘Preference’: a Comment on Amartya Sen’s Contributions to Philosophy and Economics”, Economics and Philosophy, 17: 21–38. (Scholar)
Anscombe, G. E. M., 1963. Intention (2d edition), Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Bacharach, Michael, 2006. Beyond Individual Choice, N. Gold & R. Sugden, eds., Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Baier, Annette, 1997. “Doing things with Others: The Mental Commons” in Alanen, L., S. Heinämaa, and T. Wallgren, eds., Commonality and Particularity in Ethics, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc. (Scholar)
Bratman, Michael, 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1992. “Shared Cooperative Activity”, The Philosophical Review, 101: 327–341. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. “Shared Intention”, Ethics, 104: 97–113. (Scholar)
–––, 1997a. “I Intend that We J”, in R. Tuomela and G. Holmstrom-Hintikka (eds.), Contemporary Action Theory (Volume 2: Social Action), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 49–63, reprinted in Bratman 1999: 142–161. (Scholar)
–––, 1997b. “Shared Intention and Mutual Obligation”, originally published as “Intention Partagée et Obligation Mutuelle,” in Les limites de la rationalité (Volumes 1), Jean-Pierre Dupuy and Pierre Livet (eds.), Joelle Proust, (trans.), Paris: Editions La Découverte, 246–66. Reprinted in Bratman 1999. (Scholar)
–––, 1999. Faces of Intention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009a. “Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self‐Governance”,Ethics, 119: 411–443. (Scholar)
–––, 2009b. “Modest sociality and the distinctiveness of intention”, Philosophical Studies, 144: 149–165. (Scholar)
–––, 2009c. “Shared Agency”, in Philosophy of the social sciences : philosophical theory and scientific practice, C. Mantzavinos, ed., Cambridge, UK; New York : Cambridge University Press, 41–59. (Scholar)
–––, 2014. Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2015. “Shared Agency: Replies to Ludwig, Pacherie, Petersson, Roth, and Smith”, Journal of Social Ontology, 1(1): 59–76. (Scholar)
Broome, John, 1999. “Normative requirements”, Ratio, 12: 398–419. (Scholar)
Chant, Sara Rachel, 2007. “Unintentional Collective Action”, Philosophical Explorations, 10: 245–256. (Scholar)
Chant, Sara Rachel and Zachary Ernst, 2008. “Epistemic Conditions for Collective Action”, Mind, 117(467): 549–573 (Scholar)
Darwall, Stephen, 2006. The Second-Person Standpoint: Respect, Morality, and Accountability., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Davidson, Donald, 1978. “Intending,” reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980: 83–102. (Scholar)
Dennett, Daniel C., 1987. The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Dietz, Alexander, 2016. “What We Together Ought to Do”, Ethics, 126: 955–982. (Scholar)
Epstein, Brian, 2015. The Ant Trap, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Gilbert, Margaret, 1989. On Social Facts, London: Routledge. Reprinted Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. (Scholar)
–––, 1990. “Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 15: 1–14. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. “Is an Agreement an Exchange of Promises?” Journal of Philosophy, 90: 627–49. Reprinted in Gilbert 1996. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. Living Together, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
–––, 1997. “What Is It for Us to Intend?”, in Contemporary Action Theory, vol. 2: The Philosophy and Logic of Social Action, G. Holmstrom-Hintikka and R. Tuomela (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 65–85. Reprinted with minor revisions in Gilbert 2000. (Scholar)
–––, 1999. “Obligation and Joint Commitment”, Utilitas, 11:143–63. Reprinted with minor revisions in Gilbert 2000, 50–70. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. Sociality and Responsibility, Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
–––, 2002. “Considerations on Joint Commitment: Responses to Various Comments”, in Social Facts & Collective Intentionality, G. Meggle (ed.), Frankfurt am Main: DR. Hansel-Hohenhausen AG, pp. 73-101. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008. “Two Approaches to Shared Intention: An Essay in the Philosophy of Social Phenomena”, Analyze & Kritik, 30: 483–514. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. “Shared Intention and Personal Intention”, Philosophical Studies, 144: 167–187. (Scholar)
–––, 2011. “Three Dogmas about Promising”, in Promises and Agreements, Hanoch Sheinman (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 73–101. (Scholar)
Gold, Natalie & Robert Sugden, 2007. “Collective Intentions and Team Agency”, Journal of Philosophy, 104(3): 109–137 (Scholar)
Goldman, Alvin, 1968. “Actions, Decisions, and Books of Life”, American Philosophical Quarterly 5(3): 135–151. (Scholar)
–––, 1970. A Theory of Human Action, New York: Prentice-Hall. (Scholar)
Hampshire, Stuart, 1965. Freedom of the Individual, New York: Harper & Row. (Scholar)
Hampshire, Stuart & H.L.A. Hart, 1958. “Decision, Intention and Certainty”, Mind, LXVII: 1–12. (Scholar)
Harman, Gilbert, 1976. “Practical Reason”, Review of Metaphysics, 79: 431–63. (Scholar)
–––, 1986. Change in View, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Hobbes Thomas, 1651. Leviathan, in E. Curley (ed.), Leviathan, with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994. (Scholar)
Hurley, Susan, 1989. Natural Reasons, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kornhauser, L. A., 1992a. “Modelling collegial courts. I. Path-dependence”, International Review of Law and Economics, 12: 169–85 (Scholar)
–––, 1992b. “Modelling collegial courts. II. Legal doctrine”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 8: 441–70 (Scholar)
Kornhauser, L. A. and L. G. Sager, 1986. “Unpacking the court”, Yale Law Journal, 96(1): 82–117. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. “The one and the many: adjudication in collegial courts”, California Law Review, 81: 1–59 (Scholar)
Korsgaard, Christine, 2009. Self-Constitution—Agency, Identity, and Integrity., Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kutz, Christopher, 2000. Acting Together. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 1–31. (Scholar)
Laurence, Ben, 2010. “An Anscombian Approach to Shared Agency”, in A. Ford, J. Hornsby, and F. Stoutland (Eds.), Essays on Anscombe’s Intention, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 270–298. (Scholar)
Lewis, David, 1969. Convention: a Philosophical Study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1983. Philosophical Papers, (Volume 1), New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
List, Christian and Pettit, Philip, 2006. “Group Agency and Supervenience”, in Southern Journal of Philosophy (Spindel Conference 2005), 44: 85–105. [Preprint available online] (Scholar)
–––, 2002. “Aggregating Sets of Judgements: An Impossibility Result,” Economics and Philosophy, 18: 89–110 (Scholar)
Ludwig, Kirk, 2007. “Collective Intentional Behavior from the Standpoint of Semantics”, Noûs 41, 3: 355–393. (Scholar)
–––, 2016. From Individual to Plural Agency (Collective Action: Volume 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
McMahon, Christopher, 2005. “Shared Agency and Rational Cooperation”, Noûs 39:2: 284–308. (Scholar)
–––, 2001. Collective Rationality and Collective Reasoning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Miller, Seumas, 2001. Social Action: A Teleological Account, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Pacherie, Elisabeth, 2007. “Is collective intentionality really primitive?”, in M. Beaney, C. Penco & M. Vignolo (Eds.), Mental processes: representing and inferring, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press: 153–175. (Scholar)
Peterssen, Björn, 2007. “Collectivity and Circularity”, Journal of Philosophy, 104(3): 138–156. (Scholar)
–––, 2015. “Bratman, Searle, and Simplicity. A comment on Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together”, Journal of Social Ontology 1(1): 27–38. (Scholar)
Pettit, Philip, 2001. “Collective Intentions” in N. Naffine, R. Owens, and J. Williams (eds.), Intention in Law and Philosophy, Ashgate, Dartmouth, pp. 241–54. (Scholar)
–––, 2003. “Groups with Minds of Their Own”, Socializing Metaphysics: the Nature of Social Reality, F. Schmitt, ed., Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield: 167–93. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. “The Reality of Group Agents”, in Philosophy of the social sciences : philosophical theory and scientific practice, C. Mantzavinos (ed.), Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press: 67–91. (Scholar)
–––, 2014. “Group Agents are Not Expressive, Pragmatic or Theoretical Fictions”, Erkenntnis, 79: 1641–1662 (Scholar)
Pettit, Philip and Christian List, 2011. Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Pettit, Philip and Schweikard, David, 2006. “Joint Actions and Group Agents”, Philosophy of Social Sciences, 36: 18–39. [Preprint available online] (Scholar)
Quinton, Anthony, 1975–6. “Social Objects”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 75: 1–27. (Scholar)
Robins, Michael H., 2002. “Joint Commitment and Circularity”, in Social Facts & Collective Intentionality, G. Meggle, ed., Frankfurt am Main: DR. Hansel-Hohenhausen AG: 299-321. (Scholar)
Roth, Abraham Sesshu, 2003. “Practical Intersubjectivity”, in Socializing Metaphysics: the Nature of Social Reality, F. Schmitt, ed., Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 65–91. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. “Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments”, Philosophical Review, 113(3): 359–410 (Scholar)
–––, 2014a. “Indispensability, the Discursive Dilemma, and Groups with Minds of Their Own”, in From Individual to Collective Intentionality, S. Chant, F. Hindriks, and G. Preyer, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 137–162. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b. “Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity”, Noûs, 48:4, 626–652. (Scholar)
–––, 2015. “Practical Intersubjectivity and Normative Guidance: Bratman on Shared Agency,” Journal of Social Ontology, 1(1): 39–48. (Scholar)
–––, 2016. “Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation”, Ethics, 127:1, 88–115 (Scholar)
Rovane, Carol, 1997. The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Scanlon, Thomas, 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Schmid, Hans Bernhard, 2008. “Plural Action”, Philosophy of the Social Sciences., 38:1: 25–54. (Scholar)
Schmid, Hans Bernhard, 2014. “Plural Self-Awareness”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences., 13: 7–24. (Scholar)
Searle, John, 1990. “Collective Intentions and Actions”, in Intentions in Communication, edited by P. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. Pollack, 401–415. Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1995. The Construction of Social Reality, New York: Free Press. (Scholar)
Sellars, Wilfred, 1963. “Imperatives, Intentions, and the Logic of ‘Ought’”, in Morality and the Language of Conduct, edited by Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1968. Science and Metaphysics, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Setiya, Kieran, 2010. “Intention”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Intention/">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/Intention/>. (Scholar)
Shiffrin, Seana, 2008. “Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism”, Philosophical Review, 117(4): 481–524. (Scholar)
Smith, Thomas, 2015. “Shared Agency on Gilbert and Deep Discontinuity”, Journal of Social Ontology, 1(1): 49–58. (Scholar)
Stoutland, Frederick, 1997. “Why are Philosophers of Action So Anti-Social?”, in Commonality and Particularity in Ethics, L. Alanen, S. Heinämaa, and T. Walgren (eds.), New York: St. Martin’s. (Scholar)
Stroud, Sarah, 2010. “Permissible Partiality, Projects, and Plural Agency”, in J. Cottingham and B. Feltham, (eds.), Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Thompson, Michael, 2004. “What is it to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle about Justice”, in Reason and Value, R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler and Michael Smith (eds.), Oxford University Press, 333–384. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, Life and Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Tollefsen, Deborah Perron, 2002. “Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences”, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 32(1): 25–50. (Scholar)
Tuomela, Raimo, 2003. “The We-Mode and the I-Mode”, in Socializing Metaphysics: the Nature of Social Reality, F. Schmitt (ed.), Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield: 93–127. (Scholar)
–––, 2007. The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Tuomela, Raimo, & Miller, Kaarlo, 1988. “We-Intentions”, Philosophical Studies, 53: 367–389. (Scholar)
Velleman, J. David, 1997a. “How to Share an Intention”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57: 29–50. (Scholar)
–––, 1997b. “Deciding How to Decide”, in Ethics and Practical Reasoning, Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 29–52. (Scholar)
–––, 2001. Review of Michael Bratman’s Faces of Intention, The Philosophical Quarterly, 51(202): 119–121. (Scholar)
Wallace, R. Jay, 2013. “The Deontic Structure of Morality”, in Thinking about Reasons: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Dancy, David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker, and Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 137–167. (Scholar)
Watkins, J.W.N., 1957. “Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 8(30): 104 –117. (Scholar)
Wilson, George, 1989, The Intentionality of Human Action, Stanford: Stanford University Press (Scholar)
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1953. Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees (eds.), G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)

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