Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Skepticism and Content Externalism" by Michael McKinsey
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Alston, William P., 1986 [1989], “Epistemic
Circularity”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
47(1): 1–30; reprinted in his Epistemic Justification:
Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, pp. 319–350. doi:10.2307/2107722. (Scholar)
- Brueckner, Anthony L., 1986, “Brains in a Vat”, Journal of Philosophy, 83(3): 148–167. Reprinted in Brueckner 2010: ch. 7. doi:10.2307/2026572 (Scholar)
- –––, 1992 [1999], “Semantic Answers to
Skepticism”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 73(3):
200–219; reprinted in DeRose & Warfield 1999: 43–60
also reprinted in Brueckner 2010: ch. 8. All page references are to
DeRose and Warfield 1999. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1992.tb00336.x (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Trying to Get Outside Your Own Skin”, Philosophical Topics, 23(1): 79–111. doi:10.5840/philtopics199523116 (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Trees, Computer Program
Features, and Skeptical Hypotheses”, in Robert Stern (ed.),
Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects, Oxford:
Clarendon Press. Reprinted in Brueckner 2010: 152–162 (ch. 9).
All page references are to Brueckner 2010. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Cartesian Skepticism, Content Externalism, and Self-Knowledge”, Veritas, 50(4): 53–63; reprinted in Brueckner 2010: 163–173 (Chapter 9). [All page references are to Brueckner 2010.] (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, Essays on Skepticism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.001.0001 (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Skepticism and Content
Externalism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/skepticism-content-externalism/>. (Scholar)
- Davies, Martin, 2000, “Externalism and Armchair Knowledge”, in Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 384–414. doi:10.1093/0199241279.003.0016 (Scholar)
- DeRose, Keith and Ted A. Warfield (eds.), 1999, Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Donnellan, K., 1974, “Speaking of Nothing”, The Philosophical Review, 83(1): 3–32. Reprinted in Stephen P. Schwartz (ed.), 1977, Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Page references are to Schwartz 1977. doi:10.2307/2183871 (Scholar)
- Folina, Janet, 2016, “Realism, Skepticism, and the Brain in
a Vat”, in Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a
Vat, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 155–173.
doi:10.1017/cbo9781107706965.010 (Scholar)
- Forbes, Graeme, 1995 [1999], “Realism and Skepticism: Brains
in a Vat Revisited”, Journal of Philosophy, 92(4):
205–222; reprinted in DeRose & Warfield 1999: 61–75.
Page references are to DeRose and Warfield 1999.
doi:10.2307/2940923 (Scholar)
- Gertler, Brie, 2017, “Self-Knowledge”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Self-Knowledge/" target="other">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/Self-Knowledge/> (Scholar)
- Hale, Bob, 2000, “Transmission and Closure”, Philosophical Issues, 10: 172–190. doi:10.1111/j.1758-2237.2000.tb00020.x (Scholar)
- Kaplan, David, 1977 [1989], “Demonstratives”,
presented in 1977 but not published until 1989 in Joseph Almog, John
Perry, and Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan,
Oxford: Oxford University Press: 481–564. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul A., 1972, “Naming and Necessity”, in Donald Davidson and Gilbret Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: D. Reidel:253–355. doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 (Scholar)
- McKinsey, Michael, 1987, “Apriorism in the Philosophy of Language”, Philosophical Studies, 52(1): 1–32. doi:10.1007/bf00354156 (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “Anti-Individualism and
Privileged Access”, Analysis, 51(1): 9–16.
doi:10.2307/3328625 (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Forms of Externalism and Privileged Access”, Philosophical Perspectives, 16: 199–224. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Truths Containing Empty Names”, in Piotr Stalmaszczyk and Luis Fernández Moreno (eds.), Philosophical Approaches to Proper Names, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH: 175–202. (Scholar)
- McLaughlin, B., 2000, “Self-Knowledge, Externalism, and Skepticism”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 74: 93–117. doi:10.1111/1467-8349.00065 (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary, 1975, “The Meaning of
‘Meaning’”, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7: 131–193. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981 [1999], “Brains in a Vat”, in Reason, Truth, and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1: 1–21; reprinted as “Brains in a Vat”, in DeRose & Warfield 1999: 27–42 (Chapter 2). All page references are to DeRose and Warfield 1999. (Scholar)
- Soames, Scott, 2002, Beyond Rigidity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195145283.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Steup, Matthias, 2003, “Two Forms of Antiskepticism”, in Susanna Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Cambridge,Mass.: The MIT Press: 277–293. (Scholar)
- Tymoczko, Thomas, 1989, “In Defense of Putnam’s Brains”, Philosophical Studies, 57(3): 281–297. doi:10.1007/bf00372698 (Scholar)
- Warfield, Ted A., 1998, “A Priori Knowledge of the World: Knowing the World by Knowing Our Minds”, Philosophical Studies, 92(1/2): 127–147. Reprinted in DeRose & Warfield 1999: 76–92 (ch. 5). doi:10.1023/a:1017180105616. (Scholar)
- Wright, Crispin, 1985, “Facts and Certainty”,
Proceedings of the British Academy, 71: 429–472.
[Wright 1985 available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “On Putnam’s Proof That We Are Not Brains-in-a-vat”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 92(1): 67–94. doi:10.1093/aristotelian/92.1.67 (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey’s Paradox and Putnam’s Proof”, Philosophical Issues, 10: 140–163. doi:10.1111/j.1758-2237.2000.tb00018.x (Scholar)
- Yeakel, Daniel, 2016, “Existence Hedges and Neutral Free Logic”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 116(3): 379–386. doi:10.1093/arisoc/aow016 (Scholar)