Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Moral Skepticism" by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Audi, Robert, 2015, Moral Perception, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Ayer, A. J., 1952, Language, Truth, and Logic, New York: Dover. (First edition originally published in 1935.) (Scholar)
Bambrough, Renford, 1979, Moral Skepticism and Moral Knowledge, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Beaulieu, Gerard, 2009, “Sinnott-Armstrong’s Moral Skepticism: A Murdochian Response”, Dialogue, 48(3): 673–678. (Scholar)
Bergmann, Michael, and Kain, Patrick (eds.), 2014, Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Besong, Brian, 2014, “Moral Intuition and Disagreement”, Synthese, 191(12): 2767–2789. (Scholar)
Bhogal, Harjit, 2023, “Explanationism vs Modalism in Debunking (and Theory Choice)”, Mind, 132(528): 1005–1027. (Scholar)
Blackburn, Simon, 1993, Essays in Quasi-Realism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Braddock, Matthew, 2017, “Debunking Arguments from Insensitivity”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7(2): 91–113. (Scholar)
Brink, David, 1989, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Butchvarov, Panayot, 1989, Skepticism in Ethics, Bloomington and Indianapolis; Indiana University Press. (Scholar)
Copp, David, 1991, “Moral Skepticism”, Philosophical Studies, 62: 203–233. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Darwinian Skepticism about Moral Realism”, Philosophical Issues, 18: 186–206. (Scholar)
DePaul, Michael, 2009, “Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism and the Problem of the Criterion”, Philosophical Issues, 19(1): 38–56. (Scholar)
Descartes, René, 1641, Meditations on First Philosophy, translated by D. C. Cress, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979. (Scholar)
Enoch, David, 2009, “How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?”, The Journal of Ethics, 13(1): 15–50. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Gibbard Allan, 1990, Wise Choices, Apt Feeling, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, Thinking How to Live, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Hare, R. M., 1981, Moral Thinking, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Harman, Gilbert, 1977, The Nature of Morality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hill, Scott, 2016, “From Isolation to Skepticism”, Erkenntnis, 81:649–668. (Scholar)
Huemer, Michael, 2007, Ethical Intuitionism, London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
Joyce, Richard, 2001, The Myth of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, The Evolution of Morality, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Kagan, Shelly, 2023, Answering Moral Skepticism, New York: Oxford Unievrsity Press. (Scholar)
Kahane, Guy, 2011, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments”, Nous, 45:103–125. (Scholar)
Lutz, Matt, 2021, “The Moral Closure Argument”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 19(1): 80–110. (Scholar)
Machuca, Diego E. (ed.), 2017, Moral Skepticism: New Essays, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Mackie, J. L., 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, New York: Penguin. (Scholar)
Maguire, Barry, 2015, “Grounding the Autonomy of Ethics”, in Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 10), Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press (Scholar)
May, Joshua, 2013, “Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43(3): 341–359. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
McDonald, Kelsey, Graves, Rose, Yin, Siyuan, Weese, Tara, & Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 2021, “Valence framing effects on moral judgments: A meta-analysis”, Cognition, 212: 104703. (Scholar)
McPherson, Tristram, and Plunkett, David, 2015, “Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 10), Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Pigden, Charles, 2015, “Hume on Is and Ought: Logic, Promises, and the Duke of Wellington”, The Oxford Handbook of David Hume, Paul Russell (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Putnam, Hilary, 1981, Reason, Truth, and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Russell, Bruce, 1988, “Two Forms of Ethical Skepticism”, in L. Pojman (ed.), Ethical Theory, Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth. (Scholar)
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, 1996, “Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory”, in Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, W. Sinnott-Armstrong and M. Timmons, (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Schroeder, Mark, 2010, Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, translated by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Shafer-Landau, Russ, 2005, Moral Realism: A Defense, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Sidgwick, Henry, 1874/1966, Methods of Ethics, New York: Dover. (First edition originally published in 1874.) (Scholar)
Singer, Marcus, 1973, “Moral Skepticism”, in Skepticism and Moral Principles, C. Carter (ed.), Evanston, Ill.: New University Press. (Scholar)
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 2006, Moral Skepticisms, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Expressivism and Embedding”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 677–693. (Scholar)
Sparks, Jacob, 2018, “Is, Ought, and the Regress Argument”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97(3): 528–543. (Scholar)
Stevenson, Charles, 1944, Ethics and Language, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
Street, Sharon, 2006, “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value”, Philosophical Studies, 127: 109–166. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Reply to Copp: Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism Worth Worrying About”, Philosophical Issues, 18: 207–228. (Scholar)
Sturgeon, Nicholas, 1985, “Moral Explanations”, in Morality, Reason, and Truth, D. Copp and D. Zimmerman (eds.), Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld. (Scholar)
Timmons, Mark, 1999, Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Tropman, Elizabeth, 2017, “Intuitionism in Moral Epistemology”, in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, T. McPherson & D. Plunkett (eds.), London: Routledge, pp. 472–483 . (Scholar)
Van Roojen, Mark, 2013, “Moral Intuitionism, Experiments, and Skeptical Arguments”, in Intuitions, Booth and Rowbottom (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Vavova, Katia, 2014, “Moral Disagreement and Moral Skepticism”, Philosophical Perspectives, 28(1): 302–333. (Scholar)
Wellman, Carl, 1971, Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. (Scholar)
Williams, Bernard, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)

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