Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Skepticism" by Juan Comesaña and Peter Klein

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Aikin, Scott F., 2011, Epistemology and the Regress Problem, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Aikin, Scott F. and Jeanne Peijnenburg (eds.), 2014, The Regress Problem: Metatheory, Development, and Criticism, special volume of Metaphilosophy, 45(2): 139–324. (Scholar)
Anderson, Charity and John Hawthorne, 2019a, “Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes”, in Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Volume 6), Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 234–257. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0010 (Scholar)
–––, 2019b, “Pragmatic Encroachment and Closure”, in Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology, Brian Kim and Matthew McGrath (eds.), (Routledge Studies in Epistemology), New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Audi, Robert, 1988, Belief, Justification and Knowledge, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. (Scholar)
BonJour, Laurence, 1978, “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(1): 1–13. (Scholar)
BonJour, Laurence, 1985, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Chisholm, Roderick M., 1966, Theory of Knowledge, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; first edition, 1966; second edition, 1977; third edition, 1989. (Scholar)
–––, 1973, The Problem of the Criterion, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. (Scholar)
Cohen, Stewart, 1987, “Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards”, Synthese, 73(1): 3–26. doi:10.1007/bf00485440 (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “How to Be a Fallibilist”, Philosophical Perspectives, 2: 91–123. doi:10.2307/2214070 (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons”, Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 57–89. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.3 (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Contextualism and Skepticism”, Philosophical Issues, 10: 94–107. doi:10.1111/j.1758-2237.2000.tb00013.x (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Knowledge, Speaker and Subject”, Philosophical Quarterly, 55(219): 199–212. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning, and A Priori Justification”, Philosophical Perspectives, 24: 141–159. doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00188.x (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, “Contextualism Defended”, Steup, Turri, Sosa 2014: 69–75. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “Contextualism Defended Some More”, in Steup, Turri, Sosa 2014: 79–83. (Scholar)
Coliva, Annalisa, 2015, Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology, London: Palgrave Macmillian. doi:10.1057/9781137501899 (Scholar)
Comesaña, Juan, 2005a, “Pyrrhonian Problematic, The”, in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, second edition, Donald M. Borchert (ed.), Macmillian. (Scholar)
–––, 2005b, “Unsafe Knowledge”, Synthese, 146(3): 395–404. doi:10.1007/s11229-004-6213-7 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals”, Philosophy Compass, 2(6): 781–791. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00076.x (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against Moderation”, Res Philosophica, 90(2): 237–260. doi:10.11612/resphil.2013.90.2.9 (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, “There is no Immediate Justification”, in Steup, Turri, and Sosa 2014: 222–234. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “Reply to Pryor”, in Steup, Turri, and Sosa 2014: 239–243. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “On Sharon and Spectre’s Argument against Closure”, Philosophical Studies, 174(4): 1039–1046. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0722-3 (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, Being Rational and Being Right, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Conee, Earl, 2014a, “Contextualism Contested”, in Steup, Turri, and Sosa 2014: 60–68. (Scholar)
Conee, Earl, 2014b, “Contextualism Contested Some More”, in Steup, Turri, and Sosa 2014: 75–78. (Scholar)
David, Marian and Ted A. Warfield, 2008, “Knowledge-Closure and Skepticism”, in Epistemology: New Essays, Quentin Smith (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 137–187. (Scholar)
DeRose, Keith, 1992, “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52(4): 913–929. doi:10.2307/2107917 (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Solving the Skeptical Problem”, The Philosophical Review, 104(1): 1–52. doi:10.2307/2186011 (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context”, The Philosophical Review, 111(2): 167–203. doi:10.2307/3182618 (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68(2): 346–350. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00346.x (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism, and the New Invariantism”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 55(219): 172–198. doi:10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00394.x (Scholar)
DeRose, Keith and Ted A. Warfield (eds.), 1999, Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Descartes, René, 1641, Meditations on First Philosophy, Leiden; translated in Philosophical Works of Descartes (Volume 1), Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (eds./trans.), New York: Dover Publications, 1931. (Scholar)
Dretske, Fred I., 1970, “Epistemic Operators”, The Journal of Philosophy, 67(24): 1007–1023. doi:10.2307/2024710 (Scholar)
Fantl, Jeremy and Matthew McGrath, 2002, “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification”, The Philosophical Review, 111(1): 67–94. doi:10.2307/3182570 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75(3): 558–589. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00093.x (Scholar)
–––, 2009, Knowledge in an Uncertain World, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.001.0001 (Scholar)
Feldman, Richard and Earl Conee, 1985, “Evidentialism”, Philosophical Studies, 48(1): 15–34. doi:10.1007/bf00372404 (Scholar)
Firth, Roderick, 1978, “Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts?”, in Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt, Alvin I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 215–229. doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7634-5_12 (Scholar)
Foley, Richard, 1993, Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Frances, Bryan, 2005, Scepticism Comes Alive, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199282137.001.0001 (Scholar)
Friedman, Jane, 2013, “Suspended Judgment”, Philosophical Studies, 162(2): 165–181. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Why Suspend Judging?”, Noûs, 51(2): 302–326. doi:10.1111/nous.12137 (Scholar)
Goldman, Alvin I., 1979, “What Is Justified Belief?”, in Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology, George Sotiros Pappas (ed.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1–23. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_1 (Scholar)
Haack, Susan, 1993, Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, John, 2003, Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “The Case for Closure”, in Steup, Turri, and Sosa 2014: 40–56. (Scholar)
Hobbes, Thomas, 1651, Leviathan, London. (Scholar)
Huemer, Michael, 2001, “The Problem Of Defeasible Justification”, Erkenntnis, 54(3): 375–397. doi:10.1023/a:1010718330593 (Scholar)
Klein, Peter D., 1981, Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails”, Philosophical Topics, 23(1): 213–236. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons”, Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 297–325. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.14 (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism”, Philosophical Issues, 10: 108–116. doi:10.1111/j.1758-2237.2000.tb00014.x (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning”, Philosophical Studies, 134(1): 1–17. doi:10.1007/s11098-006-9012-9 (Scholar)
Lehrer, Keith, 1990, Theory of Knowledge, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (Scholar)
Lewis, David, 1996, “Elusive Knowledge”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(4): 549–567. doi:10.1080/00048409612347521 (Scholar)
Luper-Foy, Steven (ed.), 1987, The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
McGrath, Matthew, 2004, “Review of Knowledge and Lotteries, by John Hawthorne”, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2004.08.06. URL = <https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/knowledge-and-lotteries/> (Scholar)
Moore, G.E., 1939 [1993], “Proof of an External World”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 25(5): 273–300; reprinted in his Philosophical Papers, New York, NY: Macmillan, 1959; reprinted in G. E. Moore: Selected Writings, T. Baldwin (ed.), Routledge, London, 1993: 147–70. (Scholar)
Nozick, Robert, 1981, Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Ortega y Gasset, José, 1940, Ideas y Creencias, Buenos Aires: Espasa Calpe. (Scholar)
Peijnenburg, Jeanne and Sylvia Wenmackers (eds.), 2014, “Infinite Regress in Decision Theory, Philosophy of Science, and Formal Epistemology”, special issue of Synthese, 191(4): 627–723. (Scholar)
Pryor, James, 2000, “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist”, Noûs, 34(4): 517–549. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00277 (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “What’s Wrong with Moore’s Argument?”, Philosophical Issues, 14: 349–378. doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00034.x (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, “There Is Immediate Justification”, in Steup, Turri, and Sosa 2014: 202–221. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “Reply to Comesaña”, in Steup, Turri, and Sosa 2014: 235–238. (Scholar)
Quine, W.V. and J. S. Ullian, 1970 [1978], The Web of Belief, New York: Random House; second edition, 1978. (Scholar)
Radford, Colin, 1966, “Knowledge—By Examples”, Analysis, 27(1): 1–11. doi:10.2307/3326979 (Scholar)
Rinard, Susanna, 2018, “Reasoning One’s Way Out of Skepticism”, in The Mystery of Skepticism: New Explorations, Kevin McCain and Ted Poston (eds.), Leiden: Brill. doi:10.1163/9789004393530_015 (Scholar)
Sharon, Assaf and Levi Spectre, 2017, “Evidence and the Openness of Knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, 174(4): 1001–1037. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0723-2 (Scholar)
Sosa, Ernest, 2002, “Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge”, in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Paul K. Moser (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Stanley, Jason, 2005, Knowledge and Practical Interests, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199288038.001.0001 (Scholar)
Steup, Matthias, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa (eds.), 2014, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Contemporary Debates in Philosophy 14), second edition, Chichester: Wiley Blackwell. (Scholar)
Stine, G. C., 1976, “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure”, Philosophical Studies, 29(4): 249–261. doi:10.1007/bf00411885 (Scholar)
Turri, John and Peter D. Klein (eds.), 2014, Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Van Cleve, James, 2005, “Why Coherence is Not Enough: A Defense of Moderate Foundationalism”, in Steup, Turri, and Sosa 2014: 255–266. (Scholar)
Vogel, Jonathan, 1987, “Tracking, Closure and Inductive Knowledge”, in Luper-Foy 1987: 197–215. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation”, Journal of Philosophy, 87(11): 658–666. (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, “E & \(\sim H*\)”, in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 87–107. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.003.0005
–––, 2014b, “The Refutation of Skepticism”, in Steup, Turri, and Sosa 2014: 108–120. (Scholar)
Wedgwood, Ralph, 2013, “A Priori Bootstrapping”, in The A Priori in Philosophy, Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Williamson, Timothy, 2000, Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Wilson, Jessica, 2012, “The Regress Argument against Cartesian Skepticism”, Analysis, 72(4): 668–673. doi:10.1093/analys/ans117 (Scholar)
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1969, On Certainty, Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Wright, Crispin, 2004, “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 78: 167–212. doi:10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00121.x (Scholar)

Generated Mon Dec 4 03:59:53 2023

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