Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Social Choice Theory" by Christian List
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- Arrow, K., 1951/1963, Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: Wiley. (Scholar)
- Austen-Smith, D. and J. S. Banks, 1996, “Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem.” American Political Science Review, 90: 34–45. (Scholar)
- Bartholdi, J. J., C. A. Tovey, and M. A. Trick, 1989, “The computational difficulty of manipulating an election.” Social Choice and Welfare, 6: 227–241. (Scholar)
- Ben-Yashar, R. and S. Nitzan, 1997, “The optimal decision rule for fixed-size committees in dichotomous choice situations: the general result.” International Economic Review, 38: 175–186. (Scholar)
- Berend, D. and J. Paroush, 1998, “When is Condorcet's Jury Theorem valid?” Social Choice and Welfare, 15: 481–488. (Scholar)
- Berend, D. and L. Sapir., 2007, “Monotonicity in Condorcet's Jury Theorem with dependent voters.” Social Choice and Welfare, 28: 507–528. (Scholar)
- Black, D., 1948, “On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making.” Journal of Political Economy, 56: 23–34. (Scholar)
- Blackorby, C., W. Bossert, and D. Donaldson, 1999, “Information Invariance in Variable-Population Social-Choice Problems.” International Economic Review, 40: 403–422. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics, and Ethics,. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Blau, J. H., 1975, “Liberal Values and Independence.” Review of Economic Studies, 42: 395–401. (Scholar)
- Boland, P. J., 1989, “Majority systems and the Condorcet jury theorem.” Statistician, 38: 181–189. (Scholar)
- Bossert, W. and J. A. Weymark, 1996, “Utility in social choice.” Handbook of Utility Theory, Volume 2. S. Barberà, P. J. Hammond and C. Seidel, (eds.). Boston: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- Bossert, W., C. X. Qi, and J. A. Weymark, 2013, “Extensive social choice and the measurement of group fitness in biological hierarchies.” Biology and Philosophy, 28: 75–98. (Scholar)
- Bovens, L. and W. Rabinowicz, 2006, “Democratic Answers to Complex Questions: An Epistemic Perspective.” Synthese, 150: 131–153. (Scholar)
- Brams, S. J. and A. D. Taylor, 1996, Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Brandt, F., V. Conitzer, and U. Endriss, 2013, “Computational Social Choice.” Multiagent Systems. G. Weiss (ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 213–283. (Scholar)
- Brighouse, H. and M. Fleurbaey, 2010, “Democracy and Proportionality.” Journal of Political Philosophy, 18: 137–155. (Scholar)
- Chapman, B., 2002, “Rational Aggregation.” Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 1: 337–354. (Scholar)
- Condorcet, Nicolas de, 1785, Essay sur l'Application de l'Analyse à la Probabilité des Décisions Rendue à la Pluralité des Voix. Paris. (Scholar)
- Conradt, L. and C. List, 2009, “Group decisions in humans and animals: a survey.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, B 364: 719–742. (Scholar)
- Craven, J., 1982, “Liberalism and Individual Preferences.” Theory and Decision, 14: 351–360. (Scholar)
- Deschamps, R. and L. Gevers, 1978, “Leximin and utilitarian rules: A joint characterization.” Journal of Economic Theory, 17: 143–163. (Scholar)
- Dietrich, F., 2006, “Judgment Aggregation: (Im)Possibility Theorems.” Journal of Economic Theory, 126: 286–298. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “A generalised model of judgment aggregation.” Social Choice and Welfare, 28: 529–565.
- –––, 2008, “The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified.” Episteme, 5: 56–73. (Scholar)
- Dietrich, F. and C. List, 2004, “A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence.” Synthese, 142: 175–202. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007a, “Judgment aggregation by quota rules: majority voting generalized.” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 19: 391–424. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007b, “Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation.” Social Choice and Welfare, 29: 19–33. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007c, “Strategy-proof judgment aggregation.” Economics and Philosophy, 23: 269–300. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007d, “Opinion pooling on general agendas.” [Dietrich and List 2007d available online (pdf)] (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Judgment aggregation without full rationality.” Social Choice and Welfare, 31: 15–39. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010a, “Majority voting on restricted domains.” Journal of Economic Theory, 145: 512–543. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010b, “The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory.” Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 3: 215–234. (Scholar)
- Dietrich, F. and P. Mongin, 2010, “The premise-based approach to judgment aggregation.” Journal of Economic Theory, 145: 562–582. (Scholar)
- Dietrich, F. and K. Spiekermann, 2013, “Epistemic Democracy with Defensible Premises.” Economics and Philosophy, 29(1): 87–120. (Scholar)
- Dokow, E. and R. Holzman, 2010a, “Aggregation of binary evaluations.” Journal of Economic Theory, 145: 495–511. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010b, “Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions.” Journal of Economic Theory, 145: 544–561. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010c, “Aggregation of non-binary evaluations.” Advances in Applied Mathematics, 45: 487–504. (Scholar)
- Dowding, K. and M. van Hees, 2003, “The Construction of Rights.” American Political Science Review, 97: 281–293. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “In Praise of Manipulation.” British Journal of Political Science, 38: 1–15. (Scholar)
- Dryzek, J. and C. List, 2003, “Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation.” British Journal of Political Science, 33: 1–28. (Scholar)
- Elsholtz, C. and C. List, 2005, “A Simple Proof of Sen's Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions.” Elemente der Mathematik, 60: 45–56. (Scholar)
- Elster, J., 2013, “Excessive Ambitions (II).” Capitalism and Society, 8, Issue 1, Article 1. (Scholar)
- Estlund, D., 1994, “Opinion Leaders, Independence, and Condorcet's Jury Theorem.” Theory and Decision, 36: 131–162. (Scholar)
- Feddersen, T. J. and W. Pesendorfer, 1998, “Convicting the Innocent.” American Political Science Review, 92: 23–35. (Scholar)
- Gaertner, W., 2001, Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “De jure naturae et gentium: Samuel von Pufendorf's contribution to social choice theory and economics.” Social Choice and Welfare, 25: 231–241. (Scholar)
- Gaertner, W., P. K. Pattanaik, and K. Suzumura, 1992, “Individual Rights Revisited.” Economica, 59: 161–177. (Scholar)
- Gaertner, W. and E. Schokkaert, 2012, Empirical Social Choice: Questionnaire-Experimental Studies on Distributive Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Gärdenfors, P., 2006, “An Arrow-like theorem for voting with logical consequences.” Economics and Philosophy, 22: 181–190. (Scholar)
- Gehrlein, W. V., 1983, “Condorcet's Paradox.” Theory and Decision, 15: 161–197. (Scholar)
- Genest, C. and J. V. Zidek, 1986, “Combining Probability Distributions: A Critique and Annotated Bibliography.” Statistical Science, 1: 113–135. (Scholar)
- Gibbard, A., 1969, “Social Choice and the Arrow Conditions.” Unpublished manuscript. [Gibbard 1969 available online (pdf)] (Scholar)
- –––, 1973, “Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result.” Econometrica, 41: 587–601. (Scholar)
- Gigliotti, G. A., 1986, “Comment on Craven.” Theory and Decision, 21: 89–95. (Scholar)
- Gilboa, I., D. Samet, and D. Schmeidler, 2004, “Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes.” Journal of Political Economy, 112: 932–938. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A., 2004, “Group Knowledge versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology.” Episteme, A Journal of Social Epistemology, 1: 11–22. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Why Social Epistemology Is Real Epistemology.” Social Epistemology. A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. Pritchard (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Goodin, R. E. and C. List, 2006, “A Conditional Defense of Plurality Rule: Generalizing May's Theorem in a Restricted Informational Environment.” American Journal of Political Science, 50: 940–949. (Scholar)
- Grofman, B., G. Owen, and S. L. Feld, 1983, “Thirteen theorems in search of the truth.” Theory and Decision, 15: 261–278. (Scholar)
- Guilbaud, G. T., [1952] 1966, “Theories of the General Interest, and the Logical Problem of Aggregation.” Readings in Mathematical Social Science. P. F. Lazarsfeld and N. W. Henry (eds.). Cambridge/MA: MIT Press, pp. 262–307. (Scholar)
- Harbour, D. and C. List, 2000, “Optimality Theory and the problem of constraint aggregation.” MIT Working Papers in Linguistics and Philosophy 1: The Linguistics/Philosophy Interface. R. Bhatt, P. Hawley, M. Hackl and I. Maitra (eds.). Cambridge, MA: MITWIPL, pp. 175–213. (Scholar)
- Harrison, G. W. and T. McDaniel, 2008, “Voting Games and Computational Complexity.” Oxford Economic Papers, 60: 546–565. (Scholar)
- Hausman, D., 1995, “The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons.” Mind, 104: 473–490. (Scholar)
- Hurley, S., 1985, “Supervenience and the Possibility of Coherence.” Mind, 94: 501–525. (Scholar)
- Inada, K.-I., 1964, “A Note on the Simple Majority Decision Rule.” Econometrica, 32: 525–531. (Scholar)
- Kanazawa, S., 1998, “A brief note on a further refinement of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for heterogeneous groups.” Mathematical Social Sciences, 35: 69–73. (Scholar)
- Knight, J. and J. Johnson, 1994, “Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of Democratic Legitimacy.” Political Theory, 22: 277–296. (Scholar)
- Konieczny, S. and R. Pino Pérez, 2002, “Merging Information Under Constraints: A Logical Framework.” Journal of Logic and Computation, 12: 773–808. (Scholar)
- Kornhauser, L. A. and L. G. Sager, 1986, “Unpacking the Court.” Yale Law Journal, 96: 82–117. (Scholar)
- Kroedel, T. and F. Huber, 2013, “Counterfactual Dependence and Arrow.” Noûs, 47(3): 453–466. (Scholar)
- Ladha, K., 1992, “The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech and Correlated Votes.” American Journal of Political Science, 36: 617–634. (Scholar)
- Lehrer, K. and C. Wagner, 1981, Rational Consensus in Science and Society. Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel. (Scholar)
- List, C., 2001, “A Note on Introducing a ‘Zero-Line’ of Welfare as an Escape-Route from Arrow's Theorem.” Pacific Economic Review, 6, special section in honour of Amartya Sen, 223–238. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003a, “The epistemology of special majority voting.” Working paper, London School of Economics. [List 2003a available online (pdf)] (Scholar)
- –––, 2003b, “Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate?” Erkenntnis, 58: 229–260. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003c, “A Possibility Theorem on Aggregation over Multiple Interconnected Propositions.” Mathematical Social Sciences, 45: 1–13 (with Corrigendum in Mathematical Social Sciences, 52: 109–110). (Scholar)
- –––, 2004a, “Multidimensional Welfare Aggregation.” Public Choice, 119: 119–142. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004b, “A Model of Path-Dependence in Decisions over Multiple Propositions.” American Political Science Review, 98: 495–513. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason.” Ethics, 116: 362–402. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “The Logical Space of Democracy.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 39: 262–297. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review.” Synthese, 187: 179–207. (Scholar)
- List, C. and R. E. Goodin, 2001, “Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem.” Journal of Political Philosophy, 9: 277–306. (Scholar)
- List, C., R. C. Luskin, J. S. Fishkin, and I. McLean, 2013, “Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls.” Journal of Politics, 75: 80–95. (Scholar)
- List, C. and P. Pettit, 2002, “Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result.” Economics and Philosophy, 18(1): 89–110. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared.” Synthese, 140: 207–235. (Scholar)
- May, K. O., 1952, “A set of independent, necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision.” Econometrica, 20: 680–684.
- –––, 1954, “Intransitivity, Utility, and the Aggregation of Preference Patterns.” Econometrica, 22: 1–13. (Scholar)
- McConway, K. J., 1981, “Marginalization and Linear Opinion Pools.” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 76: 410–414. (Scholar)
- McLean, I., 1990, “The Borda and Condorcet principles: Three medieval applications.” Social Choice and Welfare, 7: 99–108. (Scholar)
- McLean, I. and F. Hewitt (eds.), 1994, Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. (Scholar)
- McLean, I. S., A. McMillan, and B. L. Monroe, 1995, “Duncan Black and Lewis Carroll.” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 7: 107–123. (Scholar)
- ––– (eds.), 1996, A Mathematical Approach to Proportional Representation: Duncan Black on Lewis Carroll. Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- McLean, I. and A. B. Urken (eds.), 1995, Classics of Social Choice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Scholar)
- Miller, D., 1992, “Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice.” Political Studies, 40 (special issue): 54–67. (Scholar)
- Miller, M. K. and D. Osherson, 2009, “Methods for distance-based judgment aggregation.” Social Choice and Welfare, 32: 575–601. (Scholar)
- Monjardet, B., 2005, “Social choice theory and the ‘Centre de Mathématique Sociale’: some historical notes.” Social Choice and Welfare, 25: 433–456. (Scholar)
- Mongin, P., 1995, “Consistent Bayesian aggregation.” Journal of Economic Theory, 66: 313–351. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Spurious Unanimity and the Pareto Principle.” Paper presented at the Conference on Utilitarianism, New Orleans, March 1997. [Mongin 1997 available online (pdf)] (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Factoring Out the Impossibility of Logical Aggregation.” Journal of Economic Theory, 141: 100–113. (Scholar)
- Morreau, M., 2010, “It simply does not add up: Trouble with overall similarity.” Journal of Philosophy, 107: 469–490. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, “Theory Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn Vindicated.” Mind. (Scholar)
- Moulin, H., 1980, “On Strategy-Proofness and Single Peakedness.” Public Choice, 35: 437–455. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, Fair Division And Collective Welfare. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Mueller, D. C., 2003, Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Nehring, K., 2003, “Arrow's theorem as a corollary.” Economics Letters, 80: 379–382. (Scholar)
- Nehring, K. and C. Puppe, 2002, “Strategyproof Social Choice on Single-Peaked Domains: Possibility, Impossibility and the Space Between.” Unpublished manuscript, University of California at Davis. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “The structure of strategy-proof social choice—Part I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces.” Journal of Economic Theory, 135: 269–305. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Abstract Arrovian Aggregation.” Journal of Economic Theory, 145: 467–494. (Scholar)
- Okasha, S., 2009, “Individuals, groups, fitness and utility: multi-level selection meets social choice theory.” Biology and Philosophy, 24: 561–584. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Theory Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn versus Arrow.” Mind, 120: 83–115. (Scholar)
- Ooghe, E. and L. Lauwers, 2005, “Non-dictatorial extensive social choice.” Economic Theory, 25: 721–743. (Scholar)
- Parfit, D., 1984, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Pauly, M. and M. van Hees, 2006, “Logical Constraints on Judgment Aggregation.” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 35: 569–585. (Scholar)
- Pearl, J., 2000, Causality: models, reasoning, and inference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Pettit, P., 2001, “Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.” Philosophical Issues, 11: 268–299. (Scholar)
- Pigozzi, G., 2006, “Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation.” Synthese, 152: 285–298. (Scholar)
- Poisson, S. D., 1837, Recherches sur la probabilité des jugements en matière criminelle et en matière civile: précédées des règles générales du calcul des probabilités. (Scholar)
- Rawls, J., 1971, A Theory of Justice. Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Regenwetter, M., B. Grofman, A. A. J. Marley, and I. Tsetlin, 2006, Behavioral Social Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Riker, W., 1982, Liberalism against Populism. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co. (Scholar)
- Roberts, K., 1995, “Valued Opinions or Opinionated Values: The Double Aggregation Problem.” Choice, Welfare and Development: A Festschrift in Honour of Amartya Sen. K. Basu, P. K. Pattanaik, and K. Suzumura (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 141–165. (Scholar)
- Saari, D. G., 1990, “The Borda dictionary.” Social Choice and Welfare, 7: 279–317. (Scholar)
- Salles, M. (edited with introduction), 2005, “The history of Social Choice.” Special issue, Social Choice and Welfare, 25: 229–564. (Scholar)
- Satterthwaite, M., 1975, “Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions.” Journal of Economic Theory, 10: 187–217. (Scholar)
- Sen, A. K., 1966, “A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions.” Econometrica, 34: 491–499. (Scholar)
- –––, 1970a, “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal.” Journal of Political Economy, 78: 152–157. (Scholar)
- –––, 1970b, Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day. (Scholar)
- –––, 1977, “On weights and measures: informational constraints in social welfare analysis.” Econometrica, 45: 1539–1572. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, “Liberty and social choice.” Journal of Philosophy, 80: 5–28. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “The Possibility of Social Choice.” Nobel lecture, December 8, 1998, Stockholm. [Sen 1998 available online (pdf)] (Scholar)
- Shapley, L. and B. Grofman, 1984, “Optimizing group judgment accuracy in the presence of interdependencies.” Public Choice, 43: 329–343. (Scholar)
- Stegenga, J., 2013, “An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence.” Synthese, 190(2): 2391–2411. (Scholar)
- Suppes, P., 2005, “The pre-history of Kenneth Arrow's social choice and individual values.” Social Choice and Welfare, 25: 319–226. (Scholar)
- Thomson, W., 2000, “On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation.” Social Choice and Welfare, 18: 327–386. (Scholar)
- Tsetlin, I., M. Regenwetter, and B. Grofman, 2003, “The Impartial Culture Maximizes the Probability of Majority Cycles.” Social Choice and Welfare, 21: 387–398. (Scholar)
- Vacca, R., 1921, “Opinioni Individuali e Deliberazioni Collettive.” Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto,: 52–59. (Scholar)
- Ward, B., 1965, “Majority Voting and Alternative Forms of Public Enterprises.” The Public Economy of Urban Communities. J. Margolis (ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. (Scholar)
- Weymark, J., 2006, “The Normative Approach to the Measurement of Multidimensional Inequality.” Inequality and Economic Integration. F. Farina and E. Savaglio (eds.), London: Routledge, pp. 303–328. (Scholar)
- Wilson, R., 1975, “On the Theory of Aggregation.” Journal of Economic Theory, 10: 89–99. (Scholar)
