Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Social Norms" by Cristina Bicchieri, Ryan Muldoon and Alessandro Sontuoso

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  • Bicchieri, Cristina and Yoshitaka Fukui, 1999, “The Great Illusion: Ignorance, Informational Cascades and the Persistence of Unpopular Norms”, Business Ethics Quarterly, 9(1): 127–155. doi:10.2307/3857639 (Scholar)
  • Bicchieri, Cristina and Azi Lev-On, 2007, “Computer-Mediated Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: An Experimental Analysis”, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 6(2): 139–168. doi:10.1177/1470594x07077267 (Scholar)
  • Bicchieri, Cristina and Alessandro Sontuoso, 2015, “I Cannot Cheat on You after We Talk”, in The Prisoner’s Dilemma, Martin Peterson (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–114. doi:10.1017/cbo9781107360174.007 (Scholar)
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  • Bicchieri, Cristina and Jiji Zhang, 2012, “An Embarrassment of Riches: Modeling Social Preferences in Ultimatum Games”, in Philosophy of Economics, (Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 13), Uskali Mäki (ed.), Amsterdam: Elsevier. (Scholar)
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