Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Social Norms" by Cristina Bicchieri and Ryan Muldoon

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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  • Akerlof, George A. (1976). “The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4): 599–617. [Available online] (Scholar)
  • Alexander, J.M. (2005). “The Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism,” Analyse & Kritik, 27: 106–113. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2000). “Evolutionary Explanations of Distributive Justice,” Philosophy of Science, 67: 490–516. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2007). The Structural Evolution of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Arrow, Kenneth J. (1971). “A Utilitarian Approach to the Concept of Equality in Public Expenditure,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85(3): 409–15. [Available online] (Scholar)
  • Axelrod, R. (1992). “Citation Classic: How to Promote Cooperation,” Social and Behavioral Sciences, 44: 10. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation, New York., Basic Books. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1986). “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,” American Political Science Review, 80 (4): 1095–1111. (Scholar)
  • Bicchieri, C. (1990). “Norms of Cooperation,” Ethics, 100: 838–861. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1993). Rationality and Coordination, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Second Edition, 1996. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1997). “Learning to Cooperate,” in C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey and B. Skyrms (eds.), The Dynamics of Norms, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1999). “Local Fairness,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LIX (1): 229–236. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2002). “Covenants without swords: group identity, norms, and communication in social dilemmas,” Rationality and Society, 14(2): 192–228. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2006). The Grammar of Society: the Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Bicchieri, C. and A. Chavez (2010). “Behaving as Expected: Public Information and Fairness Norms,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23(2): 161–178. (Scholar)
  • Bicchieri, C. and J. Duffy (1997). “Corruption Cycles,” in Paul Heywood, Political Corruption, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 61–79. (Scholar)
  • Bicchieri, C., J. Duffy, and G. Tolle (2004). “Trust among strangers,” Philosophy of Science, 71: 1–34. (Scholar)
  • Bicchieri, C. and Y. Fukui (1999). “The Great Illusion: Ignorance, Informational Cascades and the Persistence of Unpopular Norms”, Business Ethics Quarterly, 9: 127–155. (Scholar)
  • Bicchieri, C. and A. Lev-On (2007). “Computer-Mediated Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: An Experimental Analysis,” Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 6: 139–168. (Scholar)
  • Bicchieri, C. and C. Rovelli, (1995). ‘Evolution and Revolution: The Dynamics of Corruption.’ Rationality and Society, 7: 201–224. (Scholar)
  • Bicchieri, C. and E. Xiao (2009). “Do the right thing: but only if others do so,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 22: 191–208. (Scholar)
  • Binmore, K. and L. Samuelson (1992). “Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata,” Journal of Economic Theory, 57: 278–305. (Scholar)
  • Bornstein, G. and M. Ben-Yossef (1994). “Cooperation in Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 30: 52–67. (Scholar)
  • Brewer, M. B. (1979). “Ingroup Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive Motivational Analysis,” Psychological Bulletin, 86: 307–324. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1991). “The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17: 475–482. (Scholar)
  • Brewer, M. B. and S. K. Schneider (1990). “Social identity and social dilemmas: A double-edged sword,” in D. Abrams & M. Hogg (eds.), Social identity theory: Constructive and Critical advances, Wheatsheaf, NY: Harvester. (Scholar)
  • Cancian, F. (1975). What are norms? A Study of beliefs and action in a Maya community, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Cialdini, R., C. Kallgren, and R. Reno (1991). “A focus theory of normative conduct,” in L. Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, New York: Academic Press, pp. 201–234.
  • Coleman, J. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge, MA: Belknap. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1989). “The Rational Choice Approach to Legal Rules” Chicago-Kent Law Review, 65: 177–191. (Scholar)
  • Dawes, R. M. (1974). “Guttman Scaling Randomized Responses: A Technique for Evaluating the Underlying Structures of Behaviors to Which People May not Wish to Admit,” Working paper, Eugene: Oregon Research Institute (University of Oregon). (Scholar)
  • ––– (1980). “Social dilemmas,” Annual Review of Psychology, 31: 169–193. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1991). “Social dilemmas, economic self-interest and evolutionary theory,” in D.R. Brown & J.E.K. Smith (eds.), Recent Research in Psychology: Frontiers of Mathematical Psychology: Essays in Honor of Clyde Coombs, New York: Springer-Verlag, 53–79. (Scholar)
  • Deutscher, I. (1973). “What,” We Say/What We Do: Sentiments and Acts, Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman. (Scholar)
  • Diamond, A. S. (1935). Primitive Law, London: Watts. (Scholar)
  • Durkheim, E. (1950). The Rules of Sociological Method, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1950). Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. (Scholar)
  • Ellickson, R. (1991). Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
  • Elster, J. (1989). The Cement of Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Fishbein, M. (1967). “A consideration of beliefs and their role in attitude measurement,” in Readings in attitude theory and measurement, Martin Fishbein (ed.), New York: Wiley.
  • Freeman, L. C. and T. Aatov (1960). “Invalidity of indirect and direct measures of attitude toward cheating,” Journal of Personality, 28: 443–447. (Scholar)
  • Gaertner, S.L., and J.F. Dovidio (1986). “The aversive form of racism” in J.F. Dovidio and S.L. Gaertner (eds.), Prejudice, Discrimination and Racism: Theory and Research, Orlando, FL: Academic Press, pp. 61–89. (Scholar)
  • Geertz, C. (1973). “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
  • Gintis, H. (2000). Game Theory Evolving, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Granovetter, M. (1985). “Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness,” The American Journal of Sociology, 91(3): 681–510. (Scholar)
  • Hamilton W.D. (1964). “The genetical evolution of social behaviour I and II,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7: 1–16 and 17–52. (Scholar)
  • Hardin, R. (1982). Collective Action, New York: Resources for the Future. (Scholar)
  • Harding, J., B. Kutner, H. Proshansky and I. Chein (1954, 1969). “Prejudice and Ethnic Relations,” in G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (eds), Handbook of Social Psychology (Volume V), 2nd edition, Reading: Addison Wesley. (Scholar)
  • Hechter, M. and K.-D. Opp (2001). Social Norms, New York: Russel Sage Foundation. (Scholar)
  • Hirshmann, A. (1982). Shifting Involvements: Private interest and public action, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Hoebel, Adamson E. (1954). The Law of Primitive Man, Cambridge, MA: Atheneum. (Scholar)
  • Hogg, M.A., and J.C. Turner (1987). “Social identity and conformity: a theory of referent information influence,” in W. Doise & S. Moscovici (eds.), Current Issues in European Social Psychology (Volume 2), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Homans, G. C. (1950). The Human Group, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1961). Social Behavior, New York: Harcourt Brace and World. (Scholar)
  • Insko, C. A., and J. Schopler (1967). “Triadic consistency: A statement of affective-cognitive-conative consistency,” Psychological Review, 74: 361–376. (Scholar)
  • Klassen, A. D., C. J. Williams, and E. E. Levitt (1989). Sex and morality in the U.S., Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press. (Scholar)
  • Kramer, R.M. and M. B. Brewer (1984). “Effects of Group Identity on Resource Use in a Simulated Commons Dilemma,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46: 1044–1057. (Scholar)
  • LaPiere, R. T. (1934). “Attitudes vs. Actions,” Social Forces, 13: 230–237. (Scholar)
  • Lewis, D. (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1975). “Languages and Language,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 3: 3–35, K. Gunderson (ed.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,. (Scholar)
  • Mackay, C. (1841). Extraordinary popular delusions and the madness of crowds, N. Stone (ed.), Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 1995. (Scholar)
  • Mackie, G. (1996). “Ending footbinding and infibulation: A conventional account,” American Sociological Review, 61: 999–1017. (Scholar)
  • Matza, D. (1964). Delinquency and Drift, New York: John Wiley and Sons. (Scholar)
  • Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973). “The Logic of Animal Conflict,” Nature, 246: 15–18. (Scholar)
  • Miller, D. T., and R. K. Ratner (1996). “The power of the myth of self-interest,” in L. Montada and M. Lerner (eds.), Current societal concerns about justice, New York: Plenum Press, pp. 25–48. (Scholar)
  • Nachbar, J. (1990). “Evolutionary Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties,” International Journal of Game Theory, 19: 59–89. (Scholar)
  • O'Gorman, H.J. (1975). “Pluralistic Ignorance and White Estimates of White Support for Racial Segregation,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 39: 313–330. (Scholar)
  • Olson, Mancur (1971 [1965]). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, revised edition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Pagel, E. (2003). Beyond Belief: The Secret Gospel of Thomas, New York: Vintage Books. (Scholar)
  • Parsons, T. (1951). The Social System, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1968 [1937]). The Structure of Social Action. A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers, New York, London: Free Press.
  • Parsons, T., and E. A. Shils (1951). Towards a General Theory of Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
  • Posner, E. (2000). Law and Social Norms, Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
  • Prentice, D.A. and D.T. Miller (1993). “Pluralistic ignorance and alcohol use on campus: some consequences of misperceiving the social norm, ” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(2): 243–56. (Scholar)
  • Robinson, C. E. (1932). Straw votes, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
  • Rommetveit, R. (1955). Social Norms and Roles, Oslo: Akedemisk Forlag. (Scholar)
  • Schelling, T. C. (1966). The strategy of conflict, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1978). Micromotives and macrobehavior, New York: Norton. (Scholar)
  • Scott, J. F. (1971). Internalization of Norms: A Sociological Theory of Moral Commitment, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. (Scholar)
  • Sherif, M. (1936). The psychology of social norms, New York: Harper. (Scholar)
  • Skyrms, B. (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2004). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Sugden, R. (1986). The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare, second edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. (Scholar)
  • ––– (2000). “The Motivating Power of Expectations,” in J. Nida-Rumelin and W. Spohn (eds.), Practical Rationality, Rules, and Structure (Theory and Decision Library), Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
  • Tajfel, H. (1973). “The Roots of Prejudice: Cognitive Aspects”, in Psychology and Race, P. Watson (ed.), Chicago: Aldine, 76–95. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1981). Human groups and social categories, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
  • Taylor, P. D. and L. B. Jonker (1978). “Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics,” Mathematical Biosciences, 40: 145–156. (Scholar)
  • Thibaut, J. W. and H. H. Kelley (1959). The social Psychology of Groups, New York: Wiley. (Scholar)
  • Trivers, R. L. (1971). “The Evoution of Reciprocal Altruism,” The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46(1): 35–57. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1985). Social Evolution, Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin/Cummings. (Scholar)
  • Turnbull, C. M. (1972). The Mountain People, New York: Touchstone. (Scholar)
  • Turner, J.C., Hogg, M.A., Oakes, P.J., Reicher, S.D., and Wetherell, M. (1987). Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
  • Ullmann-Margalit, E. (1977). The Emergence of Norms, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
  • Vanderschraaf, P. (1995). “Convention as Correlated Equilibrium,” Erkenntnis, 42(1): 65–87. (Scholar)
  • Warner, L. and M. L. DeFleur (1969), “Attitude as an interactional concept: social constraint and social distance as intervening variables between attitudes and action,” American Sociological Review, 34: 153–169. (Scholar)
  • Wicker, A. W. (1969), “Attitude versus actions: The relationship of verbal and overt behavioral responses to attitude objects,” Idea: A journal of social issues, 25: 41–78. (Scholar)
  • Wrong, D. H. (1961), “The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology,” American Sociological Review, 26 (2): 183–193. (Scholar)
  • Wuthnow, R. (1991), Acts of Compassion: Caring for Others and Helping Ourselves, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
  • Young, H. P. (1993), “The Evolution of Conventions,” Econometrica, 61: 57–84. (Scholar)
  • ––– (1998),“Social Norms and Economic Welfare,” European Economic Review, 42: 821–830. [Available online] (Scholar)

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