Works by C. L. Stevenson Cited in This Article

• 1937, “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms,” reprinted in Stevenson 1963a, pp. 10–31. (Scholar)
• 1938a, “Ethical Judgments and Avoidability,” reprinted in Stevenson 1963a, pp. 138–152. (Scholar)
• 1938b, “Persuasive Definitions,” reprinted in Stevenson 1963a, pp. 32–54. (Scholar)
• 1944, Ethics and Language, New Haven: Yale University Press.
• 1946 [1943], “Some Relations Between Philosophy and the Study of Language,” reprinted in Stevenson 1963a, pp. 175–185. (Scholar)
• 1948a, “Meaning: Descriptive and Emotive,” reprinted in Stevenson 1963a, pp. 153–174. (Scholar)
• 1948b [1941], “The Nature of Ethical Disagreement,” reprinted in Stevenson 1963a, pp. 1–9. (Scholar)
• 1950, “The Emotive Conception of Ethics and Its Cognitive Implications,” reprinted in Stevenson 1963a, pp. 55–70. (Scholar)
• 1961–62a, “Reflections on John Dewey's Ethics,” in Stevenson 1963a, pp. 94–116. (Scholar)
• 1961–62b, “Relativism and Nonrelativism in the Theory of Value,” in Stevenson 1963a, pp. 71–93. (Scholar)
• 1963a, Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical Analysis, New Haven: Yale University Press.
• 1963b, “Retrospective Comments,” in Stevenson 1963a, pp. 186–232. (Scholar)
• 1973, “Richards on the Theory of Value,” in I. A. Richards: Essays in His Honor, Reuben Brower et. al (eds), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 119–134. (Scholar)

Other References and Secondary Literature

• Ayer, A. J., 1936, Language, Truth, and Logic, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd. (Scholar)
• Barker, S., 2002, “Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?,” Analysis, 60(3): 268–279. (Scholar)
• Blackburn, S., 1984, Spreading the Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993, Essays in Quasi-Realism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004, Lust, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Blanshard, B., 1949, “The New Subjectivism in Ethics,” reprinted in Ethics: The Big Questions, 2nd edition, J. Sterba (ed.), 2009, Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 43–49. (Scholar)
• Boisvert, D., 2008, “Expressive-Assertivism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89(2): 169–203. (Scholar)
• Brandt, R., 1959, Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. (Scholar)
• Brink, D., 1989, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Burks, A., 1978, Preface to Values and Morals: Essays in Honour of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt, A. Goldman and J. Kim (eds), Dortrecht: Reidel, pp. vii–xvii. (Scholar)
• Copp, D., 2001, “Realist Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 18(2): 1–43. (Scholar)
• –––, 2009, “Realist Expressivism and Conventional Implicature,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 4, R. Shafer-Landau (ed), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 167-202. (Scholar)
• Dancy, J., 1993, Moral Reasons, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Dreier, J., 2001, “C. L. Stevenson,” in A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, A. Martinich and D. Sosa (eds), Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 175–180. (Scholar)
• Fara, Michael, 2009, “Dispositions,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta(ed.), URL = <Dispositions/">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/Dispositions/>. (Scholar)
• Finlay, S., 2005, “The Emotive Theory of Ethics,” MacMillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition, M. Borchert (editor-in-chief), New York: Thomson Gale. (Scholar)
• Fletcher G. and M. Ridge, 2014. Having it Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Frege, G., 1918, “Negation,” in The Frege Reader, Michael Beaney (ed.), 1997, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 346–361. (Scholar)
• Geach, P., 1958, “Imperative and Deontic Logic,” Analysis, 18: 49–56. (Scholar)
• –––, 1960, “Ascriptivism,” Philosophical Review, 69: 221–225. (Scholar)
• –––, 1965, “Assertion,” Philosophical Review, 74: 449–465. (Scholar)
• Gibbard, A., 1990, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2003, Thinking How to Live, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Grice, P., 1975, “Logic and Conversation,” reprinted in P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, 1989, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Hare, R. M., 1952, The Language of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1997, Sorting Out Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Kauppinen, A., 2008, “Moral Internalism and the Brain,” Social Theory and Practice, 34(1): 1–24. (Scholar)
• Mill, J. S., 1861, Utilitarianism, Roger Crisp (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Moore, G. E., 1903, Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; revised edition with “Preface to the second edition,” T. Baldwin (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. (Scholar)
• Morris, C. W., 1938, Foundations of the Theory of Signs, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
• Ogden, C. K. and I. A. Richards, 1923, The Meaning of Meaning, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. (Scholar)
• Perry, R. B., 1926, General Theory of Value: Its Meaning and Basic Principles Construed in Terms of Interest, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Prinz, Jesse, 2006, “The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments,” Philosophical Explorations, 9: 29–43. (Scholar)
• –––, 2007, The Emotional Construction of Morals, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Railton, P., 1986, “Moral Realism,” Philosophical Review, 95: 163–207. (Scholar)
• Richards, I. A., 1924, Principles of Literary Criticism, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. (Scholar)
• –––, 1926, Science and Poetry, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. (Scholar)
• Ridge, M., 2006, “Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege,” Ethics, 116(2): 302–336. (Scholar)
• –––, 2007, “Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 2, R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 51-76. (Scholar)
• –––, 2014. Impassioned Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Rosati, C. S., 2008, “Moral Motivation”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta(ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/moral-motivation/>. (Scholar)
• Roskies, A., 2003, “Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons from ‘Acquired Sociopathy’,” Philosophical Psychology, 16: 51–66. (Scholar)
• –––, 2006, “A Case Study of Neuroethics: The Nature of Moral Judgment,” in Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice, and Policy, J. Illes (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press: pp. 17–32. (Scholar)
• Satris, S., 1987, Ethical Emotivism, Dortdrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. (Scholar)
• Scanlon, T., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Schroeder, M., 2008a, Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2008b, “What is the Frege-Geach Problem?,” Philosophy Compass, 3(4): 703–720. (Scholar)
• Searle, J., 1975, “Indirect Speech Acts,” in Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, 1985, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 30–57. (Scholar)
• Shafer-Landau, R., 2003, Moral Realism: A Defence, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Smith, M., 1994, The Moral Problem, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Svavarsdottir, S., 1999, “Moral Cognitivism and Motivation,” Philosophical Review, 108:161–219. (Scholar)
• –––, 2006, “How Do Moral Judgments Motivate?”, in Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, J. Dreier (ed), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 163–181. (Scholar)
• Urmson, J., 1968. The Emotive Theory of Ethics, London: Hutchinson & Co. (Scholar)
• van Roojen, M., 2009, “Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta(ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/moral-cognitivism/>. (Scholar)
• Warnock, M., 1978. Ethics Since 1900, third edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)