Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Supervenience in Ethics" by Tristram McPherson

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Atiq, Emad, forthcoming, “Supervenience, Repeatability, & Expressivism”, Noûs, first online 01 April 2019. doi:10.1111/nous.12284 (Scholar)
Bader, Ralf, 2017, “The Grounding Argument against Non-reductive Moral Realism”, in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 12), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 106–34. (Scholar)
Baker, Derek, 2017, “The Varieties of Normativity”, in Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, New York: Routledge. pp. 567–581 (Scholar)
Berker, Selim, forthcoming, “The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles”, Noûs, first online 08 February 2018. doi:10.1111/nous.12246 (Scholar)
Blackburn, Simon, 1971, “Moral Realism”, in John Casey (ed.), Morality and Moral Reasoning, London: Methuen. pp. 101–124. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, Spreading the Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1985, “Supervenience Revisited”, in Ian Hacking (ed.), Exercises in Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 47–68. (Page reference is to the reprint in Blackburn 1993.) (Scholar)
–––, 1993, Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Ruling Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Brown, Campbell, 2011, “A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism”, in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 6), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 205–18. (Scholar)
Chrisman, Matthew, 2005, “Review of Allan Gibbard’s Thinking How to Live”, Ethics, 115(2): 406–412. (Scholar)
Coons, Christian, 2011, “How to prove that some acts are wrong (without using substantive moral premises)”, Philosophical Studies, 155(1): 83–98. (Scholar)
Cuneo, Terence, and Russ Shafer-Landau, 2014, “The Moral Fixed Points”, Philosophical Studies, 171: 399–443. (Scholar)
Dancy, Jonathan, 1995, “In Defense of Thick Concepts”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 20(1): 263–279. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, Ethics Without Principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
DePaul, Michael, 1987, “Supervenience and Moral Dependence”, Philosophical Studies, 51: 425–439. (Scholar)
Dreier, James, 1992, “The Supervenience Argument against Moral Realism”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 30: 13–38. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Explaining the Quasi-Real”, Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 10), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 273–297. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Is there a supervenience problem for robust moral realism?”, Philosophical Studies, 176: 1391–1408. (Scholar)
Dunaway, Billy, 2005, “Supervenience Arguments and Normative Non-naturalism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XCI(3): 627–655. (Scholar)
Dworkin, Ronald, 1996, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 25(2): 87–139. (Scholar)
Eklund, Matti, 2002, “Inconsistent Languages”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64(2): 251–75. (Scholar)
Eliot, Aaron, 2014, “Can Moral Principles Explain Supervenience” Res Philosophica, 91(4): 629–659. (Scholar)
Enoch, David, 2011, Taking Morality Seriously, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Faraci, David, 2017, “Hybrid Non-naturalism does not Meet the Supervenience Challenge”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 12(3): 312–318. (Scholar)
Fine, Kit, 1994, “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Varieties of Necessity”, in Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 253–281. (Scholar)
Gibbard, Allan, 2003, Thinking How to Live, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Hare, R. M., 1952, The Language of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, “Supervenience”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 58: 1–16. (Scholar)
Harrison, Gerald, 2013, “The Moral Supervenience Thesis is not a Conceptual Truth”, Analysis, 73: 62–68. (Scholar)
Hattiangadi, Anandi, 2018, “Moral Supervenience”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 48(3-4): 592–615. (Scholar)
Hills, Alison, 2009, “Supervenience and Moral Realism”, in Heike Alexander and Leitgeb Hannes (eds.), Reduction, Abstraction, and Analysis, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, pp. 163–178. (Scholar)
Horgan, Terence, 1993, “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World”, Mind, 102: 555–86. (Scholar)
–––, and Mark Timmons, 1992, “Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived”, Synthese, 92(2): 221–260. (Scholar)
Jackson, Frank, 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith, 2000, “Ethical Particularism and Patterns”, in Brad Hooker and Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 79–99. (Scholar)
Kalderon, Mark, 2005, Moral Fictionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kim, Jaegwon, 1993, Supervenience and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “From Naturalism to Physicalism: Supervenience Redux”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 85(2): 109–134. (Scholar)
Klagge, James, 1984, “An Alleged Difficulty Concerning Moral Properties”, Mind, 93: 370–380. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “Supervenience: Ontological or Ascriptive”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66: 461–470. (Scholar)
Kment, Boris, 2014, Modality and Explanatory Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Modality, Metaphysics, and Method”, in Christopher Daly (ed.), Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, Palgrave, pp. 179–207. (Scholar)
Kramer, Matthew, 2009, Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Lange, Marc, 2018, “What Would Normative Necessity Be”, Journal of Philosophy, 115(4): 169–186. (Scholar)
Leary, Stephanie, 2017, “Non-Naturalism and Normative Necessities”, in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 12), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 76–105. (Scholar)
Levine, Joseph, and Kelly Trogdon, 2009, “The Modal Status of Materialism”, Philosophical Studies, 145: 351–362. (Scholar)
Little, Margaret Olivia, 2000, “Moral Generalities Revisited”, in Brad Hooker and Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 276–304. (Scholar)
Mabrito, Robert, 2005, “Does Shafer-Landau have a Problem with Supervenience?”, Philosophical Studies, 126: 297–311. (Scholar)
Mackie, J. L., 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin. (Scholar)
McLaughlin, Brian, 1995, “Varieties of Supervenience”, in Elias Savellos and Umit Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 16–59. (Scholar)
McPherson, Tristram, 2009, “Unnatural Normativity?”, Philosophical Books, 50: 63–82. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience”, in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 7), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 205–234. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “What is at Stake in Debates among Normative Realists?” Noûs, 49: 123–146. (Scholar)
Miller, Alexander, 2017, “Moral Supervenience: A Defence of Blackburn’s argument ”, Dialectica, 71: 581–601. (Scholar)
Mitchell, Cole, 2017, “Mixed-Up about Mixed Worlds?”, Philosophical Studies, 174: 2903–2925. (Scholar)
Moore, G. E., 1903, Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1922, “The Conception of Intrinsic Value”, Philosophical Studies, London: Redwood, pp. 253–275. (Scholar)
Morton, Justin, forthcoming, “Grounding the Normative”, Philosophical Studies, first online 19 October 2018; doi:10.1007/s1109 (Scholar)
Nolan, Daniel, Greg Restall, and Caroline West, 2005, “Moral Fictionalism versus the Rest”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83(3): 307–330. (Scholar)
Olson, Jonas, 2014, Moral Error Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Raz, Joseph, 2000, “The Truth in Particularism”, in Brad Hooker and Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 48–78. (Scholar)
Ridge, Michael, 2007, “Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience”, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 4: 330–48. (Scholar)
Roberts, Debbie, 2017, “Thick Concepts”, in Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, New York: Routledge, pp. 211–225. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?”, in Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 13), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–24. (Scholar)
Rosen, Gideon, 2010, “Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction”, in Robert Hale and Aviv Hoffman (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 109–136. (Scholar)
–––, 2017a, “Ground By Law”, Philosophical Issues, 27: 279–301. (Scholar)
–––, 2017b, “Metaphysical Relations in Metaethics”, in Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, New York: Routledge, pp. 135–150. (Scholar)
–––, 2017c, “What is a Moral Law?”, in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 12), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 135–159. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, “What is Normative Necessity?” in Mircea Dumitru (ed.), Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Scanlon, Thomas M., 2014, Being Realistic about Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Schmitt, Johannes, and Mark Schroeder, 2011, “Supervenience Arguments under Relaxed Assumptions”, Philosophical Studies, 155(1): 133–160. (Scholar)
Schroeder, Mark, 2014, “The Price of Supervenience”, in M. Schroeder, Explaining the Reasons we Share, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 124–144. (Scholar)
Shafer-Landau, Russ, 2003, Moral Realism: A Defence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Shoemaker, Sydney, 1987, Review of Spreading the Word, Noûs, 21: 438–442. (Scholar)
Sider, Theodore, 2011, Writing the Book of the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Sidgwick, Henry, 1907, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edition, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981. (Scholar)
Skarsaune, Knut, 2015, “How to be a Moral Platonist”, in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 245–272. (Scholar)
Smith, Michael, 2004, “Does the Evaluative Supervene on the Natural?” in M. Smith, Ethics and the A Priori, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 208–233. (Scholar)
Stratton-Lake, Phillip and Brad Hooker, 2006, “Scanlon vs. Moore on Goodness”, in Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics after Moore, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 149–68. (Scholar)
Streumer, Bart, 2017. Unbelievable Errors, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Sturgeon, Nicholas, 2009, “Doubts about the Supervenience of the Evaluative”, in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 4), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 53–92. (Scholar)
Suikkanen, Jussi, 2010, “Non-Naturalism: The Jackson Challenge”, in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 5), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 87–110. (Scholar)
Tiefensee, Christine, 2014, “Expressivism, Anti-Archimedeanism, and Supervenience”, Res Publica, 20: 163–181. (Scholar)
Toppinen, Teemu, 2018, “Essentially Grounded Non-Naturalism and Normative Supervenience”, Topoi, 37: 645–653. (Scholar)
Väyrynen, Pekka, 2013a, “Grounding and Normative Explanation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 87(1): 155–178. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, The Lewd, the Rude, and the Nasty, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “The Supervenience Challenge to Non-naturalism”, in Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, New York: Routledge, pp. 170–184. (Scholar)
Wedgwood, Ralph, 2007, The Nature of Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Wilsch, Tobias, 2015, “The Nomological Account of Ground”, Philosophical Studies, 172(12): 3293–3312. (Scholar)
Zangwill, Nick, 1997, “Explaining Supervenience: Moral and Mental”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 22: 509–18. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Moral Epistemology and the Because Constraint”, in James Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, Oxford: Blackwell: pp. 263–281. (Scholar)

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