Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Temporal Parts" by Katherine Hawley

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Aliyev, Alexey, 2017, “Musical Perdurantism and the Problem of Intermittent Existence”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 94: 83–100. (Scholar)
Alward, Peter, 2019, “Musical Ontology and the Question of Persistence“, Acta Analytica. (Scholar)
Armstrong, D. M., 1980, “Identity Through Time”, in Peter van Inwagen (ed.) Time and Cause, Dordrecht: D. Reidel: 67–78. (Scholar)
Baber, Harriet E., 2002, “Sabellianism Reconsidered”, Sophia, 41: 1–18. (Scholar)
Baker, Lynne Rudder, 1997, “Why Constitution is not Identity”, Journal of Philosophy, 94: 599–621. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, Persons and Bodies: a Constitution View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Three-Dimensionalism Rescued: a Brief Reply to Michael Della Rocca”, Journal of Philosophy, 110.3: 166–70. (Scholar)
Balashov, Yuri, 1999, “Relativistic Objects”, Noûs, 33: 644–62. (Scholar)
–––, 2000a, “Persistence and Space-Time: Philosophical Lessons of the Pole and the Barn”, Monist, 83: 321–40. (Scholar)
–––, 2000b “Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time”, Philosophical Studies, 99: 129–66. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “On Stages, Worms and Relativity”, in Craig Callender (ed.) Time, Reality and Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 223–52. (Scholar)
–––, 2003a, “Temporal Parts and Superluminal Motion”, Philosophical Papers, 32: 1–13. (Scholar)
–––, 2003b, “Restricted Diachronic Composition, Immanent Causality and Objecthood”, Philosophical Papers, 32: 23–30. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “On Vagueness, Four-Dimensionalism and Diachronic Universalism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83.4: 523–31. (Scholar)
–––, 2005a, “Special Relativity, Coexistence, and Temporal Parts: a Reply to Gilmore”, Philosophical Studies, 124: 1–40. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Defining ‘Exdurance’”, Philosophical Studies, 133: 143–9. (Scholar)
–––, 2007a, “About Stage Universalism”, Philosophical Quarterly, 57: 21–39. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Persistence and Multi-Location in Spacetime”, The Ontology of Spacetime, volume 2, ed. D. Dieks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 59–81. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Pegs, Boards, and Relativistic Persistence”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90.2: 167–75. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, Persistence and Spacetime, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Persistence ”, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, ed. Craig Callender, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “On the Invariance and Intrinsicality of Four-Dimensional Shapes in Special Relativity”, Analysis, 74.4: 608–12. (Scholar)
Barker, S. and Dowe, P., 2003, “Paradoxes of Multi-Location”, Analysis, 63: 106-14. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Endurance is Paradoxical”, Analysis, 65: 69–75. (Scholar)
Baron, Sam, 2019, “How To Survive Presentism”, Inquiry, 62.6: 659–73. (Scholar)
Baxter, D., 1989, “Identity Through Time and the Discernibility of Identicals”, Analysis, 49: 125–31. (Scholar)
Beebee, H. and Rush, M., 2003, “Non-Paradoxical Multi-Location”, Analysis, 63.4: 311-17. (Scholar)
Benovsky, Jiri, 2009, “Presentism and Persistence”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90.3: 291–309. (Scholar)
–––, 2009a, “On (not) Being in Two Places at the Same Time: an argument against Endurantism”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 46.3: 239–48. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Endurance, Perdurance, and Metaontology”, SATS, 12.2: 159–77. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Endurance, Dualism, Temporal Passage, and Intuitions”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7.4: 851–62. (Scholar)
Bittner, Thomas, Donnelly, Maureen, and Smith, Barry, 2004, “Endurants and Perdurants in Directly Depicting Ontologies”, AI Communications, 13: 247–58. (Scholar)
Bottani, Andreas C., 2016, “Bringing Back Intrinsics to Enduring Things”, Synthese: 1–19. (Scholar)
Botterell, Andrew, 2004, “Temporal Parts and Temporary Intrinsics”, Metaphysica: 1–19. (Scholar)
Braddon-Mitchell, David and Miller, Kristie, 2004, “The Loneliness of Stages”, Analysis, 64.3: 235-42. (Scholar)
Braddon-Mitchell, David and West, Caroline, 2001, “Temporal Phase Pluralism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62: 59–83. (Scholar)
Briggs, Rachael and Nolan, Daniel, 2015, “Utility Monsters for the Fission Age”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96.3: 392–407. (Scholar)
Brink, David O., 1997, “Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons”, in J. Dancy (ed.) Reading Parfit, Oxford: Blackwell: 96–134. (Scholar)
Broad, C.D., 1927, Scientific Thought, London: Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Brogaard, B., 2000, “Presentist Four-Dimensionalism”, Monist, 83: 341–56. (Scholar)
Broome, John, 1991, Weighing Goods, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Brower, Jeffrey E., 2010, “Aristotelian Endurantism: A New Solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics”, Mind, 119: 883–905. (Scholar)
Browning, Douglas, 1988, “Sameness Through Change and the Coincidence of Properties”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49: 103–21. (Scholar)
Brueckner, Anthony, 2009, “Endurantism and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity”, Theoria, 75: 28-33. (Scholar)
Brzozowski, Jacek, 2017, “Enduring Simples and the Stages They Compose”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98: 51–64. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “More Work for Hybrid Presentism”, Metaphysica, 20.1: 103–115. (Scholar)
Burke, Michael, 1992, “Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account”, Analysis, 52: 12–17. (Scholar)
–––, 1994a, “Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle”, Journal of Philosophy, 91: 129–139. (Scholar)
–––, 1994b, “Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations among Objects, Sorts, Sortals and Persistence Conditions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 591–624. (Scholar)
–––, 1997a, “Coinciding Objects: Reply to Lowe and Denkel”, Analysis, 57: 11–18. (Scholar)
–––, 1997b, “Persons and Bodies: How to Avoid the New Dualism”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 457–67. (Scholar)
Butterfield, Jeremy, 1985, “Spatial and Temporal Parts”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 35: 32–44. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “On the Persistence of Particles”, Foundations of Physics, 35: 233–69. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “The Rotating Discs Argument Defeated”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57: 1–45. (Scholar)
Cahen, Muriel, 2017, “L’Individuation des Parties Temporalles”, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 56.4: 747–73.
Callender, Craig, 2001, “Humean Supervenience and Rotating Homogeneous Matter”, Mind, 110: 25–44. (Scholar)
Calosi, Claudio, 2015, “The Relativistic Invariance of 4D Shapes”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 50: 1–4. (Scholar)
Campdelacreu, Marta, 2018, “Stage Universalism, Voints, and Sorts”, Disputatio, 3.28: 293–307. (Scholar)
Caplan, Ben and Matheson, Carl, 2006, “Defending Musical Perdurantism”, British Journal of Aesthetics, 46.1: 59–69. (Scholar)
Carter, W.R., 1997, “Dion’s Left Foot (and the Price of Burkean Economy)”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57: 371–9. (Scholar)
Carter, W.R. and Hestevold, H.S., 1994, “On Passage and Persistence”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 31: 269–83. (Scholar)
Chisholm, Roderick M., 1973, “Parts as Essential to their Wholes”, Review of Metaphysics, 26: 581–603. (Scholar)
–––, 1976, Person and Object, London: Allen and Unwin. (Scholar)
Costa, Damiano, 2017, “The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence”, Journal of Philosophy, 114(2): 57–75. doi:10.5840/jphil201711425 (Scholar)
–––, 2020, “Was Bonaventure a Four-Dimensionalist?”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 28(2):393–404. (Scholar)
Cotnoir, Aaron, 2015, “Review of Mereology and Location, edited by Shieva Kleinschmidt”, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (Scholar)
Cowles, D.W., 1994, “On van Inwagen’s Defense of Vague Identity”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 137–58. (Scholar)
Crisp, Thomas and Smith, Donald, 2005, “‘Wholly Present’ Defined”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71.2: 318–44. (Scholar)
Curtis, Benjamin and Robson, Jon, 2016, A Critical Introduction to the Metaphysics of Time, Bloomsbury Press. (Scholar)
Daniels, Paul Richard, 2014, “Occupy Wall: A Mereological Puzzle and the Burdens of Endurantism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92.1: 91–101. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Persistence, Temporal Extension, and Transdurantism”, Metaphysica, 20.1: 83–102. (Scholar)
Davidson, Matthew, 2013, “Special Relativity and the Intrinsicality of Shape”, Analysis, 74.1: 57–58. (Scholar)
Della Rocca, Michael, 2011, “Primitive Persistence and the Impasse between Three-Dimensionalism and Four-Dimensionalism”, Journal of Philosophy, 108.11: 591–616. (Scholar)
Demarest, Heather, 2016, “Fission May Kill You (But Not for the Reasons You Thought)”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93.3: 565–82. (Scholar)
Denkel, Arda, 1995, “Theon’s Tale: Does a Cambridge Change result in a Substantial Change?”, Analysis, 55: 166–170. (Scholar)
Dietz, Alexander, 2020, “Are My Temporal Parts Agents?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 100.2: 362–79. (Scholar)
Dodd, Julian, 2004, “Types, Continuants and the Ontology of Music”, British Journal of Aesthetics, 44.4: 342–60. (Scholar)
Doepke, Frederick C., 1982, “Spatially Coinciding Objects”, Ratio, 24: 45–60. (Scholar)
Donnelly, Maureen, 2011, “Endurantist and Perdurantist Accounts of Persistence”, Philosophical Studies, 154.1: 27–51. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Three-Dimensionalism”, in Oxford Handbook of Philosophy Online, edited by M. Davis, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Duncan, Matt, 2015, “I Think Therefore I Persist”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93.4: 740–56. (Scholar)
Eagle, Antony, 2010a, “Location and Perdurance”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 5: 53–94. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “Duration in Relativistic Spacetime”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 5: 113–8. (Scholar)
–––, 2016a, “Multiple Location Defended”, Philosophical Studies, 173: 2215–31. (Scholar)
–––, 2016b, “Persistence, Vagueness, and Location”, Journal of Philosophy, 113.10: 507–32. (Scholar)
Eddon, Maya, 2010, “Why Four-Dimensionalism Explains Coincidence”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88.4: 721–28. (Scholar)
–––, 2010a, “Three Arguments from Temporary Intrinsics”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81.2: 605–19. (Scholar)
Effingham, Nikk, 2009, “Persistence, Composition and Identity”, The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, ed. Le Poidevin, Simons, McGonigal and Cameron, London: Routledge, 296–309. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Mereological Explanation and Time Travel”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88.2: 333–345. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Undermining Motivations for Universalism”, Noûs, 45.4: 696–713. (Scholar)
–––, 2011a, “Temporal Parts and Time Travel”, Erkenntnis, 74: 225–40. (Scholar)
–––, 2012 “Endurance and Perdurance”, The Continuum Companion to Metaphysics, ed. Manson and Barnard, London: Bloomsbury. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Harmoniously Investigating Concrete Structures”, Thought, 2.3: 190–95. (Scholar)
Effingham, Nikk and Melia, Joseph, 2007, “Endurantism and Timeless Worlds”, Analysis, 67: 140–47. (Scholar)
Effingham, Nikk and Robson, Jon, 2007, “A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85: 633–40. (Scholar)
Ehring, Douglas, 1995, “Personal Identity and the R-relation”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 73: 337–46. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Lewis, Temporary Intrinsics and Momentary Tropes”, Analysis, 57: 254–58. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Temporal Parts and Bundle Theory”, Philosophical Studies, 104: 163–8. (Scholar)
Einheuser, Iris, 2012, “Is There a (Meta)Problem of Change?”, Analytic Philosophy, 53.4: 344–51. (Scholar)
Eklund, Matti, 2019, “The Existence of Personites”, Philosophical Studies. doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01298-w (Scholar)
Epstein, Brian, 2015, The Ant Trap, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Evans, Gareth, 1978, “Can there be Vague Objects?”, Analysis, 38: 208. (Scholar)
Faller, August, 2019, “How Groups Persist”, Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02514-0 (Scholar)
Fan, Wenli, 2018, “Śāntarakṣita on Personal Identity: a Comparative Study”, Philosophy East and West, 68.3: 663–82. (Scholar)
Fine, Kit, 2000, “A Counter-Example to Locke’s Thesis”, Monist, 83: 357–61. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter”, Mind, 112: 195–234. (Scholar)
–––, 2008/2006, “In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism”, Philosophy, 83, supplement 62 (2008): 1–16; first published as a ‘Defense’ in Journal of Philosophy CIII.12 (2006): 699–714. (Scholar)
Fiocco, M. Oreste, 2010, “Temporary Intrinsics and Relativization”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91.1: 64–77. (Scholar)
Forbes, Graeme, 1987, “Is there a Problem about Persistence? II”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 61: 137–55. (Scholar)
Friedell, David, 2020, “Why Can’t I Change Brueckner’s Eighth Symphony?”, Philosophical Studies, 177.3: 805–24. (Scholar)
Gallois, André, 1990, “Occasional Identity”, Philosophical Studies, 58: 203–24. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Occasions of Identity, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Garrett, Brian, 1991, “Vague Identity and Vague Objects”, Noûs, 25: 341–51. (Scholar)
Geach P.T., 1966, “Some Problems about Time”, Proceedings of the British Academy , 60. Reprinted in van Inwagen and Zimmerman (eds.) Metaphysics: The Big Questions, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1967, “Identity”, Review of Metaphysics, 21: 3–12. (Scholar)
Gibbard, A., 1975, “Contingent Identity”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4: 187–221. (Scholar)
Giberman, Daniel, 2017, “Bent Not Broken: Why Exemplification Simpliciter Remains a Problem for Eternalist Endurantism”, Erkenntnis, 82.5: 947–66. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “A Reason for the Non-Specialist To Care about the Metaphysics of Properties and Persistence”, Inquiry, 61.2: 162–77. (Scholar)
–––, 2019a, “On Stage With Gunk”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97.2: 228–38. (Scholar)
–––, 2019b, “Plurdurance”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 19.54. (Scholar)
Gibson, Ian and Pooley, Oliver, 2006, “Relativistic Persistence”, Philosophical Perspectives, 20: 157–98. (Scholar)
Gilmore, C.S., 2002, “Balashov on Special Relativity, Coexistence and Temporal Parts”, Philosophical Studies, 109: 241–63. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Where in the Relativistic World Are We?”, Philosophical Perspectives, 20: 199–236. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Time-Travel, Coinciding Objects and Persistence”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 3: 177–98. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime”, Philosophy Compass, 3.6: 1224–1254. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Coinciding Objects and Duration Properties: Reply to Eagle”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 5: 95–111. (Scholar)
Gilmore, Cody, Costa, Damiano and Calosi, Claudio, 2016, “Relativity and Three Four-Dimensionalisms”, Philosophy Compass, 11.2: 102–20. (Scholar)
Giordani, C.S., and Costa, D., 2013, “From Times to Worlds and Back Again: a Transcendentist Theory of Persistence”, Thought, 2.3: 210–20. (Scholar)
Gomori, Marton, and Szabo, Laszlo E., 2019, “On the Persistence of the Magnetic Field”, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 50.1: 43–61. (Scholar)
Gorham, Geoffrey, 2010, “Descartes on Persistence and Temporal Parts”, Time and Identity, edited by Campbell, O’Rourke and Silverstein, MIT Press, pp. 165–182. (Scholar)
Goswick, Dana Lynne, 2013, “Change and Identity Through Time”, A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, edited by Dyke and Bardon, John Wiley, 365–86. (Scholar)
Grygianiec, Mariusz, 2016, “Criteria of Identity and Two Modes of Persistence”, Filozofia Nauki, 24.2: 17–29. (Scholar)
Hales, Steven and Johnson, Timothy, 2003, “Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity”, Philosophical Quarterly, 53: 524–39. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Time for Change”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 45: 497–513. (Scholar)
Hansson, Tobias, 2007, “The Problem(s) of Change Revisited”, Dialectica, 61.2: 265–274. (Scholar)
Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias, 2008, “Can I Be an Instantaneous Stage and Yet Persist Through Time?”, Metaphysica, 9.2: 235–39. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “4-D Objects and Disposition Ascriptions”, Philosophical Papers, 38.1: 35–72. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “The Tenseless Copula in Temporal Predication”, Erkenntnis, 72.2: 267–80. (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, “Institutional Objects, Reductionism, and Theories of Persistence”, Dialectica, 68.4: 525–62. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “The Endurance/Perdurance Controversy is No Storm in a Teacup”, Axiomathes, 24.4: 463–82. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “The Creation of Institutional Reality, Special Theory of Relativity, and Mere Cambridge Change”, Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02435-y (Scholar)
Harrington, J., 2005, “Discussion Note: K. Miller ‘Enduring Special Relativity’”, Southern Journal of Philosophy 53: 241–4. (Scholar)
Haslanger, Sally, 1989a, “Persistence, Change and Explanation”, Philosophical Studies 56: 1–28. (Scholar)
–––, 1989b, “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”, Analysis, 49: 119–125. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “Ontology and Pragmatic Paradox”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 92: 293–314. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 339–59. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Persistence Through Time”, in Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hawley, Katherine, 1999, “Persistence and Non-Supervenient Relations”, Mind, 108: 53–67. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, How Things Persist, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71.3: 602–21. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Persistence and Determination”, Philosophy, 83, supplement 62 (special issue on Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics): 197–212. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Metaphysics and Relativity”, The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, ed. Le Poidevin, Simons, McGonigal and Cameron, London: Routledge, 507–16. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Lewis on Persistence”, The Blackwell Companion to David Lewis, ed. Loewer and Schaffer, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 237–49. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Social Mereology”, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 3.4: 395–411. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, John, 2006, “Three-Dimensionalism”, in his Metaphysical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Three-Dimensionalism versus Four-Dimensionalism”, in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, edited by Hawthorne, Sider and Zimmerman, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Hayashi, Itsuki, 2019, “A Buddhist Theory of Persistence: Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on Rebirth”, Journal of Indian Philosophy 47.5: 979–1001. (Scholar)
Hedden, Brian, 2015, Reasons Without Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Heller, Mark, 1984, “Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects”, Philosophical Studies, 46.3: 323–334. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, The Ontology of Physical Objects, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “Things Change”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52: 695–704. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Against Metaphysical Vagueness”, Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 177–185. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Temporal Overlap is not Coincidence”, Monist, 83: 362–80. (Scholar)
Helm, Paul, 2009, “Jonathan Edwards and the Doctrine of Temporal Parts”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 61.1: 37–51. (Scholar)
Hestevold, H.S., and Carter, W.R., 2002, “On Presentism, Endurance and Change”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 32: 491–510. (Scholar)
Hinchliff, M., 1996, “The Puzzle of Change”, Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 119–36. (Scholar)
Hirsch, Eli, 1982, The Concept of Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “The Vagueness of Identity”, Philosophical Topics, 26, 139–58. (Scholar)
–––, 1999a, “Identity in the Talmud”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23.1, 166–80. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Ontological Arguments: Interpretive Charity and Quantifier Variance”, in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, edited by Hawthorne, Sider and Zimmerman, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Hochstetter, Kenneth, 2015, “Stages Can’t Act”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 40: 227–36. (Scholar)
Hochstetter, Kenneth, and Hess, Keith, 2020, “A Presentist-Friendly Definition of ‘Endures’”, Philosophia, 40: 227–36. (Scholar)
Hofweber, Thomas, 2009, “The Meta-Problem of Change”, Noûs, 43.2: 286–314. (Scholar)
Hofweber, Thomas and Velleman, David, 2011, “How To Endure”, Philosophical Quarterly, 61: 37–57. (Scholar)
Hudson, Hud, 1999, “Temporal Parts and Moral Personhood”, Philosophical Studies, 93: 299–316. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Universalism, Four-Dimensionalism and Vagueness”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60: 547–60. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Moving Faster than Light”, Analysis, 62: 203–05. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Immanent Causality and Diachronic Composition”, Philosophical Papers, 32: 15–22. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, The Metaphysics of Hyperspace, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hughes, C., 1997a, “Same-Kind Coincidence and the Ship of Theseus”, Mind, 106: 53–67. (Scholar)
–––, 1997b, “An Incredible Coincidence?”, Mind, 106: 769–72. (Scholar)
Iaquinto, Samuele, 2019, “Fragmentalist Presentist Perdurantism”, Philosophia, 47: 693–703. (Scholar)
Ingthorsson, R.D., 2009, “Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time?”, SATS, 10.1: 79–99. (Scholar)
Inman, Ross, 2014, “Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude”, Philosophical Studies, 168.3: 583–97. (Scholar)
Jansen, Ludger, 2008, “The Diachronic Identity of Social Entities”, in Persistence, edited by Kanzian, Ontos Publishing: 49–71. (Scholar)
Janzen, Greg, 2011, “On Three Arguments Against Endurantism”, Metaphysica, 12: 101–15. (Scholar)
Jaskolla, Ludwig, 2017, Real Fourdimensionalism, Springer Publishing. (Scholar)
Johnston, Mark, 1987, “Is there a Problem about Persistence? I”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 61: 107–35. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “Constitution is not Identity”, Mind, 101: 89–105. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Personites, Maximality and Ontological Trash”, Philosophical Perspectives, 30.1: 198–228. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “The Personite Problem: Should Practical Reason be Tabled? ”, Noûs, 51.3: 617–44. (Scholar)
Jubien, Michael, 1993, Ontology, Modality and the Fallacy of Reference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Kaiserman, Alex, 2019, “Stage Theory and the Personite Problem”, Analysis, 79.2: 215–22. (Scholar)
Keefe, Rosanna and Smith, Peter (eds.), 1997, Vagueness: A Reader, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Keinänen, Markku and Hakkarainen, Jani, 2010, “Persistence of Simple Substances”, Metaphysica, 11.2: 119–35. (Scholar)
Klein, C.J., 1999, “Change and Temporal Movement”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 36: 225–39. (Scholar)
Kleinschmidt, Shieva (ed.), 2014, Mereology and Location, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Refining Four-Dimensionalism”, Synthese, 194.11: 4623–40. (Scholar)
Korman, Daniel Z., 2010, “The Argument from Vagueness”, Philosophy Compass, 5.10: 891–901. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, Objects: Nothing Out of the Ordinary, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Koslicki, K., 2003, “The Crooked Path from Vagueness to Four-Dimensionalism”, Philosophical Studies, 114: 107-34. (Scholar)
Kovacs, David Mark, 2016, “Self-Made People”, Mind, 125: 1071–99. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Diachronic Self-Making”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy. (Scholar)
Kurtsal Steen, Irem, 2010,“Three-dimensionalist’s Semantic Solution to Diachronic Vagueness”, Philosophical Studies, 150.1, 79–96. (Scholar)
Langford, Simon, 2016,“3D Cohabitation”, Erkenntnis, 81, 1195–1210. (Scholar)
Leonard, Matt, 2018,“Enduring Through Gunk”, Erkenntnis, 83.4, 753–71. (Scholar)
Le Poidevin, Robin, 1991, Change, Cause and Contradiction, Basingstoke: Macmillan. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Continuants and Continuity”, Monist, 83: 381–98. (Scholar)
Levey, S., 1997, “Coincidence and Principles of Composition”, Analysis 57: 1–10. (Scholar)
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