Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Epistemological Problems of Testimony" by Nick Leonard

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Adler, Jonathan E., 1994, “Testimony, Trust, Knowing”:, Journal of Philosophy, 91(5): 264–275. doi:10.2307/2940754 (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Transmitting Knowledge”, Noûs, 30(1): 99–111. doi:10.2307/2216305 (Scholar)
–––, 2002, Belief’s Own Ethics, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
Alston, William P., 1994, “Belief-forming Practices and the Social”, in Schmitt 1994: 29–52 (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “How to Think about Reliability”:, Philosophical Topics, 23(1): 1–29. doi:10.5840/philtopics199523122 (Scholar)
Anderson, Charity, 2014, “Epistemic Authority and Conscientious Belief”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6(4): 91–99. doi:10.24204/ejpr.v6i4.147 (Scholar)
Audi, Robert, 1997, “The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Justification and Knowledge”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 34(4): 405–422. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, London and New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “The A Priori Authority of Testimony”, Philosophical Issues, 14(1): 18–34. doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00018.x (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Testimony, Credulity, and Veracity”, in Lackey and Sosa 2006: 25–46. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.003.0002 (Scholar)
Austin, J. L., 1946 [1979], “Other Minds”, part of a symposium published in Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 20: 122–197 (note his name is misspelled as Austen here). Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers, third edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 76–116. (Scholar)
Baker, Judith and Philip Clark, 2018, “Epistemic Buck-Passing and the Interpersonal View of Testimony”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 48(2): 178–199. doi:10.1080/00455091.2017.1341781 (Scholar)
Barnett, David James, 2015, “Is Memory Merely Testimony from One’s Former Self?”, The Philosophical Review, 124(3): 353–392. doi:10.1215/00318108-2895337 (Scholar)
Brewer, Scott, 1998, “Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process”, Yale Law Journal, 107(6): 1535–1681. (Scholar)
Budd, Malcolm, 2003, “The Acquaintance Principle”, The British Journal of Aesthetics, 43(4): 386–392. doi:10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.4.386 (Scholar)
Burge, Tyler, 1993, “Content Preservation”, The Philosophical Review, 102(4): 457–488. doi:10.2307/2185680 (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Interlocution, Perception, and Memory”, Philosophical Studies, 86(1): 21–47. doi:10.1023/a:1004261628340 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Postscript: ‘Content Preservation’”, in Cognition Through Understanding: Self-Knowledge, Interlocution, Reasoning, Reflection: Philosophical Essays, Volume 3, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 254–284. (Scholar)
Burroughs, Michael D. and Deborah Tollefsen, 2016, “Learning to Listen: Epistemic Injustice and the Child”, Episteme, 13(3): 359–377. doi:10.1017/epi.2015.64 (Scholar)
Carter, J. Adam and Philip J. Nickel, 2014, “On Testimony and Transmission”, Episteme, 11(2): 145–155. doi:10.1017/epi.2014.4 (Scholar)
Cholbi, Michael, 2007, “Moral Expertise and the Credentials Problem”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 10(4): 323–334. doi:10.1007/s10677-007-9071-9 (Scholar)
Christensen, David and Hilary Kornblith, 1997, “Testimony, Memory, and the Limits of the A Priori”, Philosophical Studies, 86(1): 1–20. doi:10.1023/a:1004268430546 (Scholar)
Coady, C. A. J., 1992, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0198235518.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Testimony, Observation and ‘Autonomous Knowledge’”, in Matilal and Chakrabarti 1994: 225–250. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-2018-2_11">10.1007/978-94-017-2018-2_11 (Scholar)
Constantin, Jan and Thomas Grundmann, 2020, “Epistemic Authority: Preemption through Source Sensitive Defeat”, Synthese, 197(9): 4109–4130. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01923-x (Scholar)
Crisp, Roger, 2014, “Moral Testimony Pessimism: A Defence”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 88: 129–143. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2014.00236.x (Scholar)
Croce, Michel, 2018, “Expert-Oriented Abilities vs. Novice-Oriented Abilities: An Alternative Account of Epistemic Authority”, Episteme, 15(4): 476–498. doi:10.1017/epi.2017.16 (Scholar)
Dormandy, Katherine, 2018, “Epistemic Authority: Preemption or Proper Basing?”, Erkenntnis, 83(4): 773–791. doi:10.1007/s10670-017-9913-3 (Scholar)
Dougherty, Trent, 2014, “Zagzebski, Authority, and Faith”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6(4): 47–59. doi:10.24204/ejpr.v6i4.144 (Scholar)
Dretske, Fred I., 1982, “A Cognitive Cul-de-Sac”, Mind, 91(361): 109–111. doi:10.1093/mind/xci.361.109 (Scholar)
Driver, Julia, 2006, “Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise”, Philosophical Studies, 128(3): 619–644. doi:10.1007/s11098-004-7825-y (Scholar)
Dummett, Michael, 1994, “Testimony and Memory”, in Matilal and Chakrabarti 1994: 251–272. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-2018-2_12 (Scholar)
Elgin, Catherine Z., 2002, “Take If from Me: The Epistemological Status of Testimony”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2): 291–308. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00203.x (Scholar)
Enoch, David, 2014, “A Defense of Moral Deference”:, Journal of Philosophy, 111(5): 229–258. doi:10.5840/jphil2014111520 (Scholar)
Evans, Gareth, 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Fallis, Don, 2008, “Toward an Epistemology of Wikipedia”, Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 59(10): 1662–1674. doi:10.1002/asi.20870 (Scholar)
Faulkner, Paul, 1998, “David Hume’s Reductionist Epistemology of Testimony”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79(4): 302–313. doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00065 (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “The Social Character of Testimonial Knowledge”, Journal of Philosophy, 97(11): 581–601. doi:10.2307/2678453 (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “On Dreaming and Being Lied To”, Episteme, 2(3): 149–159. doi:10.3366/epi.2005.2.3.149 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “On Telling and Trusting”, Mind, 116(464): 875–902. doi:10.1093/mind/fzm875 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, Knowledge on Trust, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589784.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Collective Testimony and Collective Knowledge”, Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 5: art. 4. doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.004 (Scholar)
Fogelin, Robert J., 2005, A Defense of Hume on Miracles, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Foley, Richard, 1994, “Egoism in Epistemology”, in Schmitt 1994: 53–73. (Scholar)
Fricker, Elizabeth, 1987, “The Epistemology of Testimony”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 61: 57–83. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/61.1.57 (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Against Gullibility”, in Matilal and Chakrabarti 1994: 125–161. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-2018-2_8 (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Critical Notice: Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony”, Mind, 104(414): 393–411. doi:10.1093/mind/104.414.393 (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Trusting Others in the Sciences: A Priori or Empirical Warrant?”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 33(2): 373–383. doi:10.1016/s0039-3681(02)00006-7 (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Testimony: Knowing Through Being Told”, in Handbook of Epistemology, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen, and Jan Woleński (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 109–130. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_3 (Scholar)
–––, 2006a, “Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy”, in Lackey and Sosa 2006: 225–245. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.003.0011 (Scholar)
–––, 2006b, “Second-Hand Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73(3): 592–618. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00550.x (Scholar)
Fricker, Miranda, 2007, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Group Testimony? The Making of A Collective Good Informant”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(2): 249–276. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00565.x (Scholar)
Fumerton, Richard, 2006, “The Epistemic Role of Testimony: Internalist and Externalist Perspectives”, in Lackey and Sosa 2006: 77–91. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.003.0004 (Scholar)
Gelfert, Axel, 2010, “Hume on Testimony Revisited”, History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis, 13(1): 60–75. doi:10.30965/26664275-01301004 (Scholar)
Gerken, Mikkel, 2013, “Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 87(3): 532–557. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00532.x (Scholar)
Golanski, Alani, 2001, “Why Legal Scholars Get Daubert Wrong: A Contextualist Explanation of Law’s Epistemology”, Whittier Law Review, 22(3): 653–721. (Scholar)
Goldberg, Sanford C., 2005, “Testimonial Knowledge through Unsafe Testimony”, Analysis, 65(4): 302–311. doi:10.1093/analys/65.4.302 (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimonial Knowledge”, Lackey and Sosa 2006: 127–141. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.003.0007 (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76(1): 1–36. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00113.x (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Experts, Semantic and Epistemic”, Noûs, 43(4): 581–598. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00720.x (Scholar)
–––, 2010a, Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593248.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “Assertion, Testimony, and the Epistemic Significance of Speech”:, Logos & Episteme, 1(1): 59–65. doi:10.5840/logos-episteme20101121 (Scholar)
Goldberg, Sanford and David Henderson, 2006, “Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72(3): 600–617. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00586.x (Scholar)
Goldman, Alvin I., 1979, “What is Justified Belief?”, in Justification and Knowledge, George S. Passas (ed.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1–23. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_1 (Scholar)
–––, 1986, Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0198238207.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(1): 85–110. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00093.x (Scholar)
Goldman, Alan H., 2006, “The Experiential Account of Aesthetic Value”, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 64(3): 333–342. doi:10.1111/j.1540-594x.2006.00211.x (Scholar)
Graham, Peter J., 1997, “What Is Testimony?”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 47(187): 227–232. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00057 (Scholar)
–––, 2000a, “Conveying Information”, Synthese, 123(3): 365–392. doi:10.1023/a:1005162716568 (Scholar)
–––, 2000b, “Transferring Knowledge”, Noûs, 34(1): 131–152. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00205 (Scholar)
–––, 2006a, “Liberal Fundamentalism and Its Rivals”, Lackey and Sosa 2006: 93–115. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.003.0005 (Scholar)
–––, 2006b, “Can Testimony Generate Knowledge?”, Philosophica (Ghent), 78(2): 105–127. [Graham 2006b available online] (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Formulating Reductionism about Testimonial Warrant and the Challenge from Childhood Testimony”, Synthese, 195(7): 3013–3033. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1140-y (Scholar)
Groll, Daniel and Jason Decker, 2014, “Moral Testimony: One of These Things Is Just Like the Others”, Analytic Philosophy, 55(1): 54–74. doi:10.1111/phib.12033 (Scholar)
Hardwig, John, 1985, “Epistemic Dependence”, Journal of Philosophy, 82(7): 335–349. doi:10.2307/2026523 (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “The Role of Trust in Knowledge”, Journal of Philosophy, 88(12): 693–708. doi:10.2307/2027007 (Scholar)
Harris, Paul L., 2002, “What Do Children Learn from Testimony?”, in The Cognitive Basis of Science, Peter Carruthers, Stephen Stich, and Michael Siegal (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 316–334. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613517.018 (Scholar)
Harris, Paul L. and Kathleen H. Corriveau, 2011, “Young Children’s Selective Trust in Informants”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 366(1567): 1179–1187. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0321 (Scholar)
Harris, Paul L., Melissa A. Koenig, Kathleen H. Corriveau, and Vikram K. Jaswal, 2018, “Cognitive Foundations of Learning from Testimony”, Annual Review of Psychology, 69(1): 251–273. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-122216-011710 (Scholar)
Hills, Alison, 2009, “Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology”, Ethics, 120(1): 94–127. doi:10.1086/648610 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Moral Testimony”, Philosophy Compass, 8(6): 552–559. doi:10.1111/phc3.12040 (Scholar)
Hinchman, Edward S., 2005, “Telling as Inviting to Trust”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70(3): 562–587. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00415.x (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Assurance and Warrant”, Philosopher’s Imprint, 14: art. 17. [Hinchman 2014 available online] (Scholar)
Hopkins, Robert, 2000, “Beauty and Testimony”, in Philosophy, the Good, the True and the Beautiful, Anthony O’Hear (ed.), New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 209–236. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “What Is Wrong With Moral Testimony?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74(3): 611–634. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00042.x (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “How to Be a Pessimist about Aesthetic Testimony”:, Journal of Philosophy, 108(3): 138–157. doi:10.5840/jphil201110838 (Scholar)
Howell, Robert J., 2014, “Google Morals, Virtue, and the Asymmetry of Deference: Google Morals, Virtue, and the Asymmetry of Deference”, Noûs, 48(3): 389–415. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00873.x (Scholar)
Hume, David, 1740 [1978], A Treatise of Human Nature, London: John Noon. Reprinted in L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), second edition, revised P. H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. (Scholar)
–––, 1748 [1977], An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, London: A. Millar. Reprinted, Eric Steinberg (ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977. (Scholar)
Insole, Christopher J., 2000, “Seeing off the Local Threat to Irreducible Knowledge by Testimony”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 50(198): 44–56. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00166 (Scholar)
Jäger, Christoph, 2016, “Epistemic Authority, Preemptive Reasons, and Understanding”, Episteme, 13(2): 167–185. doi:10.1017/epi.2015.38 (Scholar)
Jones, Karen, 1999, “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge”, Journal of Philosophy, 96(2): 55–78. doi:10.2307/2564672 (Scholar)
Jones, Ward E., 2002, “Dissident versus Loyalist: Which Scientists Should We Trust?”, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 36(4): 511–520. doi:10.1023/a:1021945707032 (Scholar)
Kallestrup, Jesper and Duncan Pritchard, 2012, “Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism: Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93(1): 84–103. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01417.x (Scholar)
Keren, Arnon, 2007, “Epistemic Authority, Testimony and the Transmission of Knowledge”, Episteme, 4(3): 368–381. doi:10.3366/e1742360007000147 (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “On the Alleged Perversity of the Evidential View of Testimony”, Analysis, 72(4): 700–707. doi:10.1093/analys/ans106 (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, “Trust and Belief: A Preemptive Reasons Account”, Synthese, 191(12): 2593–2615. doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0416-3 (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “Zagzebski on Authority and Preemption in the Domain of Belief”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6(4): 61–76. doi:10.24204/ejpr.v6i4.145 (Scholar)
Kenyon, Tim, 2013, “The Informational Richness of Testimonial Contexts”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 63(250): 58–80. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.12000 (Scholar)
Kitcher, Philip, 1993, The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195096533.001.0001 (Scholar)
Koenig, Melissa A. and Paul L. Harris, 2007, “The Basis of Epistemic Trust: Reliable Testimony or Reliable Sources?”, Episteme, 4(3): 264–284. doi:10.3366/e1742360007000081 (Scholar)
Lackey, Jennifer, 1999, “Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(197): 471–490. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00154 (Scholar)
–––, 2005a, “Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection”, Philosophical Studies, 126(2): 163–190. doi:10.1007/s11098-004-7798-x (Scholar)
–––, 2005b, “Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70(3): 636–658. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00418.x (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non‐Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony”, in Lackey and Sosa 2006: 160–182. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.003.0009 (Scholar)
–––, 2008, Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219162.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “A Deflationary Account of Group Testimony”, in Essays in Collective Epistemology, Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 64–94. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.003.0004 (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “What Is Justified Group Belief?”:, The Philosophical Review, 125(3): 341–396. doi:10.1215/00318108-3516946 (Scholar)
–––, 2018a, “Experts and Peer Disagreement”, in Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology, Matthew Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 228–245. (Scholar)
–––, 2018b, “Group Assertion”, Erkenntnis, 83(1): 21–42. doi:10.1007/s10670-016-9870-2 (Scholar)
Lackey, Jennifer and Ernest Sosa (eds.), 2006, The Epistemology of Testimony, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.001.0001 (Scholar)
Laetz, Brian, 2008, “A Modest Defense of Aesthetic Testimony”, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 66(4): 355–363. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6245.2008.00316.x (Scholar)
Lehrer, Keith, 2006, “Testimony and Trustworthiness”, in Lackey and Sosa 2006: 145–159. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.003.0008 (Scholar)
Leonard, Nick, 2016, “Testimony, Evidence and Interpersonal Reasons”, Philosophical Studies, 173(9): 2333–2352. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0611-1 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “The Inheritance View of Testimony and the Problem of Conflicting Justification”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(1): 27–36 (Scholar)
Levinson, Jerrold, 2005, “Aesthetic Properties, II”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 79: 211–227. doi:10.1111/j.0309-7013.2005.00133.x (Scholar)
Lipton, Peter, 1998, “The Epistemology of Testimony”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 29(1): 1–31. doi:10.1016/s0039-3681(97)00022-8 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Alien Abduction: Inference to the Best Explanation and the Management of Testimony”, Episteme, 4(3): 238–251. doi:10.3366/e1742360007000068 (Scholar)
Livingston, Paisley, 2003, “On an Apparent Truism in Aesthetics”, The British Journal of Aesthetics, 43(3): 260–278. doi:10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.3.260 (Scholar)
Lyons, Jack, 1997, “Testimony, Induction and Folk Psychology”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75(2): 163–178. doi:10.1080/00048409712347771 (Scholar)
Madison, B. J. C., 2016, “Internalism in the Epistemology of Testimony Redux”, Erkenntnis, 81(4): 741–755. doi:10.1007/s10670-015-9765-7 (Scholar)
Malmgren, Anna-Sara, 2006, “Is There A Priori Knowledge by Testimony?”, The Philosophical Review, 115(2): 199–241. doi:10.1215/00318108-2005-015 (Scholar)
MacFarlane, John, 2005, “Knowledge Laundering: Testimony and Sensitive Invariantism”, Analysis, 65(2): 132–138. doi:10.1093/analys/65.2.132 (Scholar)
Markovits, Julia, 2012, “Saints, Heroes, Sages, and Villains”, Philosophical Studies, 158(2): 289–311. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9883-x (Scholar)
Matilal, Bimal Krishna and Arindam Chakrabarti (eds.), 1994, Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-2018-2 (Scholar)
McDowell, John, 1994, “Knowledge by Hearsay”, in Matilal and Chakrabarti 1994: 195–224. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-2018-2_10 (Scholar)
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–––, 2011, “Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism”, Journal of Philosophy, 108(3): 111–137. doi:10.5840/jphil201110837 (Scholar)
McMyler, Benjamin, 2011, Testimony, Trust, and Authority, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794331.001.0001 (Scholar)
McMyler, 2013, “The Epistemic Significance of Address”, Synthese, 190(6): 1059–1078 (Scholar)
McShane, Paddy Jane, 2018a, “The Non-Remedial Value of Dependence on Moral Testimony”, Philosophical Studies, 175(3): 629–647. doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0885-6 (Scholar)
–––, 2018b, “Moral Testimony and Moral Understanding”, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 15(3): 245–271. doi:10.1163/17455243-20170003 (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, “Against Epistemic Pessimism about Moral Testimony”, Episteme, first online: 20 May 2019. doi:10.1017/epi.2019.11 (Scholar)
Meskin, Aaron, 2004, “Aesthetic Testimony: What Can We Learn from Others about Beauty and Art?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69(1): 65–91. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00384.x (Scholar)
McKinnon, Rachel, 2017, “How to Be an Optimist about Aesthetic Testimony”, Episteme, 14(2): 177–196. doi:10.1017/epi.2016.4 (Scholar)
Michaelian, Kourken, 2010, “In Defence of Gullibility: The Epistemology of Testimony and the Psychology of Deception Detection”, Synthese, 176(3): 399–427. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9573-1 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “The Evolution of Testimony: Receiver Vigilance, Speaker Honesty and the Reliability of Communication”, Episteme, 10(1): 37–59. doi:10.1017/epi.2013.2 (Scholar)
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–––, 2018, The Exchange of Words: Speech, Testimony, and Intersubjectivity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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