Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Thick Ethical Concepts" by Pekka Väyrynen

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Abend, Gabriel, 2011, “Thick Concepts and the Moral Brain”, European Journal of Sociology, 52(1): 143–72. doi:10.1017/s0003975611000051 (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Thick Concepts and Sociological Research”, Sociological Theory, 37(3): 209–33. doi:10.1177/0735275119869979 (Scholar)
Annas, Julia, 2016, “Learning Virtue Rules: The Issue of Thick Concepts”, in J. Annas, D. Narvaez, and N.E. Snow (eds.), Developing the Virtues: Integrating Perspectives, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 224–34. (Scholar)
Anscombe, G.E.M., 1958, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy, 33(124): 1–19. doi:10.1017/s0031819100037943 (Scholar)
Battaly, Heather D., 2001, “Thin Concepts to the Rescue: Thinning the Concepts of Epistemic Justification and Intellectual Virtue”, in A. Fairweather and L. Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 98–116. (Scholar)
Beardsley, Monroe, 1982, The Aesthetic Point of View, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Bergström, Lars, 2002, “Putnam on the Fact-Value Dichotomy”, Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 2: 1–13. (Scholar)
Blackburn, Simon, 1992, “Through Thick and Thin”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 66: 284–99. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Ruling Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Disentangling Disentangling”, in Kirchin 2013b: 121–35. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672349.003.0007 (Scholar)
Boisvert, Daniel R., 2008, “Expressive-Assertivism”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89(2): 169–203. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00315.x (Scholar)
Bolinger, Renée Jorgensen, 2017, “The Pragmatics of Slurs”, Noûs, 51(3): 439–62. doi:10.1111/nous.12090 (Scholar)
Bonzon, Roman, 2009, “Thick Aesthetic Concepts”, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 67(2): 191–9. (Scholar)
Brower, Bruce, 1988, “Virtue Concepts and Ethical Realism”, Journal of Philosophy, 85(12): 675–93. doi:10.2307/2026728 (Scholar)
Burton, Stephan L., 1992, “‘Thick’ Concepts Revised”, Analysis, 52(1): 28–32. doi:10.2307/3328878 (Scholar)
Cannon, N.D., 2020, “Irreducibly Thick Evaluation is not Thinly Evaluative”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23(3–4): 651–66. doi:10.1007/s10677-020-10108-w (Scholar)
Cepollaro, Bianca 2018, “Negative or Positive? Three Theories of Evaluation Reversal”, Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 18(3): 363–74. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, Slurs and Thick Terms: When Language Encodes Values, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. (Scholar)
Cepollaro, Bianca and Isidora Stojanovic, 2016, “Hybrid Evaluatives: In Defense of a Presuppositional Account”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 93(3): 458–88. doi:10.1163/18756735-09303007 (Scholar)
Chappell, Timothy, 2013, “There Are No Thin Concepts”, in Kirchin 2013b: 182–96. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672349.003.0010 (Scholar)
Chierchia, Gennaro and Sally McConnell-Ginet, 2000, Meaning and Grammar. An Introduction to Semantics, 2^nd edition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Cline, Brendan, 2015, “Moral Explanations: Thick and Thin”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 9(2), September, available online. (Scholar)
Dancy, Jonathan, 1995, “In Defence of Thick Concepts”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 20: 263–79. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Practical Concepts”, in Kirchin 2013b: 44–59. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672349.003.0003 (Scholar)
Eklund, Matti, 2011, “What Are Thick Concepts?”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 41(1): 25–49. doi:10.1353/cjp.2011.0007 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Evaluative Language and Evaluative Reality”, in Kirchin 2013b: 161–81. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672349.003.0009 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Thickness and Evaluation” (a review article of Väyrynen 2013), Journal of Moral Philosophy, 14(1): 89–104. doi:10.1163/17455243-01401001 (Scholar)
Elstein, Daniel Y. and Thomas Hurka, 2009, “From Thick to Thin: Two Moral Reduction Plans”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 39(4): 515–36. doi:10.1353/cjp.0.0063 (Scholar)
Enoch, David and Kevin Toh, 2013, “Legal as a Thick Concept”, in W. Waluchow and S. Sciaraffa (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 257–78. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675517.003.0012 (Scholar)
FitzGerald, Chloë and Peter Goldie, 2012, “Thick Concepts and Their Role in Moral Psychology”, in (eds.), R. Langdon and C. Mackenzie Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning, New York: Psychology Press, pp. 219–36. (Scholar)
Foot, Philippa, 1958, “Moral Arguments”, Mind, 67(268): 502–13. doi:10.1093/mind/lxvii.268.502 (Scholar)
Fricker, Miranda, 2007, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 (Scholar)
Geertz, Clifford, 1973, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture”, in his The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, New York: Basic Books, pp. 3–30. (Scholar)
Gibbard, Allan, 1992, “Thick Concepts and Warrant for Feelings”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 66: 267–83. (Scholar)
Grice, H.P., 1975, “Logic and Conversation”, in Grice 1989: 22–40. (Scholar)
–––, 1978, “Further Notes on Logic and Conversation”, in Grice 1989: 41–57. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Harcourt, Edward and Alan Thomas, 2013, “Thick Concepts, Analysis, and Reductionism”, in Kirchin 2013b: 20–43. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672349.003.0002 (Scholar)
Hare, R.M., 1952, The Language of Morals, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1963, Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, Moral Thinking, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Hay, Ryan J., 2013, “Hybrid Expressivism and the Analogy between Pejoratives and Moral Language”, European Journal of Philosophy, 21(3): 450–74. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00455.x (Scholar)
Heuer, Ulrike, 2012, “Thick Concepts and Internal Reasons”, in Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 219–46. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0009 (Scholar)
Hom, Christopher, 2008, “The Semantics of Racial Epithets”, Journal of Philosophy, 105(8): 416–40. (Scholar)
Hume, David, 1739–40, A Treatise of Human Nature, David Fate Noron and Mary J. Norton (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. (Scholar)
Hurley, S.L., 1989, Natural Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hursthouse, Rosalind, 1996, “Normative Virtue Ethics”, in Roger Crisp (ed.), How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 19–36. doi:10.1093/0198752342.003.0002 (Scholar)
Jackson, Frank C., 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Kirchin, Simon, 2010, “The Shapelessness Hypothesis”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 10(4) February, available online. (Scholar)
–––, 2013a, “Thick Concepts and Thick Descriptions”, in Kirchin 2013b: 60–77. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672349.003.0004 (Scholar)
––– (ed.), 2013b, Thick Concepts, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672349.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, Thick Evaluation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, available online. (Scholar)
Kotzee, Ben and Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), 2008, Epistemology Through Thick and Thin, a special issue of Philosophical Papers, 37(3). (Scholar)
Kyle, Brent G., 2013a, “How Are Thick Terms Evaluative?”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 13(1) January, available online. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “Knowledge as a Thick Concept: Explaining Why the Gettier Problem Arises”, Philosophical Studies, 165: 1–27. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9919-2 (Scholar)
–––, 2020, “The Expansion View of Thick Concepts”, Noûs, 54(4): 914–44. doi:10.1111/nous.12289 (Scholar)
Lang, Gerald, 2001, “The Rule-Following Considerations and Metaethics: Some False Moves”, European Journal of Philosophy, 9(2): 190–209. doi:10.1111/1468-0378.00135 (Scholar)
Liao, Shen-Yi, Aaron Meskin, and Joshua Knobe, 2020, “Dual Character Art Concepts”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101(1): 102–128. doi:10.1111/papq.12301 (Scholar)
Little, Margaret Olivia, 2000, “Moral Generalities Revisited”, in B. Hooker and M.O. Little (eds.), Moral Particularism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 276–304. (Scholar)
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 1984, After Virtue, 2^nd edition, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
McDowell, John, 1981 [1998], “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following”, in Steven H. Holtzman and Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule, London: Routledge, pp. 141–162. Reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1998), pp. 198–219. (Scholar)
Miller, Alexander, 2003, Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, Cambridge: Polity Press. (Scholar)
Möller, Niklas, 2012, “The Concepts of Risk and Safety”, in Sabine Roeser, Rafaela Hillerbrand, Per Sandin, and Martin Peterson (eds.), The Handbook of Risk Theory: Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics, and Social Implications of Risk, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 55–85. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_3 (Scholar)
Moore, A.W., 2003, “Williams on Ethics, Knowledge, and Reflection”, Philosophy, 78(305): 337–54. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Maxims and Thick Ethical Concepts”, Ratio, 19(2): 129–47. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00315.x (Scholar)
Murdoch, Iris, 1970, The Sovereignty of Good, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Nunberg, Geoff, 2018, “The Social Life of Slurs”, in Daniel Fogal, Daniel Harris, and Matt Moss (eds.), New Work on Speech Acts, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 237–95. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198738831.003.0010 (Scholar)
Prior, A.N., 1960, “The Autonomy of Ethics”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 38(3): 199–206. (Scholar)
Putnam, Hilary, 2002, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Quinn, Warren, 1987, “Reflection and the Loss of Moral Knowledge: Williams on Objectivity”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 16(2): 195–209. (Scholar)
Reuter, Kevin, 2019, “Dual Character Concepts”, Philosophy Compass, 14(1): e12557. doi:10.1111/phc3.12557 (Scholar)
Richard, Mark, 2008, When Truth Gives Out, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Roberts, Debbie, 2011, “Shapelessness and the Thick”, Ethics, 121(3): 489–520. doi:10.1086/658898 (Scholar)
–––, 2013a, “Thick Concepts”, Philosophy Compass, 8(8): 677–88. doi:10.1111/phc3.12055 (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “It’s Evaluation, Only Thicker”, in Kirchin 2013b: 78–98. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672349.003.0005 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Depending on the Thick”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 91: 197–220. doi:10.1093/arisup/akx006 (Scholar)
–––, 2018a, “Thick Epistemic Concepts”, in Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 159–78. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805366.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2018b,“Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 13: 1–24. (Scholar)
Ryle, Gilbert, 1968, “The Thinking of Thoughts: What is ‘Le Penseur’ Doing?”, in his Collected Papers, Volume 2, London: Hutchinson, pp. 480–96. (Scholar)
Rynin, David, 1957, “The Autonomy of Morals”, Mind, 66(263): 308–317. doi:10.1093/mind/lxvi.263.308 (Scholar)
Scanlon, T.M., 2003, “Thickness and Theory”, Journal of Philosophy, 100(6): 275–87. (Scholar)
Scheffler, Samuel, 1987, “Morality Through Thick and Thin: a Critical Notice of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [Williams 1985]”, Philosophical Review, 96(3): 411–34. doi:10.2307/2185227 (Scholar)
Shockley, Kenneth, 2012, “Thinning the Thicket: Thick Evaluative Concepts and Environmental Value”, Environmental Ethics, 34(3): 227–46. (Scholar)
Sibley, Frank, 2001, Approach to Aesthetics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Smith, Michael, 2013, “On the Nature and Significance of the Distinction between Thick and Thin Ethical Concepts”, in Kirchin 2013b: 97–120. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672349.003.0006 (Scholar)
Sreenivasan, Gopal, 2001, “Understanding Alien Morals”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62(1): 1–32. doi:10.2307/2653587 (Scholar)
Stevenson, Charles Leslie, 1938, “Persuasive Definitions”, Mind, 47(187): 331–50. (Scholar)
Stojanovic, Isidora, 2016, “Expressing Aesthetic Judgments in Context”, Inquiry, 59(6): 663–85. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2016.1208922 (Scholar)
Sundell, Timothy, 2016, “The Tasty, the Bold, and the Beautiful”, Inquiry, 59(6): 793–818. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2016.1208918 (Scholar)
Tappolet, Christine, 2004, “Through Thick and Thin: Good and its Determinates”, Dialectica, 58(2): 207–21. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00297.x (Scholar)
Väyrynen, Pekka, 2008, “Slim Epistemology with a Thick Skin”, in Kotzee and Wanderer 2008: 389–412. doi:10.1080/05568640809485228 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Thick Concepts and Variability”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 11(1) January, available online. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Thick Concepts: Where’s Evaluation?”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), 7: 235–70. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0008 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Shapelessness in Context”, Noûs, 48(3): 573–93. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00877.x (Scholar)
Willemsen, Pascale and Kevin Reuter, 2020, “Separability and the Effect of Valence”, Proceedings of the 42th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society, pp. 794–800, available online. (Scholar)
Williams, Bernard, 1981, “Internal and External Reasons”, in his Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–13. (Scholar)
–––, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Truth in Ethics”, Ratio, 8(3): 227–42. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1995.tb00085.x (Scholar)
Williamson, Timothy, 2009, “Reference, Inference, and the Semantics of Pejoratives”, in Joseph Almog and Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 137–58. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367881.003.0009 (Scholar)
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Zangwill, Nick, 1995, “The Beautiful, the Dainty and the Dumpy”, British Journal of Aesthetics, 35(4): 317–29. doi:10.1093/bjaesthetics/35.4.317 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Moral Metaphor and Thick Concepts: What Moral Philosophy Can Learn from Aesthetics”, in Kirchin 2013b: 197–209. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672349.003.0011 (Scholar)

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