Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Transmission of Justification and Warrant" by Luca Moretti and Tommaso Piazza

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Alspector-Kelly, Marc, 2015, “Wright Back to Dretske, or Why You Might as Well Deny Knowledge Closure”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 90(3): 570–611. doi:10.1111/phpr.12150 (Scholar)
Alston, William P., 1991, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Avnur, Yuval, 2017, “On What Does Rationality Hinge?”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7(4): 246–257. doi:10.1163/22105700-00704003 (Scholar)
Baghramian, Maria, 2017, “Comments on Annalisa Coliva, Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7(4): 272–280. doi:10.1163/22105700-00704005 (Scholar)
Bergmann, Michael, 2004, “Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69(3): 709–727. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00524.x (Scholar)
–––, 2006, Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0199275742.001.0001 (Scholar)
Beebee, Helen, 2001, “Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question and Semantic Externalism”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 51(204): 356–374. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00234 (Scholar)
Boghossian, Paul A., 1997, “What the Externalist Can Know A Priori”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 97: 161–176. doi:10.1111/1467-9264.00011 (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?”, Philosophical Studies, 106(1/2): 1–40. doi:10.1023/a:1013141719930 (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Blind Reasoning I”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 77: 225–248. doi:10.1111/1467-8349.00110 (Scholar)
Brown, Jessica, 2003, “The Reductio Argument and Transmission of Warrant”, in Nuccetelli 2003: 117–130. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Wright on Transmission Failure”, Analysis, 64(1): 57–67. doi:10.1093/analys/64.1.57 (Scholar)
Burge, Tyler, 2003, “Replies” in Meaning, Basic Knowledge and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge, María Frápolli and Esther Romero (eds.), Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
Chandler, Jake, 2010, “The Transmission of Support: A Bayesian Re-Analysis”, Synthese, 176(3): 333–343. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9570-4 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Transmission Failure, AGM Style”, Erkenntnis, 78(2): 383–398. doi:10.1007/s10670-012-9364-9 (Scholar)
Cohen, Stewart, 2002, “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2): 309–329. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00204.x (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Why Basic Knowledge Is Easy Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70(2): 417–430. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00536.x (Scholar)
Coliva, Annalisa, 2010, “Moore’s Proof And Martin Davies’s Epistemic Projects”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88(1): 101–116. doi:10.1080/00048400802587317 (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Varieties of Failure (of Warrant Transmission: What Else?!)”, Synthese, 189(2): 235–254. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-0006-6 (Scholar)
–––, 2015, Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology, London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. doi:10.1057/9781137501899 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Replies to Commentators”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7(4): 281–295. doi:10.1163/22105700-00704006 (Scholar)
Davies, Martin, 1998, “Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant”, in Knowing Our Own Minds, Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 321–362. doi:10.1093/0199241406.003.0012 (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Externalism and Armchair Knowledge”, in New Essays on the A Priori, Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke (eds.), Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 384–414. doi:10.1093/0199241279.003.0016 (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “The Problem of Armchair Knowledge”, in Nuccetelli 2003: 23–55. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission and Easy Knowledge”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 78: 213–245. doi:10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00122.x (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Two Purposes of Arguing and Two Epistemic Projects”, in Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 337–384. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.003.0015 (Scholar)
Dretske, Fred, 2005, “The Case Against Closure”, in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (eds.), Malden, MA: Blackwell, 13–25. (Scholar)
Ebert, Philip A., 2005, “Transmission of Warrant-Failure and the Notion of Epistemic Analyticity”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83(4): 505–521. doi:10.1080/00048400500338724 (Scholar)
Haddock, Adrian and Fiona MacPherson (eds.), 2008, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001 (Scholar)
Jenkins, C. S., 2007, “Entitlement and Rationality”, Synthese, 157(1): 25–45. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-0012-2 (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Boghossian and Epistemic Analyticity”, Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 8(1): 113–127. (Scholar)
Kallestrup, Jesper, 2011, “Recent Work on McKinsey’s Paradox”, Analysis, 71(1): 157–171. doi:10.1093/analys/anq094 (Scholar)
Kung, Peter, 2010, “On Having No Reason: Dogmatism and Bayesian Confirmation”, Synthese, 177(1): 1–17. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9578-9 (Scholar)
Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria, 2008, “Single Premise Deduction and Risk”, Philosophical Studies, 141(2): 157–173. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9157-1 (Scholar)
Lockhart, Thomas, 2018, “Why Warrant Transmits across Epistemological Disjunctivist Moorean-Style Arguments”, Synthese, 195(1): 287–319. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1218-6 (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Failures of Warrant Transmission: The Role of Presupposition”, Erkenntnis, 84(3): 535–557. doi:10.1007/s10670-018-9970-2 (Scholar)
Markie, Peter J., 2005, “Easy Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70(2): 406–416. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00535.x (Scholar)
McDowell, John, 1982, “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: 455–479. [McDowell 1982 available online] (Scholar)
–––, 1994, Mind and World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument”, in Haddock and Macpherson 2008: 376–389. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0017 (Scholar)
McKinsey, Michael, 1991, “Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access”, Analysis, 51(1): 9–16. doi:10.1093/analys/51.1.9 (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Forms of Externalism and Privileged Access”, Philosophical Perspectives, 16: 199–224. doi:10.1111/1468-0068.36.s16.8 (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Transmission of Warrant and Closure of Apriority”, in Nuccetelli 2003: 97–115. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent”:, in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), (Contemporary Debates in Philosophy 8), Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 53–66. (Scholar)
McLaughlin, Brian P., 2000, “Self-Knowledge, Externalism, and Skepticism I”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 74: 93–117. doi:10.1111/1467-8349.00065 (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “McKinsey’s Challenge, Warrant Transmission, and Skepticism”, in Nuccetelli 2003: 79–98. (Scholar)
Millar, Alan, 2017, “On Extended Rationality”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7(4): 235–245. doi:10.1163/22105700-00704002 (Scholar)
Moore, George E., 1939, “Proof of an External World”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 25: 273–300. Reprinted in 1993, G. E. Moore: Selected Writings, Thomas Baldwin (ed.), London: Routledge, pp. 147–170.) (Scholar)
Moretti, Luca, 2012, “Wright, Okasha and Chandler on Transmission Failure”, Synthese, 184(3): 217–234. doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9771-x (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “The Dogmatist, Moore’s Proof and Transmission Failure”, Analysis, 74(3): 382–389. doi:10.1093/analys/anu060 (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “In Defence of Dogmatism”, Philosophical Studies, 172(1): 261–282. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0293-0 (Scholar)
Moretti, Luca and Tommaso Piazza, 2013, “When Warrant Transmits and When It Doesn’t: Towards a General Framework”, Synthese, 190(13): 2481–2503. doi:10.1007/s11229-011-0018-2 (Scholar)
Neta, Ram, 2007, “Fixing the Transmission: The New Mooreans”, in Nuccetelli and Seay 2007: 62–83. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Liberalism and Conservatism in the Epistemology of Perceptual Belief”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88(4): 685–705. doi:10.1080/00048400903225734 (Scholar)
Nozick, Robert, 1981, Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Nuccetelli, Susana (ed.), 2003, New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Nuccetelli, Susana and Gary Seay (eds.), 2007, Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Okasha, Samir, 2004, “Wright on the Transmission of Support: A Bayesian Analysis”, Analysis, 64(2): 139–146. doi:10.1093/analys/64.2.139 (Scholar)
Pérez Otero, Manuel, 2018, “Cogency, Warrant Transmission-Increase and Non-Ideal Thinkers: Cogency Without Transmission Of Warrant”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 99: 23–43. doi:10.1111/papq.12211 (Scholar)
Piazza, Tommaso, 2016, “Counterfeiting Perceptual Experience. Scepticism, Internalism, and the Disjunctive Conception of Experience”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(7–8): 100–131. (Scholar)
Plantinga, Alvin, 1993a, Warrant: The Current Debate, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195078624.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 1993b, Warrant and Proper Function, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 (Scholar)
Pritchard, Duncan, 2002, “McKinsey Paradoxes, Radical Scepticism, and the Transmission of Knowledge across Known Entailments”, Synthese, 130(2): 279–302. doi:10.1023/a:1014421800473 (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism”, in Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and William H. Brenner (eds.), London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 189–224. doi:10.1057/9780230505346_11 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “How to be a Neo-Moorean”, in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 68–99 (ch. 4). (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism”, in Haddock and Macpherson 2008: 283–310. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0013 (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Wright contra McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge and Scepticism”, Synthese, 171(3): 467–479. doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9328-4 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism”, in Evidentialism and Its Discontents, Trent Dougherty (ed.), Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 235–253. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.003.0016 (Scholar)
–––, 2012a, Epistemological Disjunctivism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2012b, “Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism”, in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 4, Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 144–158. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.003.0008 (Scholar)
Pryor, James, 2000, “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist”, Noûs, 34(4): 517–549. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00277 (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “What’s Wrong with Moore’s Argument?”, Philosophical Issues, 14(1): 349–378. doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00034.x (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “When Warrant Transmits”, in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Oxford/New York: Oxford University PressOxford, 269–303. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.003.0011 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Problems for Credulism”, in Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, Chris Tucker (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 89–132. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.003.0005 (Scholar)
Sainsbury, R.M., 2000, “Warrant-Transmission, Defeaters and Disquotation”, Philosophical Issues, 10: 191–200. doi:10.1111/j.1758-2237.2000.tb00021.x (Scholar)
Schechter, Joshua, 2013, “Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure”, Philosophical Studies, 163(2): 429–452. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9823-1 (Scholar)
Schiffer, Stephen, 2004, “Skepticism and the Vagaries of Justified Belief”, Philosophical Studies, 119(1/2): 161–184. doi:10.1023/b:phil.0000029355.63475.9d (Scholar)
Shaw, Kegan J., 2016, “Religious Epistemological Disjunctivism”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 79(3): 261–279. doi:10.1007/s11153-015-9553-y (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “A Plea for the Theist in the Street: A Defense of Liberalism in the Epistemology of Religious Experience”, Faith and Philosophy, 36(1): 102–128. doi:10.5840/faithphil2019117118 (Scholar)
Siegel, Susan and Nicholas Silins, 2015, “The Epistemology of Perception”, in The Oxford Handbook on the Philosophy of Perception, Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 781–811. (Scholar)
Silins, Nicholas, 2005, “Transmission Failure Failure”, Philosophical Studies, 126(1): 71–102. doi:10.1007/s11098-005-4541-1 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic”, in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 2, Tamar S. Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University press, pp. 108–140. (Scholar)
Smith, Martin, 2009, “Transmission Failure Explained”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(1): 164–189. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00270.x (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Two Notions of Epistemic Risk”, Erkenntnis, 78(5): 1069–1079. doi:10.1007/s10670-012-9376-5 (Scholar)
–––, 2016, Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755333.001.0001 (Scholar)
Tucker, Christopher, 2010a, “When Transmission Fails”, The Philosophical Review, 119(4): 497–529. doi:10.1215/00318108-2010-012 (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “The Dangers of Using Safety to Explain Transmission Failure: A Reply to Martin Smith”, Episteme, 9(4): 393–406. doi:10.1017/epi.2012.24 (Scholar)
Volpe, Giorgio, 2017, “Extended Rationality: Some Queries about Warrant, Epistemic Closure, Truth and Scepticism”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7(4): 258–271. doi:10.1163/22105700-00704004 (Scholar)
Weatherson, Brian, 2007, “The Bayesian and the Dogmatist”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 107(1pt2): 169–185. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00217.x (Scholar)
White, Roger, 2006, “Problems for Dogmatism”, Philosophical Studies, 131(3): 525–557. doi:10.1007/s11098-004-7487-9 (Scholar)
Wright, Crispin, 1985, “Facts and Certainty”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 71: 429–472. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey’s Paradox and Putnam’s Proof”, Philosophical Issues, 10: 140–163. doi:10.1111/j.1758-2237.2000.tb00018.x (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “(Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G.E. Moore and John McDowell”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2): 330–348. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00205.x (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference”, in Nuccetelli 2003: 57–77. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)? I”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 78: 167–212. doi:10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00121.x (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Perils of Dogmatism”, in Nuccetelli and Seay 2007: 25–48. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Comment on John McDowell’s ‘The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument’”, in Haddock and Macpherson 2008: 390–404. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0018 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “McKinsey One More Time”, in Self-Knowledge, Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 80–104. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0005 (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Replies Part IV: Warrant Transmission and Entitlement: Zalabardo, Pryor, Coliva, and Williams”, in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Oxford/New York: Oxford University PressOxford, 451–486. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.003.0018 (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “On Epistemic Entitlement (II): Welfare State Epistemology”, in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 213–247. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.003.0011 (Scholar)

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