Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Transmission of Justification and Warrant" by Luca Moretti and Tommaso Piazza
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- Avnur, Yuval, 2017, “On What Does Rationality Hinge?” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7: 246–257. (Scholar)
- Baghramian, Maria, 2017, “ Comments on Annalisa Coliva, Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7: 272–280. (Scholar)
- Bergmann, Michael, 2004, “Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69: 709–727. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, Justification Without Awareness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Beebee, Helen, 2001, “Transfer of warrant, begging the question and semantic externalism,” Philosophical Quarterly, 51: 356–374. (Scholar)
- Boghossian, Paul, 1997, “What the Externalist Can Know A Priori,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 97: 161–175. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “How Are Objective Reasons Possible?,” Philosophical Studies, 106: 1–40. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Blind Reasoning,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp., 77: 225–248. (Scholar)
- Brown, Jessica, 2003, “The Reductio Argument and Transmission of Warrant,” in New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Susanna Nuccetelli (ed.), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 117–130. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Wright on Transmission Failure,” Analysis, 64: 57–67. (Scholar)
- Burge, Tyler, 2003, “Replies” in Meaning, Basic Knowledge and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge, Maria Frapolli and Esther Romero (eds.), Chicago: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
- Chandler, Jake, 2010, “The transmission of support: a Bayesian re-analysis,” Synthese, 176: 333–343. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Transmission failure, AGM-style,” Erkenntnis, 78: 383–398. (Scholar)
- Cohen, Stewart, 2002, “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65: 309–329. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Why Basic Knowledge Is Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70: 417–30. (Scholar)
- Coliva, Annalisa, 2010, “Moore’s Proof and Martin Davies’s epistemic project,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88: 101–116. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission: what else?!),” Synthese, 189: 335–354. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Replies to commentators,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7: 281–295. (Scholar)
- Davies, Martin, 1998, “Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant,” in Knowing Our Own Minds, Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 321– 61. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Externalism and Armchair Knowledge,” in New Essays on the A Priori, Paul Boghossian and Chris Peacocke (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 384–414. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003a, “The problem of armchair knowledge” in New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Susanna Nuccetelli (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 23–55. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003b, “Armchair Knowledge, Begging the Question, and Epistemic Warrant,” Carl G. Hempel Lectures, Princeton University. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission and Easy Knowledge,” Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 78: 213–245. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Two Purposes of Arguing and Two Epistemic Projects,” in Minds, Ethics and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 337–384. (Scholar)
- Dretske, Fred, 2005, “The Case against Closure”, in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (eds.), Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 13–25. (Scholar)
- Ebert, Philip, 2005, “Transmission of Warrant-Failure and the Notion of Epistemic Analyticity,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83: 505–521 (Scholar)
- Jenkins, Carrie, 2007, “Entitlement and Rationality,” Synthese, 157: 25–45. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Boghossian and Epistemic Analyticity,” Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 8: 113–127. (Scholar)
- Kallestrup, Jasper, 2011, “Recent Work on McKinsey’s Paradox,” Analysis, 71: 157–171. (Scholar)
- Kung, Peter, 2010, “On having no reason: dogmatism and Bayesian confirmation ,” Synthese 177: 1–17. (Scholar)
- Lockhart, Thomas, 2018, “Why warrant transmits across epistemological disjunctivist Moorean-style arguments,” Synthese, 195(1): 287–319. (Scholar)
- Markie, Peter, 2005, “Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74: 30–55. (Scholar)
- McDowell, John, 1982, “Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge,” Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: pp. 455–79. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, Mind and World, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008. “The Disjunctive Conception of Evidence as Material for a Transcendental Argument,” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Adrian Haddock and Fiona MacPherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 376–389. (Scholar)
- McKinsey, Michael, 1991, “Anti-individualism and privileged access,” Analysis, 51: 9–16. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Forms of externalism and privileged access,” Philosophical Perspectives, 16: 199–224. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Transmission of warrant and closure of apriority,” in New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, S. Nuccetelli (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 97–115. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Externalism and privileged access are inconsistent,” in Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen (eds), Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 53–66. (Scholar)
- McLaughlin, Brian, 2000, “Skepticism, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge,” Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 74: 93–118. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “McKinsey’s Challenge, Warrant Transmission, and Skepticism” in New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Susanna Nuccetelli (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 79–98. (Scholar)
- Millar, Alan, 2017, “On extended rationality,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7: 235–245. (Scholar)
- Moore, George E., 1939, “Proof of an External World”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 25: 273–300. (Reprinted in Baldwin, Thomas (ed.), 1993, G. E. Moore: Selected Writings, London: Routledge, pp. 147–170.) (Scholar)
- Moretti, Luca, 2012, “Wright, Okasha and Chandler on transmission failure”, Synthese, 184: 217–234. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “The dogmatist, Moore’s proof and transmission failure,” Analysis, 74: 382–389. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “In defence of dogmatism,” Philosophical Studies, 172: 261–282. (Scholar)
- Moretti, Luca, and Tommaso Piazza, 2013, “When warrant transmits and when it doesn’t: towards a general framework,” Synthese, 190: 2481–2503. (Scholar)
- Neta, Ram, 2007, “Fixing the transmission: The new Mooreans,” in Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Susanna Nuccetelli and Gray Seay (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 62–83. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Liberalism and Conservatism in the Epistemology of Perceptual Belief,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88: 685–705. (Scholar)
- Nozick, Robert, 1981, Philosophical Explanations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Okasha, Samir, 2004, “Wright on the Transmission of Support: a Bayesian analysis,” Analysis, 64: 139–146. (Scholar)
- Piazza, Tommaso, 2016, “Counterfeiting Perceptual Experience. Scepticism, Internalism, and the Disjunctive Conception of Experience,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23: 100–131. (Scholar)
- Pritchard, Duncan, 2002,“McKinsey Paradoxes, Radical Scepticism, and the Transmission of Knowledge across Known Entailments,”Synthese, 130: 279–302. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism,” in Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock and William Brenner (eds.), London: Palgrave Macmillian, pp. 189–224. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “How to be a Neo-Moorean,” in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 68–99. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism,” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Adrian Haddock and Fiona MacPherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 284–310. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Wright Contra McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge and Scepticism,” Synthese, 171: 467–479. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Idealism, Internalism Disjuntivism,” in Evidetialism and its Discontents, Trent Dougherty (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 362–392. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, Epistemological Disjunctivism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Pryor, Jim, 2000, “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist,” Nous, 34: 517–549. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “What’s wrong with Moore’s argument?,” Philosophical Issue, 14, Epistemology: 349–378. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Problems for Credulism,” in Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, Chris Tucker (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “When Warrant Transmits,” in Wittgenstein, Epistemology and Mind: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 269–303. (Scholar)
- Sainsbury, Mark, 2000, “Comments on Crispin Wright’s ‘Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey’s Paradox and Putnam’s Proof,” Philosophical Issues, 10: 191–200. (Scholar)
- Schiffer, Stephen, 2004, “Skepticism and the vagaries of justified belief,” Philosophical Studies, 131: 525–557. (Scholar)
- Siegel, Susan, and Nico Silins, 2015, “The epistemology of perception,” in The Oxford Handbook on the Philosophy of Perception, Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 781–811. (Scholar)
- Silins, Nico, 2005, “Transmission failure failure,” Philosophical Studies, 126: 71–102. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic,” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology Vol. 2, Tamar S. Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University press, pp. 108–140. (Scholar)
- Smith, Martin, 2009, “Transmission Failure Explained,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79: 164–189. (Scholar)
- Tucker, Chris, 2010a, “When Transmission Fails,” Philosophical Review, 119: 497–529. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010b, “Transmission and Transmission Failure in Epistemology,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, [available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “The Dangers of Using Safety to Explain Transmission Failure: A Reply to Martin Smith,” Episteme, 9: 393–406. (Scholar)
- Volpe, Giorgio, “Extended Rationality: Some Queries about Warrant, Epistemic Closure, Truth and Scepticism,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7: 258–271. (Scholar)
- Weatherson, Brian, 2007, “The Bayesian and the dogmatist,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 107: 169–85. (Scholar)
- White, Roger, 2006, “Problems for Dogmatism,” Philosophical Studies 131: 525–557. (Scholar)
- Wright, Crispin, 1985, “Facts and Certainty,” Proceedings of the British Academy, 71: 429–472. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000. “Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey’s Paradox and Putnam’s Proof,” Philosophical Issues 10: 140–163. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002. “(Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 330–348. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003. “Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference,” in New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Susanna Nuccetelli (ed.), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 57–77. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free?),” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 78: 167–212. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007. “Perils of Dogmatism,” in Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Susanna Nuccetelli (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 25–48. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008. “Comment on John McDowell’s ‘The Disjunctive Conception of Evidence as Material for a Transcendental Argument’,” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Adrian Haddock and Fiona MacPherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 390–404. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011. “McKinsey One More Time,” in Self-Knowledge, Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 80–104. (Scholar)
