Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Axiomatic Theories of Truth" by Volker Halbach and Graham E. Leigh
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- Aczel, Peter, 1980, “Frege structures and the notion of proposition, truth and set”, The Kleene Symposium, Jon Barwise et al. (editors), Amsterdam: North-Holland, 31–59. (Scholar)
- Bealer, George, 1982, Quality and Concept, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Burgess, John P., 2014, “Friedman and the axiomatization of Kripke’s theory of truth”, in Foundational Adventures: Essays in Honor of Harvey M. Friedman, edited by Neil Tennant, London: College Publications and Templeton Press (online). (Scholar)
- Cantini, Andrea, 1989,“Notes on Formal Theories of Truth”, Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, 35: 97–130. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “A Theory of Formal Truth Arithmetically Equivalent to \(\mathrm{ID}_1\)”,Journal of Symbolic Logic, 55: 244–59. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, Logical Frameworks for Truth and Abstraction: An Axiomatic Study, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics (No. 135), Amsterdam: Elsevier. (Scholar)
- Cieśliński, Cezary, 2010, “Truth, Conservativeness, and Provability”, Mind, 119: 409–422. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Deflationism, Conservativeness and Maximality”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 36: 695–705. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, The Epistemic Lightness of Truth: Deflationism and its Logic, Cambridge University. (Scholar)
- Enayat, Ali and Albert Visser, 2015, “New Constructions of satisfaction classes”, in Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, K. Fujimoto, and J. Martínez-Fernández (eds.), Dordrecht: Springer, 321–335. (Scholar)
- Feferman, Solomon, 1962, “Transfinite recursive progressions of axiomatic theories”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 27: 259–316. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, “Towards Useful Type-free Theories. I.” Journal of Symbolic Logic, 49: 75–111. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “Reflecting on Incompleteness”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 56: 1–49. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Axioms for Determinateness and Truth”, Review of Symbolic Logic, 1: 204–217. (Scholar)
- Field, Hartry, 1999, “Deflating the Conservativeness Argument”, Journal of Philosophy, 96: 533–40. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 32: 139–177. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, Saving Truth from Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Franzén, Torkel, 2004, Inexhaustibility: a non-exhaustive treatment, Association for Symbolic Logic. (Scholar)
- Friedman, Harvey and Michael Sheard, 1987, “An Axiomatic Approach to Self-Referential Truth”, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 33: 1–21. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, “The Disjunction and Existence Properties for Axiomatic Systems of Truth”, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 40: 1–10. (Scholar)
- Fujimoto, Kentaro 2012, “Classes and Truths in Set Theory”, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 163: 1484–1523. (Scholar)
- Glanzberg, Michael, 2015, “Complexity and Hierarchy in Truth Predicates”, in Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, K. Fujimoto, and J. Martínez-Fernández (eds.), Dordrecht: Springer, 211–243. (Scholar)
- Halbach, Volker, 1994, “A System of Complete and Consistent Truth”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 35: 311–27. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Disquotational Truth and Analyticity”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 66: 1959–1973. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Reducing Compositional to Disquotational Truth”, Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2009), 786–798. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, Axiomatic Theories of Truth, Cambridge University, revised edition 2014. (Scholar)
- Halbach, Volker and Leon Horsten, 2006, “Axiomatizing Kripke’s Theory of Truth”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 71: 677–712. (Scholar)
- Hájek, Petr and Pavel Pudlak, 1993, Metamathematics of First-Order Arithmetic, Berlin: Springer. (Scholar)
- Heck, Richard, 2001, “Truth and Disquotation”, Synthese, 142: 317–352. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “Consistency and the Theory of Truth”, Review of Symbolic Logic, 8: 424–466. (Scholar)
- Horsten, Leon, 1995, “The Semantical Paradoxes, the Neutrality of Truth and the Neutrality of the Minimalist Theory of Truth”, in The Many Problems of Realism (Studies in the General Philosophy of Science: Volume 3), P. Cortois (ed.), Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 173–87. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, The Tarskian Turn. Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth, MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Horsten, Leon and Graham E. Leigh, 2017, “Truth is Simple”, Mind, 126(501): 195–232. (Scholar)
- Kahle, Reinhard, 2001, “Truth in applicative theories”, Studia Logica, 68: 103–128. (Scholar)
- Kaye, Richard, 1991, Models of Peano Arithmetic, Oxford Logic Guides, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Ketland, Jeffrey, 1999, “Deflationism and Tarski’s Paradise” Mind, 108 (429): 69–94. (Scholar)
- Kotlarski, Henryk and Zygmunt Ratajczyk, 1990a, “Inductive Full Satisfaction Classes”, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 47: 199–223. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990b, “More on Induction in the Language with a Satisfaction Class”, Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, 36: 441–54. (Scholar)
- Kotlarski, Henryk, Stanislav Krajewski, and Alistair H. Lachlan, 1981, “Construction of Satisfaction Classes for Nonstandard Models”, Canadian Mathematical Bulletin, 24: 283–93. (Scholar)
- Kreisel, Georg and Azriel Lévy, 1968, “Reflection Principles and Their Use for Establishing the Complexity of Axiomatic Systems”, Zeitschrift für mathematische Logic und Grundlagen der Mathematik, 14: 97–142. (Scholar)
- Kremer, Michael, 1988, “Kripke and the logic of truth”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 17: 225–278. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul, 1975, “Outline of a Theory of Truth”, Journal of Philosophy, 72: 690–716. (Scholar)
- Lachlan, Alistair H., 1981, “Full Satisfaction Classes and Recursive Saturation”, Canadian Mathematical Bulletin, 24: 295–97. (Scholar)
- Leigh, Graham E., 2013, “A proof-theoretic account of classical principles of truth.” Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 164: 1009–1024.
- –––, 2015, “Conservativity for Theories of Compositional Truth via Cut Elimination.” Journal of Symbolic Logic, 80(3): 845–865 (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Reflecting on Truth”, IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications, 3(4): 557–594. (Scholar)
- Leigh, Graham E., and Michael Rathjen, 2012, “The Friedman-Sheard Programme in Intuitionistic Logic”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 77: 777–806. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “An ordinal analysis for theories of self-referential truth”, Archive for Mathematical Logic, 49: 213–247. (Scholar)
- Leitgeb, Hannes, 2001, “Theories of truth which have no standard models”, Studia Logica, 68: 69–87. (Scholar)
- Maudlin, Tim, 2004, Truth and paradox. Solving the riddles, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- McGee, Vann, 1985, “How Truthlike Can a Predicate Be? A Negative Result,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 14: 399–410. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox: An Essay on the Logic of Truth, Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “Maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski’s schema (T)”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 21: 235–241. (Scholar)
- Myhill, John, 1950, “A system which can define its own truth”, Fundamenta Mathematicae, 37: 190–92.
- Nicolai, Carlo, 2016, “A Note on Typed Truth and Consistency Assertions”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 45: 89–119. (Scholar)
- Reinhardt, William N., 1986, “Some Remarks on Extending and Interpreting Theories,with a Partial Predicate for Truth”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15: 219–51. (Scholar)
- Schindler, Thomas, 2015, “A Disquotational Theory of Truth as Strong as \(\mathrm{Z}^{-}_2\)”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 44: 395–410. (Scholar)
- Scott, Dana, 1975, “Combinators and classes”, in \(\lambda\)-calculus and Computer Science Theory (Lecture Notes in Computer Science: Volume 37), C. Böhm (ed.), Berlin: Springer, 1–26. (Scholar)
- Shapiro, Stewart, 1998, “Proof and Truth: Through Thick and Thin”, Journal of Philosophy, 95 (10): 493–521. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Deflation and Conservation”, Principles of truth, Volker Halbach and Leon Horsten (eds.), Frankfurt a.M.: Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen, 103–128 (Scholar)
- Sheard, Michael, 1994, “A Guide to truth Predicates in the Modern Era”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 59: 1032–54. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Weak and strong theories of truth”, Studia Logica , 68: 89–101. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Truth, probability, and naive criteria”, Principles of truth, Volker Halbach and Leon Horsten (eds.), Frankfurt a.M.: Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen, 169–181. (Scholar)
- Takeuti, Gaisi, 1987, Proof Theory (Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics: No. 81), Amsterdam: North-Holland, second edition. (Scholar)
- Tarski, Alfred, 1935, “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages”, in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, Indianapolis: Hackett 1983, 2d edition, 152–278. (Scholar)
- Tennant, Neil, 2002, “Deflationism and the Gödel-Phenomena”, Mind, 111: 551–582. (Scholar)
- Turner, Raymond, 1990,Truth and modality, London: Pitman. (Scholar)
- Visser, Albert, 1989, “Semantics and the liar paradox,” Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 4: 617–706. (Scholar)
- Yablo, Stephen, 1993, “Paradox without self-reference,” Analysis, 53: 251–252. (Scholar)
- Wcisło, Bartosz, and Mateusz Łełyk, 2017, “Notes on bounded induction for the compositional truth predicate”, Review of Symbolic Logic, 10: 455-–480. (Scholar)
