Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Deflationism About Truth" by Bradley Armour-Garb, Daniel Stoljar and James Woodbridge
This is an automatically generated and experimental page
If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Alston, William, 1996, A Realist Conception of Truth, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Armour-Garb, Bradley, 2001, “Deflationism and the Meaningless Strategy,” Analysis, 61(4): 280–9. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Minimalism, the Generalization Problem, and the Liar,” Synthese, 139(3): 491–512. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Horwichian Minimalism and the Generalization Problem,” Analysis, 70(4): 693–703. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Challenges to Deflationary Theories of Truth,” Philosophy Compass, 7(4): 256–66. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, “Moorean Truth, Deflationism, and the Collapse Argument.”
- Armour-Garb, Bradley and JC Beall, 2001, “Can Deflationists be Dialetheists?” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 30(6): 593–608. (Scholar)
- –––, (eds.), 2005. Deflationary Truth, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court Press. (Scholar)
- Armour-Garb, Bradley and James Woodbridge, 2013, “Semantic Defectiveness and the Liar,” Philosophical Studies, 164(3): 845–63. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, Pretense and Pathology: Philosophical Fictionalism and its Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, The Deflationary Approach to Truth: A Guide, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Assay, Jamin, 2014, “Against Truth,” Erkenntnis, 79(1): 147–64. (Scholar)
- Ayer, A.J., 1935, “The Criterion of Truth,” Analysis, 3(1-2): 28–32. (Scholar)
- –––, 1936 [1952], Language, Truth and Logic, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2nd edition. (Scholar)
- Azzouni, Jody, 1999, “Comments on Shapiro,” Journal of Philosophy, XCVI(10): 541–4. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “Deflationist Truth,” in Michael Glanzberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 477–502. (Scholar)
- Bar-On, Dorit, Claire Horisk, and William Lycan, 2005, “Postscript to ‘Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions’,” in Armour-Garb and Beall 2005, pp. 344–52. (Scholar)
- Bar-On, Dorit and Keith Simmons, 2007, “The Use of Force Against Deflationism,” in Dirk Greimann and Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, London: Routledge, pp. 61–89. (Scholar)
- Båve, Arvid, 2009, “A Deflationary Theory of Reference,” Synthese, 169(1): 51–73. (Scholar)
- Beall, JC, 2001, “A Neglected Deflationist Approach to the Liar,” Analysis, 61(2): 126–9. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Deflationism and Gaps: Untying ‘Not’s in the Debate,” Analysis, 62(4): 299–305. (Scholar)
- Beall, JC and Bradley Armour-Garb, 2003, “Deflationists Should be Dialetheists,” Noûs, 37(2): 303–24. (Scholar)
- –––, (eds.), 2006, Deflationism and Paradox, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- Boghossian, Paul, 1990, “The Status of Content,” Philosophical Review, XCIX(2): 157–84. (Scholar)
- Boyd, Richard, 1983, “On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism,” Erkenntnis, 19(1-3): 45–90. (Scholar)
- Brandom, Robert, 1988, “Pragmatism, Phenomenalism, and Truth Talk,” Realism and Anti-Realism: Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 12: 75–93. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Burgess, Alexis, 2011, “Mainstream Semantics + Deflationary Truth,” Linguistics and Philosophy, 34(5): 397–410. (Scholar)
- Candlish, Stewart and Nic Damnjanovic, 2007, “A Brief History of Truth,” in Dale Jacquette (ed.), Philosophy of Logic, (Handbook of the Philosophy of Science: Volume 5), Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, pp. 227–323. (Scholar)
- Cartwright, Richard, 1987, “A Neglected Theory of Truth,” in Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 71–93. (Scholar)
- Cieśliński, Cezary, 2015, “The Innocence of Truth,” Dialectica, 69(1): 61–85. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “Minimalism and the Generalisation Problem: On Horwich’s Second Solution,” Synthese, 195(3): 1077–1101. (Scholar)
- Collins, John, 2002, “Truth or Meaning? A Question of Priority,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(3): 497–536. (Scholar)
- Damnjanovic, Nic, 2005, “Deflationism and the Success Argument,” Philosophical Quarterly, 55(218): 53–67. (Scholar)
- Dasgupta, Shamik, 2015, “The Possibility of Physicalism,” Journal of Philosophy, CXI(9–10): 557–92. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Metaphysical Rationalism,” Noûs, 50(2): 379–418. (Scholar)
- David, Marian, 1994, Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “A Substitutional Theory of Truth?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72(1): 182–9. (Scholar)
- Davidson, Donald, 1967, “Truth and Meaning,” Synthese, 17(3): 304–2; reprinted in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 17–36. (Page reference is to the reprint.) (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “The Structure and Content of Truth,” Journal of Philosophy, LXXXVII(6): 279–328. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth,” Journal of Philosophy, XCIII(6): 263–78. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “The Centrality of Truth,” in Jaroslav Peregrin (ed.), Truth and Its Nature (If Any), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 105–15. (Scholar)
- Devitt, Michael, 1997, Realism and Truth, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2nd edition. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “The Metaphysics of Truth,” in M. Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Readings, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001, pp. 579–611. (Scholar)
- Divers, John and Alexander Miller, 1994, “Why Expressivists about Value Should Not Love Minimalism about Truth,” Analysis, 54(1): 12–9. (Scholar)
- Douven, Igor and F.A. Hindriks, 2005, “Deflating the Correspondence Intuition,” Dialectica, 59(3): 315–29. (Scholar)
- Dummett, Michael, 1959, “Truth,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59(1): 141–62; reprinted (with a Postscript from 1972) in Dummett 1978, pp. 1–24. (Page reference is to the reprint.) (Scholar)
- –––, 1978, Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Edwards, Douglas, 2013, “Truth as a Substantive Property,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2): 279–94. (Scholar)
- Eklund, Matti, 2021, “What is Deflationism about Truth?” Synthese, 198(2): 631–45. (Scholar)
- Elbourne, Paul, 2011, Meaning: A Slim Guide to Semantics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Field, Hartry, 1972, “Tarski’s Theory of Truth,” Journal of Philosophy, LXIX(7): 347–75; reprinted in Field 2001, pp. 3–26 (Page reference is to the original.) (Scholar)
- –––, 1978, “Mental Representation,” Erkenntnis, 13(1): 9–61; reprinted in Field 2001, pp. 30–67. (Page reference is to the original.) (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, “The Deflationary Conception of Truth,” in Crispin Wright and George McDonald (eds.), Fact, Science and Morality, New York: Blackwell Publishing, 1987, pp. 55–117. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “Critical Notice: Paul Horwich’s Truth,” Philosophy of Science, 59(1): 321–30. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994a, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” Mind, 103(411): 249–85; reprinted in Field 2001, pp. 104–40. (Page reference is to the original.) (Scholar)
- –––, 1994b, “Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse,” Philosophical Review, 103(3): 405–52; reprinted in Field 2001, pp. 222–58. (Page reference is to the original.) (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Deflating the Conservativeness Argument,” Journal of Philosophy, XCVI(10): 533–40. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001a, “Postscript to ‘Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content’,” in Field 2001, pp. 141–56. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001b, “Attributions of Meaning and Content,” in Field 2001, pp. 157–74. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 32(2): 139–77. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Reply to Anil Gupta and Jose Martinez-Fernandez,” Philosophical Studies, 124(1): 105–28. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, Saving Truth from Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fine, Arthur, 1984a, “The Natural Ontological Attitude,” in Jarrett Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 83–107. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984b, “And Not Anti-Realism Either,” Noûs, 18(1): 51–65. (Scholar)
- Frege, Gottlob, 1918, “Thoughts,” reprinted in Peter Geach (ed.), Logical Investigations, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, pp. 1–30. (Page reference is to the reprint.) (Scholar)
- Friedman, Michael, 1974, “Explanation and Scientific Understanding,” Journal of Philosophy, LXXI(1): 5–19. (Scholar)
- Galinon, Henri, 2015, “Deflationary Truth: Conservativity or Logicality?” Philosophical Quarterly, 65(259): 268–274. (Scholar)
- Gamster, Will, 2018, “Truth: Explanation, Success, and Coincidence,” Philosophical Studies, 175(5): 1243–65. (Scholar)
- Gentzen, Gerhard, 1935 [1969], Investigations into Logical Inference, Ph.D. thesis, Universität Göttingen, in M.E. Szabo (ed.), The Collected Papers of Gerhard Gentzen, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co, pp. 68–131. (Scholar)
- Grover, D., 1977, “Inheritors and Paradox.” Journal of Philosophy, LXXIV(10): 590–604; reprinted in Grover 1992, pp. 121–36. (Page reference is to the original.) (Scholar)
- Grover, Dorothy, 1992, A Prosentential Theory of Truth, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Grover, Dorothy, Joseph Camp, and Nuel Belnap, 1975, “A Prosentential Theory of Truth,” Philosophical Studies, 27(2): 73–125; reprinted in Grover 1992, pp. 70–120. (Page reference is to the original.) (Scholar)
- Gupta, Anil, 1993a, “Minimalism.” Language and Logic: Philosophical Perspectives, 7: 359–69. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993b, “A Critique of Deflationism,” Philosophical Topics, 21(2): 57–81. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “An Argument Against Tarski’s Convention T,” in Richard Schantz (ed.), What is Truth?, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 225–37. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006a, “Do the Paradoxes Pose a Special Problem for Deflationists?” in Beall and Armour-Garb 2006, pp. 133–147. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006b, “Remarks on Christopher Hill’s Thought and World,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72(1): 190–195. (Scholar)
- –––, and Nuel Belnap, 1993, The Revision Theory of Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, and Jose Martinez-Fernandez, 2005, “Field on the Concept of Truth: Comment,” Philosophical Studies, 124(1): 45–58. (Scholar)
- Halbach, Volker,1999, “Disquotationalism and Infinite Conjunctions,” Mind, 108(429): 1–22. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “How Innocent Is Deflationism?” Synthese, 126(1): 167–94. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, Axiomatic Theories of Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hill, Christopher, 2002, Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Holton, Richard, 1993, “Minimalism about Truth,” in Brian Garrett and Kevin Mulligan (eds.), Themes from Wittgenstein (Working Papers in Philosophy: No. 4), Canberra: Australia National University Press, pp. 45–61. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps,” Philosophical Studies, 97(2): 137–68. (Scholar)
- Horisk, Claire, 2007, “The Expressive Role of Truth in Truth-Conditional Semantics,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 57(229): 535–57. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Truth, Meaning, and Circularity,” Philosophical Studies, 137(2): 269–300. (Scholar)
- Horsten, Leon, 1995, “The Semantical Paradoxes, the Neutrality of Truth, and the Neutrality of the Minimalist Theory of Truth,” in Paul Cortois (ed.), The Many Problems of Realism, Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, pp. 173–87. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Levity,” Mind, 118(471): 555–81. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Theories of Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Horwich, Paul, 1982, “Three Forms of Realism,” Synthese, 51(2): 181–201. (Scholar)
- –––, (ed.), 1994, Theories of Truth, New York: Dartmouth. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “Realism Minus Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56(4): 877–81. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998a, Truth, Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd edition [1st edition, 1990]. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998b, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “A Defense of Minimalism,” Synthese, 126(1-2): 149–65. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “A World without Isms: Life after Realism, Fictionalism, Non-Cognitivism, Relativism, Reductionism, Revisionism, and so on,” in Patrick Greenough and Michael Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 188–202. (Scholar)
- Jackson, Frank and Philip Pettit, 1990, “Program Explanation: a General Perspective,” Analysis, 50(2): 107–17. (Scholar)
- Jackson, Frank, Graham Oppy, and Michael Smith, 1994, “Minimalism and Truth Aptness,” Mind, 103(411): 287–301. (Scholar)
- Johnston, Mark, 1989, “Dispositional Theories of Value,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 63: 139–74. (Scholar)
- Kalderon, Mark, 1999, “The Transparency of Truth,” Mind, 106(423): 475–97. (Scholar)
- Ketland, Jeffrey, 1999, “Deflationism and Tarski’s Paradise,” Mind, 108(429): 69–94. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena: Reply to Tennant,” Mind, 114(453): 75–88. (Scholar)
- Kitcher, Philip, 1989, “Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World,” Scientific Explanation: MSPS, XIII: 410–505. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64(2): 346–64. (Scholar)
- Kirkham, Richard, 1992, Theories of Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul, 1975, “Outline of a Theory of Truth,” Journal of Philosophy, LXXII(19): 690–716. (Scholar)
- Kukla, Quill and Eric Winsberg, 2015, “Deflationism, Pragmatism, and Metaphysics,” in Stephen Gross, Nicholas Tebben, and Michael Williams (eds.), Meaning without Representation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 25–46. (Scholar)
- Künne, Wolfgang, 2003, Conceptions of Truth, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- Lance, Mark, 1997, “The Significance of Anaphoric Theories of Truth and Reference,” Truth: Philosophical Issues, 8: 181–98. (Scholar)
- Laudan, Larry, 1981, “A Confutation of Convergent Realism,” Philosophy of Science, 48(1): 19–49. (Scholar)
- Leeds, Stephen ,1978, “Theories of Truth and Reference,” Erkenntnis, 13(1): 111–29. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Truth, Correspondence, and Success,” Philosophical Studies, 79(1): 1–36. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1970, “General Semantics,” Synthese, 22(1-2): 18–67. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61(4): 343–77. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
- Maudlin, Tim, 2004, Truth and Paradox: Solving the Riddles, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- McGee, Vann, 2005, “Maximal Consistent Sets of Instances of Tarski’s Schema (T),” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 21(3): 235–41. (Scholar)
- McGrath, Matthew, 2000, Between Deflationism and Correspondence, New York: Garland Publishing. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth,” Philosophical Studies, 112(1): 47–67. (Scholar)
- Murzi, Julien and Lorenzxo Rossi, 2018, “Conservative Deflationism,” Philosophical Studies, 177(10): 535–49. (Scholar)
- O’Leary-Hawthorne, John and Graham Oppy, 1997, “Minimalism and Truth,” Noûs, 31(2): 170–96. (Scholar)
- Oms, Sergi, 2019, “Conceivability, Minimalism and the Generalization Problem,” Dialogue, 58(2): 287–97. (Scholar)
- Patterson, Douglas, 2005, “Deflationism and the Truth-Conditional Theory of Meaning,” Philosophical Studies, 124(3): 271–94. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, Alfred Tarski: Philosophy of Language and Logic, New York: Palgrave-MacMillan. (Scholar)
- Picollo, Lainia and Thomas Schindler, 2020, “Is Deflationism Compatible with Compositional and Tarskian Truth Theories?” in Carlo Nicolai and Johannes Stern (eds.), Modes of Truth, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 41–68. (Scholar)
- Platts, Mark, 1980, “Introduction,” in Mark Platts (ed.), Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 1–18. (Scholar)
- Price, Huw, 1998, “Three Norms of Assertibility, or How the Moa Became Extinct,” Language, Mind, and Ontology: Philosophical Perspectives, 12: 241–54. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Truth as Convenient Friction,” Journal of Philosophy, C(4): 167–90. (Scholar)
- Prior, Arthur, 1967, “Correspondence Theory of Truth,” in Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Volume 2), New York: The Macmillan Co. and The Free Press, pp. 223–232. (Scholar)
- –––, 1971, Objects of Thought, Peter Geach and Anthony Kenny (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary, 1978, Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983a, “Vagueness and Alternative Logic,” Erkenntnis, 19: 297–314; reprinted in Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers (Volume 3), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 271–86. (Page reference is to the reprint.) (Scholar)
- –––, 1983b, “On Truth,” in Leigh Cauman, et al. (eds.), How Many Questions? Essays in Honor of Sidney Morgenbesser, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, pp. 35–56; reprinted in Putnam 1994, pp. 315–29. (Page reference is to the reprint.) (Scholar)
- –––, 1985, “A Comparison of Something with Something Else,” New Literary History, 17: 61–79; reprinted in Putnam 1994, pp. 330–50. (Page reference is to the reprint.) (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “Does the Disquotational Theory Really Solve All Philosophical Problems?” Metaphilosophy, 22(1-2): 1–13; reprinted in Putnam 1994, pp. 264–78. (Page references is to the reprint.) (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, Words and Life, James Conant (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Quine, W.v.O., 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1970 [1986], Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Page reference is to the 2nd edition, 1986.) (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, Theories and Things, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, Pursuit of Truth, Revised Edition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Ramsey, Frank, 1927, “Facts and Propositions,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 7 (Supplementary): 153–70; reprinted in David Mellor (ed.), Philosophical Papers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 34–51. (Page references is to the reprint.) (Scholar)
- –––, 1929, On Truth: Original Manuscript Materials (1927–1929), Episteme, 16, Nicholas Rescher and Ulrich Majer (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. (Scholar)
- Rabin, Gabriel, 2020, “Fundamentality Physicalism,” Inquiry, published online January 2, 2020. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2019.1688177 (Scholar)
- Rescher, Nicholas, 1969, Many-Valued Logic, New York: McGraw-Hill. (Scholar)
- Restall, Greg, 2006, “Minimalists Can (and Should) Be Epistemicists, and it Helps if They Are Revision Theorists Too,” in Beall and Armour-Garb 2006, pp. 97–106. (Scholar)
- Rumfitt, Ian, 1995, “Truth Wronged: Crispin Wright’s Truth and Objectivity,” Ratio (New Series), VIII(1): 100–7. (Scholar)
- Schantz, Richard, 1998, “Was Tarski a Deflationist?” Logic and Logical Philosophy, 6: 157–72. (Scholar)
- Sellars, Wilfrid, 1974, “Meaning as Functional Classification,” Synthese, 27(3): 417–37. (Scholar)
- –––, 1979, Naturalism and Ontology, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company. (Scholar)
- Simmons, Keith, 1999, “Deflationary Truth and the Liar,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 28: 455–88. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Deflationism and the Autonomy of Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72(1): 196–204. (Scholar)
- Shapiro, Stewart, 1998, “Proof and Truth: Through Thick and Thin,” Journal of Philosophy, XCV(10): 493–521. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Gurus, Logical Consequence, and Truth Bearers: What Is It That Is True,” in Armour-Garb and Beall 2005, pp. 153–70. (Scholar)
- Soames, Scott, 1999, Understanding Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Sosa, Ernest, 1993, “Epistemology, Realism, and Truth: The First Philosophical Perspectives Lecture,” Language and Logic: Philosophical Perspectives, 7: 1–16. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, Robert, 1970, “Pragmatics,” Synthese, 22(1-2): 272–89. (Scholar)
- –––,1973, “Pragmatic Presuppositions,” reprinted in Context and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 47–62. (Page reference is to the reprint.) (Scholar)
- Strawson, Peter, 1949, “Truth,” Analysis, 9(6): 83–97. (Scholar)
- –––, 1950, “Truth,” Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 24: 129–56. (Scholar)
- Tarski, Alfred, 1935 [1956], “Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen,” Studio Philosophica, 1: 261–405. Translated in 1956 by J.H. Woodger as “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages,” reprinted in John Corcoran (ed.), Logic, Semantics, Mathematics, Second Edition, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983, pp. 152–278. (Page reference is to the reprint.) (Scholar)
- –––, 1944, “The Semantic Conception of Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4(4): 341–75. (Scholar)
- Van Fraassen, Bas, 1980, The Scientific Image, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Williams, Michael, 1986, “Do We (Epistemologists) Need a Theory of Truth?”Philosophical Topics, 14(1): 223–42. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Meaning and Deflationary Truth,” Journal of Philosophy, XCVI(11): 545–64. (Scholar)
- Waxman, Daniel, 2017, “Deflationism, Arithmetic, and the Argument from Conservativeness,” Mind, 126(502): 429–63. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy, 1994, Vagueness, London: Routledge Press. (Scholar)
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1934 [1974], Philosophical Grammar, R. Rhees (ed.) and A. Kenny (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. (Scholar)
- –––, 1937 [2005], The Big Typescript: TS 213, C. Grant, Louis Luckhardt and Maximilian Aue (eds. and translators), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. (Scholar)
- –––, 1953 [2009], Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, revised 4th edition. (Scholar)
- Woodbridge, James, 2005, “Truth as a Pretense,” in Mark Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 134–77. (Scholar)
- Wrenn, Chase, 2011, “Practical Success and the Nature of Truth,” Synthese, 181(3): 451–70. (Scholar)
- –––, 2021, “Deflating the Success-Truth Connection,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, published online October 24, 2021. doi:10.1080/00048402.2021.1966483 (Scholar)
- Wright, Crispin, 1992, Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Yablo, Stephen,1985, “Truth and Reflection,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 14(3): 297–349. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “Paradox Without Self-Reference,” Analysis, 53(4): 251–2. (Scholar)
