Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Deflationary Theory of Truth" by Daniel Stoljar and Nic Damnjanovic
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Armour-Garb, B., 2001. ‘Deflationism and the Meaningless Strategy’, Analysis, 61 (4): 280–89. (Scholar)
- Armour-Garb, B., 2004. ‘Minimalism, the Generalization Problem, and the Liar’, Synthese, 39: 491–512. (Scholar)
- Armour-Garb, B. and JC Beall (eds.), 2005. Deflationary Truth, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court Press. (Scholar)
- Ayer, A.J., 1935. ‘The Criterion of Truth’, Analysis, 3: 28–32. (Scholar)
- Bar-On, D., C. Horisk and W.G. Lycan, 2005. ‘Postscript to ‘Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions’’, in B. Armour-Garb and J.C. Beall (eds.) 2005. (Scholar)
- Beall, J.C., 2001. ‘A Neglected Deflationist Approach to the Liar’, Analysis, 61 (2): 126–9. (Scholar)
- Beall, J.C. and Armour-Garb, B. (eds.) 2006. Deflationism and Paradox, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- Boghossian, P.A., 1990. ‘The Status of Content’, The Philosophical Review, XCIX (2): 157–184. (Scholar)
- Cartwright, R., 1987. ‘A Neglected Theory of Truth’. In R. Cartwright, Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987. (Scholar)
- Collins, J., 2002. ‘Truth or Meaning? A Question of Priority’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 497–536. (Scholar)
- David, M., 1996. Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D., 1990. ‘The Structure and Content of Truth’, Journal of Philosophy, 87: 279–328. (Scholar)
- Devitt, M., 1990. Realism and Truth, 2nd Edition, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Dummett, M., 1959. ‘Truth’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 59: 141–162. Reprinted in M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. (Scholar)
- Field, H., 1972. ‘Tarski's Theory of Truth’, Journal of Philosophy, 69: 347–75. (Scholar)
- Field, H., 1986. ‘The Deflationary Conception of Truth’, in G. MacDonald and C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science and Morality, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Field, H., 1992. ‘Critical Notice: Paul Horwich's ‘Truth’’, Philosophy of Science, 59: 321–30. (Scholar)
- Field, H., 1994a. ‘Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content’, Mind, 103 (411): 249–84. (Scholar)
- Field, H., 1994b. ‘Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse’, Philosophical Review, 103 (3): 405–52. (Scholar)
- Field, H., 1999. ‘Deflating the Conservativeness Argument’, Journal of Philosophy, 96: 533–40. (Scholar)
- Field, H., 2003. ‘A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 32: 139–77. (Scholar)
- Field, H., 2005. ‘Reply to Anil Gupta and Jose Martinez-Fernandez’, Philosophical Studies, 124: 105–28. (Scholar)
- Frege, G., 1918. ‘Thoughts’, in his Logical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1977. (Scholar)
- Grover, D., 1992. A Prosentential Theory of Truth, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Grover, D., Camp, J., and Belnap, N., 1975. ‘A Prosentential Theory of Truth’, Philosophical Studies, 27: 73–125. (Scholar)
- Gupta, A., 1993. ‘A Critique of Deflationism’, Philosophical Topics, 21: 57–81. (Scholar)
- Gupta, A., 2006. ‘Do the Paradoxes Pose a Special Problem for Deflationists?’, in JC Beall and B. Armour-Garb (eds.) 2006. (Scholar)
- Gupta, A., and Belnap, N. 1993. The Revision Theory of Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Gupta, A. and Martinez-Fernandez, J., 2005. ‘Field on the Concept of Truth: Comment’, Philosophical Studies, 124: 45–58. (Scholar)
- Halbach, V., 1999. ‘Disquotationalism and Infinite Conjunctions’, Mind, 108: 1–22. (Scholar)
- Hill, C., 2002. Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Holton, R., 2000. ‘Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps’, Philosophical Studies, 97 (2): 137–68. (Scholar)
- Horisk, C., 2007. ‘The Expressive Role of Truth in Truth-Conditional Semantics’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 57: 535–557 (Scholar)
- Horisk, C., 2008. ‘Truth, Meaning, and Circularity’, Philosophical Studies, 13: 269–300 (Scholar)
- Horwich, P. (ed.), 1994. Theories of Truth, New York: Dartmouth. (Scholar)
- Horwich, P., 1998a. Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- Horwich, P., 1998b. Truth, Oxford: Blackwell (first edition 1990). (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., Oppy, G. and Smith, M. ‘Minimalism and Truth Aptness’, Mind, 103 (411): 287–302. (Scholar)
- Kalderon, E., 1999. ‘The Transparency of Truth’, Mind, 106: 475–97. (Scholar)
- Ketland, J., 1999. ‘Deflationism and Tarski's Paradise’, Mind, 108: 69–94. (Scholar)
- Kirkham, R.L., 1992. Theories of Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S., 1975. ‘Outline of a Theory of Truth’, Journal of Philosophy, 72: 690–716. (Scholar)
- Künne, W., 2003. Conceptions of Truth, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- Lance, M., 1997. ‘The Significance of Anaphoric Theories of Truth and Reference’, in E. Villanueva, (ed.), Philosophical Issues 8: Truth. (Scholar)
- Leeds, S., 1978, ‘Theories of Truth and Reference’, Erkenntnis, 13: 111–129. (Scholar)
- Maudlin, T., 2004. Truth and Paradox: Solving the Riddles, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- McGee, V., 2005. ‘Maximal Consistent Sets of Instances of Tarski's Schema (T)’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 21: 235–41. (Scholar)
- McGrath, M., 2000. Between Deflationism and Correspondence, New York: Garland Publishing. (Scholar)
- O'Leary Hawthorne, J. and Oppy, G., 1997. ‘Minimalism and Truth’, Noûs, 31: 170–96. (Scholar)
- Platts, M., 1980. ‘Introduction’, in M. Platts (ed.), Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Price, H., 1998. ‘Three Norms of Assertibility’, in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 12: pp. 41–54. (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V.O., 1970. Philosophy of Logic, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. (Scholar)
- Ramsey, F.P., 1927. ‘Facts and Propositions’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 7 (Supplementary): 153–170. (Scholar)
- Rescher, N., 1969. Many-Valued Logic, New York: McGraw-Hill (Scholar)
- Restall, G., 2006. ‘Minimalists Can (and Should) Be Epistemicists, and it Helps if They Are Revision Theorists Too’, in JC Beall and B. Armour-Garb (eds.) 2006. (Scholar)
- Shapiro, S., 1998. ‘Proof and Truth: Through Thick and Thin’, Journal of Philosophy, 95: 493–521. (Scholar)
- Strawson, P., 1950. ‘Truth’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 24: 111–56. (Scholar)
- Soames, S., 1999. Understanding Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E., 1993. ‘Epistemology, Realism, and Truth: The First Philosophical Perspectives Lecture’, Philosophical Perspectives, 7, Language and Logic: 1–16. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, R., 1975. ‘Pragmatic Presupposition’, reprinted in S. Davis (ed.), Pragmatics: A Reader, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. (Scholar)
- Tarski, A., 1944. ‘The Semantic Conception of Truth’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, IV: 341–75. (Scholar)
- Tarski, A., 1958. ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’, in A. Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers form 1923 to 1938, Oxford: Oxford University, 1958. (Scholar)
- Williams, M., 1999. ‘Meaning and Deflationary truth’, Journal of Philosophy, 96: 545–64. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T., 1994. Vagueness, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Wright, C., 1992. Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Yablo, S., 1985. ‘Truth and Reflection’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 14: 297–349. (Scholar)
- Yablo, S., 1993. ‘Paradox Without Self-Reference’, Analysis, 53: 251–2. (Scholar)
