Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Pluralist Theories of Truth" by Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen and Cory Wright
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- Acton, Harry, 1935, “The correspondence theory of truth,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 35: 177–194. (Scholar)
- Alston, William, 2002, “Truth: concept and property,” in Richard Shantz (ed.), What is Truth?, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 11–26. (Scholar)
- Asay, Jamin, 2018, “Putting pluralism in its place,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 96: 175–191. (Scholar)
- Barnard, Robert & Terence Horgan, 2013, “The synthetic unity of truth,” in Pedersen & Wright (eds.) 2013, pp. 180–196. (Scholar)
- Beall, J.C., 2000, “On mixed inferences and pluralism about truth predicates,” Philosophical Quarterly, 50: 380–382. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Deflated truth pluralism,” in Pedersen & Wright (eds.) 2013, pp. 323–338. (Scholar)
- Blackburn, Simon, 2013, “Deflationism, pluralism, expressivism, pragmatism,” in Pedersen & Wright (eds.) 2013, pp. 263–277. (Scholar)
- Boghossian, Paul, 2003, “The normativity of content,” Philosophical Issues, 13: 31–45. (Scholar)
- Cotnoir, Aaron, 2009, “Generic truth and mixed conjunctions: some alternatives,” Analysis, 63: 473–479. (Scholar)
- David, Marian, 1994, Correspondence and Disquotation: an Essay on the Nature of Truth, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Truth as the epistemic goal,” in Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 151–169. (Scholar)
- Devlin, John, 2003, “An argument for an error theory of truth,” Philosophical Perspectives, 17: 52–82. (Scholar)
- Dodd, Julian, 2013, “Deflationism trumps pluralism!,” in Pedersen & Wright (eds.) 2013, pp. 298–322. (Scholar)
- Dummett, Michael, 1978, Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Edwards, Douglas, 2008, “How to solve the problem of mixed conjunctions,” Analysis, 68: 143–149. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Simplifying alethic pluralism,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49: 28–48. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012a, “On alethic disjunctivism,” Dialectica, 66: 200–214. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012b, “Alethic vs. deflationary functionalism,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20: 115–125. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013a, “Truth, winning, and simple determination pluralism,” in Pedersen & Wright (eds.) 2013, pp. 113–122. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013b, “Truth as a Substantive Property,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91: 279–294. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018a, The Metaphysics of Truth, Oxford, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018b, “The Metaphysics of Domains,” in Wyatt, Pedersen & Kellen (eds.) 2018, pp. 85–106. (Scholar)
- Engel, Pascal, 2002, Truth, Chesham: Acumen Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Alethic functionalism and the norm of belief,” in Pedersen and Wright (eds.) 2013, pp. 69–86. (Scholar)
- Ferrari, Filippo, 2016, “Disagreement about taste and alethic suberogation,” Philosophical Quarterly, 66: 516–535. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “Normative Alethic Pluralism,” in Wyatt, Pedersen & Kellen (eds.) 2018, pp. 145–168. (Scholar)
- Ferrari, Filippo & Sebastiano Moruzzi, forthcoming, “Ecumenical alethic pluralism,” to appear in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. doi: 10.1080/00455091.2018.1493880 (Scholar)
- Gibbard, Alan, 2003, “Thoughts and norms,” Philosophical Issues, 13: 83–98. (Scholar)
- Hales, Steven, 2001, “On Lynchian pluralism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 699–709. (Scholar)
- Horgan, Terence, 2001, “Contextual semantics and metaphysical realism: Truth as indirect correspondence,” in Michael Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 67–95. (Scholar)
- Horgan, Terence & Matjaž Potrč, 2000, “Blobjectivism and indirect correspondence,” Facta Philosophica, 2: 249–270. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Abundant truth in an austere world,” in Michael Lynch & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Truth and Realism: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford: University Press, pp. 137–167. (Scholar)
- Horgan, Terence & Mark Timmons, 2002, “Conceptual relativity and metaphysical realism,” Philosophical Issues, 12: 74–96. (Scholar)
- Horgan, Terence & Robert Barnard, 2006, “Truth as mediated correspondence,” The Monist, 89: 31–50. (Scholar)
- Horton, Michael & Ted Poston, 2010, “Functionalism about truth and the metaphysics of reduction,” Acta Analytica, 27:13–27. (Scholar)
- Horwich, Paul, 1990, Truth, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Joachim, Harold, 1905, “‘Absolute’ and ‘relative’ truth,” Mind, 14: 1–14. (Scholar)
- Kaufmann, Felix, 1948, “Three meanings of ‘truth’,” Journal of Philosophy, 45: 337–350. (Scholar)
- Kim, Seahwa & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen, 2018, “Strong truth pluralism,” in Wyatt, Pedersen & Kellen (eds.) 2018, pp. 107–130. (Scholar)
- Kölbel, Max, 2002, Truth Without Objectivity, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “‘True’ as ambiguous,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77: 359–384. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Should we be pluralists about truth?,” in Pedersen & Wright (eds.) 2013, pp. 278–297. (Scholar)
- Künne, Wolfgang, 2003, Conceptions of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lucas, John, 1969, “True,” Philosophy, 54: 175–186. (Scholar)
- Lynch, Michael, 1998, Truth in Context: An Essay on Objectivity and Pluralism, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Alethic pluralism and the functionalist theory of truth,” Acta Analytica, 15: 195–214. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “A functionalist theory of truth,” in M. Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, pp. 723–749.
- –––, 2004a, “Minimalism and the value of truth,” Philosophical Quarterly, 54: 498–516. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004b, “Truth and multiple realizability,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 384–408. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005a, “Functionalism and our folk theory of truth: reply to Cory Wright,” Synthese, 145: 29–43. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005b, “Précis to True to Life,” and “Response to commentators,” Philosophical Books, 46: 289–291, 331–342. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005c, “Truisms about truth,” in Heather Battaly and Michael Lynch (eds.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of William Alston, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, pp. 255–274. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “ReWrighting Pluralism,” The Monist, 89: 63–84. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, Truth as One and Many, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “The many faces of truth: a response to some critics,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20: 255–269. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013a, “Three questions for truth pluralism,” in Pedersen & Wright (eds.) 2013, pp. 21–41. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013b,“Expressivism and plural truth,” Philosophical Studies, 163: 385–401. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “Truth Pluralism, Quasi-realism and the Problem of Double-Counting,” in Wyatt, Pedersen & Kellen (eds.) 2018, pp. 63–84 (Scholar)
- Maffie, James, 2002, “Why care about Nezahualcoyotl? Veritism and Nahua philosophy,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 32: 71–91. (Scholar)
- Næss, Arne, 1938a, ‘Truth’ as Conceived by Those Who Are Not Professional Philosophers, Oslo: Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo, Skrifter. (Scholar)
- –––, 1938b, “Common-sense and truth,” Theoria, 4: 39–58. (Scholar)
- Nolan, Daniel, 2009, “Platitudes and metaphysics,” in David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 267–300. (Scholar)
- Patterson, Douglas, 2010, “Truth as conceptually primitive,” in Wright & Pedersen (eds.) 2010, pp. 13–29. (Scholar)
- Pedersen, Nikolaj J., 2006, “What can the problem of mixed inferences teach us about alethic pluralism?,” The Monist, 89: 103–117. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Stabilizing alethic pluralism,” Philosophical Quarterly, 60: 92–108. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Recent work on alethic pluralism,” Analysis, 72: 588–607. (Scholar)
- Pedersen, Nikolaj J. L. L. & Douglas Edwards, 2011, “Truth as one(s) and many: on Lynch’s alethic functionalism,” Analytic Philosophy, 52: 213–230. (Scholar)
- Pedersen, Nikolaj J. L. L. & Michael P. Lynch, 2018, “Truth Pluralism,” in Michael Glanzberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Truth, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 543–575. (Scholar)
- Pedersen, Nikolaj J. L. L. & Cory Wright (eds.), 2013, Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Pettit, Philip, 1996, “Realism and truth: a comment on Crispin Wright’s Truth and Objectivity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56: 883–890. (Scholar)
- Pratt, James, 1908, “Truth and ideas,” Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 5: 122–131. (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary, 1994, “Sense, nonsense, and the senses: An inquiry into the powers of the human mind,” Journal of Philosophy, 91: 445–515. (Scholar)
- Quine, Willard van Orman, 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Sainsbury, Mark, 1996, “Crispin Wright: Truth and Objectivity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56: 899–904. (Scholar)
- Schiller, Ferdinand, 1906, “The ambiguity of truth,” Mind, 15: 161–176. (Scholar)
- Shah, Nishi, 2003, “How truth regulates belief,” Philosophical Review, 112: 447–482. (Scholar)
- Sher, Gila, 1998, “On the possibility of a substantive theory of truth,” Synthese, 117: 133–172. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “In search of a substantive theory of truth,” Journal of Philosophy, 101: 5–36. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Functional pluralism,” Philosophical Books, 46: 311–330. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Forms of correspondence: the intricate route from thought to reality,” in Pedersen & Wright (eds.) 2013, pp. 157–179. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016a, Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic, Oxford, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016b, “Substantivism about truth,” Philosophy Compass, 11: 818–828. (Scholar)
- Tappolet, Christine, 1997, “Mixed inferences: a problem for pluralism about truth predicates,” Analysis, 57: 209–210. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Truth pluralism and many-valued logics: a reply to Beall,” Philosophical Quarterly, 50: 382–385. (Scholar)
- Tarski, Alfred, 1944, “The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4: 341–376. (Scholar)
- Ulatowski, Joseph, 2017, Commonsense Pluralism about Truth: An Empirical Defence, London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
- Wedgwood, Ralph, 2002, “The aim of belief,” Philosophical Perspectives, 16: 276–229. (Scholar)
- White, Alan, 1970, Truth, London: Macmillan & Co. (Scholar)
- Whiting, Daniel, 2013, “Truth: the aim and norm of belief,” Teorema, 32: 121&135. (Scholar)
- Williams, Bernard, 2002, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Wright, Cory, 2005, “On the functionalization of pluralist approaches to truth,” Synthese, 145: 1–28. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Truth, Ramsification, and the pluralist’s revenge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88: 265–283. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Is pluralism inherently unstable?,” Philosophical Studies, 159: 89–105. (Scholar)
- Wright, Cory & Nikolaj Pedersen, 2010, “Truth, pluralism, monism, correspondence,” in Wright & Pedersen (eds.) 2010, pp. 205–217. (Scholar)
- Wright, Cory & Nikolaj Pedersen (eds.), 2010, New Waves in Truth, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
- Wright, Crispin, 1992, Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “Précis to Truth and Objectivity” and “Response to commentators,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56: 863–868, 911–941. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Comrades against quietism: reply to Simon Blackburn on Truth and Objectivity,” Mind, 107: 183–203. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Truth: a traditional debate reviewed,” in Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds), Truth, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 203–238. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Minimalism, deflationism, pragmatism, pluralism,” in Michael Lynch (ed.) The Nature of Truth: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 751–787. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “A plurality of pluralisms?,” in Pedersen and Wright (eds.) 2013, pp. 123–153.
- Wyatt, Jeremy, 2013, “Domains, plural truth, and mixed atomic propositions,” Philosophical Studies, 166: 255–236. (Scholar)
- Wyatt, Jeremy, 2016, “The many (yet few) faces of deflationism,” Philosophical Quarterly, 66: 362–382. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “Truth in English and elsewhere: an empirically-informed functionalism,” in Wyatt, Pedersen & Kellen (eds.) 2018, pp. 169–196. (Scholar)
- Wyatt, Jeremy & Michael P. Lynch, 2016, “From one to many: recent work on truth,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 53: 323–340. (Scholar)
- Wyatt, Jeremy, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Nathan Kellen, (eds.), 2018, Pluralisms in Truth and Logic, London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
- Yu, Andy, 2017, “Logic for Alethic Pluralists,” The Journal of Philosophy, 114: 277–302. (Scholar)
