Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Two-Dimensional Semantics" by Laura Schroeter

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Åqvist, L., 1973, “Modal Logic with Subjunctive Conditionals and Dispositional Predicates”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1: 1–76. (Scholar)
Ball, D., 2014, “Two-Dimensionalism and the Social Character of Meaning”, Erkenntnis, 79: 567–595. (Scholar)
Bealer, G., 2002, “Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance”, in Conceivability and Possibility, T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 71–125. (Scholar)
Biggs, S. and J. Wilson, 2020, “Abductive Two-Dimensionalism: A New Route to the A Priori Identification of Necessary Truths”, Synthese 197: 59–70. (Scholar)
Bjerring, J.C., 2014, “Problems in Epistemic Space”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 43: 153–70. (Scholar)
Block, N. and R. Stalnaker, 1999, “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap”, Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46. (Scholar)
Boghossian, P., 2011, “Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82: 488–497. (Scholar)
Braddon-Mitchell, D., 2004, “Masters of Our Meanings”, Philosophical Studies, 118: 133–152. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “A Priori Analysis and the Methodological A Posteriori”, in The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, C. Daly (ed.), Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 33–50. (Scholar)
Brehany, R., 2006, “Pragmatic Analyses of Anaphoric Pronouns: Do Things Look Better in 2-D?” in Two-Dimensional Semantics, M. Garcia-Carpintero and J. Macia (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 22–37. (Scholar)
Burge, T., 1979, “Individualism and the Mental”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: 73–122. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind”, Journal of Philosophy, 83: 697–720. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “Wherein is Language Social?” in Reflections on Chomsky, A. George (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 175–191. (Scholar)
Byrne, A., 1999, “Cosmic Hermeneutics”, Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 347–384. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Chalmers on Epistemic Content”, SOFIA conference on Metaphysics of Mind: URL \(= \lt\)http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/Epistemic.pdf\(\gt\). (Scholar)
Byrne, A. and J. Pryor, 2006, “Bad Intensions”, in Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications, M. Garcia-Carpintero and J. Macia (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 38–54. (Scholar)
Camp, E., 2017, “Pragmatic Force in Semantic Context”, Philosophical Studies, 174: 1617–1627. (Scholar)
Carnap, R., 1947, Meaning and Necessity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1950, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 11: 20–40. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 473–496. (Scholar)
–––, 2002a, “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” in Conceivability and Possibility, T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 145–200. (Scholar)
–––, 2002b, “On Sense and Intension”, Philosophical Perspectives, 16: 135–82. (Scholar)
–––, 2002c, “The Components of Content”, in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, D. Chalmers (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 608–33. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics”, Philosophical Studies, 118: 153–226. (Scholar)
–––, 2006a, “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”, in Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications, M. Garcia-Carpintero and J. Macia (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 55–140. (Scholar)
–––, 2006b, “Two-Dimensional Semantics”, in Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, E. Lepore and B. Smith (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 575–606. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism”, in Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, B. McLaughlin (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 313–335. (Scholar)
–––, 2011a, “Propositions and Attitude Reports: A Fregean Account”, Noûs, 45: 595–639. (Scholar)
–––, 2011b, “The Nature of Epistemic Space”, in Epistemic Modality, A. Egan and B. Weatherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, Constructing the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, “Frontloading and Fregean sense: Reply to Neta, Schroeter and Stanley”, Analysis, 74: 676–697. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “Intensions and Indeterminacy: Reply to Soames, Turner, and Wilson”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89: 249–269. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D. and F. Jackson, 2001, “Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation”, Philosophical Review, 110: 315–61. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D., and B. Rabern, 2014, “Two-dimensional semantics and the nesting problem”, Analysis, 74: 210–224. (Scholar)
Crimmins, M., 1992, Talk About Beliefs, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Crossley, J. N. and I. L. Humberstone, 1977, “The Logic of ‘Actually’”, Reports on Mathematical Logic, 8: 11–29. (Scholar)
Davies, M. and I. L. Humberstone, 1980, “Two Notions of Necessity”, Philosophical Studies, 38: 1–30. (Scholar)
Diaz-Leon, E., 2011, “Reductive explanation, concepts and a priori entailment”, Philosophical Studies, 155: 99–116. (Scholar)
Descartes, R., 1641, Meditations on First Philosophy, ed. J. Cottingham, 1996, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Dennett, D., 1988, “Quining Qualia”, in Consciousness in Modern Science, A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 44–77. (Scholar)
Deutsch, Harry, 1993, “Semantics for Natural Kind Terms”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23: 389–411. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Contingency and Modal Logic”, Philosophical Studies, 60: 89–92. (Scholar)
Dever, J., 2007, “Low-Grade Two-Dimensionalism”, Philosophical Books, 48: 1–16. (Scholar)
Donnellan, K., 1970, “Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions”, Synthese, 21: 335–358. (Scholar)
Dowell, J. L., 2008, “Empirical Metaphysics: the role of intuitions about possible cases in philosophy”, Philosophical Studies, 140: 19–46. (Scholar)
Dummett, 1973, Frege: Philosophy of Language, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy, London: Duckworth. (Scholar)
Ebbs, G., 2014, “Conditionalization and Conceptual Change: Chalmers in Defense of a Dogma”, Journal of Philosophy, 111: 689–703. (Scholar)
Elliott, E., K. McQueen, and C. Weber, 2013, “Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and the Argument from Epistemic Misclassification”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91: 375–389. (Scholar)
Evans, G., 1979, “Reference and Contingency”, Monist, 62: 161–189. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Fine, K., 2007, Semantic Relationism, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Forbes, G., 2011, “The problem of factives for sense theories”, Analysis, 71: 654–662. (Scholar)
Frege, G., 1892, “On Sinn and Bedeutung”, in The Frege Reader, M. Beany (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell (1997), pp. 151–71. (Scholar)
Fritz, P., 2013, “A logic for epistemic two-dimensional semantics”, Synthese, 190: 1753–1770.
Gertler, B., 2002, “Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments about the Mind”, Noûs, 36: 22–49. (Scholar)
Greene, M., 2017, “Conversation and Common Ground”, Philosophical Studies, 174: 1589–1604 (Scholar)
Grice, P., 1989, Studies in the Ways of Words, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Haas-Spohn, U., 1995, Versteckte Indexikalität und subjektive Bedeutung, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag; English translation, Hidden Indexicality and Subjective Meaning. (Scholar)
Hazen, A. 1976, “Expressive Completeness in Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 5: 25–46. (Scholar)
–––, 1978, “Eliminability of the Actuality Operator in Propositional Modal Logic”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 19: 617–622. (Scholar)
Heck, R., 2018, “The Frontloading Argument”, Philosophical Studies, 175: 2582–2608. (Scholar)
Hill, C. and B. McLaughlin, 1999, “There are Fewer Things in Reality than are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49: 445–454. (Scholar)
Humberstone, L., 2004, “Two-Dimensional Adventures”, Philosophical Studies, 118: 17–65. (Scholar)
Jackson, F., 1994, “Armchair Metaphysics”, in Meaning in Mind, M. Michael and J. O’Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 23–42. (Scholar)
–––, 1998a, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998b, “Reference and Description Revisited”, Philosophical Perspectives, 12: 201–218. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Reply to Yablo: What do we communicate when we use ethical terms?” Philosophical Books, 48: 24–29. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Why We Need A-Intensions”, Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “The Story of ‘Fred’”, in Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, J. Thomson and A. Byrne (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 191–203. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Reference and Description from the Descriptivists’ Corner”, Philosophical Books, 48: 17–26. (Scholar)
Jackson, F. and P. Pettit, 1995, “Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation”, Philosophical Quarterly, 45: 20–40. (Scholar)
Jago, M., 2009, “Logical Information and Epistemic Space”, Synthese, 167: 327–341. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, The Impossible: An Essay on Hyperintensionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Jenkins, C., 2008, Grounding Concepts: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “A Priori Knowledge: The Conceptual Approach”, in The Continuum Companion to Epistemology, A Cullison (ed.), 180–98. London: Continuum Press. (Scholar)
Johannesson, E., and S. Packalén, 2016, “The A Priori-Operator and the Nesting Problem”, Thought, 5: 169–179. (Scholar)
Kamp, J. A. W., 1971, “Formal Properties of ‘Now’”, Theoria, 37: 227–273. (Scholar)
Kant, I., 1787, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith, London: Macmillan (1929). (Scholar)
Kaplan, D., 1989a, “Demonstratives”, in Themes from Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 481–563. (Scholar)
–––, 1989b, “Afterthoughts”, in Themes from Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 565–612. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “Words”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement, 64: 93–119. (Scholar)
Kipper, J., 2012, A Two-Dimensional Guide to Conceptual Analysis, Frankfurt: Ontos. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Propositional apriority and the nesting problem”, Philosophical Studies, 174: 1091–1104. (Scholar)
Kripke, S., 1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Kroon, F., 2004a, “A-Intensions and Communication”, Philosophical Studies, 118: 279–298. (Scholar)
–––, 2004b, “Descriptivism, Pretense, and the Frege–Russell Problems”, Philosophical Review, 113: 1–30. (Scholar)
Laurence, S. and E. Margolis, 2003, “Concepts and Conceptual Analysis”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67: 253–282. (Scholar)
Lewis, D., 1966, “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, Journal of Philosophy, 63: 17–25. (Scholar)
–––, 1969, Convention, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1970, “How to Define Theoretical Terms”, Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–46. (Scholar)
–––, 1972, “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 412–458. (Scholar)
–––, 1979, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”, Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, “Mad Pain, Martian Pain”, in Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, N. Block (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 216–222. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, “Index, Context, and Content”, in Philosophy and Grammar, S. Kanger and S. Ohlman (eds.), Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 79–100. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Reduction in Mind”, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, S. Guttenplan (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 412–431. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Naming the Colours”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342. (Scholar)
Loar, B., 1990, “Phenomenal States”, Philosophical Perspectives, 4: 81–108. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “David Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49: 465–495. (Scholar)
Marconi, D., 2005, “Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Articulation Problem”, Synthese, 143: 321–349. (Scholar)
Melnyk, A., 2008, “Conceptual and Linguistic Analysis: A Two-Step Program”, Noûs, 42: 267–291. (Scholar)
Neta, R., 2014, “Chalmers’s Frontloading Argument for A Priori Scrutability”, Analysis, 74: 651–661. (Scholar)
Nimtz, C., 2004, “Two-Dimensionalism and Natural Kind Terms”, Synthese, 138: 125–148. (Scholar)
Ninan, D., 2010a, “De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication”, Philosophy Compass, 5: 551–567. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, “Semantics and the objects of assertion”, Linguistics and Philosophy, 33: 355–380. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Self-Location and Other-Location”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 87: 301–331. (Scholar)
Perry, J., 1979, “The problem of the Essential Indexical”, Noûs, 13: 3–21. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, “A Problem about Continued Belief”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 61: 317–322. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Stalnaker and Indexical Belief”, in Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, J. Thomson and A. Byrne (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 204–221. (Scholar)
Pickel, B., 2016, “Frontloading, Supposition, and Contraction”, Philosophical Quarterly, 66: 559–578. (Scholar)
Pickel, B. and M. Schulz, 2018, “Quinean Updates: In Defense of ‘Two Dogmas’”, Journal of Philosophy, 115: 57–91. (Scholar)
Predelli, S., 1998, “‘I am not here now’”, Analysis, 58: 107–115.
Pryor, J., 2006, “Hyper-Reliability and Apriority”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 106: 327–344. (Scholar)
Putnam, H., 1970, “Is Semantics Possible?” in Languages, Belief and Metaphysics, H. Kiefer and M. Munitz (eds.), Contemporary Philosophic Thought: The International Philosophy Year Conferences at Brockport, New York: SUNY Press, pp. 50–63. Reprinted in Putnam (1975), pp. 139–152. (Scholar)
–––, 1972, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7: 131–193. Reprinted in Putnam (1975), pp. 215–271. (Scholar)
–––, 1973, “Explanation and Reference”, in Conceptual Change, G. Pearce and P. Maynard (eds.): Dordrecht-Reidel, pp. 199-221. Reprinted in Putnam (1975), pp. 196–214. (Scholar)
–––, 1974, “The Refutation of Conventionalism”, Noûs, 8: 25–40. Reprinted in Putnam (1975), pp. 153–195. (Scholar)
–––, 1975, Mind, Language, and Reality (Philosophical Papers: Volume 2), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 1951b, “On Carnap’s Views on Ontology”, Philosophical Studies, 2: 65–72. (Scholar)
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–––, 2012b, “Propositions and Multiple Indexing”, Thought, 1: 116–124. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Monsters in Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives”, Philosophical Studies, 164: 393–404. (Scholar)
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Richard, M., 1990, Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Rupert, R.D., 2016, “Embodied Knowledge, Conceptual Change, and the A Priori; or, Justification, Revision and the Ways Life Could Go”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 53: 169–192. (Scholar)
Sbardolini, G., 2019, “Two-Dimensional Paradox”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97: 605–617. (Scholar)
Schroeter, L., 2003, “Gruesome Diagonals”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 3 (3): 1–23. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “The Rationalist Foundations of Chalmers’ 2D Semantics”, Philosophical Studies, 118: 227–255. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Considering Empty Worlds as Actual”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83: 331–347. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Against A Priori Reductions”, Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 562–586. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Scrutability and Epistemic Updating: Comments on Chalmers’ Constructing the World”, Analysis, 74: 638–651. (Scholar)
Schroeter, L. and J. Bigelow, 2009, “Jackson’s Classical Model of Meaning”, in Mind, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, I. Ravenscroft (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 85–109. (Scholar)
Schroeter, L. and F. Schroeter, 2009, “A Third Way in Metaethics”, Noûs, 43: 1–30. (Scholar)
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–––, 2006a, “Reply to Critics of Reference and Description”, Central Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association: URL \(= \lt\)http://www-rcf.usc.edu/\({\sim}\)soames/replies/Rep_Chicago.pdf\(\gt\). (Scholar)
–––, 2006b, “Understanding Assertion”, in Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, J. Thomson and A. Byrne (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 222–250. (Scholar)
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–––, 1981, “Indexical Belief”, Synthese, 49: 129–151. Reprinted in Stalnaker (1999a), pp. 130–149. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, Inquiry, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Bradford. (Scholar)
–––, 1987, “Semantics for Belief”, Philosophical Topics, 15: 177–190. Reprinted in Stalnaker (1999a), pp. 117–129. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “Belief Attribution and Context”, in Contents of Thought, R. Grimm and D. Merrill (eds.), Tucson: University of Arizona Press, pp. 156–181. Reprinted in Stalnaker (1999a), pp. 150–166. (Scholar)
–––, 1999a, Context and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999b, “Introduction”, in Stalnaker (1999a), pp. 1–28. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “On Considering a Possible World as Actual”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. 75: 141–156. Reprinted in Stalnaker (2003), pp. 188–200. (Scholar)
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