Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Incommensurable Values" by Nien-hê Hsieh and Henrik Andersson

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Adler, M., 1998, “Law and Incommensurability: Introduction,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 146: 1169–1184. (Scholar)
Anderson, E., 1993, Value in Ethics and Economics, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
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Andersson, H., 2015, “Propping Up the Collapsing Principle,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 18 (3): 475–486. (Scholar)
–––, 2016a, “Parity and Comparability, a Concern Regarding Chang’s Chaining Argument,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19 (1): 245–253. (Scholar)
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–––, 2017, How it all relates: Exploring the space of value comparisons, Ph.D. dissertation, Lund University. (Scholar)
Andersson, H., & Herlitz, A., 2018, “A More Plausible Collapsing Principle,” Theoria, 84 (4): 325–336. (Scholar)
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Bales, A., Cohen, D., & Handfield, T., 2014, “Decision Theory for Agents with Incomplete Preferences,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92 (3): 453–470. (Scholar)
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Broome, J., 1997, “Is Incommensurability Vagueness?” in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, R. Chang (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Incommensurable Values”, in Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin, R. Crisp and B. Hooker (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Burkert, W., 1972, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, translated by E. Minar, Jr., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Byron, M., (ed.), 2004, Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Carlson, E., 2004, “Broome’s Argument against Value Incomparability,” Utilitas, 16: 220–224. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Parity Demystified,” Theoria, 76 (2): 119–128. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 16 (3): 449–463. (Scholar)
Chan, D., 2010, “Reasoning Without Comparing,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (2): 153–164. (Scholar)
Chang, R. (ed.), 1997a, Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1997b, “Introduction”, in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, R. Chang (ed.), Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Against Constitutive Incommensurability or Buying and Selling Friends,” Philosophical Issues, 11: 33–60. (Scholar)
–––, 2002a, Making Comparisons Count, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2002b, “The Possibility of Parity,” Ethics, 112: 659–688. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Putting Together Morality and Well-Being,” in Practical Conflicts, P. Baumann and M. Betzler (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Parity, Interval Value, and Choice,” Ethics, 115: 331–350. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability?,” Philosophical Issues, 22 (1): 106–126. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid,” Philosophical Studies, 164 (1): 163–187. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Comparativism: The Ground of Rational Choice,” in Weighing Reasons, E. Lord and B. McGuire (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Constantinescu, C., 2012, “Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15 (1): 57–70. (Scholar)
Crisp, R. and B. Hooker, (eds.), 2000, Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
D’Agostino, F., 2003, Incommensurability and Commensuration: The Common Denominator, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. (Scholar)
De Sousa, R., 1974, “The Good and the True,” Mind, 83: 534–551. (Scholar)
Doody, R., 2019, “Parity, Prospects, and Predominance,” Philosophical Studies, 176 (4): 1077–1095. (Scholar)
Dos Santos, M. F., 2020, “Superhard Choices,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98 (2):248–265. (Scholar)
Ellis, S., 2008, “The Main Argument for Value Incommensurability (and Why It Fails),” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 46 (1): 27–43. (Scholar)
Elson, L., 2014a, “Heaps and Chains: Is the Chaining Argument for Parity a Sorites?,” Ethics, 124 (3): 557–571. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “Borderline Cases and the Collapsing Principle,” Utilitas, 26 (1): 51–60 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Incommensurability as Vagueness: A Burden-Shifting Argument,” Theoria, 83 (4): 341–363. (Scholar)
Espinoza, N., 2008, “The Small Improvement Argument,” Synthese, 165 (1): 127–139. (Scholar)
Feyerabend, P., 1978, Science in a Free Society, London: New Left Books. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, Philosophical Papers (Volume 1), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge, third edition, London: Verso. (Scholar)
Finnis, J., 1980, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Commensuration and Public Reason,” in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, R. Chang (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Gert, J., 2004, “Value and Parity,” Ethics, 114: 492–510. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Parity, Preference and Puzzlement,” Theoria, 81 (3): 249–271. (Scholar)
Griffin, J., 1986, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Importance, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “Mixing Values”, The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary), 65: 101–118. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Incommensurability: What’s the Problem?” in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, R. Chang (ed.), Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Replies”, in Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin, R. Crisp and B. Hooker (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Gustafsson, J., 2013, “Indeterminacy and the Small-Improvement Argument,” Utilitas, 25 (4): 433–445. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Does the Collapsing Principle Rule Out Borderline Cases?” Utilitas, 30 (4): 483–492. (Scholar)
Gustafsson, J. and Espinoza, N., 2010, “Conflicting Reasons in the Small-Improvement Argument,” Philosophical Quarterly, 60 (241): 754–763. (Scholar)
Halstead, J., 2015, “The Impotence of the Value Pump,” Utilitas, 27 (2): 195–216. (Scholar)
Hare, C., 2010, “Take the Sugar,” Analysis, 70 (2): 237–247. (Scholar)
Heath, T., 1921, A History of Greek Mathematics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Herlitz, A., 2019, “Nondeterminacy, two-step models, and justified choice,” Ethics, 129 (2): 284–308. (Scholar)
Hsieh, N., 2005, “Equality, Clumpiness, and Incomparability,” Utilitas, 17: 180–204. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Is Incomparability a Problem for Anyone?” Economics and Philosophy, 23: 65–80. (Scholar)
Kelly, C. 2008, “The Impossibility of Incommensurable Values,” Philosophical Studies, 137 (3): 369–382. (Scholar)
Klocksiem, J., 2010, “In Defense of the Trichotomy Thesis,” Acta Analytica, 25 (3): 317–327. (Scholar)
Kuhn, T., 1977, The Essential Tension, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, “Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability,” in PSA 198: Proceedings of the 1982 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, P. Asquith and T. Nickles (eds.), East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, third edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Levi, I., 1986, Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “The Second Worst in Practical Conflict,” in Practical Conflicts, P. Baumann and M. Betzler (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Luce, R. D., 1958,“ A probabilistic theory of utility,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 26 (2): 193–224.
Messerli, M., & Reuter, K., 2017, “Hard Cases of Comparison,” Philosophical Studies, 174 (9): 2227–2250. (Scholar)
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Millgram, E., 1997, “Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning,” in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, R. Chang (ed.), Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Moore, G.E., 1902, Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Nagel, T., 1979, “The Fragmentation of Value”, in Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Nussbaum, M., 2001, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, revised edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Parfit, D., 1987, Reasons and Persons, paperback edition with corrections, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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Pinkowski, D., 2013, “Practically Equal: An Analysis of the Practical Nature of Equality and Incomparability,” Acta Analytica, 28 (4): 457–470. (Scholar)
Qizilbash, M., 2012, “Incommensurability or Vagueness? A Comment on Rabinowicz and Sugden”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 112 (3): 333–338. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Incommensurability and Vagueness: Is the Vagueness View Defensible?, ” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 17 (1): 141–153. (Scholar)
Rabinowicz, W., 2009, “Incommensurability and Vagueness,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 83 (1): 71–94. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Value Relations,” Theoria, 74 (1): 18–49. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Value Relations Revisited,” Economics and Philosophy, 28 (2): 133–164. (Scholar)
–––, 2021a, “Can Parfit′s Appeal to Incommensurabilities in Value Block the Continuum Argument for the Repugnant Conclusion?” in Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit, J. McMahan, T. Campbell, J. Goodrich, and K. Ramakrishnan (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2021b, “Incommensurability Meets Risk” in Value Incommensurability: Ethics, Risk, and Decision-Making, H. Andersson and A. Herlitz (eds.), Routledge. (Scholar)
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–––, 1997, “Abstract and Concrete Value: Plurality, Conflict, and Maximization,” in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, R. Chang (ed.), Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
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