Cited works

Note: Numbers in square brackets indicate to which of the above sections the following works are especially relevant.

• Almotahari, Mahrad and Hosein, Adam, 2015, “Is Anything Just Plain Good?”, Philosophical Studies, 172: 1485–1508. [3] (Scholar)
• Anderson, Elizabeth, 1993, Value in Ethics and Economics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. [2, 3, 4] (Scholar)
• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (several editions). [1]
• Ayer, A. J., 1946, Language, Truth, and Logic, second edition, London: Victor Gollancz. [3] (Scholar)
• Beardsley, Monroe C., 1965, “Intrinsic Value”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 26: 1–17. [3, 4] (Scholar)
• Bentham, Jeremy, 1789, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (several editions). [1] (Scholar)
• Berlin, Isaiah, 1969, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [1, 5] (Scholar)
• Blackburn, Simon, 1984, Spreading the Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [3] (Scholar)
• Blanshard, Brand, 1961, Reason and Goodness, London: Allen and Unwin. [2] (Scholar)
• Bodanszky, Eva and Conee, Earl, 1981, “Isolating Intrinsic Value”, Analysis, 41: 51–53. [2] (Scholar)
• Bradley, Ben, 1998, “Extrinsic Value”, Philosophical Studies, 91: 109–26. [6] (Scholar)
• –––, 2006, “Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 9: 111–30. [2] (Scholar)
• Brentano, Franz, 1969 (originally published in 1889), The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. [1, 2, 5] (Scholar)
• Broad, C. D., 1930, Five Types of Ethical Theory, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. [2, 5] (Scholar)
• –––, 1985 (originally presented as lectures in 1952–53), Ethics, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. [2, 5] (Scholar)
• Butchvarov, Panayot, 1989, Skepticism in Ethics, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. [1, 3, 4] (Scholar)
• Bykvist, Krister, 2009, “No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails”, Mind, 118: 1–30. [2] (Scholar)
• Carlson, Erik, 1997, “The Intrinsic Value of Non-Basic States of Affairs” Philosophical Studies, 85: 95–107. [5] (Scholar)
• Chang, Ruth, 1997, “Introduction”, in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Ruth Chang (ed.), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. [5] (Scholar)
• –––, 2002, “The Possibility of Parity”, Ethics, 112: 659–88. [5] (Scholar)
• Chisholm, Roderick, 1968–69, “The Defeat of Good and Evil”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 42: 21–38. [5] (Scholar)
• –––, 1972, “Objectives and Intrinsic Value”, in Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein, R. Haller (ed.), Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt. [4] (Scholar)
• –––, 1975, “The Intrinsic Value in Disjunctive States of Affairs”, Noûs, 9: 295–308. [4, 5] (Scholar)
• –––, 1978, “Intrinsic Value”, in Values and Morals, A. I. Goldman and J. Kim (ed.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel. [2, 4] (Scholar)
• –––, 1981, “Defining Intrinsic Value”, Analysis, 41: 99–100. [2, 4] (Scholar)
• –––, 1986, Brentano and Intrinsic Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [1, 2, 4, 5] (Scholar)
• Conee, Earl, 1982, “Instrumental Value without Intrinsic Value?”, Philosophia, 11: 345–59. [3, 6] (Scholar)
• Dancy, Jonathan, 2000, “The Particularist’s Progress”, in Moral Particularism, Brad Hooker and Margaret Little (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. [5] (Scholar)
• Dewey, John, 1922, Human Nature and Conduct, New York: H. Holt. [3] (Scholar)
• Epicurus, 1926, Letter to Menoeceus, in Epicurus: The Extant Remains, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [1] (Scholar)
• Ewing, A. C., 1948, The Definition of Good, New York: Macmillan. [2] (Scholar)
• Feldman, Fred, 1997, Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [1, 4, 5, 6] (Scholar)
• –––, 2000, “Basic Intrinsic Value”, Philosophical Studies, 99: 319–46. [4, 5] (Scholar)
• Foot, Philippa, 1985, “Utilitarianism and the Virtues”, Mind, 94: 196–209. [3] (Scholar)
• Frankena, William K., 1973, Ethics, second edition, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. [1, 6] (Scholar)
• Geach, Peter, 1956, “Good and Evil”, Analysis, 17: 33–42. [3] (Scholar)
• Gibbard, Allan, 1990, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. [3] (Scholar)
• Hägerström, Axel, 1953, Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals, Uppsala: Uppsala University Press. [3] (Scholar)
• Hare, Richard M., 1952, The Language of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [3] (Scholar)
• Harman, Gilbert, 1967, “Toward a Theory of Intrinsic Value”, Journal of Philosophy, 64: 792–804. [5] (Scholar)
• Hobbes, Thomas, 1651, Leviathan (several editions). [3] (Scholar)
• Hume, David, 1739, A Treatise of Human Nature (several editions). [3] (Scholar)
• Hurka, Thomas, 1998, “Two Kinds of Organic Unity”, Journal of Ethics, 2: 299–320. [5] (Scholar)
• Kagan, Shelly, 1998, “Rethinking Intrinsic Value”, Journal of Ethics, 2: 277–97. [3, 4] (Scholar)
• Kant, Immanuel, 1785, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (several editions). [2] (Scholar)
• –––, Lectures in Ethics (notes taken by some of Kant’s students in the latter half of the eighteenth century; several editions). [2]
• Korsgaard, Christine, 1983, “Two Distinctions in Goodness”, Philosophical Review, 92: 169–95. [3, 4] (Scholar)
• Lemos, Noah, 1994, Intrinsic Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [1, 2, 4, 5] (Scholar)
• –––, 1998, “Organic Unities”, Journal of Ethics, 2: 321–37. [5] (Scholar)
• Lewis, Clarence I., 1946, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, La Salle: Open Court. [2, 6] (Scholar)
• Mill, John Stuart, 1863, Utilitarianism (several editions) [1, 5] (Scholar)
• Moore, G. E., 1903, Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [1–6] (Scholar)
• –––, 1912, Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [1–6] (Scholar)
• –––, 1922, Philosophical Studies, New York: Harcourt, Brace. [2] (Scholar)
• Oldfield, Edward, 1977, “An Approach to a Theory of Intrinsic Value”, Philosophical Studies, 32: 233–49. [5] (Scholar)
• Olson, Jonas, 2006, “G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84: 525–34. [2] (Scholar)
• Parfit, Derek, 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press. [5] (Scholar)
• Plato, Philebus (several editions). [1]
• –––, Protagoras (several editions) [1]
• –––, Republic (several editions) [1]
• –––, Timaeus (several editions) [1]
• Quinn, Warren S., 1974, “Theories of Intrinsic Value”, American Philosophical Quarterly 11: 123–32. [5] (Scholar)
• Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni, 1999, “A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 100: 33–52. [3, 4] (Scholar)
• –––, 2003, “The Tropic of Value”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66: 389–403. [3, 4] (Scholar)
• –––, 2004, “The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value”, Ethics, 114: 391–423. [2] (Scholar)
• Rachels, Stuart, 1998, “Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Better Than”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76: 71–83. [5] (Scholar)
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni, 2002, “Instrumental Values—Strong and Weak”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 5: 23–43. [1, 3, 4, 6] (Scholar)
• Ross, W. D., 1930, The Right and the Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [1–6] (Scholar)
• –––, 1939, Foundations of Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [1–6] (Scholar)
• Scanlon, Thomas M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. [2] (Scholar)
• Sidgwick, Henry, 1907, The Methods of Ethics (seventh edition), London: Macmillan. [1] (Scholar)
• Stevenson, Charles L., 1944, Ethics and Language, New Haven: Yale University Press. [3] (Scholar)
• Temkin, Larry S., 1987, “Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16: 138–87. [5] (Scholar)
• –––, 1997, “A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 25: 175–210. [5] (Scholar)
• –––, 2012, Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [5] (Scholar)
• Thomson, Judith, 1997, “The Right and the Good”, Journal of Philosophy, 94: 273–98. [3] (Scholar)
• Tucker, Miles, 2016, “The Pen, The Dress, and the Coat: A Confusion in Goodness”, Philosophical Studies, 173: 1911–22. [4] (Scholar)
• –––, (forthcoming), “From an Axiological Standpoint”, Ratio. [4] (Scholar)
• Zimmerman, Michael J., 2001, The Nature of Intrinsic Value, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. [1–6] (Scholar)

Other works

• Allen, Julie, 2003, “G. E. Moore and the Principle of Organic Unity”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 37: 329–39. (Scholar)
• Alm, David, 2004, “Atomism about Value”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 312–31. (Scholar)
• Anderson, C. Anthony, 1997, “Chisholm and the Logic of Intrinsic Value”, in The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, L. E. Hahn (ed.), Chicago: Open Court. (Scholar)
• Aquinas, St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae (several editions).
• Åqvist, Lennart, 1968, “Chisholm-Sosa Logics of Intrinsic Betterness and Value”, Noûs, 2: 253–70. (Scholar)
• Arrhenius, Gustaf, 2000, “An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies”, Economics and Philosophy, 16: 247–66. (Scholar)
• –––, 2005, “Superiority in Value”, Philosophical Studies, 123: 97–114. (Scholar)
• Arrhenius, Gustaf, and Rabinowicz, Wlodek, 2005a, “Millian Superiorities”, Utilitas, 17: 127–46. (Scholar)
• –––, 2005b, “Value and Unacceptable Risk: Temkin’s Worries about Continuity Reconsidered”, Economics and Philosophy, 21: 177–97. (Scholar)
• Attfield, Robin, 1987, A Theory of Value and Obligation, New York: Croom Helm. (Scholar)
• –––, 1991, The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Athens: University of Georgia Press. (Scholar)
• Audi, Robert, 1997a, “Intrinsic Value and Moral Obligation”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 35: 135–54. (Scholar)
• –––, 1997b, Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1998, “The Axiology of Moral Experience”, Journal of Ethics, 2: 355–75. (Scholar)
• –––, 2003a, “Intrinsic Value and Reasons for Action”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 41: 30–56. (Scholar)
• –––, 2003b, “Intrinsic Value, Inherent Value, and Experience: A Reply to Stephen Barker”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 61: 323–27. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• Baldwin, Thomas, 2003, “The Indefinability of Good”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 37: 313–28. (Scholar)
• Barker, Stephen, 2003, “The Experiential Thesis: Audi on Intrinsic Value”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 41: 57–61. (Scholar)
• Baron, Marcia, 1986, “On Admirable Immorality”, Ethics, 96: 557–66. (Scholar)
• Baron, Marcia, et al., 1997, Three Methods of Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Baylis, Charles A., 1958, “Grading, Values, and Choice”, Mind, 67: 485–501. (Scholar)
• Beardsley, Elizabeth L., 1957, “Moral Worth and Moral Credit”, Philosophical Review, 66: 304–28. (Scholar)
• Benson, Paul, 1987, “Moral Worth”, Philosophical Studies, 51: 365–82. (Scholar)
• Bernstein, M., 2000, “Intrinsic Value”, Philosophical Studies, 102: 329–43. (Scholar)
• Binmore, Ken, and Voorhoeve, Alex, 2003, “Defending Transitivity Against Zeno’s Paradox”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31: 272–79. (Scholar)
• Bradley, Ben, 2001, “The Value of Endangered Species”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 35: 43–58. (Scholar)
• –––, 2002, “Is Intrinsic Value Conditional?”, Philosophical Studies, 107: 23–44. (Scholar)
• –––, 2007, “A Paradox for Some Theories of Welfare”, Philosophical Studies, 133: 45–53. (Scholar)
• Brady, Michael S., 2008, “Value and Fitting Emotions”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 42: 465–75. (Scholar)
• Brandt, Richard, 1959, Ethical Theory, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. (Scholar)
• –––, 1963, Value and Obligation, New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World. (Scholar)
• –––, 1979, A Theory of the Good and the Right, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Brännmark, Johan, 2001, “Good Lives: Parts and Wholes”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 38: 221–31. (Scholar)
• –––, 2008, “Excellence and Means: On the Limits of Buck-Passing”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 42: 301–315. (Scholar)
• –––, 2009, “Goodness, Values, Reasons”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12: 329–43. (Scholar)
• Broad, C. D., 1942, “Certain Features in Moore’s Ethical Doctrines”, in Schilpp, 1942. (Scholar)
• Broome, John, 1991, Weighing Goods, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• –––, 1999a, Ethics out of Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1999b, “Normative Requirements”, Ratio, 12: 398–419. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004, Weighing Lives, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Brülde, Bengt, 1998, The Human Good, Gothenburg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis. (Scholar)
• Brunero, John, 2010, “Consequentialism and the Wrong Kind of Reasons: A Reply to Lang”, Utilitas, 22: 351–59. (Scholar)
• Byrne, Thomas, 2016, “Might Anything Be Plain Good?”, Philosophical Studies, 173: 3335–3346. (Scholar)
• Callicott, J. Baird, 1986, “The Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species”, in Bryan Norton (ed.), The Preservation of Species, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• Card, Robert F., 2004, “Consequentialist Teleology and the Valuation of States of Affairs”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 7: 253–65. (Scholar)
• Carlson, Erik, 1995, Consequentialism Reconsidered, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
• –––, 1997, “A Note on Moore’s Organic Unities”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 31: 55–59. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001, “Organic Unities, Non-Trade-Off, and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value,” Journal of Ethics, 5: 335–60. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004, “Broome’s Argument against Value Incomparability”, Utilitas, 16: 220–24. (Scholar)
• –––, 2007, “Higher Values and Non-Archimedean Additivity”, Theoria, 73: 3–27. (Scholar)
• –––, 2010, “Parity Demystified”, Theoria, 76: 119–28. (Scholar)
• –––, 2013, “Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 16: 449–63. (Scholar)
• –––, forthcoming, “‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’”, Noûs. (Scholar)
• Carson, Thomas L., 2000, Value and the Good Life, South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
• Carter, Robert Edgar, 1968, “The Importance of Intrinsic Value”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 28: 567–77. (Scholar)
• –––, 1974, “Intrinsic Value and the Intrinsic Valuer”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 34: 504–14. (Scholar)
• Castañeda, Hector-Neri, 1969, “Ought, Value, and Utilitarianism”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 6: 257–75. (Scholar)
• Chang, Ruth (ed.), 1997, Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2002, Making Comparisons Count, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
• –––, 2005, “Parity, Interval Value, and Choice”, Ethics, 115: 331–50. (Scholar)
• Chappell, Timothy, 2001, “The Implications of Commensurability”, Philosophy, 76: 137–48. (Scholar)
• Cheney, Jim, 1992, “Intrinsic Value in Environmental Ethics: Beyond Subjectivism and Objectivism”, Monist, 75: 227–35. (Scholar)
• Chisholm, Roderick M., 1974, “Practical Reason and the Logic of Requirement”, in Practical Reason, Stephan Körner (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Chisholm, Roderick M. and Sosa, Ernest, 1966a, “Intrinsic Preferability and the Problem of Supererogation”, Synthese, 16: 321–31. (Scholar)
• –––, 1966b, “On the Logic of ‘Intrinsically Better’”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 3: 244–49. (Scholar)
• Constantinescu, Cristian, 2012, “Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15: 57–70. (Scholar)
• Crisp, Roger, 2005, “Value, Reasons and the Structure of Justification: How to Avoid Passing the Buck”, Analysis, 65: 80–85. (Scholar)
• –––, 2006, Reasons and the Good, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2008, “Goodness and Reasons: Accentuating the Negative”, Mind, 117: 257–65. (Scholar)
• –––, 2009, “Goodness and Reasons: A Response to Stratton-Lake”, Mind, 118: 1095–99. (Scholar)
• Dancy, Jonathan, 1993, Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• –––, 1999, “On the Logical and Moral Adequacy of Particularism”, Theoria, 65: 212–24. (Scholar)
• –––, 2000, “Should We Pass the Buck?”, in Anthony O’Hear (ed.), Philosophy, the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2003, “Are There Organic Unities?”, Ethics, 113: 629–50. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004, Ethics without Principles, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Danielsson, Sven, 1997, “Harman’s Equation and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value”, Uppsala Philosophical Studies, 46: 23–34. (Scholar)
• –––, 1998, “Harman’s Equation and Non-Basic Intrinsic Value”, Uppsala Philosophical Studies, 47: 11–19. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001, “The Supervenience of Intrinsic Value”, Uppsala Philosophical Studies, 50: 93–103. (Scholar)
• Danielsson, Sven and Olson, Jonas, 2007, “Brentano and the Buck-Passers”, Mind, 116: 511–22. (Scholar)
• D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel, 2000a, “Sentiment and Value”, Ethics, 110: 722–48. (Scholar)
• –––, 2000b, “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 65–90. (Scholar)
• Darwall, Stephen, 1977, “Two Kinds of Respect”, Ethics, 88: 36–49. (Scholar)
• –––, 2003, “Moore, Normativity, and Intrinsic Value”, Ethics, 113: 468–89. (Scholar)
• Davison, Scott A., 2012, On the Intrinsic Value of Everything, New York: Continuum. (Scholar)
• Delon, Nicolas, 2014, “Moral Status, Final Value, and Extrinsic Properties”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 114: 371–79. (Scholar)
• DePaul, Michael R., 2002, “A Half Dozen Puzzles regarding Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 629–35. (Scholar)
• Dewey, John, 1939, Theory of Valuation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
• Dorsey, Dale, 2012a, “Can Instrumental Value Be Intrinsic?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93: 137–57. (Scholar)
• –––, 2012b, “Intrinsic Value and the Supervenience Principle”, Philosophical Studies, 157: 267–85. (Scholar)
• Dreier, Jamie, 2003, “Gibbard and Moore”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. 41: 158–64. (Scholar)
• Ducasse, C. J., 1968, “Intrinsic Value”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 28: 410–12. (Scholar)
• Duncan-Jones, Austin, 1958, “Intrinsic Value: Some Comments on the Work of G. E. Moore”, Philosophy, 33: 240–73. (Scholar)
• –––, 1966, “Good Things and Good Thieves”, Analysis, 26: 113–18. (Scholar)
• Edwards, Rem B., 1979, Pleasures and Pains, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
• Egonsson, Dan, 1998, Dimensions of Dignity, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
• Elliot, Robert, 1992, “Intrinsic Value, Environmental Obligation and Naturalness”, Monist, 75: 138–60. (Scholar)
• Ewing, A. C., 1973, Value and Reality, London: George Allen and Unwin. (Scholar)
• Feit, Neil, 2001, “The Structure of Higher Goods”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 39: 47–57. (Scholar)
• Feldman, Fred, 1986, Doing the Best We Can, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
• –––, 1992, Confrontations with the Reaper, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1998, “Hyperventilating about Intrinsic Value”, Journal of Ethics, 2: 339–54. (Scholar)
• –––, 2002a, “The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 604–28. (Scholar)
• –––, 2002b, “Comments on Two of DePaul’s Puzzles”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 636–39. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004, Pleasure and the Good Life, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2010, What Is This Thing Called Happiness?, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Findlay, J. N., 1963a, Language, Mind, and Value, London: Allen and Unwin. (Scholar)
• –––, 1963b, Meinong’s Theory of Objects and Values, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1968, Values and Intentions, London: Allen and Unwin. (Scholar)
• Finnis, John, 1983, Fundamentals of Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Flanagan, Owen, 1986, “Admirable Immorality and Admirable Imperfection”, Journal of Philosophy, 83: 41–60. (Scholar)
• Fletcher, Guy, 2008, “Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value”, Social Theory and Practice, 34: 517–32. (Scholar)
• Foot, Philippa, 1961, “Goodness and Choice”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 35: 45–60. (Scholar)
• –––, 1978, Virtues and Vices, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
• Frankfurt, Harry G., 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Freeman, James B., 1973, “Fairness and the Value of Disjunctive Actions”, Philosophical Studies, 24: 105–11. (Scholar)
• Fried, Charles, 1970, An Anatomy of Values, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Frondizi, Risieri, 1963, What Is Value?, La Salle: Open Court. (Scholar)
• Garcia, J. L. A., 1987, “Goods and Evils”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 47: 385–412. (Scholar)
• Gardiner, P. L., 1964, “Pain and Evil”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 38: 107–24. (Scholar)
• Gaus, Gerald F., 1990, Value and Justification, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Geach, Peter, 1977, The Virtues, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Gert, Joshua, 2004, “Value and Parity”, Ethics, 114: 492–520. (Scholar)
• Gibbard, Allan, 2003, “Normative Properties”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. 41: 141–57. (Scholar)
• Goldstein, Irwin, 1989, “Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional, Intrinsic Values”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50: 255–76. (Scholar)
• –––, 1996, “Pain’s Intrinsic Badness and Ethical Anti-Realism”, in The Problematic Reality of Values, Jan Bransen and Marc Slors (ed.), Assen: Van Gorcum. (Scholar)
• –––, 2002, “The Good’s Magnetism and Ethical Realism”, Philosophical Studies, 108: 1–14. (Scholar)
• –––, 2003, “Malicious Pleasure Evaluated: Is Pleasure an Unconditional Good?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 84: 24–31. (Scholar)
• Gregory, Alex, 2014, “A Very Good Reason to Reject the Buck-Passing Account”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92: 287–303. (Scholar)
• Grice, Paul, 1991, The Conception of Value, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Griffin, James, 1986, Well-Being, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1997, “Incommensurability: What’s the Problem?”, in Chang, 1997. (Scholar)
• Gustafsson, Johan E., 2013, “Value-Preference Symmetry and Fitting-Attitude Accounts of Value Relations”, Philosophical Quarterly, 63: 476–91. (Scholar)
• –––, 2014, “Neither ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’ nor ‘Better’ in Terms of ‘Good’”, Noûs, 48: 466–73. (Scholar)
• Haines, William A., 2010, “Hedonism and the Variety of Goodness”, Utilitas, 22: 148–70. (Scholar)
• Haji, Ishtiyaque, 2009, Freedom and Value, Dordrecht: Springer. (Scholar)
• –––, 2012, Reason’s Debt to Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Hall, Everett, 1952, What Is Value?, New York: Humanities Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1961, Our Knowledge of Fact and Value, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. (Scholar)
• Handfield, Toby, 2014, “Rational Choice and the Transitivity of Betterness”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89: 584–604. (Scholar)
• –––, 2016, “Essentially Comparative Value Does Not Threaten Transitivity”, Thought, 5: 3–12. (Scholar)
• Hansson, Bengt, 1968a, “Fundamental Axioms for Preference Relations”, Synthese, 18: 423–42. (Scholar)
• –––, 1968b, “Choice Structures and Preference Relations”, Synthese, 18: 443–58. (Scholar)
• Hansson, Sven Ove, 1998, Structures of Value, Lund: Lund Philosophy Reports. (Scholar)
• Hare, R. M., 1964, “Pain and Evil”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 38: 91–106. (Scholar)
• Hargrove, Eugene C., 1992, “Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value”, Monist, 75: 183–207. (Scholar)
• Harman, Gilbert, 2000, Explaining Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Harman, Gilbert, and Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 1996, Moral Realism and Moral Objectivity, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Harris, George W., 2001, “Value Vagueness, Zones of Incomparability, and Tragedy”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 38: 155–76. (Scholar)
• Hartmann, Nicolai, 1932, Ethics, London: George Allen and Unwin. (Scholar)
• Haybron, Daniel M., 1999, “Evil Characters”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 36: 137–48. (Scholar)
• Heathwood, Chris, 2008, “Fitting Attitudes and Welfare”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 3: 47–73. (Scholar)
• Henson, Richard G., 1979, “What Kant Might Have Said: Moral Worth and the Overdetermination of Dutiful Action”, Philosophical Review, 88: 304–28. (Scholar)
• Herman, Barbara, 1981, “On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty”, Philosophical Review, 90: 359–82. (Scholar)
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