Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Value Pluralism" by Elinor Mason
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Anderson, E., 1993, Value in Ethics and Economics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods”, in Chang 1997. (Scholar)
- Andreou, C., 2005, “Incommensurable Alternatives and Rational Choice”, Ratio, 18: 249-261. (Scholar)
- Bales, R. E., 1971, “Act-utilitarianism: account of right-making characteristics or decision-making procedures?”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 8: 257-65. (Scholar)
- Becker, L., 1992, “Places for Pluralism”, Ethics, 102: 707-719. (Scholar)
- Berlin, I., 1969, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, New York: Random House. (Scholar)
- Bradley, B., 2009, Well-Being and Death, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Chang, R., 2004, “Putting Together Morality and Well-Being”, in Practical Conflicts, P. Baumann and M. Betzler (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “Value Pluralism”, in James Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Volume 25), 2nd edition, Elsevier, pp. 21-26. (Scholar)
- Chang, R. (ed.), 1997, Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Chappell, T., 1998, Understanding Human Goods, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. (Scholar)
- Crowder, G., 2002, Liberalism and value pluralism, Continuum: London. (Scholar)
- Ellis, S., 2008, “The Main Argument for Value Incommensurability (and Why it Fails)”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 46: 27-43. (Scholar)
- Feldman, F., 2004, Pleasure and the Good Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Finnis, J., 1980, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Fletcher, G., 2013, “A Fresh Start for an Objective List Theory of Well-Being”, Utilitas, 25(2): 206–220. (Scholar)
- Galston, W., 2002, Liberal Pluralism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Geach, P., 1956, “Good and Evil”, Analysis, 17: 33-42. (Scholar)
- Gill, M. and Nichols, S., 2008, “Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics”, Philosophical Issues, 18: 143-163. (Scholar)
- Gowans, C. (ed.), 1987, Moral Dilemmas Oxford, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Griffin, J., 1986, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Incommensurability: What’s the Problem?”, in Chang 1997. (Scholar)
- Harman, G., and Thomson, J.J., 1996, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell (Scholar)
- Heathwood, C., 2015, “Monism and Pluralism about Value”, in Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Value Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 136-157. (Scholar)
- Hsieh, N., 2005, “Equality, Clumpiness and Incomparability”, Utilitas, 17: 180-204. (Scholar)
- Hurka, T., 1996, “Monism, Pluralism and Rational Regret”, Ethics, 106: 555-575. (Scholar)
- Hill, T., 1992, “Kantian Pluralism”, Ethics, 102: 743-762. (Scholar)
- Kagan, S., 2014, “An Introduction to Ill-Being”, Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (Volume 4), Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kant, I., 1948, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, H.J. Paton (tr. and ed.), London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Kekes, J., 1993, The Morality of Pluralism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Kelly, C., 2008, “The Impossibility of Incommensurable Values”, Philosophical Studies, 137: 369-382. (Scholar)
- Klocksiem, J., “Moorean Pluralism as a Solution to the Incommensurability Problem”, Philosophical Studies online, 153(3): 335-49. (Scholar)
- Larmore, C., 1987, Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Lemos, N., 1993, “Higher Goods and the Myth of Tithonus”, The Journal of Philosophy, 93: 482-96. (Scholar)
- Lin, E., (2014) “Pluralism about Well-Being”, Philosophical Perspectives, 28(1): 127–154. (Scholar)
- McDowell, J., 1979, “Virtue and Reason”, The Monist, 62: 331-350. (Scholar)
- Mill, J.S., 2002, Utilitarianism in The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill, J. B. Schneewind & Dale E. Miller (eds.), New York: Random House. (Scholar)
- Millgram, E., 1997, “Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning”, in Chang 1997. (Scholar)
- Moore, G.E., 1903, Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T., 1979, “The Fragmentation of Value” in Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Nussbaum, M., 1986, The Fragility of Goodness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Parfit, D., 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Railton, P., 1992, “Pluralism, Determinacy and Dilemma”, Ethics, 102: 720-742. (Scholar)
- Raz, J., 1986, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Raz, J., 1997, “Incommensurability and Agency” in Chang 1997. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Richardson, H., 1994, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Ross, W.D., 1930, The Right and the Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Schaber, P., 1999, “Value Pluralism: Some Problems”, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 33: 71-78. (Scholar)
- Sen, A., 1980, “Plural Utility”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 81: 193–215. (Scholar)
- Skorupski, J., 1996, “Value Pluralism”, in D. Archard (ed.), Philosophy and Pluralism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 105-108. (Scholar)
- Seung, T.K., and Bonevac, D., 1992, “Plural Values and Indeterminate Rankings” Ethics, 102: 799-813. (Scholar)
- Sinnott-Armstrong, W., 1988, Moral Dilemmas, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Stocker, M., 1990, Plural and Conflicting Values, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Abstract and Concrete Value: Plurality, Conflict and Maximization”, in Chang 1997. (Scholar)
- Swanton, C., 1995, “Profiles of the Virtues”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 76: 47-72. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Taylor, C., 1982, “The Diversity of Goods” in Utilitarianism and Beyond, B. Williams and A. Sen (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Leading a Life”, in Chang 1997. (Scholar)
- Thomson, J.J., 1990, The Realm of Rights, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press). (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “The Right and the Good”, Journal of Philosophy, 94: 273-298. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, Goodness and Advice, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Tucker, M., 2016, “Two Kinds of Value Pluralism”, Utilitas, 28(3): 333-346. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, D., 1980, “Weakness of Will, Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, A.O. Rorty (ed.), Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Incommensurability: Four Proposals”, in Chang 1997. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, Needs, Values, Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Williams, B., 1973, “Ethical Consistency” in Problems of the Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Wolf, S., 1992 “Two Levels of Pluralism”, Ethics, 102: 785-798. (Scholar)